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 ABSTRACT 
 
There is a right to life Article in a number of international and regional human 
rights treaties which is not currently being employed to give the full potential effect 
to the right. There are issues arising beyond the horizons, particularly with regard 
to the identity of the rights-bearer, the human in the international law of human 
rights, that fail to be addressed by a restrictive interpretation. For instance, a failure 
to recognise the human represented by human genetic material and to record it the 
respect called for by an expanded notion of human dignity has implications for the 
future, when new humans  clones, hybrids, chimera  might enter the realm of 
created beings, with, it is argued here, a valid claim to respect for their human rights 
entitlements, including that their right to life shall be protected by law. 
In order to establish the potential scope of the right to life treaty provision, the texts 
are introduced and a case is made for the validity of a dynamic and evolving 
interpretation of the right, the living instrument approach, within the international 
legal framework established by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The 
human identity is then examined across a number of disciplines, as well as in law, in 
order to challenge an interpretation that places any requirements on the rights-bearer 
of personhood. The proposed solution is to argue for broader definitions, both of 
the human and of the life protected, than is currently the case, and for a greater 
realisation of what is at stake in human rights jurisprudence regarding the right, 
involving issues of the moral nature of the protecting law. A failure to realise and act 
upon the issues raised will allow intolerable injustice to be perpetrated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Human rights are much more than ideas. Human rights are not constrained by law. 
Human rights are both lived dreams and denied realities ....  
Robert McCorquodale
4
 
 
1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
There is a right to life provision in a number of treaties in human rights jurisprudence, 
but its meaning is far from clear and its interpretation may allow individual lives to be 
threatened, often mortally, in situations in which just and equitable law is available and 
should be used to protect them. In the spring of 2006, over sixty years after the ending of 
the Second World War with its concomitant Holocaust, there are some threats to human 
life which are as old as history, and others which are newer, or, being old, such as war, 
threaten more lives than they did in the past, by virtue of what is called advances in 
technology. Sixty years ago, when the human rights treaties began to be formulated, it 
was at least (reasonably) clear who was alive and who was dead; who was human and 
who was not; who was pregnant and who was not; who was ready for burial and who was 
                                                 
4 Introduction, p. xi, Human Rights (Ed.) (2003). 
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not.
5
 Future generations could not be affected by manipulation
6
 of their germline, and 
infertile people remained as non-biological parents. At that time, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
in his Four Freedoms speech, considered that:  
The fourth [freedom] is freedom from fear  which, translated into world terms, means a 
world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no 
nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor  
anywhere in the world.
7
  
At that time war was seen as the most likely destroyer of the human race, in part or in 
total. There are other threats now, undreamt of by Roosevelt, and it seems in keeping with 
the concept of human rights law as a living instrument to re-assess the right to life 
provision, present in a number of international and regional instruments, in the light of 
current technologies and other threats, and to ascertain its basic scope. That is, what is, or 
should be, meant by the Article known as the right to life; whose life is intended to be, 
or should be, protected, to what extent, and by what law? 
The intention of this thesis is to bring to the readers attention some of the issues which 
have arisen, or may foreseeably arise in the (possibly very near) future, with regard to the 
right to life provision in international and regional human rights treaties, and to begin to 
examine a prescription for addressing them that is both moral and just, and which 
satisfactorily expresses a States deontological obligation. A foundational value for the 
                                                 
5 Regarding recognition of death, a certainty of the past, and less certain now, see Friedman (1990), querying 
whether an anencephalic child, proposed as an organ donor, would be considered as yet ready for burial. See 
also Singer, infra n.33; and, for the assurance that was certain in the past, and is now lost, see In The Room by 
James Thomson (1834-1882): I know what is and what has been; / Not anything to me comes strange, / Who 
in so many years have seen / And lived through every kind of change. / I know when men are good or bad, 
/ When well or ill, he slowly said; / When sad or glad, when sane or mad, / And when they sleep alive or dead. 
6 Manipulation is a standard scientific term for work with genetic material, and does not carry any value-laden 
implications when used in this context. On a values debate regarding the implications of germline manipulation, 
see Habermas (2003). 
7 Address to Congress 06/01/1941, Chapter 36: Congressional Record, 1941, Vol.87, Pt.I 
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international law of human rights would help both to justify laws involvement in matters 
relating to procreation, birth and death,
8
 and to answer questions about abortion,
9
 
euthanasia,
10
 the death penalty,
11
 and other, wider themes, such as genocide,
12
 the right to 
life in armed conflict,
13
 the right to development including healthcare and education, the 
right to an uncontaminated environment.
14
 Beyond even these complex situations are 
more difficult ones still, including the possible breakdown of barriers between species, 
with a less certain concept of the human than has previously scientifically and 
philosophically prevailed, and the possibility of human material being created solely for 
the purpose of being engineered into other humans, or for other reasons than bringing a 
                                                 
8 See Dworkin (1993); and Chapter 4, following. 
9 See the website of the Alan Guttmacher Institute for specialist information and statistics on reproductive 
health generally, including abortion: www.agi-usa.org  (Accessed 29/12/2004). 
10 See, for a pro-euthanasia stance, Magnusson (2001 and 2002); Hope (2004). See for other views Amarasekara 
and Bagaric (2002); de Haan (2002); Scott Peck (1997). See generally Moreland and Geisler (1990). For moral 
arguments, arising from the UK jurisdiction decision in the Airedale NHS Trust v Bland case see Keown (1993, 
1997); Jennet (1993) (pro-euthanasia in cases of persistent vegetative state [PVS], a term which he coined); 
Gormally (1993); and citing Bland with approval, the views of Harris (e.g. 1999). 
11 Whilst the debate regarding the death penalty is of obvious relevance to any thesis considering the right to 
life, there is not scope here to give more than a cursory introduction to some of the issues. The major text is 
Schabas (2002) and reference should be made to that for any comprehensive analysis. See also Hood (2002). For 
current information, see the Amnesty International [AI] Death Penalty site, which gives updated country 
reports, statistics, and a list of the present status of ratification of international and regional treaties to abolish 
the death penalty. (The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty; 
the Protocol to the ACHR to Abolish the Death Penalty; Protocols 6 and 13 ECHR.) 
http://web.amnesty.org/rmp/dplibrary.nsf/index?openview (accessed 02/08/2002). 
12 There is not scope here for a broad-ranging discussion of the crime of genocide; the term was coined by 
Raphael Lemkin, who was also the instigator and the prime mover behind the Genocide Convention: Lemkin, 
(1944). See generally, Schabas, (2000); Stein, Genocide website, based at the University of the West of England, 
UK: http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/ (Accessed 24/04/2006). See also Gordon, (2002). For a geopolitical 
analysis of the role of the US in the twentieth centurys genocides, see Power (2002). For a juridical discussion 
of the nature of genocide, see the International Criminal Tribunal for Ruanda [ICTR] first conviction for 
genocide, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 02/09/1998 and Appeal, 01/06/2001; and Jørgensens analysis of the 
definition of genocide and of sentencing patterns in the former Yugoslavia in respect of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugosalvia [International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991], [ICTY], Keraterm Case, Prosecutor v. Duko Sikirika, Damir Doen, Dragan 
Kolundija, when compared with the reasoning of the differently constituted Court in respect of Prosecutor v. 
Radislav Krstiÿ. Jørgensen (2002). 
13 See Paust (2002). 
14 See, e.g. Shelton, infra n.853, and Atapattu and Fitzmaurice, supra n.63. 
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life into being. 
In laying claim to a right to life, and assessing whether it includes a right to have the 
necessary conditions of life protected, it is important to be able to determine the 
boundaries of life  to establish when the life protected by law begins and when it ends, 
and at what stages or in which circumstances its natural progression may be validly 
interfered with, either to create life or to terminate it, or to affect its viability. Steven 
Potter explains the problem: 
The word life has probably been around ever since mankind began using language. It is a 
word of fundamental importance to all of us, and seldom do we make it through an entire day 
without putting it to use. We do so, however, with only a sketchy and subjective idea of what life 
actually means. This is because, until recently, within the last century or so, it has been easy for 
people to distinguish between what they call living and what they call non-living. There has been 
no need to define life precisely; its meaning is intuitively understood.
15
  
Dependent upon the answers to the questions of life lies an understanding of what 
conditions are required to maintain life, and to whom the responsibility for the 
maintenance of those conditions devolves, and within what moral framework the answers 
should be constructed. 
1.1.1 THREATS TO THE HUMAN BEING: LOOKING BEYOND THE HORIZON 
It was mentioned, above, that there are new threats to the human, which may require the 
protection of the human rights bodies. The need to be open to as yet unforeseen situations 
is a matter of which the human rights bodies themselves are conscious, as shown in the 
discussions surrounding the future of the European Convention on Human Rights [ECHR] 
system:   
                                                 
15 Biomedical Engineer, Professor Steve M. Potter (1986). Quotation taken from the Introduction to a student 
work, which Professor Potter is still happy to endorse (personal e-mail, April 9, 2002). 
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The overriding concern with the present reform process is to ensure that the Convention 
system is in a position to cope with future problems, some of them by definition as yet 
unforeseen. It has to look not just to the horizon, but beyond it. This is particularly true since, 
even on an optimistic view, any new Protocol is unlikely to enter into force before two or three 
years.
16
 
This comment recognises two things. First, that there are present horizons drawing a line 
across our vision of the future; of the problems that societies may face, and human rights 
systems may have to deal with, possibly quite soon. Secondly, it indicates that 
responsiveness is important but it is slow. Human rights discourse, it is to be argued here, 
is demonstrably and defensibly a living instrument
17
 that has already worked to make a 
great deal of difference to many peoples lives, and ability to live, by a valid and dynamic 
interpretative theory. Yet it could do more, and failure to do more might help to permit 
injustice, in all sorts of situations, some known, some theoretically but not yet practically 
possible, some with vast potential for good, and some which may destroy the human race. 
One of the first things to be done is to establish what is to be understood by the life that is 
to be protected; whose life, when it begins, and when it ends, as a basis for an analysis of 
when the protection of the law begins and ends in relation to those parameters, currently, 
and whether improvements and advances can be suggested in the light of new 
understandings and new possibilities. 
1.1.2 LIFES BOUNDARY MOMENTS 
The article under examination in this thesis states that it is the right to life that is protected 
                                                 
16 Adapted from Response of the European Court of Human Rights to the CDDH (Steering Committee for 
Human Rights) Interim Activity Report: Response to the Drafting Group on the Reinforcement of the Human 
Rights Protection Mechanism (CDDHGDR). Prepared following the 46th Plenary Administrative Session 
on 02/02/2004, para.5.   
17 See infra, s.2.3.4.iii. 
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by law, and as it is human rights which are under discussion, the assumption is that that is 
human life.
18
 The protected life is the property of a living human;
19
 without life, there is 
a human corpse, not a human being.
20
 The protection of the article, whilst is is expressed 
as being of life, is intimately bound up with the human bearing that life. So the life 
protected is a human life, from the beginning of that human until its end  neither of 
which states of being is as straightforward as it may first appear. 
The issues are complex. Life is at its most fragile at boundary moments
21
  conception, 
birth, severe illness or trauma, death  but the determination of a legal bright line
22
 in 
what may in fact be more of an ongoing process than has been generally recognised in 
law, whilst necessary, is controversial and problematic. Advances in biotechnology are 
making it even more so, particularly in determining the living and the dead, and in 
deciding what is human at all; although it could be claimed that the determination of what 
is human was problematic in law even before the development of genetic technologies, 
with some legal systems not identifying the human being as a legal subject unless it was 
born alive  and that concept can be found in Roman Law.
23
  
Human rights bodies have continued in this tradition, and the preborn human has not been 
                                                 
18 Regarding possible rights of non-human life, see infra, n.513, and accompanying text; DeGrazia 92005). 
19 Regarding the issue of property rights in human beings, see Davies and Naffine (2001). 
20 See DeGrazia (2005), pp.54-56; and generally Roach (2004). 
21 Boundaries of life is a phrase used also by Williams, (1997, ch.3), although the expression is used less broadly 
in Williams work than is the case here where it is intended to denote not only the moment of birth and death, 
but also moments when life is more fragile or threatened, including conception, when under sentence of judicial 
execution, in time of war or famine, etc. 
22 Plomer (2002), at p.135. 
23 See Melville (1915), at p.83. In order that a child should be invested with personality and acquire the position 
of a legal person, the Roman Law required that a child should have beeen born alive; in other words, live 
birth was a pre-requisite [which] involved complete separation form the body of the mother, followed by 
breathing. This requirement has been translated in some modern instruments to involve a requirement of live 
birth for the recognition of the born child as a human being, not only as a legal person. See infra, n.593, n.600, 
and accompanying texts. 
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recognised as a human rights-bearer;
24
 although, intriguingly, future generations are 
beginning to find a place, recognised in case law as possible victims of rights violations.
25
 
And so there is a lacuna, in that those not yet conceived enjoy rights and the obligations of 
the State towards them, as do those surviving birth, whereas human genetic material 
which is actually in being, either manipulated in vitro
26
 or growing in utero, is not 
accorded any recognition. Or at least, not a consistent form of recognition; a pregnant 
woman convicted of a capital crime in countries where the death penalty persists will not 
be executed, for instance, suggesting some recognition of another human life, separate 
from the life of the condemned mother.
27
 
Jolly has written about the nursing care of those whose children have died before, during, 
or soon after birth, addressing grief for the death of those lost before life has been 
established.
28
 This is a helpful concept; there are bound to be situations where a 
balancing of lives to be protected may be required. Support for a position that calls for the 
protection of established lives as a priority before those not-yet-established ones can be 
drawn from Rawls, who wrote about our duties to future generations, but said that the 
                                                 
24 HRC, Queenan v Canada, infra, n.593 and accompanying text. 
25 HRC, E.H.P. v. Canada, para.8a: The question of standing of future generations was mentioned by the HRC 
as an expression of concern. 
26 External to the body, in an artificial environment. 
27 Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty are set out in Economic 
and Social Council [ECOSOC] Resolution 1984/50 of 25 May 1984; ECOSOC Resolution 1989/64 of 24 May 
1989 includes steps for the implementation of those safeguards. See also the quinquennial Report of the UN 
Secretary-General [SG] to the Commission on Human Rights [CHR] on capital punishment and implementation 
of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty, with its annual 
supplements, e.g.: Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: Status of the International Covenants on 
Human Rights. The question of the death penalty: Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/2006/83, 10 
February 2006. See also for general discussion, e.g. Amnesty International, The Death Penalty and Women 
under the Nigeria Penal Systems, 10 February 2004; Hood (2002); the Death Penalty Information Centre 
[DPIC], http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (accessed 28/04/2006). 
28 See Jolly (1987), p.1. On such grief, see Williams (2005). 
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burden on this generation does not need to be overly onerous.
29
 We do have to live 
somewhat in the service of the lives to come, as previous generations did, we hope, for us; 
but their interests do not prevail over our reasonable ones. This is not repudiating their 
interests; it is simply saying that in a balancing of interests, the established lifes 
interests will prevail. Our interests do mean, of course, for moral reasons  because it is 
good and right; and for communitarian utilitarian reasons  for the health of society  that 
we give large importance to the interests of those future generations. 
Regarding lifes boundaries, and the related concept of the living human, apart from the 
issues surrounding fertilisation and conception, and genetic matters,
30
 when does one stop 
being human, or at least having human life that is protected by law  when the brain is 
dead (if so, how much brain?
31
), or when cardio-respiratory function stops? The major 
                                                 
29 Rawls (1971, 1999 rev.ed.), infra, n.1028, and accompanying text. 
30 Such as so-called cloning, or, more accurately, somatic cell nuclear transfer. See generally Mattei (Ed.) (2002). 
See Plomer (2002) for analysis of the problems related to legislation in this area. See further infra, n.535 and 
accompanying text. 
31 See World Medical Association Declaration on Death, adopted by the 22nd World Medical Assembly Sydney, 
Australia, August 1968, and amended by the 35th World Medical Assembly Venice, Italy, October 1983; 
Harvard Protocol, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the Definition of Brain 
Death; the now widely-accepted USA 1980 Uniform Determination of Death Act [UDDA], of which the 
Uniform Law Commissioners [ULC] noted that The purpose of the UDDA is a minimum one. It recognizes 
cardiorespiratory and brain death in accordance with the criteria the medical profession universally accepts. The 
act does not authorize euthanasia or death with dignity, and does not enact any sort of living will. The current 
state of medical decision-making as it relates to death, termination of life, or other related issues remains 
unchanged. These issues are left to other law. The UDDA simply attempts to relieve one relatively small 
problem in law and medicine, before it becomes a larger one. 
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-udoda.asp (accessed28/04/2006). See 
particularly, for a clear discussion of the history of legislative determination of death, and the philosophical 
implications, DeGrazia (2005); on brain death as a social term, Hughes, (1996); on transplant, Machado, 
(1998); and on brain death in connection with PVS, Jennett and Plum (1972); Jennett (2002). D.A. Jones (1995), 
and Evans and Hill (1989) express the Catholic viewpoint, normally seen as one of the staunchest so-called pro-
life stances in the global ethic, asserting the preservation of life above most other considerations. See, e.g., 
Magisterium of the Catholic Church, Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Instruction on Respect for Human 
Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation: Replies to Certain Questions of the Day (Feb. 22, 1987), reprinted in 16 
Origins 697 (1987). Such a position is summarised in D.A. Jones, The UK definition of death, The Linacre 
Quarterly, (date not given, accessed 30/10/2005), http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/jon/jon_01death.html, in 
which the much wider questions of what actually constitutes death, and whether what is being acted upon in the 
context of brain-stem death as the determinator of freedom to harvest organs is the death of the person (as in 
the brain, mind, rationality aspects of the living body) and not the human being  a matter to be entered into in 
greater detail as this thesis progresses. 
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question here can be encapsulated in the notion of personhood; that is, a requirement of 
some kind or level of consciousness. For some commentators, the permanent ending of 
this attribute of the human personality is sufficient to assert that the human is dead, and 
therefore ready for burial or for giving the gift of life to others through donation of 
essential organs. Certain organ transplants are better performed from beating-heart 
donors, that is, people not yet certified as dead.
32
 Yet a woman in apparent whole-brain 
death will continue to support a pregnancy if respiratory, nutrition and other functions are 
assisted, demonstrating that hormonal levels are still being regulated.
33
 It is obviously 
necessary to make a much more careful assessment of what constitutes the human in the 
international law of human rights than has previously been the case. 
1.2 THE TREATIES UNDERSTANDING 
The law has to be able to make judgements regarding who is the protected subject, the 
rights-bearer, but it is difficult to find enlightenment in the treaties that offer protection of 
the right to life. For instance, the American Convention on Human Rights [ACHR] 
[r]ecognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived from ones being a national 
of a certain state, but are based upon the attributes of the human personality
34
 continues 
by clarifying that [f]or the purposes of this Convention, person means every human 
being.
35
 Further, [e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall 
be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No-one shall be 
                                                 
32 Such as heart, liver, and kidneys, in order to reduce to a minimum the duration of warm anoxic time 
undergone by the organs (time in the body without oxygen and before rapid cooling, during which cells will 
begin to die). See generally Machado (1998); Morris (Co-ordinator) (2002). 
33 See Singer (1995), Is the Sanctity of Life Ethic Terminally Ill? in Kuhse (Ed.) (2002), pp.246-261, at pp.250-
251. Originally published in Bioethics 9, no. 3-4 (1995), pp.307-343, and citations and discussion, supra n.31. 
34 Preamble, ACHR. 
35 Article 1.2, ACHR. 
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arbitrarily deprived of his life.
36
 There are a number of inadequacies in this statement, 
unlikely to be apparent at the time of its drafting,
37
 and it is the aim of this thesis to clarify 
the new challenges facing human rights discourse in its aspiration to offer protection to 
life, and where possible suggest some potential futures for that provision. But the 
questions go beyond defining human, person, and life; when those have been 
determined, it is still necessary to establish the extent of protection, to know what 
situations and risks are to be protected by law, and the scope of that protection and of that 
law; and further, to understand what the human rights bodies interpretation will be, or 
could be, or should be, of their own treaty provisions. 
1.3 A MORAL LAW FOR LIFE  
In order to reach a position where life is effectively protected by law, it is necessary to 
confirm the relationship between the substantive law which purports to protect life and the 
procedural devices which allow its articulation. For example, there is little point having a 
statute prohibiting murder on the statute books if no prosecutions are brought, or if there 
are a wide-ranging and apparently arbitrary class of exceptions to situations which are 
classed as culpable homicide, or if it is declared that no agent of the State may be 
prosecuted for any killing carried out whilst on duty.
38
 Further, it is necessary to define 
clearly the distinction between that which can and that which cannot be violated in 
respect to life; when can a moral case be made for protecting to the uttermost, or failing to 
protect, human life? Which conversations are operative in the debate about the value (and, 
                                                 
36 Article 4, ACHR. 
37 See discussions surrounding the drafting of UDHR, where Mr. Vanistendael, of the International Federation of 
Christian Trades Unions, suggested that the right to life provision should include the individuals acquisition of 
rights from the first moment of his physical development, a moment which could not at that time take place in 
vitro, or be frozen indefinitely. UN Doc E/CN.4/AC.2/SR/3, at p.7. 
38 See infra, n.781 and accompanying text. 
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therefore, the degree of protection) of life  the value of which lives, and the value to 
whom,
39
 including a possible monetary value?
40
 And what risks must be protected 
against, at what cost? 
Protection of life is a misunderstood phrase. Some arguments, and particularly in the 
context of abortion, or end-of-life interventions, understand protection to mean that life 
may never be lawfully taken; that it must be prolonged to the uttermost. Such an 
interpretation dismisses the possibility of sacrifice as an acceptable mode of dying,
41
 
except when that sacrifice is in the service of the State, in which case it might be exerted 
upon both the willing
42
 and the reluctant.
43
 This is in addition to the more obvious 
interpretation, that a humans life is never to be wilfully lost if there is anything that could 
be done to save it, whatever the cost in resources or suffering, or if, in the face of 
                                                 
39 On the value of the life of a severely malformed and stillborn child, to her family and to the wider 
community, see Williams (2005).  
40 See e.g. ACHR, Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia Reparations, 27/02/2002, para.62: With regard to violation of the right 
to life  since restitutio in integrum is not possible and in view of the nature of the right violated, the reparation is 
made, inter alia, pursuant to the practice of international jurisprudence through fair monetary compensation, to 
which should be added the positive measures taken by the State to ensure that there is no repetition of 
offending acts, such as those in this case. [Footnote omitted]. See also Hope (2004). 
41 See DAmato, [fictional] Opinion of Professor Tieu: the most immoral act that we could conceive of would 
be to take the life of a group. Conversely, one of the highest acts of morality is to save the life of a group [by 
personal sacrifice]. DAmato (1980), p.479 
42 I know that I shall meet my fate / Somewhere among the clouds above; / Those that I fight I do not hate / 
Those that I guard I do not love; / My country is Kiltartan Cross, / My countrymen Kiltarton's poor, / No 
likely end could bring them loss / Or leave them happier than before. / Nor law nor duty bade me fight, / Nor 
public men, nor cheering crowds, / A lonely impulse of delight / Drove to this tumult in the clouds; / I 
balanced all, brought all to mind, / The years to come seemed waste of breath, / A waste of breath the years 
behind / In balance with this life, this death. W.B. Yeats, An Irish Airman Foresees his Death (1919). 
43 Whilst people may be reluctant for many reasons to give their lives in the service of the State, including fear, 
the reason most likely to be heard in human rights discourse is that of conscientious objection. To be afraid is 
not enough; to be unafraid but have reasons of belief for not wishing to be involved in violence or to kill (rather 
than not wishing to be killed) is considered valid. On recognition of conscientious objection, see UN CHR, 
Fifty-eighth session: Item 11(g), Civil and Political Rights, Including the Question of Conscientious Objection to Military 
Service. See also Council of Europe: Exercise of the Right of Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Council of Europe 
Member States: Recommendation 1518 (2001), recalling Assembly Resolution 337 (1967), Recommendation 816 
(1977); and Recommendation No. R(87)8 of the Committee of Ministers. For background, see Doc.8809, Report 
by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights. 
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whatever provocation, life is threatened in defence of the self or other. 
Otherwise, life might only be protected within certain limits. However, what those limits 
might be, the reasons for them and their expression in national legal systems, must be a 
matter of careful thought and drafting; the consequences are death, and the death of a 
living being is a matter which might be contemplated for both acceptable moral reasons, 
and for amoral ones. Previous generations, and many contemporaneous generations 
around the world, had their own ways of dealing with circumstances which inspired fear, 
or loathing, or were regarded as having the potential to weaken the society, or to 
compromise its ability to survive: the answer was often death. In many cultures  
particular diseases and disabilities earned a social death definition before the physical death 
had occurred.
44
 One such cause was the perceived and fabricated potential to weaken the 
blood in the case of the demonized Other, the Jew in Nazi-occupied Europe.
45
 Law and 
medicine together provided the answer to the threat: Leading constitutional lawyers 
wrote text books underlining the importance of a scientific/legal approach to the 
protection of the Volk.
46
 That protection was achieved by, with, and through the law; 
determination of who was citizen or non-citizen, who would live and who would die, was 
according to who was seen as the Other.  
Whether such determinations are being made today, and if so how the international law of 
human rights is addressing the issues, will be considered in this thesis. The basis for 
assessment of the substantive law for its ability or otherwise to protect human rights and 
inherent human dignity, that is to recognise those circumstances where life ought to be 
                                                 
44 Hughes, (1996). 
45 Fraser, in Cheah, Fraser and Grbich (Eds.) (1996), pp. 63-79, at pp.65-66.  
46 Ibid, p.66. 
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absolutely protected, and to be able to discern situations where it may be both lawfully and 
morally brought to an end, or not protected, will be measured in this thesis by the yardstick 
presented by a leading German legal philosopher, Radbruch, and known as the Radbruch 
Formula.   
1.3.1  RADBRUCH AND THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 
The object and purpose of the human rights treaties can generally be found in their 
obligation to secure rights article; the requirement to respect, protect and fulfil the treaty 
rights and freedoms to those within the jurisdiction. It is to be argued here that this is a 
Radbruchian obligation, in that the key is adjudication of courses of action which could 
lead to intolerable injustice. Briefly, Gustav Radbruch asserted an argument that, for law 
to serve the interests of justice, it has to both possess the qualities of legal certainty and to 
reflect certain moral values. This is not the place to enter into the arguments in detail  see 
below for that debate  but the point must be made at an early stage, that the basis for 
human rights discourse is a moral one, and that in the context of the right to life in 
particular the interests of justice  both legal certainty and the avoidance of the betrayal of 
equality  are reflected in a requirement of a bias towards the protection of life
47
 in 
national legislation and in the outworking of the human rights jurisprudence itself, and 
that this bias demands a wider recognition of potential rights-bearers. It is intended here to 
draw principles from Radbruchs work to provide scaffolding for a discussion of the 
content and nature of law in national legal systems, particularly, in the context of this 
thesis, law which impacts upon life and the ability to live.  
                                                 
47 Quinot (2004). 
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In an era when human rights have been described as values for a godless age
48
 it is 
difficult to find a strong foundation for those values  Baxi has decried the lack of a 
social theory of human rights.
49
 If the rules are not those of a god  and in the 
international, cross-cultural jurisdiction of international human rights law, it is difficult to 
see how they can be the precepts of one religion or another  then they must have some 
other basis, or a basis which is fundamental to all understandings of the divine, and also to 
moral standards which reject a theistic basis.
50
 The concept of human dignity is the key; 
that which affronts human dignity must justify itself. 
It is helpful here to reiterate the uncertainty about what constitutes facts in respect of 
human life, and again to note that what constitutes facts, in this field particularly, is a very 
Western concept.
51
 It is, for instance, impossible to state that such-and-such a moment, a 
day or week, or number of cells, or a physical characteristic such as a beating heart, or 
supposed sentience (psychological or to pain)  the beginnings of a personality  
represent a transience into being-ness.
52
 It must be decided if human rights are only for 
the sentient, those described by Nino as moral persons,
53
 or if those who are human 
beings, but still only potential persons, (if such a distinction can be made) can have rights. 
The hypothesis is that human dignity can be recognised, and acted upon, where human 
                                                 
48 Klug (2000). 
49 Baxi (2002), at p.112. 
50 Wilson (1998); infra, n.695 and accompanying text. 
51 A noteworthy example of a non-Western way of approaching facts was given by the President of Nigeria, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, in an interview with the Sunday Times, 24 October 2004: In Africa we normally don't 
count the number of our children. It's superstition, really. When people ask you if you have one, you say: 
Many. If you have none you say: Many. And if you have many you say: Many. It is not that the facts are 
unknown, but that there is something more important, a belief system, to be acted upon. This is in contrast to a 
Western mindset, which prefers its beliefs to be supported by facts where possible; and if facts seem to 
contradict the beliefs, then it is the beliefs that are discarded, and not the facts.   
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2099-1311325,00.html. (Accessed 09/11/2004). 
52 See Martin (2000); see generally What is it to be Human? Conversations in Print, Institute of Ideas, (2001).  
53 Nino, (1991), p.34. 
 34
genetic material is found; which is not the same as granting rights to human DNA, as will 
be seen. 
As that which affronts human dignity almost inevitably causes suffering in one form or 
another, so Baxis proposition, I take it as axiomatic that the historic mission of 
contemporary human rights is to give voice to human suffering, to make it visible and to 
ameliorate it
54
 provides an answer to the search for a philosophic foundation for rights. It 
will be argued that avoiding unbearable injustice by rejecting preventable human 
suffering leading to avoidable deaths, together with recognition of human dignity, makes 
a sufficient raison dêtre for the discipline, and assessing the situations in which 
violations of rights are alleged by that determination provides a more defensible criterion 
for decisions than most others. 
1.3.2 A BIAS OR PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF LIFE 
This phrase, a bias or presumption in favour of life, formulated by Quinot in the context 
of a comparative analysis of the right to die in United States [US] and South African 
[SA] constitutional law, represents a probable culmination of a legal-philosophical 
question which will have to be answered[, which] is the extent to which the whole concept 
or system of human rights carries a bias towards life.55 Quinot suggests that [t]he South 
African Constitutional Court has hinted at something to this effect (in the context of the 
right to die debate) in stating that life is one of the core/most important rights/values in 
the 1996 Constitution.56 He sees the difficulty as one of decisions having to be made 
                                                 
54 Baxi (2002), p.103. 
55 Quinot (2004), at p.172, footnote 200. 
56 Ibid. 
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regarding freedom of choice contra the protection or promotion of life.57 Whilst this 
aspect (of exercise of freedom of choice) is, of course, of profound importance in the 
context of the euthanasia and abortion debates, it is less so with regard to what will be 
seen as other threats to life, where the life not protected was lost in ways other than at the 
persons choice; indeed, where there were readily available interventions that would have 
saved that life, and possibly many others. The role of international law in preventing 
violations, or perhaps in failing to do so, must be examined; are victims being given a 
voice, and are they being heard  or are they silenced by law as well as by circumstance? 
 
1.3.3 SILENCED VOICES 
It is of course the nature of the subject, the violation of the right to life, to mean eternal 
silence; failure to protect life means death. Yet we have to look beyond that silence, and 
beyond the horizons;
58
 there other means of silencing, with three  at least  silences at 
work in the context of the right to life in international law. Failure to give a voice, or to 
listen to a voice, equals a silencing, as referred to by Charlesworth, the possibly inevitable 
drawback in that all systems of knowledge depend on deeming certain issues as 
irrelevant or of little significance.
59
 Another is the silencing of those who are not 
privileged to be given a voice in the international legal order, except by being recognised 
as a victim (or otherwise having standing) and needing appropriate resources of 
knowledge, advice and finance, to be able to bring a challenge against States (or non-
                                                 
57 Ibid. 
58 See supra, n.16. 
59 Charlesworth (1998) p.381. 
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State actors) abuse of power.
60
 Failure to do so allows voices to be silenced, dying 
unheard before any tribunal that could have made a difference, and without a right of 
representation or redress, or the possibility that in the future others voices will have the 
opportunity to speak and to be heard.  
Some voices are not silenced, but are silent, unwilling or unable to participate in a 
discourse that denies them identity. For Kemshall, a definition of discourse implies 
relations of power,
61
 and the power relations implicit in human rights discourse may 
themselves serve to silence some voices. Many have been, and continue to be, silenced by 
a system that does not give a voice to the Other, whether that Other is of a different 
gender, or age, or race, or physical or mental ability. As Wright claims, in a discussion of 
the problems of understanding the history of international law: 
The voices of the silent are usually described as not being heard because of imbalances in 
economic and political power. On a deeper level they may also not be heard because the very 
nature of historical and legal discourse in the international arena makes their voices unintelligible 
within the malestream of time and history.
62
 
What must also be remembered, in the case of life-challenging violations, is that it is not 
only the violated person  the silenced one  who suffers. Bereavement is a grief most 
profoundly borne, but, again, it is not the only way in which a persons family, friends, 
neighbourhood, community and State are affected by the loss of a life (and, again they 
may be silenced by the lack of opportunity available to make a case). To clarify, the loss 
may be of a not-yet-established life; the degradation of the environment may affect the 
                                                 
60 See Lacey in Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women in Knop (Ed.) (2004) pp.13-55, at pp.20-21, 
where she describes a criticism of liberalisms emphasis upon the individual, which can obstruct the realisation 
of rights in those who are differently situated. Laceys argument can be read as meaning that the voices of 
women who do not, for instance, enjoy access to resources, or do not even wish to enjoy such access, are 
thereby silenced.  
61 Kemshall, (2002) at p.132. 
62 Wright (2002) pp.217-218. 
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ability of future generations, yet unconceived, to live a safe, and healthy, life.
63
 It may be 
that life cannot adequately be lived, because of lack of food, or work, or medicine. The 
manner of dying may be harmful to a population, in terms of its collective morality; for 
instance, by the carrying out of judicial execution,
64
 the South African Constitutional 
Court [SACC] in State v. Makwanyane and Another having noted the States 
responsibility to teach the value of life and dignity, and respect for them.
65
 Even after 
death, there may be a contingent moral and emotional disequilibrium, if the body is not 
treated in line with the rites that it is felt should be accorded.
66
 Punishment may be further 
inflicted on the body of a person, tortured and executed, to make a harsher point, even, for 
those who believe in it, denying bodily resurrection because the body has been 
dismembered.
67
 
There are also questions to be asked about the cultural relativity of international human 
rights law, which could raise issues of certain groups being silenced by, and within, the 
                                                 
63 See Shelton, infra notes 308 and 853, and Atapattu (2002), on the emerging right to a healthy environment; 
and Fitzmaurice (1999), on a childs right to such an environment. 
64 See, for instance, on the death penalty and its outworking in Texas, Dieter (1994); on the cruelty of the 
execution of the penalty, Denno (1994); on the possible alternatives, Bedau (1989-1990); on the participation of 
health professionals in lethal injection executions, LeGraw and Grodin (2002); on interventions by an outraged 
international society and the role of transnational public litigation in US death penalty cases, Babcock (2002); on 
a developing international understanding of the inappropriateness of the supreme penalty and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, see Schabas (2000). See Garland (1996), where he examines the 
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65 Para.222. For discussion see Garland, (1996). 
66 Supra, n.1053. 
67 See, e.g., Foucault, (1977 ed., tr. Alan Sheridan), Chapter 1.  
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law.
68
 In all cultures there may be matters which are, officially, outside the law, but on 
which the society, the society outside the law and the society within it, the people and the 
lawyers, agree to keep silent. Abortion and infanticide may be representative of such 
silences of law. LaFleur, writing on Japanese Buddhist attitudes to abortion, notes: 
Buddhist womens silence  or could it more accurately be called silencing?  again 
presents us with one of those cases where the absence of a voice may, in fact, say a great 
deal.
69
 The absence of certain voices in human rights discources is indeed saying a great 
deal. 
1.4 SOME SCENARIOS 
In order to appreciate the scope of the perceived problems with regard to the current 
working-out of the right to life Article, and the likely impact of the suggested solution, 
some scenarios will be referred to throughout this thesis. They are necessarily limited in 
the extent to which they may be described and discussed, but are chosen to represent some 
of the possible aspects of human life and its protection at law which are currently 
inchoate, and which may be helped by a new (or rather, more certain) reading of the 
Article, as it is found in major human rights treaties. These scenarios are chosen to 
represent four aspects of life: the human before birth; the creation of new humans; the 
creation of new beings who may or may not be human; and the 
misuse/misrepresentation of human DNA.
70
 
The first category is that of human life before birth, and whether a human being is indeed 
                                                 
68 For an introduction to some of the issues within the ideological conflict between universalism and cultural 
relativity, see Wright (2002) for issues of cultural relativity and gender; An Naŷim (2001) for an Arabic 
perspective on human rights; Englehart (2000) on the place of rights in the Asian Values debate.  
69 LaFleur (1995), p.9. 
70 Deoxyribonucleic acid. For further scientific information, see section 3.4.1.i, infra. 
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a human person enjoying rights before birth. Both abortion and the possibility of there 
being a crime of homicide of the preborn, as well as other issues surrounding the 
manipulation of human embryonic material, are issues related to the human status of the 
preborn. The argument here is that it is both counterintuitive and biologically wrong to 
dismiss the humanity of the unborn child of human parents, although legal abortion is 
both necessary and desirable on national statute books. The legal denial of the humanity 
of the preborn has been used as a semantic device to protect the possibility of legal 
abortion, but consequently an unborn child who is the victim of murder/manslaughter is 
not recognised as a victim and the perpetrator is not punished. This is, it is to be argued 
here, unbearable injustice. 
The second category is that of the creation of new humans. Such beings may be those 
known colloquially as clones, where the embryo has been created by somatic cell 
nuclear transfer rather than natural, in utero, identical twinning, which takes place when 
an embryo splits post-fertilisation and pre-implantation. It will be seen, below, that it has 
been suggested that clones are not humans but are activated eggs, a new kind of being 
never before seen. New kinds of beings, whether they are clones or others, are, it is 
argued, going to be seen, and it is necessary to be very clear in advance whether these 
new beings are human, and human rights-bearers. It is to be argued here that such beings, 
where human genetic material is present,
71
 should be included in human rights protection, 
specifically in the contest of this discussion, the protection of the right to life. Whilst 
banning cloning is favoured, the chances are that it will happen somewhere; the 
consequent creations must be accorded human rights-bearing status. 
                                                 
71 A point obviously in need of further debate and definition: see section 3.4.1.iii, infra. 
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Slightly more difficult is the third category suggested above, that of those creations which 
may be less obviously human, such as part-human hybrids or chimera. Cyborgs
72
 are a 
possible issue of the future, and the question will then be how much artificial replacement 
can be made to a human body for it to be no longer human, to no longer qualify as a human 
rights-bearer. Two prosthetic legs, two prosthetic arms  a heart, lungs, liver, kidneys; 
perhaps only a brain remaining, sustained entirely by machinery. Is this a human, any more 
or less than a non-sentient being who is in that form of coma (with associated apparent 
unresponsive wakefulness) known as a persistent vegetative state [PVS]
73
 and who is 
sustained entirely by the interventions of others? The situation of permanently
74
 
unconscious people, those described as being in PVS, is Steinbock alleges, different. She 
refers to the American Academy of Neurology amicus curiae brief in the American State 
case, Paul Brophy v. New England Sinai Hospital, Inc.:
 75 
No conscious experience of pain and suffering is possible without the integrated 
functioning of the brainstem and cerebral cortex. Pain and suffering are attributes of 
consciousness, and PVS patients like Brophy do not experience them. Noxious stimuli may 
activate peripherally located nerves, but only a brain with the capacity for consciousness can 
translate the neural activity into an experience. That part of Brophys brain is forever lost.76 
This viewpoint of PVS is not without its detractors;
77
 but more pertinent to the current 
                                                 
72 Part-human, part-machine (or construction); it could be claimed that a person with a pacemaker, or a cochlear 
implant, or an artificial hip, is a cyborg, and that the age of cyborgs is already here. Kevin Warwick has been 
successful with the first extra-sensory (ultrasonic) input for a human and with the first purely electronic 
communication experiment between the nervous systems of two humans. http://www.kevinwarwick.com/ 
(Accessed 16/12/2004). 
73 See Jennet and Plum, Persistent Vegetative State after Brain Damage; A Syndrome in Search of a Name, 
(1972): the criteria needed to establish that prediction [of irrecoverability] reliably have still to be confirmed. 
Until then persistent is safer than permanent or irreversible. 
74 As Steinbock (1992) acknowledges, some people in PVS have been restored to a degree of sentient life.  
75 1986, and in Steinbock, supra n.74, at p.27. 
76 Cited in Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight) Hastings 
Centre Report 18 (February/March 1988), p.31, and in Steinbock, supra n.74, at p.223, footnote 32. 
77 See supra, n.74. 
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discussion, are they human rights-bearers? 
The final category to be addressed is that of the misuse/misrepresentation of human DNA. 
Can new humans be grown from discarded DNA; is there a right to life of corpses? It 
is suggested here that the taking of DNA from a corpse to closely re-create that biological 
being (who will not be the same person, nor exactly the same biologically because of the 
impact of mitochondrial DNA) should be the subject of effective legal regulation, 
prohibiting the practice. Bound up in this debate is the status of personhood with respect 
to the human being, inhabiting the living human body. 
These four categories are not clear-cut and distinct, but are bound up in each other; 
whatever happens to new embryos, whether they are straightforwardly human or possibly 
something else, falls outside the remit of human rights if the preborn human, and therefore 
the human embryo, is not counted as a human rights-bearer, and so the abortion argument 
is of relevance, for instance. These matters will become clearer as this thesis progresses; 
for the present, the questions have been introduced. 
1.5 APPROACH 
1.5.1 ASPECTS OF PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP 
Whilst existing work on the subject of the right to life itself
78
 is limited, works covering 
the theories and practice of human rights generally contribute to the analysis of specific 
                                                 
78 See Ramcharan, (Ed.)(1985); Ramcharan (1983); Przetacznik (1976); and reviews of Ramcharan and 
contributors, Bedau, (August 1988) and van Aggelen, (July 1986); Orlin, The Right to Life / The Right to Die: 
The Rights, their Interrelationship and the Jurisprudential Problems in Orlin, Rosas and Scheinin (Eds.) (2000); 
Prémont and Montant, (Eds.) (1993). 
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rights, whilst other texts focus on a particular aspect of the right
79
 (such as capital 
punishment
80
 or the life of the unborn
81
).  The right to life is presented, in the main, with 
the civil and political rights. The general view of writers has been that such rights are 
negative obligations, requirements for States to refrain from action that violates the right 
concerned, the reasoning being that such requirements do not involve much in the way of 
expenditure;
82
 this view is losing force in the light of evolving understandings of human 
rights, their function and attendant obligations, and in the recognition of the positive 
obligations to be found attached to even the civil and political rights.
83
 The only major 
work on The Right to Life in International Law is that edited by Ramcharan in 1985,
84
 
which contributed to an expansion of the earlier accepted scope of the provision.
85
  
1.5.2 MATTERS INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED 
The issues involved in analysing a matter generally abbreviated to four short words  the 
right to life  but better paraphrased as the right to life shall be protected by law
86
 are 
formidable, the fields cross-disciplinary and the arguments circular. This thesis will, at an 
early stage, provide a general overview of the treaty provision found in, for instance, 
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR], Article 2 of 
the ECHR, Article 4 of the ACHR and Article 4 of the African Convention on Human and 
                                                 
79 Joyce (1961); See also St.John-Stevas (1963); Williams (1997); Prémont, Tom, and Mayenzet, (Eds.) (1998); 
Okechukwu (1990); Plowman (1942); Keen (1992). See also texts such as The Bossuyt Report: The Adverse 
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80 See supra, n.11. 
81 See Ibegbu (2000). 
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83 See Mowbray, (2004).  
84 Including Ramcharan, (1985) The Concept and Dimension of the Right to Life. 
85 See n.305, infra, and accompanying text. 
86 To be discussed further, below; but see, for instance, the Concurring Opinion of Sir Stephen Sedley in 
ECtHR, Keenan v. United Kingdom, 03/04/2001, para.2.  Article 2 contains not a general assertion of the right to 
life but a specific obligation of states signatories to protect that right by law. 
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Peoples Rights [ACHPR],
87
 the concept that is the right to life shall be protected by 
law. Excluded, as being beyond the scope of this thesis, will be discussion of the right in 
its wider context, that which has come to be known as a right to living and which was 
first presented in a major context in Ramcharans edited text of 1986, The Right to Life in 
International Law. 
 
1.5.3 METHODOLOGY 
It is not possible to see how any attempt to define life, or what it means to have life, or 
to be a human or a person or to have not achieved these states or to have lost them in 
some respect or another, can be addressed without canvassing a wider field of knowledge 
than that found within the confines of a single academic field, and so the approach to this 
thesis is cross-disciplinary.
88
 However, whilst philosophy, religion, biology, medicine, 
physics, psychology and history are amongst the disciplines called upon to some extent or 
another, the focus is that of international human rights law, and therefore the full available 
scope will be used to clarify positions within international law. Whilst the reader may be 
pointed to sources on relevant matters, much descriptive and analytical detail of other 
                                                 
87 For general texts, see e.g.:  Alston, (Ed.) (1996); Craven (1995); Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical 
Integrity, and Liberty in Henkin (Ed.) (1981); Dixon and McCorquodale (4th ed., 2003); Harris, OBoyle, and 
Warbrick (1995); McCorquodale, (Ed.) (2003); Newman and Weissbrodt, (2nd ed.,1996); Rehof in Alfredsson 
and Eide (1999), pp.89-101; Steiner and Alston (1996). 
88 Methodological note: it is incumbent upon me here to state some limitations of the research which follows. 
As a lawyer, and not trained in the study of philosophy, medicine, biology, anthropology, psychology, religion, 
economics and history  all of which receive some mention in this thesis  I have had to rely upon the 
scholarship of others in order to arrive at sufficient knowledge of a particular field. This I have done by 
consulting relevant literature including dictionaries, encyclopaedias, and commentaries, and making internet 
searches, initially, and where appropriate using these as pointers to original works. Current journals have been of 
particular help (such as the BMJ). Following this, I have checked the understandings at which I have arrived by 
interview with one or more people skilled in the field, (as noted throughout the text) and whilst I am grateful to 
these, and others, the final choice of sources, and the conclusions that I have drawn, remain mine. 
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disciplines knowledge base will not be entered into unless there is some particular point 
to be served by so doing, or unless there is particularly great controversy surrounding an 
important contribution. Additionally, there is not space to enter into a thoroughgoing 
analysis of some of the major themes even in law; readers will, again, be pointed to more 
authoritative references as appropriate.  
The task of this thesis is to establish and define in international law terms that there is a 
special spark, something that makes humans capable of acting with dignity, and worthy 
of being treated with respect for their inherent dignity, and that this immaterial aspect 
places an obligation upon States to recognise its presence in human life and to work to 
promote and sustain that life in wellbeing. 
To that end, the thesis will take the following form. Following this introductory first 
chapter, there are four substantive chapters of this thesis, and a Conclusion, drawing 
together the issues presented. The right to life article itself, as set out in international and 
regional treaties, will be considered in Chapter Two. Under examination will be aspects of 
the right gleaned from the texts  who the relevant right to life articles cover, how they 
have evolved over time, and how they should be interpreted, particularly in the light of 
human rights laws relationship to the general canon of public international law.  
This will lead into an examination of the subject matter of international human rights law, 
the human, in Chapter Three, and an analysis of inherent dignity, the quality which 
entitles that human to be singled out as a rights-bearer. Included in this, a case will be 
made for acknowledging the need to show respect for an extended notion of human 
dignity in dealings with human genetic material. A justification for this broad class will be 
made, and a definition suggested of what is meant by human genetic material in this 
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context. 
The treaty provisions are re-addressed, in Chapter Four, in order to establish whether the 
paraphrase briefly introduced in the first substantial chapter, that of the right to life being 
protected by law, is a valid conclusion to draw from the right to life provisions, which is 
then discussed more fully in the light of an interpretation based on the Radbruch 
formula. In this interpretation, the notion of unbearable injustice is assessed against a 
framework of preventable human suffering and recognition of inherent human dignity, 
as a standard for analysis of the substantive law.  
The work done in earlier chapters is then applied in Chapter Five to the offered definition 
of a rights-bearer, the human represented in the narrow sense by human genetic material, 
more generally by individual living humans, and in the broader sense by human 
populations at risk (including future generations). The issues briefly introduced in the first 
chapter will be examined in the light of the work done, particularly in the context of the 
work that could be accomplished by human rights discourses to protect the humans right 
to life from unbearable injustice, such as may be perpetrated by an interpretation that 
places any requirements on the rights-bearer of personhood. The proposed solution is to 
argue for broader definitions, both of the human and of the life protected, than is currently 
the case, and for a greater realisation of what is at stake in human rights jurisprudence 
regarding the right, involving issues of the moral nature of the protecting law at national 
level. 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
There is a right to life Article in a number of international and regional human rights 
treaties which is not currently being employed to give the full potential effect to the right. 
 46
There are issues arising beyond the horizons, particularly with regard to the identity of 
the rights-bearer, the human in the international law of human rights, that fail to be 
addressed by a restrictive interpretation of the right, and consequently may permit 
intolerable injustice to take place with impunity. For instance, a failure to recognise the 
human represented by human genetic material and to record it the respect called for by an 
expanded notion of human dignity has implications for the future, when new humans  
clones, hybrids, chimera  might enter the realm of created beings, with, it is argued here, 
a valid claim to respect for their human rights entitlements, including that their right to 
life shall be protected by law. 
The aim of this thesis is to promote a more effective interpretation of the right to life 
provision, by means of a dynamic and evolving interpretative theory which is both legally 
and morally valid in international law. This teleological approach, drawing on the living 
instrument analogy which has been widely accepted by the courts and tribunals in order 
to best promote the object and purpose for the human rights treaties, is necessary as the 
horizons of the future become the realities of today. Any failure to realise the impact of 
those technologies on the lives of humans will be to deny those realities for whole classes 
of beings who should, morally and in the pursuit of justice, have a claim to be classed as 
human rights-bearers. 
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TREATIES, INTERPRETATION, AND THE 
RIGHT TO LIFE  
 
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.  
The right enshrined in this article is the supreme right of the human being.  
Human Rights Committee, Baboeram-Adhin et al. v. Suriname
89
 
 
2.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The nature of human rights treaties, described by the ECtHR as [u]nlike international 
treaties of the classic kind,
90
 is more than an undertaking which establishes mere 
reciprocal engagements between Contracting States.91 What the nature of that 
undertaking is, and how they should be best interpreted (with particular reference, in this 
context, to their right to life provisions) is the subject of examination in this chapter. The 
aim is to secure a sound basis for an exploration of issues, currently at or beyond the 
horizon, which require addressing by human rights discourse, in order that the provision, 
the right to life shall be protected by law shall be given full effect. 
The ideal of the recognition and protection of human rights by the development of treaties 
                                                 
89 Baboeram-Adhin and Kamperveen et al. v. Suriname, Views, para.14(3), citing Article 6, ICCPR. 
90 ECtHR, Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), 23 March 1995, paras.7172. 
91 Ibid. 
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was facilitated by the establishment of the United Nations,
92
 and the work that was then 
undertaken to formulate a regime of international human rights protection
93
 served to 
establish the proposition that there was  and is  a justiciable concept of human rights, 
including a right to life. As Colon-Collazo
94
 points out, the first proclamation in the 
Western Hemisphere of every human beings inherent right to life was made in 1776, in 
the June 12 Declaration of Virginia
95
 and the July 4 United States Declaration of 
Independence,
96
 where it was manifested that every man had inalienable rights to life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 
The task of this chapter is to clearly articulate the right to life provision as it is now 
included in major international and regional treaties, establishing where the protection of 
life proposition can be found in law, and the appropriate method of interpretation. The 
world is now a very different place from that envisaged at the inception of the treaties, 
and ensuring that the object and purpose of the treaties is established and promoted will, it 
                                                 
92 Although it took some time; the Council of Europes [COE] ECHR was adopted in 1950, 16 years before the 
UNs ICCPR. For a record of the creation of human rights systems as an ideological response to war, see 
Simpson, (2001), Chapter 4. 
93 See, for instance, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-1948, Section G.1.a, p.572: At its fourth session, the 
Economic and Social Council established a procedure and a timetable for the formulation of an International 
Bill of Human Rights (resolution 46(IV)). See also Henkin (1981). Shue suggests the following list as 
including the necessary material for an International Bill of Rights: UN Charter, Preamble and Articles 1, 55, 
and 56; UDHR; ICESCR; ICCPR; ICCPR [First] Optional Protocol. Shue, (1980) Introduction, endnote 1, p.181. 
94 Colon-Collazo, A Legislative History of the Right to Life in the Inter-American Legal System, in Ramcharan 
(ed.)(1985) at p.33. 
95 George Mason, Author; adopted by the Virginia Constitutional Convention on June 12, 1776: Section 1:  
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when 
they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and 
obtaining happiness and safety. 
96 Thomas Jefferson, Author (June, 1776) In Congress, July 4, 1776. The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United 
States of America:   
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.  
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed,  . 
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will be argued, require a flexible interpretive theory, in order to meet the demands of 
issues and situations, such as the scenarios introduced earlier, which are currently beyond 
the horizon but which may not stay out of reach for long. 
This will then pave the way for an examination in the next chapter of the concept of the 
rights-bearer  who is the human who has their life protected by law? The fourth chapter 
will consider more deeply the nature of that protecting law, but for the present it is 
important to place human rights protection in its normative context, and to consider its 
claim to development as a living instrument, in order to consider the validity of a 
dynamic interpretation of the right to life provision in those treaties, meeting the need of 
looking beyond the horizons.  
2.2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN TREATIES AND OTHER 
INSTRUMENTS 
Under consideration throughout this thesis will be the United Nations Charter, and those 
universal human rights treaties, Conventions and Declarations that specifically refer to a 
right to life; those regional human rights treaties, and protocols thereto, that include a 
right to life, or intend the protection of life; certain documents that are not yet in force, or 
that are not legally binding at the international or regional level, but that contain 
formulations of the right to life; and some national Constitutions and Bills of Rights. 
Other examples of the many occasions when the right to life is mentioned, directly or 
obliquely, or its protection is intended, by an instrument in force or not, enforceable or 
not, aspirational or justiciable or not, include those international and regional instruments 
that prohibit criminal violations of life, although they may not specifically express it, or 
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may enjoy the status of declarations rather than treaties.
97
 For instance, the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Genocide Convention) whilst 
not specifically mentioning a right to life, has as its whole aim the protection of life by 
the criminalisation of mass violations of the right to life.
98
 Similarly, the COEs 
document, Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism, expresses a 
State obligation to take the measures needed to protect the fundamental rights of 
everyone within their jurisdiction against terrorist acts, especially the right to life.
99
 Even 
the unlikely-sounding Vienna Convention on Consular Relations [VCCR] has been used 
to good effect in death penalty cases: the recent decision of the ICJ in LaGrand, which 
represents a new phase of litigation over Article 36 [of the VCCR] violations, has already 
prevented one execution.
100
 These texts will be mentioned but not covered in detail. 
The aim, therefore, of this chapter is to analyse the right to life provision as found in the 
major international and regional texts, focusing upon its development from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], and the influence of that development in other 
texts, initially by looking at those specific right to life provisions. It is, however, not 
                                                 
97 E.g., Article 3(a) of the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women [DEVAW]. 
98 See the Preamble to the Genocide Convention. 
99 COE, H(2002)004, adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its 804th Meeting (11 July 2002), Article I. 
100 Babcock (2002), p.387. Babcock points out that post-Furman, the USA has executed seventeen foreign 
nationals from thirteen different countries (as of  09/01/2002) and that in virtually every case the USA had 
failed to notify the detainees of their rights to consular notification and assistance under article 36 of the 
VCCR. Babcock, (2002) at p.368, and referencing at footnote 5 the DPIC, Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty 
in the United States. As of 01/05/2006 this number had risen to 21 executed persons (and one death in custody): 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31anddid=582#executed. (Accessed 01/05/2006). See ICJ, 
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) 31/03/2004, para.21. See further United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: Plata v. Dretke and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional 
Division, 16/08/2004, regarding the (unfavourable) outcome of one of the appeals from Avena. On the role of 
transnational public litigation in US death penalty cases, including discussion on the workings of VCCR, see 
Babcock (2002); Deen-Racsmány (2002). The execution prevented was that of Gerardo Valdez; Karl and Walter 
La Grand, German nationals, were both executed (24 February and 3 March 1999, respectively, and despite the 
ICJs expression of provisional measures). Valdez death sentence was vacated, and substituted with life without 
parole, following Mexicos intervention on the grounds of Oklahomas violation of Article 36 VCCR. (AP, 23 
November 2003, and reported on DIPC, 1 January 2004). See Feria-Tinta (2001). On the ICJ and provisional 
measures, see Yoshiyuki Iwamoto (Lee) (2002). 
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assumed that they contain the entirety of what is needed to protect or nurture what Scott 
terms the full development of personhood,
101
 that which will be argued here as the right 
to live.
102
 The following discussion, in which the right to life provisions of a number of 
international and regional instruments will be introduced, represents the key expression of 
the treaty (and other) commitments of States which may have an impact on the right to 
life itself, and are the core aspects of the right to life in international law. 
2.2.1 THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN TREATY  SINE QUA NON 
The formulation of a formal, treaty-based right to life in the international arena has often 
been more eloquent in the aspiration than in the practice. As a treaty provision, an 
endowment of a right to life has a number of controversial elements, not least in terms of 
whether it is a sine qua non, as asserted by Colonel Hodgson of Australia during the 
debates surrounding the formulation of the UDHR: 
In his opinion certain rights listed  were quite obvious, and already guaranteed. That 
applied, for example, to the right to existence which was, so to speak, a sine qua non. It was a right 
which was already assured by the laws of all countries .103 
Without life there is nothing, and therefore no need to enact Bills of Rights, as no 
provision has any meaning for the dead. To make life expressly the subject of an Article 
was, it was argued, superfluous.
104
 In the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
                                                 
101 Scott (1999), at p.634, and citing Scott, (1989), at 786; although note that it will become clear that 
personhood is not argued here as a necessary attribute of a life that is to be protected. See Finnis (1980), notes 
on s.VII4, pp.194-195. 
102 Infra, s.2.3.4.iv. 
103 UDHR travaux préparatoires: UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.13, p.7, and discussed further in Schabas, (2002) at p.28. 
See also joined cases Edwards  et al. v. The Bahamas, 4 April 2001, para.109: The right to life is widely recognized 
as the supreme right of the human being, and the conditio sine qua non to the enjoyment of all other rights. 
104 See also the debate between Belgiums Lebeau and Frances Cassin on whether there needed to be a 
specifically right to life provision: Lebeau argued that the wording needed to be Everyone has the right to 
protection of his life. UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.53, pp.1-3. 
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[IACommHR] Baby Boy case, Monroy Cabra expressed the same principle somewhat 
differently when he stated that: 
Life is the primary right of every individual. It is the fundamental right and the condition 
for existence of all other rights. If existence is not recognized, there is no subject upon which to 
predicate the other rights. It is a right that antecedes other rights and exists by the mere fact of 
being, with no need for the state to recognize it as such.
105
  
Commissioner Monroy Cabra was relating the pre-existence of the right to the ability of a 
specific provision to give force to its protection. However, if one accepts its place in the 
treaties, as those who drafted them eventually did,
106
 the difficulties are only just 
beginning; what is the scope of this right and the other rights to be included? 
 i Formulation in UDHR 
The formulation of the right to life provision in international human rights treaties 
developed from that articulated in UDHR, Article 3: Everyone has the right to life, 
liberty and security of person. William Schabas has traced the arguments involved in the 
formulating of the right to life article in UDHR, noting that early suggestions were wider 
in scope than major world powers were prepared to envisage. At one stage in the drafting 
procedure for UDHR, the proposed rights were divided into three sections; the status of 
liberty, the status of equality, and the status of security. Life was the first title in the 
status of liberty,
107
 although in an earlier working paper, entitled survival, a right to life 
was not included.
108
 UDHRs travaux préparatoires
109
 reveal seeds of Cold War 
                                                 
105 Para.9. 
106 Although as Schabas, (2002) at p.11, footnote 70, points out, the idea had been mooted in international law 
as early as 1910, in an article by Rougier, La théorie de lintervention dhumanité. [1910] Revue général de droit 
international public 468, at pp.517-518. Rougier considered the question from the standpoint of humanitarian 
intervention, which he considered would be justified where a State violated the right to life of its subjects by 
wholesale massacres or even negligence in the provision of basic healthcare during an epidemic. 
107 UN Doc. E/CN.4/W.18. 
108 UN Doc. E/CN.4/W.4, p.12.  
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dissent,
110
 UK and USA disinclination to spend any more than they absolutely had to on 
anything that they did not absolutely have to, and a (largely) major-power/Latin American 
split on issues of morality.
111
 These included the humanity of the preborn,
112
 the 
humaneness of the death penalty,
113
 and the requirement to provide welfare rights to ones 
people.
114
 
Schabas shows that the debate regarding the scope of the right to life was vibrant during 
the drafting of the article in UDHR:  
Participants in the debate attempted to breathe meaning into the provision  for example 
by emphasizing an economic and social content for the right to life, or in other words the right 
to live, the right to a certain quality of life  in the end, prudence dictated a less precise 
statement, one which neither excluded the more radical approaches to the right to life nor 
                                                                                                                                                  
109 N.b.: The more common term travaux préparatoires will be used to include the situations where procès-verbaux 
might otherwise be employed with regard to non-treaty international instruments. 
110 UN Doc. A/C.3/R.105, p.2; Schabas describes the debates in the Third Committee of the General Assembly 
as being lengthy and heated  sometimes degenerat[ing] into the tense polemics which characterized the dawn 
of the Cold War. Schabas (2002), p.35, footnote 104 and accompanying text. See also UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/SR/35, pp.3-5. For comment on the birth of UDHR [as] nothing less than a political event, see Waltz 
(2001). 
111 UN Doc. See, for instance, the following suggestions, to amend UN Doc E/800: Everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and security of person. 
UN Doc A/C.3/220: Panama: Every human being has the right to exist and to maintain, develop, protect and 
defend his existence. 
UN Doc A/C.3/224: Cuba: Every human being has the right to life, liberty, and security and integrity of the 
person. 
UN Doc A/C.3/268: Uruguay: Everyone has the right to life, honour, liberty, and to legal, economic and social 
security. 
112 See generally Schabas, infra n.110. 
113 See the Draft Chilean Declaration, infra, n.131 and accompanying text; see also Ecuador: Draft Charter of 
International Rights and Duties, UN Doc E/CN.4/32: Article 1(1) Right to Life: There shall be no death penalty. 
Mutilation, flogging, and other tortures and degrading procedures are categorically forbidden, whether as 
penalties, corrective measures, or means of investigating offences. Everyone, including incurables, imbeciles and 
the insane, has the right to life from the moment of conception. Persons unable to support themselves by their 
own efforts have the right to sustenance and support, and the State has the corresponding duty of seeing to it 
that such support is made available. Schabas (2nd ed., 1997) notes that this text was the first to openly proclaim 
abolition of the death penalty. (p.32, footnote 72 and accompanying text.) 
114 E.g., UN Doc A/C.3/266: Mexico: Add, as a second paragraph, [to amend UN Doc E/800] the following: 
The right to maintenance, health, education and work, is considered essential in order to obtain an increase in 
the standard of living of the individual, as well as to secure the full existence of social justice and the full 
development of the human being. 
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endorsed them. In this way, it accurately served the purposes of the Declaration, which was to 
be a manifesto whose scope could evolve over time, and not a detailed statement riddled with 
awkward exceptions.115 
Regarding the sanctity of human life, issues surrounding the death penalty and abortion 
were of great import in the discussions, but were left out of the final reckoning. Schabas 
remarks that: [m]any delegates to the United Nations would have preferred some mention 
that the right to life began from conception, thereby protecting the foetus. On this point, 
too, compromise dictated silence.
116
  
Yet the aspirational nature of the UDHR was emphasised from the beginning. It was not 
intended to create law:
117
 [The Universal Declaration of Human Rights] is not a treaty; it 
is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or 
of legal obligation. It is a declaration of human rights and freedoms to serve as a common 
standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations.
118
 France and Belgium had been 
the only states to assert legal force intrinsic within the Declaration; the Belgian 
representative (M. Dehousse) proclaimed that [t]here will be, therefore, very great moral 
prestige and moral authority attaching to this Declaration. Therefore the man in the street 
claiming certain rights would not simply be an isolated voice crying in the wilderness; it 
will be a voice upheld by all the peoples of the world represented at this Assembly.
119
 
However, as Lauterpacht goes on to point out, it was a voice to which those who 
proclaimed it were as yet unwilling to give the dignity and force of an obligation binding 
                                                 
115 Supra, n.110, at p.41. 
116 Ibid., at p.25. 
117 See Lauterpacht, (1948) for discussion: Lauterpachts work in Britain is cited by Simpson as being the most 
significant contribution in the later years of the war towards an International Charter of Human Rights. 
Simpson (2001), p.205. See also Kunz (1949). 
118 Eleanor Roosevelt, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and Principal Representative of the 
United States on the Third Committee, 9 December 1948: Statement to the UN General Assembly. 
119 UN Doc. A/PV. 181, p.47, and quoted in Lauterpacht, supra, n.117, at p.355. 
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upon them in the sphere of law as well as that of conscience.
120
 Yet there is a case for 
claiming that after fifty years it has attained the status of customary international law,
121
 
and that it is standard-setting within international society; indeed, as will be shown, that 
UDHR expresses a legal obligation with regard to some rights, including the right to life. 
Its eventual formulation, whilst failing to reflect the potential richness of some of the 
suggestions, mentioned above, did not overemphasise a criminal justice flavour, as 
Eleanor Roosevelt remarked that the United Kingdom was trying to do in its proffered 
drafts,
122
 and in that sense, it is a stronger document for the protection of rights than it 
otherwise might have been. 
ii Global Regimes 
The eventual form of the international human rights protection did not reflect the original 
intention, which was that there should be a Declaration (not normative), an all-
encompassing Covenant expressing binding principles, and a Protocol of Implementation, 
translating the maxims of the Charter into binding norms of positive international law.123 
The outcome was, of course, three-fold, plus the Optional Protocols; but the form was far 
from the best of the visions which had initiated the process. Whilst the first part, the 
Declaration, went according to plan, the envisaged Covenant became two, the ICCPR and 
the ICESCR. 
                                                 
120 Lauterpacht, supra, n.117, at p.355. See Simpson e.g. pp.404-430, on the fight Eleanor Roosevelt  at odds 
with her own State officials  became involved in, regarding whether there should be a declaration or a binding 
Covenant, which at one stage had the USA in an unholy alliance with the Soviet bloc. Simpson (2001), at 
p.431. 
121 See Franck (1995), p.98: As a mere resolution, it did not claim binding force, yet it was passed with such 
overwhelming support, and such prestige has accrued to it in recent years, that it may be said to have become a 
customary rule of state obligation. See Schachter (1991) for critique.  
122 UN Doc. A/C3/SR.103. 
123 Kunz, (1949) at p. 322 
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Article 3 of the UDHR text, whilst providing a basis for the concept of a right to life 
article in ICCPR, evolved into something reflecting more of the criminal justice flavour 
challenged by Eleanor Roosevelt in the earlier instrument, for instance by including an 
acknowledgement of the reality of the death penalty in a number of states legal 
systems.
124
 The concepts of liberty and security were taken into a separate Article, and the 
right to life provision was expanded, in Article 6 of the ICCPR: 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of 
commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only 
be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court. 
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing 
in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from 
any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the 
sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death shall be available in all 
cases. 
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or prevent the abolition of capital 
punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant. 
It is interesting to note the United Kingdom draft of the right to life provision for ICCPR; 
it made additions, themselves expanded upon suggestions made by the United States, 
which referred to loss of life in consequence of deterring intrusion to, trespass on, or 
                                                 
124 Supra, n.122. 
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burglary from private property, arson, etc.,
125
 relating, and trying to restrict, the right to 
life to a context of defence of property and criminal justice. This anchors the right to life 
provision firmly to liberty and security of the person, as discussed above, and to the 
arbitrary deprivation of life, including by State use of lethal force. This may be considered 
as scene-setting, for the way that life, and the right to it, was to be interpreted.
126
  
The UN, in the formula of rights protection in Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, [CRC], made an assertion regarding the inherent right to life of the child: 
6. (1)   States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life. 
(2) States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development 
of the child. 
The right to life is also specifically recognised in Article 9 of the International Convention 
on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: 
The right to life of migrant workers and members of their families shall be protected by 
law. This is an example of the human rights bodies taking advantage of the occasion of a 
Convention which is designed to protect a particular group, whose members may 
experience discrimination in their enjoyment of rights, to emphasis the applicability of 
human rights to all groups, no matter from whence they come, nor what their constituents 
may be. The right to life of specific groups has also been emphasised in other texts, for 
instance in Article 6 of the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples: 
Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as 
                                                 
125 In relation to which, see SACC case, Minister of Safety and Security et al. (ex parte) in Re. The State v. 
Walters and Walters, 21 May 2002.  
126 Conversely, the Indian Supreme Court have taken the association of protection of the right to life with 
liberty and security of person (Article 21, Indian Constitution) to expand the scope of reference of the Article; 
see further Deshta and Deshta (2002). 
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distinct peoples and to full guarantees against genocide or any other act of violence, including the 
removal of indigenous children from their families and communities under any pretext. 
In addition, they have the individual rights to life, physical and mental integrity, liberty and 
security of person. 
Article II of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid recognizes a number of possible violations of the right to life, 
including straightforward denial, and murder, genocide, lack of basic living essentials, 
and discrimination. The Convention relates the definition of apartheid to the denial of the 
right to life:  
For the purpose of the present Convention, the term the crime of apartheid, which shall 
include similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in 
southern Africa, shall apply to the following inhuman acts committed for the purpose of 
establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial 
group of persons and systematically oppressing them:  
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and 
liberty of person:  
 
(b) Deliberate imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to 
cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part;  
These latter texts, in their recognition of, and emphasis upon the right to rights of groups 
who may be seen as being the Other, show the trend of human rights thinking in a manner 
which is of importance in the context of the current discussion. If human rights can 
declare the maleficence inherent in establishing and maintaining domination by one 
racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically 
oppressing them, then, it might be argued, a similar case can be made against one 
genetic group (so to speak) acting in a similar fashion towards another genetic group; 
perhaps in establishing a colony of so-called clones in order to create organs for 
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transplant, a theme which may not be so far-fetched as it sounds at present.
127
 This 
argument will be taken up below. 
iii Regional regimes 
a. Europe 
Some of the criminal justice issues in the UK proposed draft for UDHR, which had led 
at one stage to the Drafting Committee considering enforcement procedures under the 
Declaration, resurface in the Council of Europe arena where the UKs influence was more 
overriding
128
 than it was within that particular debate in the United Nations. This can be 
seen in Article 2 of the ECHR: 
1. Everyones right to life shall be protected by law. No-one shall be deprived of his life 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime 
for which this penalty is provided by law. 
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article 
when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained; 
c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection 
Discernible within the wording of ECHR are the concerns of the UK, reflected in Article 
2(2). The UK had sought to place an emphasis upon provisions described as negative 
obligations, ie. those that avoided (apparently) imposing too great a burden upon 
governments; this was the same approach as had been taken to the global regime by both 
the UK and USA, ultimately, although there were earlier proposals for a broader, more 
                                                 
127 Although this projected scenario has been the theme of at least two films: The Island, (Warner Bros and 
DreamWorks, 2005), allegedly itself cloned from The Clonus Horror (Clonus Associates, 1978). J. Schossler, 
Filmmakers Fail to Beach The Island, (08/11/2005). 
128 See Simpson, (2001); Lester, (1984 and 1998); Marston, (1993); and Wicks, (2000). Wicks comments that [a]s 
with most other rights, the final right to life in Article 2 ECHR is firmly based upon the United Kingdoms 
draft. (p.439). 
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liberal regime, rather than that known as minimalist, which saw the inclusion of social 
and economic rights as positively harmful.
129
 
It should be noted that Protocol No.6 of the ECHR was the first international instrument 
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, although it was limited in its application.
130
 In 
2003, with the entry into force of Protocol No.13, there is now an obligation on State 
parties to abolish the death penalty in all circumstances, including in time of war. This 
Protocol noted, in the Preamble, that everyones right to life is a basic value in a 
democratic society and that the abolition of the death penalty is essential for the protection 
of this right and for the full recognition of the inherent dignity of all human beings.  
b.  The Americas 
One of the rejected early drafts of UDHR, promoted by Chile,
131
 was based on 
discussions being undertaken contemporaneously for the 1948 American Declaration on 
the Rights and Duties of Man [ADRDM]. Article 1 of ADRDM finally settled on: Every 
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person.
132
 Chiles draft 
had the following right to life provision,
133
 including the first specific mention of the 
issue of capital punishment in international human rights law:
134
 
                                                 
129 Warren Seavey, quoted in Simpson (2001) at p.198. Simpson cites the work of the American Law Institute in 
creating a draft human rights Bill: American Law Institute, Report to the Council of the Institute and Statement of 
Essential Human Rights by a Committee of Advisers, Representing the Principal Countries of the World 1944. Reprinted in 
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 243 (1946) 18. 
130 Article 2: A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of 
war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied only in the instances laid down in the law and in 
accordance with its provisions.  
131 Francisco Campos, F. Nièto del Rio, Charles G. Fenwick and A. Gómez Robledo; 31 December 1945. 
Schabas, (2002), p.27 
132 Very similar to UDHRs Article 3, although in that case the rights-bearer is noted as everyone, instead of 
every human being. 
133 See analysis in Edwards et al. v. The Bahamas, 04/04/2001, paras.125-130. 
134 Schabas, (2002), p.27, note 30. 
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Every person has the right to life. This extends to the right to life from the moment of 
conception; to the right to life of incurables, imbeciles and the insane. It includes the right to 
sustenance and support in the case of those unable to support themselves by their own efforts; 
and it implies a duty of the state to see to it that such support is made available. The right to life 
may be denied by the state only on the ground of a conviction of the gravest of crimes, to which 
the death penalty has been attached.135 
The discrepancy between the two, the brief final formulation as opposed to the wide-
ranging aspirational proposal, indicates the depth of difference between States in their 
contemplation of the potential of the new human rights regimes. The ACHR went 
somewhat further than the ADRDM in its expression of the protection to be afforded to 
life, and is indeed the only human rights treaty to express the moment of the beginning of 
the protection; although its qualification, in general, rather mitigates against the effect. 
Article 1.2 
For the purposes of this Convention, person means every human being 
Article 4 
Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law 
and, in general, from the moment of conception. No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the 
Death Penalty was adopted in 1990, stating in its Preamble that everyone has the 
inalienable right to respect for his life, a right that cannot be suspended for any reason 
and making a provision to exclude judicial execution from the panoply of State 
punishment in the broadest possible terms.
136
 
The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of 
Violence against Women, in its Article 4 rather oddly states that: 
Every woman has the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise and protection of all 
human rights and freedoms embodied in regional and international human rights instruments. 
                                                 
135 UN  Doc. A/C.1/38; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2.  
136 This text makes a concession to States that wish to retain the death penalty in wartime in its Article 2. 
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These rights include, among others:  
The right to have her life respected;  
Whether respect, without anything further, equates with protection is problematical, 
and will be discussed further, below.  
 c. Africa 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, however, equates the respect for life 
with its dependence upon bodily integrity, in Article 4:  Human beings are inviolable. 
Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. 
No-one may be arbitrarily deprived of this right. In 2003, the Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa was formulated 
in the context of integrity and security of the person, in Article 4(1): 
Every woman shall be entitled to respect for her life and the integrity and security of her 
person. All forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall 
be prohibited. 
The 1999 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child also relates the right to 
life to survival and development in its Article 5: 
5. (1)   Every child has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. 
(2)   States Parties to the present Charter shall ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the 
survival, protection and development of the child. 
(3)  Death sentence shall not be pronounced for crimes committed by children. 
Abass and Baderin comment that Article 4(o) of the 2000 Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, in its affirmed respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection 
of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities in 
conjunction with promotion of gender equality and respect for human rights, the rule of 
law and good governance commit to not only a clear expression of in respect of good 
governance, rule of law and the respect for the sanctity of human life that is remarkable in 
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the AU, but also because these rights have now become issues to be focused in the 
process of maintaining peace and security in Africa.
137
 Further, a twofold obligation can 
be derived from Article 3(h) of the Constitutive Act, the objective to promote and protect 
human and peoples rights, and that both the obligations are positive ones that would 
demand positive action on the part of the AU to fulfil, and thereby ensuring an effective 
guarantee of human rights within the continent.
138
 One can read into the close proximity 
of the respect for the sanctity of life article, outlined above, to those protect and promote 
obligations, a concomitant commitment to the view that sees an inherent requirement 
within a right to life article to positive action on the part of States, in this case African 
States, a concept to be discussed further, below. 
d. Other Provisions 
There is no Asian regional or Islamic human rights treaty yet in force, but there have been 
a number of instruments drafted, either by groups of States, or interested parties such as 
NGOs. These include the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Rights, with a right to 
life provision in Article I: 139 
Human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort shall be made to protect it. In particular 
no one shall be exposed to injury or death, except under the authority of the law. 
Just as in life, so also after death, the sanctity of a persons body shall be inviolable. It is the 
obligation of believers to see that a deceased persons body is handled with due solemnity. 
The 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam, states in Article 2: 
(a) Life is a God-given gift and the right to life is guaranteed to every human being. It is the 
duty of individuals, societies and states to safeguard this right against any violation, and it is 
prohibited to take away life except for a Shari'ah-prescribed reason. 
                                                 
137 Abass and Baderin, (2002), passim. 
138 Ibid. 
139 See The Arab Judicial Forum White Papers, Theme 2: The Judicial Role in Human Rights Protection, 
http://www.arabjudicialforum.org/ajf_wp_2.html (Accessed 13/11/2004). 
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(b) It is forbidden to resort to any means which could result in the genocidal annihilation of 
mankind. 
(c) The preservation of human life throughout the term of time willed by Allah is a duty 
prescribed by Shari'ah. 
(d) Safety from bodily harm is a guaranteed right. It is the duty of the state to safeguard it, 
and it is prohibited to breach it without a Shari'ah-prescribed reason. 
The 1995 Arab Charter of Human Rights, Article 5, provides that: 
Every individual has the right to life, liberty and security of person. These rights shall be 
protected by law. 
In 1998, a non-binding document was created by the non-governmental Asian Human 
Rights Commission and a number of NGOs. The Asian Human Rights Charter
140
 has as 
part of its right to life provision:
141
   
Foremost among rights is the right to life, from which flow other rights and freedoms. The 
right to life is not confined to mere physical or animal existence but includes the right to every 
limb or faculty through which life is enjoyed. It signifies the right to live with basic human 
dignity, the right to livelihood, the right to a habitat or home, the right to education and the right 
to a clean and healthy environment for without these there can be no real and effective exercise 
or enjoyment of the right to life. The state must also take all possible measures to prevent infant 
mortality, eliminate malnutrition and epidemics, and increase life expectancy through a clean and 
healthy environment and adequate preventative as well as curative medical facilities. It must 
make primary education free and compulsory  
Wilde finds this Charter [an] interesting document because it illustrates how human 
rights discourse has evolved since foundational documents like the ICCPR was drafted. It 
reflects current human rights issues such as the role of non-state actors, the public/private 
divide, and the impact of globalization.
142
  
Harris describes the document as embod[ying] universally applicable human rights that 
                                                 
140 See Wilde (1998) and Harris (2000). 
141 Article 3.2. See Harris, Ibid., at p.17. 
142 Wilde (1998), p.138. 
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arise from an Asian perspective and incorporates many of the rights supported by most 
Asian states under various other treaties.
143
 Harris finds the primary utility of the 
Charter  in its strict description of rights. This definite statement of rights can be used 
as a lobbying point for the peoples of Asia and a voice to espouse their needs and 
concerns.
144
 The right to life statement is certainly all of that; but how is it to be 
understood and acted upon?  
2.2.3 PROTECTED BY LAW AS AN EFFECTIVE PARAPHRASE OF THE RIGHT TO 
LIFE ARTICLES 
It has been suggested, above, that the phrase the right to life shall be protected by law 
presents a helpful and semantically comprehensible paraphrase of the States obligations in 
respect of this right. This section will examine the texts to clarify this obligation, with 
specific reference to their right to life Articles.  
i Instruments including Protected by Law 
The ICCPR, Article 6, inserted an assertion (not present in the parent Declaration, UDHR) 
that the right to life should be protected by law, as did Article 2 of the ECHR: Everyone's 
right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for 
which this penalty is provided by law. Article 9 of the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families declares 
that: The right to life of migrant workers and members of their families shall be protected 
by law. Article 5 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child is 
                                                 
143 Harris, (2002) p.2. [Footnote omitted].  
144 Ibid., p.3. 
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similarly phrased in the relevant aspects: Every child has the inherent right to life. This 
right shall be protected by law. Article 4 of the ACHR calls for the protection of law: 
Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law 
and, in general, from the moment of conception. No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
his life. Other instruments, non-binding or not yet in force, also mention the protection of 
the law.
145
 
ii Other Instruments 
Some texts simply express a right to life, as in the UDHR and the ADRDM. Article 4 of 
the ACHPR declares that [h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be 
entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily 
deprived of this right.
146
 This wide-ranging aspiration is more directly stated in the CRC, 
Article 6: 1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to life. 2. States 
Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the 
child. Other texts include an obligation of respect, as in the Protocol to the ACHPR on 
the Rights of Women in Africa,
147
 and Article 4 of the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women: Every woman has 
the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise and protection of all human rights and 
freedoms embodied in regional and international human rights instruments. These rights 
include, among others: (a) The right to have her life respected. Article 4(o) of the 2000 
Constitutive Act of the African Union calls for respect for the sanctity of human life, 
                                                 
145 E.g., Article I(c) of the Universal Islamic Declaration of Rights; Article 2(a) of the Cairo Declaration of 
Human Rights in Islam; Article 5 of the Arab Charter of Human Rights; Article 3 of the UN DEVAW. 
146 Likewise, Article 6 of the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
147 Article 4(1) Every woman shall be entitled to respect for her life and the integrity and security of her person. 
All forms of exploitation, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited.  
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condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and 
subversive activities. Protection envisages some form of State action in the exercise of 
State obligations, implying a positive, active obligation, whereas respect suggests a 
more passive form of recognition, an attitude rather than an action. 
2.3 INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 
There are few topics in international law which have given rise to such extensive 
doctrinal debate as treaty interpretation.
148
 So begins Sinclair, author of a major work, 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in his section on Interpretation of 
Treaties. That doctrinal dispute, in its greater complexities, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but some aspects of it must be addressed. The interpretation of the right to life 
provision in human rights treaties presents two challenges; firstly, that it is indeed a 
provision of human rights treaties, and there are a number of arguments surrounding the 
proper interpretive light to shed on such treaties  should it be the same light as 
illuminates the general run of public international law treaties, or should it be of a special 
kind, reflecting human rights as a form of lex specialis?
149
 Here it is important to 
characterize a human rights treaty, something done effectively by Toufayan in exploring 
this same question.
150
 Having discarded human rights protection of the individual, either 
                                                 
148 Sinclair (1973), p.69. 
149 See definition in World Trade Organization [WTO], Report of the Panel, 02/07/1998, Indonesia - Certain 
Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry: Complaint by Japan, European Communities, and the United 
States: 5.129  Sinclair describes lex specialis as the concept that a specific norm of conventional 
international law may prevail over a more general norm. Lex specialis is widely supported in doctrine and 
extends back to Grotius. Among agreements that are equal in respect to the qualities mentioned, that should 
be given preference which is more specific and approaches more nearly to the subject in hand: for special 
provisions are ordinarily more effective than those that are general. Furthermore, GATT panels have 
recognized lex specialis. [Footnotes and citations omitted].  
150 Toufayan, (2005), pp.3-4. 
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in personam
151
 or as a bearer of legal rights,
152
 as being insufficiently differentiating from 
other kinds of treaties, he focuses on the non-reciprocal nature of human rights treaties as 
the key to this riddle;
153
 his analysis mirrors that of Craven.
154
 Toufayan offers a 
definition of human rights treaties as a limited category of treaties whose purpose is to 
recognize and protect individual human rights in a way that is independent of the question 
of nationality link, or of the acceptance of similar obligations by any other state party, 
and this is the sense in which the term human rights treaty will be used here. 
The second problem, mentioned above, is more closely focussed on the specific terms 
used, right and life, and how they should be interpreted, and the answer to this 
question depends upon the approach taken, and the conclusion reached, in considering the 
first problem posed. This will, therefore, be addressed first. How are treaties in general 
interpreted, and is this appropriate for human rights treaties? 
2.3.1 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 
Treaty texts are normally interpreted in the light of the provisions of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties [VCLT]. The aim behind VCLT was that it should 
apply across the board for all inter-State treaties, with no difference being made between 
general public international law treaties of reciprocal obligation, and others such as 
international human rights and international humanitarian law treaties, where the 
                                                 
151 Protection of the individual would include, for example, international labour conventions, international 
humanitarian law, and diplomatic and consular protection treaties. Ibid., p.3, footnotes 10, 11, and 12. 
152 Ibid., p.3, footnote 13. Toufayan suggests in this context the Charter of the United Nations, Article 230 of 
the Treaty on European Union, and a UN Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters of 25 
June 1998. 
153 Ibid. Toufayan cites in this context Craven (2000) 489, at p.497; Provost, BYIL, (1994) 383, at pp.383-385. 
154 Craven (2000). 
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obligation is from States towards those in their own jurisdiction. At an early stage of the 
development of international law, in 1930, McNair had regarded an all-encompassing 
approach as being possibly over-reaching: 
[These] remarks are prompted by the belief that inadequate attention has been given by 
students of international law to the widely differing functions and legal character of the 
instruments which it is customary to comprise under the term treaty. It is suggested that this 
branch of law would be in a more advanced state if more writers on the subject would study 
these essential differences and endeavour to provide for them instead of attempting to lay down 
rules applicable to treaties in general.
155
 
McNair had discerned the development of a body of international public law possessing a 
peculiar sanctity and degree of permanence.
156
 These treaties were not abrogated by the 
outbreak of war and also showed a tendency  to produce exceptions to the rule that a 
treaty cannot confer burdens or impose benefits upon third parties: pacta tertiis nec 
nocunt nec prosunt.
157
 He predicted the evolution of many more disputes arising from 
treaties,
158
 and preferred that rules should be framed relevant to the differing legal 
character of the several kinds of treaties.
159
 In his pacta tertiis example, he did not 
envisage the conferring of rights upon citizens and others within the jurisdiction; but still, 
it is rather a pity that the framers of VCLT did not bear his warning in mind. One of the 
reasons for the insistence upon what might be considered as the branches of the public 
international law tree being covered by the same umbrella of rules and principles (to 
somewhat mix metaphors) is the concern, raised by Toufayan in the context of the ILCs 
                                                 
155 McNair (1930), BYIL pp.100-118, at p.100. 
156 Ibid., p.112. 
157 Ibid., p.113. 
158 Ibid., p.118. 
159 Ibid. 
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work in this area, regarding the possible fragmentation
160
 of international law. The 
stance therefore taken has caused particular difficulties in the field of reservations to 
human rights treaties, where the lack of reciprocal obligation has created a lacuna, which 
will be discussed further, below, in the context of reservations to the right to life provision 
as found in, for example, ICCPR. However, the role of the Vienna Convention has been 
acknowledged as pertaining to human rights treaties, including by the human rights treaty 
bodies,
161
 and so it is appropriate to analyse its application. 
 i General rule of interpretation 
Article 31 of the VCLT is of particular relevance to the present discussion: 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition 
to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty 
or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. 
Further to the quest for an authentic (however that may be defined or understood  see 
                                                 
160 Toufayan, p.5. See See the Study on the Function and scope of the lex specialis rule and the question of self-
contained regimes: Preliminary Report by Mr. Martti Koskenniemi, Chairman of the Study Group, 
(ILC(LVI)/SG/FIL/CCCRD.1/Add.1) (unpublished text; on file with the Codification Division of the  UN 
Office of Legal Affairs),  cited in Toufayan, p.5, footnote 20. See also Craven (2000). 
161 See infra, notes 162 to 164 and accompanying text. 
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below) interpretation of terms, Article 32 of the VCLT declares that: 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation 
according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
The role of the Vienna Convention has been recognized by the human rights bodies;
162
 
indeed, the Articles in question here, Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, were acknowledged 
even before the entry into force of the Convention as being indicative of customary 
international law, in the ECtHR case of Golder v. UK.
163
 The ECtHR in Loizidou v Turkey 
discussed a number of questions relating to interpretation of the text of the European 
Convention, including the application of Article 31(1) and (3)(b) of the VCLT: 
 To determine whether Contracting Parties may impose restrictions on their acceptance of 
the competence of the Commission and Court under Articles 25 and 46  the Court will seek 
to ascertain the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of these provisions in their context 
and in the light of their object and purpose (see,  Article 31 para.1 of the Vienna Convention 
of 23 May 1969 on the Law of Treaties). It shall also take into account, together with the 
context, any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement 
of the parties regarding its interpretation (see Article 31 para.3(b) of the above-mentioned 
Vienna Convention).
164
 
The Inter-American Court has also acknowledged the role of the Vienna Convention: the 
Inter-American Court reiterates that when interpreting the American Convention in 
accordance with the general rules of treaty interpretation enshrined in Article 31(1) of the 
                                                 
162 E.g., IACtHR, Hilaire, Benjamin, Constantine et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago (June 21, 2002), paras.18 & 19. See also 
at ICTY, Prosecutor v.Tadic, Appeals Judgement, paras.300 and 303; at the ECSR, International Federation of Human 
Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France, 15/07/1999, para.26, and in Dissenting Opinion of Mr Stein Evju joined by Mrs 
Polonca Koncar and Mr Lucien Francois, and Dissenting Opinion of Mr Rolf Birk. 
163 Paras.29-30. 
164 Para.73. 
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United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties .
165
 It can be seen that in good 
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in 
their context and in the light of its object and purpose, is, therefore, the overarching 
principle behind the interpretation of treaties. This immediately presents a threefold 
possibility; a textual element  ordinary meaning  and a teleological element  object 
and purpose  as well as a contextual element, involving the preamble and annexes of the 
text, and any agreements or instruments agreed by the parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty (Article 31(2) of the VCLT). Account is to be taken of Article 31 
para.3(b) of the VCLT, which looks to State practice for further enlightenment. 
Subsequent agreements between the parties, (Article 31(3)(a)), relevant rules of 
international law, (Article 31(3)(c)), and whether a special meaning was intended for the 
terms under discussion are also to be considered, (Article 31(4)), although not in a 
hierarchical sense. There is no suggestion that any of these aids are of any lesser or 
greater import in the task before the Court; in fact, the International Law Commission, in 
its 1966 Report, denied absolutely the possibility of a hierarchy operating in the 
provisions of what was then Articles 27 and 28 of the draft Convention: 
[Observations of Governments] appeared to indicate a possible fear that the successive 
paragraphs of article 27 [now 31] might be taken as laying down a hierarchical order for the 
application of various elements of interpretation in the article. The Commission, by heading the 
article General rule of interpretation in the singular and by underlining the connexion between 
paragraphs 1 and 2 and again between paragraph 3 and the two previous paragraphs, intended to 
indicate that the application of the means of interpretation in the article would be a single 
combined operation. All the various elements, as they were present in any given case, would be 
                                                 
165  Hilaire, Benjamin, Constantine, et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21/06/2002, para.19. 
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thrown into the crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation.
166
 
So, if not hierarchically, what approach to treaty interpretation is to be taken, and by 
whom? 
ii Why interpret? 
Sinclair describes the aim and goal of treaty interpretation as being problematical: even 
on this preliminary issue, there is a measure of disagreement among publicists.
167
 He 
categorizes three schools of thought as reflect[ing] the subjective (or intentions of the 
parties) approach, the objective (or textual) approach and the teleological (or object 
and purpose) approach.
168
 The textual reason appears to be favoured by VCLT: Articles 
31 and 32 of the VCLT are seen as clearly based on the view that the text of a treaty must 
be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties, not including 
an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the parties,
169
 according to the 
International Law Commission [ILC]. Sinclairs opinion is that: 
Every text, however clear on its face, requires to be scrutinised in its context and in the light 
of the object and purpose which it is designed to serve. The conclusion which may be reached after 
such a scrutiny is, in most instances, that the clear meaning which originally presented itself is the 
correct one, but this should not be used to disguise the fact that what is involved is a process of 
interpretation.
170
 
The obvious point needs to be made; even an apparently straightforward reading of a text 
is in fact an interpretation, a textual one, and being that interpretation and only that, it 
                                                 
166 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth session. Geneva, 4 May19 June 
1966, at p.219. 
167 Ibid., p.70. 
168 Ibid. Note that Sinclair is here using these three approaches as reasons for interpreting a treaty, and not as 
methods; however, they correspond to the the thematics that will be discussed, infra, as approaches to the 
interpretation of the treaties themselves. 
169 Ibid., p.71. 
170 Ibid., pp.72-73 [emphasis in original]. 
 74
denies other possibilities. Decisions must be made  but by whom? 
iii Who interprets? 
Texts, in this instance human rights treaties, could be interpreted either by the bodies that 
created them, or those set up under them, by the State parties in some other forum, or by 
the judges, Commissioners or Committee members to whom applications are brought 
under the treaties terms, where a right of individual or State-on-State application is 
allowed and accepted.
171
 Further, States will apply the terms of international treaties in 
their national courts. In practice, there is a mixture of all of these. For example, in the case 
of the first suggestion, the bodies that created the treaties having the ability to make 
interpretations, the Human Rights Committee issues General Comments [GCs] on 
particular Articles of ICCPR,
172
 and on aspects of interpretation itself,
173
 and State 
Reports (Summary Records, Concluding Observations, Comments) can also be used as a 
forum for interpreting treaty terms.
174
 In respect of the second suggestion, the bodies set 
up under the treaties may themselves interpret them: for example, the Inter-American 
                                                 
171 Or, in the case of the European Social Charter and Revised Charter [ESC], a system of Collective 
Complaints, heard by the European Committee on Social Rights [ECSR]. 
172 See GCs 6 and 14 on aspects of Article 6 of the ICCPR. 
173 E.g., HRC GC 24, Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the [International] 
Covenant [on Civil and Political Rights] or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under 
Article 41 of the Covenant. (Fifty-second session, 1994). 
174 Other UN Treaty Bodies act similarly. See the UN website, Treaty Bodies Database, for the proceedings of 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [CESCR]; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination [CERD]; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women [CEDAW]; the 
Committee against Torture [CAT]; the Committee on the Rights of the Child [CRC]; the Committee on Migrant 
Workers [CMW]. All of these bodies may make comments on the protection of life within their relevant 
jurisdictions, e.g., CRC Summary of the Second Part (Public) of the 98th Meeting: Rwanda, 11/10/1993, 
CRC/C/SR.98/Add.1 (Summary record); the State Party was questioned regarding the Rwandan practice of the 
obligation of children to feed their parents and ascendants, if they are in need. 
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Court  [IACtHR] has issued a number of effective and useful Advisory Opinions.
175
 State 
parties to most treaties, unless the treaty specifically provides otherwise, are free to issue 
declarations and reservations,
176
 when ratifying or acceding to a treaty, explaining their 
understanding of terms used, scope of jurisdiction etc. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, there is the interpretation that happens in commissions, courts, tribunals, and 
other decision-making bodies, both national and international, where treaty terms arise for 
adjudication.  
iv States as interpreters: the problem of reservations to human rights treaties 
An example of States being involved further in the interpretation of the treaty at the time 
of, or after, its conclusion, is that they may issue declarations and reservations,
177
 a 
possibility defined in Article 2(d) of the VCLT as: 
 a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when signing, 
ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, where it purports to exclude or modify the 
legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State. 
Articles 19, 20, 21, 22, and 23 of the VCLT further comprehensively discuss the ability to 
formulate reservations (Article 19) and acceptance (Article 20) of reservations, the 
position of the States concerned with regard to other States who do (or do not) accept the 
reservation (Article 21), the withdrawal of reservations (Article 22), and the formulation 
of reservations and objections to them (Article 23); the possibility of reservations and 
their impact on treaty interpretation is taken into account implicitly in Article 31(2)(b) of 
the VCLT,  That is, VCLT addresses reservations comprehensively except that no 
                                                 
175 Article 64 of the ACHR. See also Article 65(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, and Article 47 of the ECHR. Note 
that the capacity to issue Advisory Opinions under Article 47(2) of the ECHR is more restrictive than that 
under ACHR, and consequently ineffective. 
176 On reservations to human rights treaties, see supra n.173; Baylis, (1999); Goodman, (2002). 
177 On the distinction between declarations and reservations, see ECtHR, Belilos v. Switzerland, 20/04/1988. 
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mention is made of the unique position of human rights treaties. 
For instance, in declarations and reservations to the ICCPR, some States have made 
reference to reproductive issues, suggesting that the term inherent should not be taken to 
mean before birth: France, for instance, stated that The Government of the French 
Republic declares that this Convention, particularly article 6, cannot be interpreted as 
constituting any obstacle to the implementation of the provisions of French legislation 
relating to the voluntary interruption of pregnancy.
178
  
The pragmatic precept at play is that reservations encourage participation; States who 
cannot agree to all the terms, or who suspect that an interpretation of a particular term 
may run against their perceived interests, might thereby be encouraged to assume the 
majority of the treaty obligations. However, it can readily be seen that too many 
reservations, or even a few reservations to some fundamental aspect of a treaty, will 
undermine its effective implementation. Where a treaty, such as ICCPR, does not address 
the question of reservations
179
 the test of the reservations validity is both that it should 
not conflict with norms of jus cogens, and, according to Article 19(c) of the VCLT, its 
compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty. The HRC, in its General 
Comment 24 on reservations to ICCPR, lists these rights: they include the provision that 
a State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to torture, to subject persons to 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily deprive persons of 
                                                 
178 See also Luxembourg: The Government of Luxembourg declares that article 6 of the present Convention 
presents no obstacle to implementation of the provisions of Luxembourg legislation concerning sex 
information, the prevention of back-street abortion and the regulation of pregnancy termination. Tunisia made 
a Declaration: The Government of the Republic of Tunisia declares that the Preamble to and the provisions of 
the Convention, in particular article 6, shall not be interpreted in such a way as to impede the application of 
Tunisian legislation concerning voluntary termination of pregnancy. Available at UN Treaty Collection, 
Reservations and Declarations to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty15_asp.htm (accessed 28/04/2005). 
179 Except in Article 2 of the Second Optional Protocol. 
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their lives, 
180
 It is not usually permissible to reserve on non-derogable rights or on the 
provisions which guarantee the enforcement of rights obligations.
181
 The principle of 
reciprocity presents the complex aspect for human rights treaties, making the fundamental 
give-and-take of obligations and benefits which underpins the VCLTs envisaged 
reservations framework ineffective. The HRC considers the problem in paragraphs 16 and 
17 of the General Comment and although accepting that in non-human rights treaties the 
reaction of other states to a reservation may indicate its validity, it draws this decision 
upon itself, seeing itself as not motivated by the same self-interest as states. However, this 
still leaves the problem of how to react to an invalid reservation. The answer is that it will 
be severable  ie. the treaty will continue to be in full force for that state and the 
reservation will be meaningless. 
Paust, in an assessment of the right to life in war, asserts that:  the fact that a person is 
killed does not necessarily mean that the human right to life has been violated, and the 
fact that the right is nonderogable is not determinative of whether or not the right applies 
to prohibit a killing in the first place.
182
 HRC General Comment 24 considers 
reservations to non-derogable provisions, and the offence they may do to the treaty and to 
the rule of law itself: 
some provisions are non-derogable exactly because without them there would be no rule of 
law. A reservation to the provisions of article 4 itself, which precisely stipulates the balance to be 
struck between the interests of the State and the rights of the individual in times of emergency, 
would fall in this category. And some non-derogable rights, which in any event cannot be 
reserved because of their status as peremptory norms, are also of this character - the prohibition 
                                                 
180 General Comment No. 24: Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the 
Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant. 
04/11/94, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para.8. 
181 paras.11-12. 
182 Paust (2002), at p.414 
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of torture and arbitrary deprivation of life are examples.  While there is no automatic 
correlation between reservations to non-derogable provisions, and reservations which offend 
against the object and purpose of the Covenant, a State has a heavy onus to justify such a 
reservation.
183
 
The right to life is indeed nonderogable, as shown in the major treaties, such as Article 
4(2) of the ICCPR,
184
 although it must be noted that Article 15 of the ECHR states that 
No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of 
war,  shall be made under this provision.
185
 As Paust states, the fact that there has been 
a killing does not necessarily mean that there has been a violation of the right to life; and 
there does not need to have been a derogation to what is a non-derogable right to make 
that killing legitimate, as envisaged in Article 15(2) of the ECHR. 
v Human rights bodies as interpreters 
Human rights treaties lay claim to being a form of lex specialis, with a responsibility to 
inform other fields of law. This point was made by Judge Lukas Loucaides of the 
European Court of Human Rights in his dissenting judgement in McElhinney v. Ireland in 
which he also showed that national law should itself derive certain principles, such as 
                                                 
183 HRC General Comment 24, Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the 
Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, 
04/11/94. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, para.10. [Footnote omitted]. 
184 (4)1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which is 
officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their 
obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law and do not 
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. 
2. No derogation from Article[s] 6,  may be made under this provision.  
 
 
185 Article 15. Derogation in time of emergency 
1. In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may 
take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under 
international law. 
2. No derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war,  shall be made 
under this provision. 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impartiality and fairness, from the field of human rights: 
[ N]owadays judicial institutions, at least in the countries where the Convention is 
applicable, are bound to secure the safeguards of fairness and impartiality provided therein and 
protect States accordingly. 
In a case like the one before the Court, the lex specialis is the European Convention of 
Human Rights. General principles of international law are not embodied in the Convention 
except insofar as reference is expressly made to them by the Convention  Therefore, one 
should be reluctant to accept restrictions on Convention rights derived from principles of 
international law such as those establishing immunities which are not even part of the jus cogens 
norms.
186
 
This application of a lex specialis can be seen at its most specialised in the European 
Court exercise of the margin of appreciation,
187
 for instance; this is not a concept known 
generally to international law. The COE had declared in the Preamble to ECHR that the 
(original ten) Member States were resolved, as the Governments of European countries 
which are like-minded and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom 
and the rule of law to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the 
Rights stated in the Universal Declaration, and yet the Court was able to formulate a 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation. This concept, originating in French 
administrative law in the context of judicial review, has been developed to allow a 
supervised national discretion in the exercise of Convention rights. The margin of 
appreciation is defined by Benvenisti as being based on the notion that each society is 
entitled to certain latitude in resolving the conflict between individual rights and national 
interests or among different moral convictions.
188
 This is in contrast to the later 
reaffirmation in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action [VDPA] of the 
                                                 
186 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Loucaides 
187 First articulated by the ECtHR in the 1976 case of Handyside v. UK, paras.48-49. See Bailey, Harris & Jones 
(1995) pp.12-14. 
188 Benvenisti, (1999) p.844  
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importance of ensuring the universality, objectivity and non-selectivity of the 
consideration of human rights issues.
189
 The suggestion was clearly articulated by the 
ECtHR in the Handyside v. UK
190
 case, that local justice may be more pertinent in certain 
cases than the decisions of a distant judiciary, and that considering the supranational 
nature of the Convention, some discretion must be allowed, as a concession to national 
sovereignty and a tool of distributive justice. Detractors such as Higgins
191
 regard the 
exercise of such a discretion as no less than an abrogation of duty, and even some of the 
more fervent admirers of the doctrine are forced to admit that its use in the past has been a 
convenient vehicle for the failure of the Court to give sufficient or adequate reasons for its 
variation from the claims of a particular standard,
192
 or to address controversial issues in 
certain contexts.
193
 The margin of appreciation is clearly not a general principle of 
international law: to what extent are such principles applicable in the interpretation of 
human rights treaties?  
The sources of international law are often presumed as those stated in Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice.
194
 Of these, Article 38(1)(d) is of particular 
                                                 
189 VDPA, para.32. 
190 1976 A 24. 
191 Higgins, (1976-77), p.315. 
192 See generally Mahoney (1998). 
193 See Johnston v. Ireland, (1987) which distinguished Article 12 of the Convention from its basis in Article 16 of 
the UDHR, in allowing Ireland to continue its constitutional ban on divorce. A pan-European right to divorce 
would have been seen by many, even at that time, as a common fundamental standard.  
194 Article 38: 
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to 
it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.  
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree 
thereto. 
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relevance to the point under discussion: subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, 
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. Article 59 provides: The 
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of 
that particular case. This refutes the application of the principle of stare decisis; there is 
no binding precedent, either from preceding judgements of the Court or from other 
sources.
195
 Yet Article 38(2), Statute of the ICJ, allows for a broad interpretation where 
appropriate: This provision [Article 38(1)] shall not prejudice the power of the Court to 
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. Further, the ICJ, in the 
Namibia Case, stated that an international instrument must be interpreted and applied 
within the overall framework of the juridical system in force at the time of the 
interpretation.
 196
  
vi Human rights principles as interpretive principles 
Human rights principles themselves can also lay claim to being interpretive principles in 
the canon of other treaties, and in national law. It is instructive in that regard to consider 
the most recent international treaty to enter into force, for which the protection of human 
life is a primary aim: the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which for 
instance does allow for (although not compel) the exercise of precedent, in its Article 
21(2): The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous 
decisions. Human Rights Watch made recommendations, prior to the final draft of the 
                                                 
195 For a thorough discussion of the role of precedent in the ECtHRs decisions, and the difficulties which 
would be attendant upon an insistence upon being bound in different situations and changing societal 
circumstances, see Williams and Rainey (2002), pp.13-14. 
196 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, p.16. 
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Rome Statute, regarding the appropriate guiding principles for all aspects of an 
international criminal court, including choice of applicable law. In their report,
197
 
reference is made to legality, encompassing the requirement of certainty as to the law 
and to the principles of equality and universality;
198
 such principles may be seen as 
underpinning justice. The report recognises the evolving nature of international law 
(which indeed has contributed to the establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
something that could not have been successfully undertaken prior to this) for instance, in 
the comment: 
In the area of international criminal law, customary international and treaty law may not be 
sufficiently developed at the present time to provide legal guidance on all possible matters 
concerning the application of the statute. General principles, derived from practice in a range of 
national legal systems, should be drawn upon to fill any potential lacuna. The International Court 
of Justice has relied upon this source of law in the exercise of its judicial function, as has the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.199 
The eventual article of the Rome Statute of the ICC dealing with applicable law, Article 
21, included the provisions that the Court: 
shall apply  general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards. 
Further, section 3 of Article 21 adds that: The application and interpretation of law 
pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, 
and includes an anti-discrimination clause. HRWs report made the comment that It will 
be essential to the ICC's credibility and legitimacy that the Court observe the highest 
                                                 
197 Justice in the Balance: Recommendations for an Independent and Effective International Criminal Court, 
(June 1998). 
198 HRW, Ibid, section G, Introduction, citing Article 26 of the ICCPR, at footnote 208. 
199  HRW, Ibid, section G, [footnotes omitted]. 
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standards of international human rights law.
200
  
It is suggested here that the human rights tribunals and other bodies are similarly at liberty 
to work out their manner of deciding cases, and that in fact, as the principles of human 
rights can be seen as informing other areas of law, both national and international, this 
freedom to decide in the interests of justice is an essential element, and is recognised in 
their own constituting acts. The Statute of the Inter-American Court describes that body as 
autonomous, and its purpose as being the application and interpretation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights. The Court exercises its functions in accordance 
with the provisions of the aforementioned Convention and the present Statute.
201
 Further, 
The Court shall exercise adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction,
202
 something which has 
been reiterated in the case law: 
[ T]he Inter-American Court reiterates that when interpreting the American Convention 
in accordance with the general rules of treaty interpretation enshrined in Article 31(1) of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of Treaties , and considering the object and purpose 
of the American Convention, the Tribunal, in the exercise of the authority conferred on it by 
Article 62(3) of the Convention, must act in a manner that preserves the integrity of the 
provisions of Article 62(1) of the Convention. It would be unacceptable to subordinate these 
provisions to restrictions that would render inoperative the Courts jurisdictional role, and 
consequently, the human rights protection system established in the Convention  The Court 
has the inherent authority consistent with the imperative of judicial certainty to determine the 
scope of its own jurisdiction.
203
 
Article 5 of the ICCPR suggests a form of negative interpretation, a requirement not to 
interpret in a particular way or so as to achieve a particular end, an end which may be 
seen as being in contradiction of the principles of human rights: 
                                                 
200 Ibid. 
201 Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Article 1: Nature and Legal Organization. 
202 Article 2. Jurisdiction. 
203  Hilaire, Benjamin, Constantine, et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21/06/2002, para.19. 
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1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or 
person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is 
provided for in the present Covenant. 
2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human 
rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, 
conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize 
such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent. 
This does not imply, however, a complete laissez-faire attitude, or that human rights 
tribunals are at liberty to dismiss the application of any general principles of arbitration, 
or the exercise of precedent. Yet, even having accepted that the human rights treaty 
bodies, and others as relevant, they will interpret the treaties in a manner which preserves 
rights and freedoms, that they will not necessarily be bound by precedent, by the decisions 
of other bodies or even by the general principles of international law, although they will 
take account of the VCLT, that they will if they wish formulate their own principles, such 
as the margin of appreciation, or not,
204
 does not answer the ultimate question; how to 
interpret the treaties.  
vii How to interpret? 
Whilst VCLT, in particular its Articles 31 and 32, might appear at first glance to offer a 
guide on how treaties should be interpreted,
205
 Sinclair suggests that the Convention rules 
on interpretation reflect an attempt to assess the relative value and weight of the elements 
to be taken into account in the process of interpretation rather than to describe the process 
                                                 
204 Supra, notes 187-193 and accompanying text. 
205 Koskenniemi comments that it is frequently noted that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is of the nature 
of a compromise: it refers to virtually all thinkable interpretive methods. See Koskenniemi, (1989), p.292, 
footnote 89 for a thorough discussion of this point. 
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of interpretation itself.
206
 Brownlie emphasizes the need for there to be some general 
principles operating within the international arena as aids to interpretation, rather than the 
kind of rules which are general, question-begging and contradictory.
207
 He suggests that 
the ILC in its work confined itself to isolating the comparatively few general principles 
which appear to constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties.
208
 Further, 
what matters is the intention of the parties as expressed in the text, which is the best 
guide to the more recent common intention of the parties.
209
 Whether that is true in the 
context under discussion here, the right to life provision of international and regional 
human rights treaties, remains to be seen. There needs to be some theoretical approach to 
the problem, some reason for deciding on specific principles and applying them; different 
approaches can lead to different decisions, or, as Fitzmaurice puts it, with more emphasis, 
radically divergent results.
210
 The ICJ have faced such an interpretive difficulty, in the 
LaGrand Case,
211
 with regard to the scope and interpretation of Article 41 of the Statute 
of the ICJ; indeed, as Orakhelashvili notes,
212
 one view  that of Fitzmaurice
213
  would 
indicate that the Court has jurisdiction to prescribe binding provisional measures, whereas 
another view  that of Thirlway
214
  suggests the opposite. The following section will 
therefore consider possible interpretive theories, and offer a taxonomy for application in 
                                                 
206 Sinclair, (1973), at p.73. 
207 Brownlie (6th ed., 2003), p.602. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Fitzmaurice (1951), p.2. See also Williams and Rainey, supra, n.195, for a discussion of this point in the 
context of the ECtHRs judgements in respect of language and education rights. 
211 LaGrand Case (Germany v. USA), 27/06/2001. The details of this particular case are beyond the scope of the 
present discussion: see Babcock (2002); Orakhelashvili (2002); Yoshiyuki Iwamoto (Lee) (2002). 
212 Orakhelashvili (2002), p.116. 
213 Citing G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 542 (1986), at 548. 
214 Citations including H. Thirlway, Indication of Provisional Measures by the International Court of Justice, in R. 
Bernhardt (Ed.) Interim Measures Indicated by the International Courts 28 (1994). [Other citations omitted]. See also 
Yoshiyuki Iwamoto (Lee) (2002), in support of Thirlways position. 
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the present context. 
2.3.2 INTERPRETIVE THEORIES 
Interpretive theories abound: Koskenniemi suggests that there is a possibility of either a 
subjective or objective approach to the interpretation of treaties. A subjective one seeks to 
ascertain the will of the parties  what was it that States agreed to do?  involving the 
question-begging perspective of whether or not to give effect to a normal meaning 
of the terms;
215
 whereas an objective one assumes that [treaties] bind because 
considerations of teleology, utility, reciprocity, good faith or justice require this.
216
 
However, as he points out, the normal textual interpretation, which seems to be 
supported both by the subjective as well as the objective understanding (what was agreed 
and expressed is most likely to be in the interests of justice) fails in logic, as it assumes 
what was to be proved; that the expression has a certain meaning instead of another 
one.
217
 The fact that a matter concerning this has come to adjudication proves that the 
ascertainment of the normal requires interpretation .
218
 Further, if intent is to be the 
goal of interpretation, it cannot be used as a means for attaining it.
219
 An objective 
approach cannot be employed to discover what it was that was consented to, either; the 
system simultaneously denies there to be such a thing as an objective normality or any 
other non-subjective criterion by which the contractual relationship could be evaluated. 
Because it tells us only that we cannot proceed beyond our subjective views about such 
                                                 
215 Koskenniemi (1989), p.293. 
216 Ibid., p.291. For further discussion of the concept of justice and the role of interpretation in achieving this, 
see Koskenniemi, Ibid., p.293, footnote 90; and s.4.2.2, infra. 
217 Ibid., p.292. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid., p.294. 
 87
matters and that nobody has any duty to defer to anothers subjective views.
220
 
The imperfect answer in the end is to look again to VCLT, to examine the matters which 
are supposed to be held in tension, and to consider them together, as the ILC argued was 
to be the case at the time of VCLTs drafting. That is, to take into account the text, the 
context, the object and purpose; plus an aspect which may be the sum of these parts, or 
may go beyond them  effectiveness. Sinclair argues the fine difference which takes 
effective beyond object and purpose,
221
 citing the ILC: 
When a treaty is open to two interpretations one of which does and one of which does not 
enable the treaty to have appropriate effects, good faith and the objects and purpose of the treaty 
demand that the former interpretation should be adopted.
222
  
The question is, therefore, what may be considered to be appropriate effects in the 
context of a human rights treaty, and what interpretive theories it is valid to deploy. The 
HRC considered this problem in Dias v. Angola, noting that Article 9 of the ICCPR 
protects the right to security of person also outside the context of formal deprivation of 
liberty, otherwise the Covenant guarantees would be rendered ineffective.
223
 
Toufayan suggests five bases of interpretation; (1) the treaty text, (2) the legislative 
history, (3) the context, (4) the object and purpose, (5) logic. It is suggested that his (2), 
the legislative history, is covered in the discussion above by the term context, and that 
Toufayans use of context, which he associate[s] with the contextual or systematic 
method which appreciates the meaning of terms in their nearer or wider context is 
confusing in the light of VCLTs own use of the term context (Article 31(2)); and that 
                                                 
220 This point is raised, below, in the context of moral intuition and the search for justice: see text accompanying 
n.700, infra. 
221 See Sinclair (1973) pp.74-76. 
222 1966 ILC Reports, p.50, and in Sinclair (1973) at p.75. 
223 Para.8.3. See also Delgado Paez, para.5.5. 
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(5), the logical method which favours rational techniques of reasoning and such abstract 
legal principles as per analogiam, a contrario, contra proferentem, ejusdem generis, etc., 
is a merging of the ordinary meaning of the terms used, and the object and purpose, 
and for the present purposes, that is the interpretation of one specific term, the right to 
life, in one particular kind of treaty, human rights, it is sufficient to address the issues by 
the three approaches given above, with their somewhat different interpretations from 
those understood by Toufayan as being a classification [which] corresponds to a large 
extent with the current state of international law on the subject.
224
  
2.3.3 AN INTERPRETIVE TAXONOMY 
Three approaches to interpretation were suggested, above: textual, teleological, and 
contextual. The taxonomy used here will take three of Toufayans bases and adapt them to 
those three categories: 
Textual: associated with the textual or grammatical method which focuses on the 
expression of the common will of the parties
225
 and to include relevant logic: which 
favours rational techniques of reasoning,
226
 and the contextual or systematic method 
which appreciates the meaning of terms in their nearer and wider context.
227
 
Teleological: the object and purpose, associated with the teleological or functional 
method which concentrates on the object and purpose of the treaty and will, if necessary, 
transcend the confines of the text
228
 and which may also includes aspects of logical 
                                                 
224 Toufayan, supra n.150, p.7, and footnote 30. 
225 Ibid., p.7, point (1). 
226 Ibid., p.7, point (5). 
227 Ibid., p.7, point (3). 
228 Ibid., p.7, point (4). 
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application.
229
 
Context: Article 31 of the VCLTs provisions, which include the text itself, its preamble 
and annexes, and agreements or instruments made in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty or subsequently; and, in light of Article 31(4): A special meaning shall be 
given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended, also the legislative history 
associated with the subjective or historical method which seeks to extract the real 
intentions of the drafters and, consequently, encourages recourse to travaux 
préparatoires.
230
 
There is necessarily some overlap between these, plus some additional points to take into 
account, but these matters will become apparent as they are now further considered in 
respect of human rights in general, and specifically with regard to the right to life 
provision in treaty texts. 
i Textual approach 
Klabbers has described a concept of treaty, which he bases upon the works of Hart, 
Thirlway and Fitzmaurice;
231
 states have entered into treaties and as soon as there is 
some form of agreement, international legal rights and/or obligations are created.
232
 That 
obligation may well be felt to go beyond the letter of the law; consider the phraseology 
of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, which state that in cases not 
                                                 
229 Ibid., p.7, point (5). Sinclair, supra n.206, p.75, suggests that a true teleological approach may diffe[r] from an 
approach based on effectiveness, since it can be argued that the effective interpretation of a treaty is a matter of 
necessity based upon the presumed interest of the authors to make the treaty provision effective rather than 
ineffective, whereas interpretation by reference to the object and purpose of a treaty requires a subjective 
appreciation by the would-be interpreter of what were the aims of the parties. However, he counters this by the 
reflection that the true object and purpose of the treaty is to be gained from its own terms, particularly its 
preamble, and therefore the danger of an excessive departure from the text is minimised. Further, the object 
and purpose is only one element of the general rule, and a subsidiary element at that. 
230 Ibid., p.7, point (2). 
231 Klabbers (1996) 
232 Ibid., at  p.13. 
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covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the protection of the 
principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.
233
 It is obviously 
envisaged that protecting the human person is an overriding principle, and that even 
where there is not specifically a law that can be applied, life should be preserved where at 
all possible. This suggestion is open to all sorts of riders and caveats, and will be 
considered further, in the next chapter; the present question is the interpretation of the law 
that is there. It is suggested that a broad focus of interpretation ought to be accepted as a 
basis for protecting life; if, as asserted by the Geneva Conventions, above, the principles 
of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience apply even where the law does not, 
then where there is law, it is envisaged that it should not be hampered in its application by 
a rigorous and restrictive interpretation. 
Such an interpretation would immediatiely run into some difficulties, anyway, with 
respect to those treaty texts which, rather grandly, proclaim that the right to life shall be 
protected by law. The semantic limitations of the phrase must be borne in mind. The 
right to life is not an entity; the expression does not even include the full formulation of 
the right in any article, nor make linguistic sense in the way that a right to be free from 
torture or right to a fair trial might do.
234
 It is instructive to note here the debate between 
Belgiums Lebeau and Frances Cassin, recorded in the UDHR travaux, on whether there 
needed to be a specifically right to life provision: Lebeau argued that the wording needed 
to be Everyone has the right to protection of his life.
235
 There is no right to life; 
Vasseleu writes, in the context of patent law, of life as a gift, that the gift of life is given 
                                                 
233 Preamble, Protocol II, and Article 1(2), Protocol I, 1977, Geneva Conventions. 
234 See UDHR travaux regarding the right to life as a right to existence: UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.1/3. 
235 See also UN Doc. E/CN.4/SR.53, pp.1-3, and p.35 in Schabas. 
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by an unknowable other.
236
 From wherever life comes, it is not in the panoply of State 
obligation to bestow it, though it may be in the States power to take it away. 
The Article which is the subject of this thesis is usually expressed in a less than useful 
fashion as the right to life; an expression that suggests that the right to life is protected, as 
a human right, rather than the life of the individual being protected as of right by law.
237
 
This is a fundamental difference. The point being made here is that one can have a right to 
have ones life protected  as is seen in Article 1 of the Convention on Assistance in the 
Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency: The States Parties shall 
cooperate between themselves and with the International Atomic Energy Agency  to 
facilitate prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency to 
minimize its consequences and to protect life, property and the environment from the 
effects of radioactive releases;
238
 but protecting ones right to life is a rather different, 
more metaphysical, question. It will be seen that the emphasis of the texts is variable 
across the relevant human rights treaties, and it has been expressed in different terms: 
sometimes as a simple assertion of the individuals right, as in ADRDM, sometimes more 
specifically.
239
  
ii Teleological approach 
To reiterate what was noted above regarding the teleological (or functional) approach to 
treaty interpretation, this method concentrates on the object and purpose of the treaty, if 
necessary, transcend[ing] the confines of the text, possibly including aspects of logical 
                                                 
236 Vasseleu, Patent Pending: laws of invention, patent life forms and bodies as ideas in Cheah, Fraser and 
Grbich (eds.) (1996), p.113. 
237 See supra, n.235.  
238 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
239 Supra, s.2.2.1. 
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application.
240
 Addo and Grief, in the context of a discussion of Article 3 of the 
ECHR,
241
 draw attention to the relative brevity of the text, which masks the volume and 
variety as well as the complexity of the issues engendered by its terms.
242
 The same 
could certainly be said of the right to life Article, in that treaty and in the others where it 
finds a place, and Addo and Griefs proposition regarding the conclusions that must be 
drawn from the failure to provide more detail is illuminating also in the current context. 
They expect that skeletal norms will be fleshed out through subsequent State practice, the 
adoption of more specific treaties  and especially judicial elaboration.
243
 What States 
believe they are expected to do, and what human rights bodies and others make of the 
texts, will provide the meat on the bare bones of the text, in order that the object and 
purpose of the treaty may be fulfilled. 
The ECtHR referred to the object and purpose of the Convention in the context of 
Article 2 in Tahsin Acar v. Turkey: 
Article 2 of the Convention ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the 
Convention, from which no derogation is permitted. Together with Article 3 of the Convention, 
it also enshrines one of the basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of 
Europe. The object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of 
individual human rights requires that these provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make 
its safeguards practical and effective .244  
The question to be considered, of course, is how to make the object and purpose of the 
right to life Article, wherever and in whatever form it is found, practical and effective,
245
 
                                                 
240 Supra, n.229 and accompanying text. 
241 The Article relating to the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
242 Addo and Grief (1998), p.510. 
243 Ibid. 
244 Para.209. 
245 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, 09/10/1979, para.24: The Convention is intended to guarantee not rights that are 
theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective. 
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and raises the debate introduced above by Sinclair, the connection between respecting and 
achieving the object and purpose of the treaty, and the need to make the treaty effective 
in a current context that may be very different from anything ever envisaged during the 
creation of the treaty. Sinclairs understanding drew from the ILC to add good faith to 
the object and purpose requirement in order to enable the treaty to have appropriate 
effects.
246
 It is suggested here that effectiveness for the right to life Articles can be 
achieved in part by allowing a dynamic and evolutive interpretation, in keeping with a 
concept of the treaties as living instruments,
247
 and making an autonomous definition of 
the terms human and life, and that this interpretation can be supported by reference to 
Article 31(1), (3)(b), and (4) of the VCLT. An autonomous interpretation can be 
recognised within the contextual approach, which will now be addressed. 
iii Contextual approach 
The contextual approach includes, as well as the text itself, its preamble and annexes, and 
agreements or instruments made in connection with the conclusion of the treaty or 
subsequently. Article 31(4) of the VCLT also allows for an autonomous definition of 
terms: A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so 
intended. Contextual interpretation in the taxonomy being employed here would include 
recourse to the travaux préparatoires, seeking what it was that the parties intended, and 
ascertaining if that is helpful in view of the other contextual elements to be taken into 
consideration. The contextual approach involves a number of elements, rather than being 
driven by one aspect to the exclusion of all others. 
In other disciplines, interpretation has employed very similar methods to good effect: for 
                                                 
246 Supra, n.222. 
247 See infra, s.2.3.4.iii. 
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instance Edwards and Townshend
248
 present, in the historical forum, interpretive theories 
including political, economic, and social context.
249
 It is an intrinsically robust 
approach, taking the treaty text under review in its wider context, which in the current 
case would mean not only taking into account wider issues regarding the particular Article 
itself, but also means not examining the right to life provision separately from the other 
substantive rights that surround it, or from the articles designed to give effect to those 
rights. The preambles would also be included; ECHR and ACHPR include reference to 
UDHR, and the motives and principles driving that global instrument are therefore of 
relevance in the context of these regional instruments also. 
Other instruments signed at the time or subsequently are of import, which, it is suggested, 
brings the Genocide Convention into play. Unusally, the Genocide Convention is 
specifically mentioned in another Convention, Articles 6(2) and (3) of the ICCPR, and 
with the intention of giving the fullest possible effect to the Genocide Convention. The 
matter of genocide, it is suggested, was at the forefront of the drafters and signatories 
minds, when concluding the major international human rights instruments. The preamble 
to the UN Charter confirms this worldview: 
We, the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the 
equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under 
                                                 
248 Further, [ others focus] on psychological motivation, or more exclusively on the text itself. Edwards and 
Townshend explain the Cambridge Schools contribution to political philosophy, in setting the works of the 
great political thinkers in their historical context: Laslett traced Lockes Two Treatises of Government back from 
their publication in 1690 to their composition at least ten years earlier.  At a stroke, the reading of a central 
but always troublesome text was transformed; it had been mistaken by interpreters in a fundamental sense. A 
text of this kind, written post-1688, after the Glorious Revolution, was a cosy justification of the status quo. The 
same text, now identified as written much earlier, became a revolutionary call to arms. This most basic assertion 
of historical fact helped to turn the study of political thought towards a more contextualist focus. Edwards and 
Townshend (2002) at p.3; and citing Laslett, (1998). 
249 (2002), at p.5. 
 95
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom 
250
 
The Charter, UDHR, the Genocide Convention and ICCPR can all be read together, at 
least in the respect of gaining a contextualist focus
251
 of the overriding object and 
purpose of the human rights treaties in general, and the right to life provision in particular. 
Mass loss of life was a driving force in the establishment and practices of the UN, and of 
the regional bodies who seek to confirm respect for human rights as a fundamental basis 
for inter- and intra-State action.
252
 
The national picture is of major relevance also in working towards a coherent theory of 
treaty interpretation. Choudhry offers a theory of comparative constitutional interpretation 
which analyses constitutional jurisprudence in three modes, which he refers to as 
universalist, dialogical and genealogical.
253
 The first aims to inform by the determination 
of universal principles; the second, by considering judgements from other jurisdictions 
and deciding whether or not they are of relevance to the current jurisdiction and context, 
engaging in a process of justification.
254
 Choudhry explains the final mode: The starting 
point for the genealogical use of comparative case law is a family relationship between 
two legal systems, one of which is the source of comparative insight for the other.
255
 The 
point is made here that there is such a family relationship between the international and 
regional human rights systems, and that the principles which they strive to apply are 
                                                 
250 Preamble, UN Charter, entered into force October 24, 1945. For an interpretation of We, the Peoples in the 
context of current human rights discourses, see McCorquodale (2004). 
251 Edwards and Townshend, supra n.248. 
252 See Charter of Paris, infra, n.684 and accompanying text. 
253 Choudhry (1999). 
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid, p.866. 
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universal, so that there is a de facto dialogue between the bodies which is entirely for the 
good of the ultimate aim, a universal standard of human rights protection.
256
 This point 
was well made by the President of the IACtHR, Judge Trindade, whose position is that: 
Human rights treaties such as the European and American Conventions have,  by means 
of such interpretative interaction, reinforced each other mutually, to the ultimate benefit of the 
protected human beings. Interpretative interaction has in a way contributed to the universality of 
the conventional law on the protection of human rights. This has paved the way for a uniform 
interpretation of the corpus juris of contemporary International Human Rights Law.257 
As noted earlier, the nature of human rights treaties, are sui generis: they create, over and 
above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the 
words of the Preamble benefit from a collective enforcement.258  
2.3.4 EVOLVING TREATY INTERPRETATION 
i Changing context 
In terms of an evolving interpretation, there is the age-old problem of defining 
understandings. Drafters may have put a word into a treaty without adding an explanation 
of terms, because they believed that they, and everyone else, understood what it meant; 
and, either at the time or later, problems may become apparent. In the case of the right to 
life, this is well demonstrated by the current understanding of what it is to be alive, to 
have life, as opposed to the understanding of half a century ago, before assisted 
reproduction, ventilators, and brain death protocols, as well as some of the more 
metaphysical change in understandings and beliefs regarding such matters as eternal life 
came about. Those who drafted UDHR knew who was alive and who was dead; they 
                                                 
256 See infra, n.858 and accompanying text. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Ibid. 
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might not be so certain if faced with an in vitro embryo, or a beating-heart donor of 
organs for transplant, waiting to be harvested. Law needs to be able to determine lifes 
boundaries for its own autonomous purposes, and those purposes may be different from 
the doctors, or the priests, or the relatives, or the communitys, or the States; the 
purposes of human rights may be different from those of municipal law in general or 
international law in particular. How legitimate is it to develop a particular definition of a 
term, specific to a single discipline, in order to give effect to that disciplines objectives? 
The terms in question here are human and life, terms not known for being amenable to 
specific definition in any discipline. It is necessary, in some instances, to consult the 
preparatory works of treaties in order to find out what it was that was intended, and where 
necessary, it may be appropriate to move on. 
ii Recourse to travaux préparatoires 
Where the treaty terms are either obscure ab initio, or have become insufficiently definite 
due to the treaties presence in a changing world
259
  points to be addressed in the next 
chapter in respect of the identity of the rights-bearer  it is suggested here that recourse 
may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of 
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.
260
 This could help, not only in a 
positive sense of confirming an approach, or a definition of terms, as being intended for 
the treaty, but also in what might be seen as a more negative sense, in that reference to 
drafting materials, procès-verbaux or travaux préparatoires, could show clearly that the 
situation now prevailing was not envisaged, as could also be confirmed by reference to 
the circumstances of the treatys conclusion. 
                                                 
259 See Hart (1949). 
260 Article 31 of the VCLT. 
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Sinclair argues that although the question of recourse to travaux préparatoires has often 
been regarded as the touchstone which serves to distinguish the adherents of the textual 
approach from the adherents of the intentions approach,
261
 the coherence of this 
suggestion is ill-founded. Those who are looking for elucidation of the text of a treaty will 
be approaching the travaux in a different manner from those who seek to find the 
intentions of the parties independently of the text.  
Schabas points out, in considering the scope of right to life provisions in international 
human rights law based on travaux préparatoires (specifically in this instance, of what 
became Article 3 of the UDHR) that care must be taken; the exercise goes beyond treaty 
interpretation. 
Resort to the travaux préparatoires is less appropriate in the context of international human 
rights law than with respect to other types of treaties, because the former merits an interpretation 
that goes beyond the intention of its drafters. By its very nature, international human rights law 
must be dynamic, adapting and evolving with progress in social thought and attitudes.
262
 
The ECtHR has commented upon a developing interpretation with regard to what might 
have been intended at the time of drafting in Loizidou v. Turkey, where, in respect of the 
Courts enforcement machinery provisions, it was stated that  these provisions cannot 
be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of their authors as expressed more 
than forty years ago. That is, the authors intentions need not be the guiding principle 
now: [a]ccordingly, even if it had been established, which is not the case, that 
restrictions, other than those ratione temporis, were considered permissible under Articles 
25 and 46  at a time when a minority of the present Contracting Parties adopted the 
                                                 
261 Ibid., p.72. 
262 Schabas, (2002), at p.40. 
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Convention, such evidence could not be decisive.
263
 The idea of justifying an evolving and 
dynamic interpretation will be returned to throughout this thesis, but the scene can be set by 
reference to a case brought under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:  
[T]he Charter is not the product of a few individual public servants, however distinguished, 
but of a multiplicity of individuals who played major roles in the negotiating, drafting and 
adoption of the Charter. How can one say with any confidence that within this enormous 
multiplicity of actors, without forgetting the role of the provinces, the comments of a few federal 
civil servants can in any way be determinative?
 264 
One approach in international law places heavy reliance on positions clearly expressed in 
travaux préparatoires, as indicators of the drafters intentions. For instance in Chitat Ng v. 
Canada, a HRC communication involving extradition to face the death penalty, an argument 
in favour of close adherence to States original presumed consensus was strongly affirmed 
by the extraditing State, Canada, who submitted that: 
[A] decision to extend the Covenant to extradition treaties or to individual decisions 
pursuant thereto, would stretch the principles governing the interpretation of human rights 
instruments in unreasonable and unacceptable ways. It would be unreasonable because the 
principles of interpretation which recognize that human rights instruments are living documents 
and that human rights evolve over time cannot be employed in the face of express limits to the 
application of a given document. The absence of extradition from the articles of the Covenant 
when read with the intention of the drafters must be taken as an express limitation.265 
For others, taking a narrow viewpoint, restricted to what it is believed the drafters 
intended, could be, in Campbells terms, an example of the limitation of human rights by 
particularisation, which often leads to a limiting of the concept of rights, as 
                                                 
263 Supra, n.90 
264 Supreme Court of Canada [SCC], Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, In the matter of the Constitutional Question 
Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.63, and in the matter of the Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 
1979, c.288, as amended by the Motor Vehicle Amendment Act, 1982, 1982 (B.C.), c.36, para.51. Cited by 
Chaskalson P., in the Constitutional Court of the Republic of South Africa [SACC] The State v. T. Makwanyane 
and M. Mchunu, 06/06/1995, para.18. 
265 Ibid., para.9.2. 
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compromises, exceptions and restrictions are made to these rights.
266
 Whilst there may be 
some arguments for remaining true to the historical context of their drafting, this 
proposition was refuted by counsel for the applicant in Chitat Ng v. Canada.
267
 
Unfortunately the HRC at that time sidestepped the issue raised by the State party, that 
[t]he absence of extradition from the articles of the Covenant when read with the 
intention of the drafters must be taken as an express limitation,
268
 by focussing on 
Canadas responsibility to secure the protection of the human rights of those within its 
territory.
269
 Whilst this is a reasonable focus per se, an interpretation which accepted an 
absence from the Articles of a treaty as an express limitation could, as attempted in 
this case, be used to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Such a defeat would have 
great significance for those whose human rights in general, and right to life in particular, 
can only be protected by reliance upon an evolving and dynamic interpretation.
270
 The 
HRC were to recognise this subsequently: see Judge v. Canada.
271
 The IACtHR have 
                                                 
266 Campbell (1986), Introduction: Realizing Human Rights in Campbell et al. (Eds.) (1986) at p.1, and in 
McCorquodale, (Ed.) (2003) Introduction, p.xii; see also Plomer, (2002), for analysis of the problems caused by 
particularisation in a UK statute, the 1990 HFE Act. 
267 Para.11.5. 
268 Ibid., para.9.2. 
269 On the history of extradition from Canada to face the death penalty, see also HRC, Kindler v. Canada, 
30/07/1993; Cox v. Canada, 31/10/1994; Judge v. Canada, infra, n.279, and accompanying text. 
270 There is not scope here to enter into this subject in detail. See generally ECtHR, Sigurjonsson v. Iceland (1993) 
paras.33-35. See also the concurring Individual Opinion by Messrs. Kurt Herndl and Waleed Sadi in HRC, Cox 
v. Canada, which expressed the matters to be taken into consideration: Views of 31/10/1994, citing Oppenheim, 
International Law, 1992 edition, Vol.1, p.1271. Herndl and Sadis viewpoint is that the ascertainable will of the 
drafters should be taken fully into account in any interpretation of a human rights treaty, but that since the 
primary beneficiaries of human rights treaties are not States or governments but human beings, the protection 
of human rights calls for a more liberal approach than that normally applicable in the case of ambiguous 
provisions of multilateral treaties. 
271 Supra, n.279. Further, the HRC noted (para.10.3): Significantly, the Committee notes that since Kindler the 
State party itself has recognized the need to amend its own domestic law to secure the protection of those 
extradited from Canada under sentence of death in the receiving state, in the case of United States v. Burns. There, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the government must seek assurances, in all but exceptional cases, that 
the death penalty will not be applied prior to extraditing an individual to a state where he/she faces capital 
punishment. It is pertinent to note that under the terms of this judgement, Other abolitionist countries do not, 
in general, extradite without assurances.[Footnote omitted: emphasis in original]. 
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issued an Advisory Opinion in which a case is made for moving on from the drafters 
intention: 
The American Declaration has its basis in the idea that the international protection of the 
rights of man should be the principal guide of an evolving American law.  This American law 
has evolved from 1948 to the present; international protective measures, subsidiary and 
complementary to national ones, have been shaped by new instruments. As the International 
Court of Justice said: an international instrument must be interpreted and applied within the 
overall framework of the juridical system in force at the time of the interpretation That is why 
the Court finds it necessary to point out that to determine the legal status of the American 
Declaration it is appropriate to look to the inter-American system of today in the light of the 
evolution it has undergone since the adoption of the Declaration, rather than to examine the 
normative value and significance which that instrument was believed to have had in 1948.
272
  
It is appropriate to look, also, to the world of today in the light of all that has passed, and 
all that has changed, since the first formulation of human rights instruments, over half a 
century ago. If the UDHR was being drafted now, it would be a very different 
Declaration. 
iii Living Instrument 
The evolution of human rights was first discerned by the ECtHR in Tyrer v. UK, when the 
Convention was described as a living instrument, which, as the Commission rightly 
stressed, must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions;
273
 it is a theme has 
been taken up by the IACtHR, as an expression of global legal practice, for instance being 
raised in the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tigni Community Case: Furthermore, such human 
rights treaties are live instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of the 
                                                 
272 Interpretation of the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man within the Framework of 
Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion of 14/07/1989, (Requested by the 
Republic of Colombia), para.37, citing ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Rep. 1971, p.16 at 31. 
273 Para.31. 
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times and, specifically, to current living conditions.
274
 The living instrument theme has 
been taken up as a principle pervasive across the boundaries of regional and international 
human rights law and public international law,
275
 something also noted by the European 
Committee of Social Rights [ECSR],
276
 who have observed that: 
27. The Charter was envisaged as a human rights instrument to complement the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It is a living instrument dedicated to certain values which 
inspired it: dignity, autonomy, equality and solidarity. The rights guaranteed are not ends in 
themselves but they complete the rights enshrined in the European Convention of Human 
Rights.
277
 
The ECSR commented in World Organisation against Torture (OMCT) v. Greece that: 
The Committee furthermore recalls that the Charter is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in light of developments in the national law of member states of the Council of 
Europe as well as relevant international instruments.
278
 
The evolving nature of human rights jurisprudence has been explicitly commented upon 
by the human rights bodies, for instance the HRC in Judge v. Canada:  
[T]here may be exceptional situations in which a review of the scope of application of the 
rights protected in the Covenant is required, such as where an alleged violation involves that 
most fundamental of rights  the right to life  and in particular if there have been notable 
factual and legal developments and changes in international opinion in respect of the issue raised 
 The Committee considers that the Covenant should be interpreted as a living instrument and 
                                                 
274 Para.146. See also Solemn Hearing of the ECtHR, on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year, 
22/01/2004: Speech by Judge Trindade, President, IACtHR, The development of international human rights law by the 
operation and the case-law of the European and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights, para.6. 
275 The ICJ in the Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), 25/09/1997, 
para.112, noted that because as the Court recalled in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life 
and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn, States must be prepared to recognise an 
evolving obligation in international law. [Citation omitted]. See also Gabcíkovo, paras.53, 140. Other 
jurisdictions have made use of the development; the Treaty of Waitangi, concluded on the 6 February 1840, 
between the Maori of New Zealand and the British Crown, has been described late in the twentieth century as 
being a living instrument. See Te Runanga O Muriwhenua v Attorney-General [1990] at 655. 
276 Committee of Independent Experts established under Article 25 of the ESC. 
277 ECSR, International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v France, para.27. 
278 Para.31, 7/12/2004. See also OMCT v. Ireland, para.63; OMCT v. Italy, para.41; OMCT v. Portugal, para.34; 
OMCT v. Belgium, para.38. 
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the rights protected under it should be applied in context and in the light of present-day 
conditions.
279
  
The HRC have commented in Pohl et al. v. Austria that the Covenant must be interpreted 
in the light of changing social standards and perceptions.
280
 Further, see the ECtHR in 
Selmouni v. France:   
The Court has previously examined cases in which it concluded that there had been 
treatment which could only be described as torture  However, having regard to the fact that 
the Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day 
conditions, the Court considers that certain acts which were classified in the past as 
inhuman and degrading treatment as opposed to torture could be classified differently in 
future. It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the 
protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires 
greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies.
281
 
The living instrument theme may be observed as being applicable not only to the 
substantive provisions of human rights treaties, but also to procedural aspects.
282
 
However, Mowbray points out the European Courts failure to theoretically justify its 
development of what has become an important thesis, with ramifications stretching across 
all the human rights jurisdictions:
 
 
 the Court generally eschews abstract theorising
283
 and favours the incremental 
evolution of its principles. Nevertheless, and given the benefit of hindsight, as the doctrine was 
to become the basis of considerable judicial creativity, it would have been beneficial if the Court 
in Tyrer had expanded upon the reasons for its adoption of such a doctrine.
284
 
                                                 
279 Judge v. Canada, 05/08/2002, para.10.3. 
280 HRC, Pohl et al. v. Austria, endnote 10. Citing Broeks v. The Netherlands, 09/04/1987, at para.14; Zwaan-de Vries 
v. The Netherlands, 09/04/1987, at para.14. 
281 Selmouni v. France, 28/07/1999, para.101. 
282 Loizidou v. Turkey, Preliminary Objections, para.71. 
283 For example, it has refused to offer a general theory of the positive obligations upon States arising under the 
Convention: Plattform 'Ärzte für das Leben' v Austria, A 139 (1988); (1991) 13 EHRR 204 at para.31. Mowbray 
(2005), footnote 20. 
284 Ibid., p.61. 
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The argument of this thesis is that there have indeed been notable factual and legal 
developments and changes in international opinion in the case of that most fundamental 
right, and that therefore human rights treaties must be interpreted in light of 
developments in the national law of member states of the Council of Europe as well as 
relevant international instruments. Such developments in  relevant international 
instruments can be noted in both substantive and procedural aspects: for example, treaties 
now are often drafted differently. It would not be appropriate to expect that a 
straightforward textual interpretation, to whatever extent such a thing is possible, can be 
exercised in the same manner with the older generation of treaties as it is with the new. 
To take an example, the Optional Protocol to the UN CRC, on the Sale of Children, Child 
Prostitution, and Child Pornography, is a text of much later date than the initial human 
rights instruments, having entered into force on 18 January 2002.
285
 It represents a newer 
generation of international treaties,
286
 in that it takes care to define terms
287
 and to clearly 
articulate the nature of the obligations which States are undertaking by becoming parties 
to the treaty. States will put effective national law in place in respect of the obligations 
covered by the treaty, civil, criminal, or administrative;
288
 appropriate penalties
289
 will 
                                                 
285 See also Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in 
Armed Conflicts, entered into force on 12 February 2002.  
See also the Apartheid Convention, Article IV: 
The States Parties to the present Convention undertake:  
(a) To adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress as well as to prevent any encouragement of 
the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist policies or their manifestations and to punish persons guilty of 
that crime;  
(b) To adopt legislative, judicial and administrative measures to prosecute, bring to trial and punish in 
accordance with their jurisdiction persons responsible for, or accused of, the acts defined in article II of the 
present Convention, whether or not such persons reside in the territory of the State in which the acts are 
committed or are nationals of that State or of some other State or are stateless persons. 
286 See for instance the definitions texts of the Convention on Biodiversity, the Cartagena Protocol to that 
Convention, on Biosafety. 
287 Article 2. 
288 Aticle 3(1,2,4); Article 9. See Article 4 on jurisdiction. 
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punish infringements of that law, tak[ing] into account their grave nature.
290
 These 
measures are subject to the provisions of national law and national legal principles, and to 
the requirements of international law.
291
 Whilst a clear definition of terms and obligations 
can itself present difficulties,
292
 it is generally to be welcomed when carefully drafted. 
The earlier treaties, not enjoying the benefits of such clarity, therefore present a different 
interpretive challenge. Given that, as Koskenniemi noted, there is a question-begging 
perspective in attempting to give a normal meaning to any treaty term,
293
 the lack of 
definition  in the current context, of either the rights-bearer, the human, (and its 
associated terms, everyone, person, etc.
294
) or of the nature of the right protected, 
life, means that some kind of interpretation is required, other than a very straightforward 
textual one. Both teleological and contextual approaches, as described above, can 
legitimately be employed to justify an evolving and dynamic interpretation, that which 
has been described as accepting that the treaties are living instruments. A living 
instrument interpretive approach, not only applies in such matters as understanding what 
is the field of application of the text, but in the standards applied, as shown by the ECtHR 
in Selmouni v. France: 
having regard to the fact that the Convention is a living instrument which must be 
interpreted in the light of present-day conditions  the Court considers that certain acts which 
were classified in the past as inhuman and degrading treatment as opposed to torture could 
                                                                                                                                                  
289 Aticle 3(3). 
290 Ibid.  
291 Article 6.  
292 Particularisation, in Campbells terms: supra, n.266 and accompanying text. See e.g. Article 3 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, n.373, infra, which prohibits some very specific actions, such as 
reproductive cloning (not an exact scientific term) and selection for eugenic purposes, without offering definitions 
 what is a eugenic purpose?  or considering the possibility of problems arising, related to similar but unlisted 
practices. 
293 Koskenniemi (1989), p.293; see discussion, supra at n.215 and accompanying text. 
294 See s.3.2.1, infra, for a discussion of these terms as found in the treaties. 
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be classified differently in future. It takes the view that the increasingly high standard being 
required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly 
and inevitably requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of 
democratic societies.
295
 
The assertion that the treaties must adapt to the evolution of the times and, specifically, 
to current living conditions, and also that their provisions must be seen in the light of 
changing social standards and perceptions, views reiterated in one form or another by all 
the human rights bodies cited above, show that an approach which accepts the need for a 
dynamic and evolving response to challenges, unknown in the past,
296
 is accepted across 
the board, and indeed legitimated by an understanding of textual, teleological and 
contextual treaty interpretation. 
iv Autonomous definition of terms 
It is not unknown for human rights discourse to present an autonomous definition of a 
particular situation. For instance, the ECtHR has developed its own understanding of what 
constitutes a criminal charge, in order to effectively adjudicate fair-trial guarantees,
297
 as 
there is not a European-wide consensus (where seeking consensus is itself an interpretive 
doctrine).
298
 In Engel et al. v. The Netherlands, the Court made it clear that the purpose of 
its intervention in disputing the status  essentially, the definition  of an offence in the 
national legal system was in order to promote the object and purpose of the Convention. 
States were allowed discretion, but it was affirmed that the autonomy of the concept of 
                                                 
295 28/07/199, para.101. [Citations omitted]. 
296 The right to life is intimately bound up with the right to marry and found a family, and with the right to 
respect for private and family life, as variously expressed in the treaties. It was not envisaged at the time of 
drafting that a situation such as that experienced by the Drewitt Barlow family, infra, n.655, could or would ever 
be possible. 
297 First articulated in a case involving military disciplinary charges, Engel et al. v. Netherlands, (1976), para.81. See 
also Harris, OBoyle and Warbrick (1995), pp.166-73.  
298 For a discussion of the living instrument theme in respect of a European consensus doctrine, see Erdman 
(2003), Benvenisti (1999). 
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criminal operates, as it were, one way only.
299
 That is, States are free to classify any 
infringement as criminal, but not to classify anything which the Court has included in its 
understanding of a criminal offence  generally in relation to the penalty to be extended  
as civil or disciplinary, thereby sidestepping fair trial guarantees which apply only to 
criminal offences.
300
 It seems logical therefore that States ought to be able to extend the 
protection of the right to life as broadly as they wish in determining to whom it should 
refer, and establishing the scope of the life protected, in order to promote an object and 
purpose of the Convention, as provided in Article 2, but not any more narrowly than the 
Court has determined. 
v Reference to National Application 
A living instrument interpretive approach can also take into account the jurisprudence 
built upon the Bills of Rights which are included in a number of Constitutions, and which 
are equally vehicles of the same universal principles, either finding their own basis in 
UDHR or in some cases providing the genealogical roots of the rights themselves,
301
 
facilitating therefore a dialogue between the human rights jurisprudence of the 
international and regional bodies and the Constitutional and Supreme Courts as being 
entirely in order. The supremacy of human rights observance can be seen in many 
instances in constitutional materials, such as this comment taken from the IAComHR 
deliberations in the case of Osvaldo Antonio López: , immediately after assuming its 
duties on December 10, 1983, the Argentine Constitutional Government adopted several 
                                                 
299 Supra n.297, end para.81. 
300 See also Ezeh and Connors v. United Kingdom, 09/10/2003, on reference to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
from its 15/07/2002; and The Competition Commission of South Africa v. Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa 
(Pty) Ltd. et al., 21/08/2003, paras.31-51, for a critique of Engel, esp. para. 51(3) Yet, even within the European 
jurisprudence there is a history of strong dissents that suggest that the expansive notion of what is criminal is 
problematic for nation states. 
301 See Colon-Collazo, supra, n.94, at p.33. 
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provisions aimed at full restoration of the rule of law and unrestricted enjoyment of basic 
human rights and freedoms.
302
 
Constitutional jurisprudence is also prepared to draw from the work of human rights 
bodies, as the SACC has shown in Makwanyane. In a discussion of customary 
international law and the ratification and accession to international agreements under the 
Constitution of South Africa, decisions of bodies dealing with comparable instruments, 
such as the HRC, the IACtHR, the ECommHR and ECtHR could all be used to provide a 
framework within which [aspects of the Constitution] can be evaluated and 
understood.
303
 
vi The right to life as a right to live  
Evolving interpretation of the human right to life can be claimed as a basis for a new and 
dynamic understanding of the right; that is, that it includes the right to live, i.e. to have 
lifes necessities supported. This is something which has been most strongly supported in 
the national cases introduced above: the right to housing, for instance, in India, in ISC 
Olga Tellis et al. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation et al., in Bangladesh in Ain O Salish 
Kendro (ASK) et al. v Government of Bangladesh et al., and in South Africa, in 
Grootboom.
304
 If the wording of the right to life texts is seen as representing a negative 
obligation (a narrow view) the hypothesis is that there is a positive aspect of that 
obligation, a requirement to promote life, which has been interpreted (in terms of a broad 
view) as a Right to Living.
305
 MacKays work
306
 offers an example of how the 
                                                 
302 30/6/1987, para.11. 
303 S. v. Makwanyane and Another, 06/06/1995, para.35. 
304 Government of Republic of South Africa et al. v Grootboom et al. 
305 See, e.g. Ramcharan, and Przetacznik, supra, n.78.  
306 MacKay (1998). 
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contribution of Ramcharan et al., introduced above,
307
 has developed in practice: 
In 1985, the IACHR examined the rights of the Yanomami people in the context of the 
construction of the Trans-Amazonia highway in Brazil, invasion of their territory by small-scale 
gold miners and devastating illnesses brought in by the miners.  The IACHR found, due to 
Brazil's failure to take timely measures to protect the Yanomami, that violations of, inter alia, 
the right to life and the right to preservation of health and well-being under the American 
Declaration had occurred  In reaching this conclusion, the IACHR reiterated the widely held 
conclusion that the right to life has broad application beyond intentional or arbitrary deprivation 
of life (Ramcharan 1985). It also requires that governments take affirmative steps to protect life 
by ensuring environmental integrity and promoting policies that guarantee basic survival of 
persons subject to state jurisdiction.
308
 
This point of view has been criticised, earlier in the drafting of the UDHR,
309
 the seminal 
text, and later, for instance by Bedau,
310
 who criticises the idea of a right to living, 
particularly for its lack of a sound philosophical basis, in seeking to broaden the remit of 
the right to life; Ramcharan submits that the narrow approach is no longer adequate.
311
 He 
disagrees in this with Dinstein,
312
 who questions whether there is an inherent right to life 
couched in nature and customary international law. That argument in its wider aspects is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, and is therefore only briefly introduced, although there is 
one aspect which will be seen to be of relevance, below: that of the concept of arbitrary 
deprivation of life. 
The slight re-emphasis in nomenclature in the current hypothesis, in placing the right to 
                                                 
307 Supra, n.78, and accompanying text. 
308 Ibid., p.11, citing IACtHR, Yanomami v. Brazil, 5 March 1985. See also IAComHR, The Human Rights Situation 
of the Indigenous People in the Americas, Chapter III, Doctrine and Jurisprudence of the IACHR on Indigenous 
Rights (1970-1999), para.1. Rights to life, personal liberty, and humane treatment; and Affidavit Of Dinah L. 
Shelton, Key affidavit on the alien tort claims act issue in Aguinda, et al. v. Texaco, Inc., regarding international 
law relating to the rights of persons abroad who complain of illnesses which they attribute to severe 
environmental contamination. 
309 See Kunz (1949).  
310 Supra, n.78. 
311 Supra, n.84. 
312 Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty in Henkin (1981) at p.115. 
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life as understood in early texts and adjudication into a framework described as a right to 
live serves to signify a major contextual difference, in that the right to live represents a 
totality of which the negatively-seen obligation  the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of 
life, represents only a part. The point is not that a right to live is a broader view of the 
right to life, but that the right to life cannot exist without a right to live. It is essential that 
the necessary conditions of life are protected before a situation in which the arbitrary 
deprivation of life, whether in a criminal justice or State use of lethal force context, 
becomes relevant. 
Contemporaneously with the drafting of UDHR, there was taking place in Paris, in July, 
1947 a meeting of a Committee of UNESCO,
313
 with a mandate to consider the theoretical 
bases of human rights. Philosophers and writers were consulted, including Mahatma 
Gandhi, Teilhard de Chardin, and Aldous Huxley. The result of the enquiry had the 
following to say on the right to live: 
The right to live is the condition and, as it were, the foundation of all other rights. It is the 
condition of other rights since it is the minimum human right. It is inseparably involved in the 
very existence of man. But to live is more than barely to exist, and it is therefore the right which 
makes specific all other rights since they mark the degree of well-being which man may achieve. 
All rights derive, on the one hand, from the nature of man as such and, on the other, since man 
depends on man, from the stage of development achieved by the social and political groups in 
which he participates. 314 
The commentary to the UNESCO draft remarks that: [o]ne group of rights is essentially 
connected with the provision of means for subsistence, through his own efforts or, where 
                                                 
313 Edward H. Carr, Chairman;  P. McKeon, Rapporteur; Pierre Auger; Georges Friedmann; Harold J. Laski; 
ChungShu Lo; and Luc Somerhausen.  
314 Human Rights, UNESCO (Ed.) (1947); Appendix II, p.268. 
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they are insufficient, through the resources of society.
315
 This is a reflection of the 
rejected Chilean offering to the General Assemblys first session, in drafting UDHR, with 
a text that had been offered also as a draft for the ADRDM.
316
 It can be seen, however, 
that although there was a groundswell of opinion in favour of an expanded concept of the 
right to life, the formulation of UDHR and the subsequent human rights treaties did not 
include within the right to life provision the wide-ranging matters that had been raised as 
being, in the view of some delegates and commentators, essential elements of such an 
obligation. Can a sufficiently strong case be made for moving on from the very narrow 
interpretation of that specific time, which was not even necessarily a consensus of the 
drafters intentions, but rather a reflection of the stance of prevailing political power?  
A strong case for a deeper understanding of the right to life as a right to live was made by 
the Indian Supreme Court (ISC) in 1985. In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal 
Corporation, slum dwellers argued successfully that their right to a livelihood was an 
aspect of their Article 21 (of the Indian Constitution) right to life, and therefore the 
removal of their pavement huts was a violation of that right. The Court held that: If the 
right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way 
of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of 
livelihood to the point of abrogation.
317
 The court there recognised the consequences of 
not making a wide interpretation of the right to life; the whole gamut of protection 
afforded by a situation being accorded recognition under the auspices of the right would 
be denied to a whole class of actions, those which deprived a person of their right to a 
                                                 
315 Ibid. 
316 Francisco Campos, F. Nièto del Rio, Charles G. Fenwick and A. Gómez Robledo; 31 December 1945. 
Schabas (2002) p.27 
317 Para.2.1. 
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livelihood, that which enables life. Any deprivation of life would not fall under the 
scrutiny of a procedure established by law, and in whatever other form such action 
might be challenged, it would not have the power of a constitutional challenge, or 
similarly one under the treaty bodies jurisdiction. That, which alone makes it possible to 
live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of 
the right to life.
318
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
The question addressed in this chapter was how the right to life was first formulated as a 
treaty right, and how that right has been developed in other international instruments as 
time has gone on. Interpretive theories and a taxonomy have been introduced, and the 
validity of an evolutive and dynamic interpretive approach demonstrate. Further, it has 
been shown that appropriate use of valid interpretive tools can form a basis of a 
developing broader view of the right to lifes substantive scope, which is as a right to 
live. The claim here is that a developing broader view of the rights-bearer is both 
legitimate and necessary in order to address the likely problems of the future, exemplified 
here in some limited scenarios but likely to be intrinsic to issues arising beyond the 
horizons or in the test tube today, but on the doorstep, in the street, before the courts and 
tribunals tomorrow. 
The protection of life as a right was addressed in the committees, chaired by Eleanor 
Roosevelt, which worked towards the formulation of the UDHR. The eventual phrasing of 
the right to life Article and its base within what was termed the status of liberty 
represented a criminal justice provision, in protecting against the arbitrary deprivation of 
                                                 
318 Ibid. 
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life. This may be considered to be a lowest common denominator approach in terms of 
what states, particularly the powerful interests represented and led by the USA and the 
UK, would accept. The claim that the right to life is universal and inalienable, that it is a 
right inherent in all human beings simply by the nature of their humanity, is seen as the 
basis of this, generally non-derogable, right. This shared value is proclaimed as a standard 
for all humanity.  
The proposal for this chapter was, therefore, to document the protection of life in human 
rights discourses in the context of the post-Second World War treaties, and regional 
instruments. Those chosen were determined by either their status  as a major 
international or regional treaty  or their specific relevance in the context of the protection 
of life. The chapter traced some of the discussion and eventual decisions and formulations 
regarding the place of a right to life in international and regional treaties, and whilst this is 
a useful starting-point, it represents only a fraction of the issues which are immediately 
apparent upon any consideration of the protection of life in international law.  
The aggressive use of force against non-combatants, including a States own civilians, 
may have prompted the moves which resulted in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Covenants, and consequent developments, but other issues are at stake. 
Much must revolve around the definition of life itself, to be considered in the next 
chapter; major aspects of life, including determining whether a person was living or dead, 
were less complex before the medical developments of the latter half of the twentieth 
century. This and other matters are, unsurprisingly, not considered in the main body of 
treaty law with right to life provisions; for instance, it is not until the Charter of 
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Fundamental Rights of the European Union
319
 that the trade in organs is included as a 
prohibited factor.
320
 Even then, it is included under Article 3, the right to integrity of the 
person, and not Article 2, the right to life. 
These scenarios mentioned above will now be briefly returned to in order to show the 
relevance of the issues addressed witin this chapter. They were, it will be recalled, chosen 
to represent four aspects of life: the human before birth; the creation of new humans; the 
creation of new beings who may or may not be human; and the 
misuse/misrepresentation of human DNA. Whilst the preborn human was a known issue 
at the time of the drafting of the treaties, the other three aspects were, to a greater or lesser 
extent, unknown. A brief introduction to the expanding concept of a right to life as a right 
to live has been given above, showing how an evolving notion of the substance of the 
right is emerging. In order to address the scenarios which are very real possibilities of the 
future, it is essential that there should be, also, an evolving understanding of the rights-
bearer. 
Given the implications of some of the issues outlined above, and of the many others 
which are also relevant, it is, therefore, not surprising that the most eloquent perceptions 
of a right to life are not to be found in active treaty form; DNA was not yet discovered, 
and so the idea that it might be used to isolated and used to create new beings matching its 
progenitors was unknown. The travaux préparatoires of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights include draft Articles to protect life which are both powerful and moving 
and which were, ultimately, not adopted; they would have made a stronger basis for 
                                                 
319 Proposed by the Praesidium at Nice, 2000, and issued in Brussels, 28 July 2000. Article 3, Right to the 
Integrity of the Person. 
320 See also Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning 
Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin, Chapter VI, Article 21: Prohibition of Financial Gain. 
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meeting the challenges of today. However, a flexible interpretative theory, which 
incorporates a dynamic impetus, is available to the treaty bodies, and to the national 
courts which are, in some cases, taking the lead in developing a responsive jurisprudence. 
The treaty provisions, particularly if interpreted according to the living instrument 
principle, are available; what, exactly, are the challenges which must be addressed? The 
next chapter will consider matters related to the defining and creating of life, in order to 
promote a better understanding of who is, or could be, the human in the international 
law of human rights. 
 116
 
 
 
Who is the Human in the International Law of  
Human Rights? 
The past provides many instances where the law refused to see a human being  
when it should have.  
The future may provide instances where the law may be asked to see a human  
when it should not.  
The challenge for future generations will be to define what is most essentially human. 
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice, Vermont Supreme Court. 
Baker v. State.321 
3.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
3.1.1 ADVANCING HORIZONS 
In the quotation above, Chief Justice Amestoy has miscalculated the timescale; the 
challenge is not for future generations to define what is most essentially human, but for 
this generation. It is also a question for rights discourse: Crawford points out that the 
notion of a right presupposes identification of a subject of the right.
322
 It is a question 
which the treaties and human rights bodies have avoided in the past and are avoiding now, 
and that avoidance is exposing lacunae in laws coverage, and illogicality in argument is 
permitting injustice. Some of the problems with a full and effective implementation of the 
                                                 
321 Vermont Supreme Court, Baker v. State, at p.889. 
322 Crawford (1979) at p.88. 
 117
right in the circumstances now prevailing are beyond the horizons of what was known 
and understood at the time of drafting of the treaties, and some may still be beyond the 
horizons of what is feasible, scientifically, now. Some may have been, if not beyond the 
horizons, then certainly beyond the pale, morally, and have now become acceptable in 
moral terms, reflecting a changing consensus.
323
 
3.1.2 EXERCISING THE WISDOM OF SOLOMON: DETERMINING LIFES 
BOUNDARIES 
Determining the boundaries of life for the purposes of international law is a complex 
problem, and well illustrated by the famous dilemma in which King Solomon, acting in 
his capacity as judge, was called upon to decide to whom a child belonged.324 The story, 
and the need for exercise of wisdom in a seemingly irresolvable situation, where nevertheless 
the law had to reach a resolution, can be used to draw other analogies in the many complex 
questions which surround determination of the living and the dead. Whilst it may be valid to 
consider that modern technology and the welfare state between them have made redundant 
such apparently simple decisions as Solomons now appears to be, there is a case for arguing 
that the questions are no different; one must simply be clearer about the logic behind the 
answers. The questions are, however, more complex, and the consequences of the answers 
arrived at more far-reaching.  
                                                 
323 Supra, n.298. 
324 Narratives of the life and work of King Solomon, famed for his wisdom, are found in the religious traditions 
of Islam (Chapters 2, 4, 6, 21, 27, 34 and 38 of the Quran), Judaism and Christianity (1 Kings, Proverbs, Song 
of Songs and Ecclesiastes in the Old Testament). For those unfamiliar with this story, it it can be found in 1 
Kings Chapter 4, Old Testament (King James Version; this particular story is not related in the Quran). See 
further: Kassis (1983); Werblowsky and Wigoder, (Eds.) (1997); and Metzger and Coogan (1993). 
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The scenarios presented in the Introduction to this work
325
 will be seen here to play a 
part in illustrating and illuminating some of the concerns, in discovering just who is the 
human in the international law of human rights? This is not as clear-cut a concept as 
may be expected; one might readily assume that the right to life is a human rights 
provision, and therefore directed at humans. As indicated in the illustrative scenarios, 
however, the status of the human is now less certain. Four areas of uncertainty were 
indicated: the human before birth; the creation of new humans; the creation of new 
beings who may or may not be human; and the misuse/misrepresentation of human 
DNA. 
When the treaties were themselves first conceived, the concept of the identity of the 
rights-bearing person was certainly less of an issue than it is now, largely for reasons 
which will become clearer as this chapter progresses, but which include the impact of the 
new biotechnologies,
326
 and also because of an aspect of postmodern thinking which may 
best be described as the loss of a firm societal knowledge of what is right and wrong in 
dealings with living human material. Abandonment of the widespread practice of religious 
belief has as a consequence the much wider freedom for the newly-recognised and 
emphasized individual to make her or his own decisions about matters affecting life and 
death, both their own and those of other people.
327
 It is harder to know what is morally 
right to do, and what is wrong and should never be done. Ramsey expresses the concerns 
                                                 
325 See text accompanying n.70, supra. 
326 These will be discussed further, below, but some of the concerns felt by those who see new biotechnological 
advances as a moral threat can be found in Sullivan et al.,(1999), particularly for the authors concerns regarding 
those who are defined or catalogued as less than human as, the authors note, were Jews in Nazi Germany, and 
for the discussion regarding when protectable human life begins. (p.81). 
327 See Menski (2003) for a discussion of tradition and modernity in which Hindu law is contrasted with 
Western beliefs on this point; see also infra, n.1038. 
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which spring from the issues facing mankind: 
We need to raise the ethical questions with a serious and not a frivolous conscience. A man 
of frivolous conscience announces that there are ethical quandaries ahead that we must consider 
before the future catches up with us. By this he often means that we need to devise a new ethic 
that will provide the rationalization for doing in the future what men are bound to do because of 
new actions and interventions science will have made possible. In contrast, a man of serious 
conscience means to say in raising urgent ethical questions that there may be some things that 
men should never do. The good men do can be made complete by the things they refuse to 
do.
328
 
As Yamin asserts, [p]art, if not the core, of the modernist underpinnings of human rights 
is an unwavering belief in the existence of an ascertainable truth that cannot be decoupled 
from justice.
329
 That is the point towards which this argument is proceeding; the 
discoverable truth regarding the right to life and its protection at law, and part of that truth 
is to establish a truth of what it means to be human, and to have life. This cannot be 
claimed to be the only truth, the definitive approach; the argument is centuries, or even 
millennia, old, and ongoing. But it will be seen that the approach to be presented here is a 
legally and morally defensible, logical approach. 
To begin this chapter there will be a further examination of the treaties, in order to find 
out how the rights-bearer has been identified in them  human, person, everyone, etc. 
The identity of the rights-bearer will be established, which will clarify some of the 
problems that have arisen over the past half-century, followed by a necessarily brief 
discussion of what other disciplines have to offer on the understanding of what constitutes 
human life. Definitions (or understandings that are more diffuse than an actual definition) 
                                                 
328 Ramsey (1985) at p.37, citing Ramsey, (1970) with emphasis newly added by the author himself. 
329 Alicia Ely Yamin, Ethnic Cleansing and Other Lies: Combining health and human rights in the search for 
truth and justice in the Former Yugoslavia, in Mann et al., (Eds.) (1999), pp.82-105, at p.82; reprinted from 
Health and Human Rights 2(1) (1966). 
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will be sought in biology, medicine, psychology, and philosophy, and include an 
investigation cross-culturally, and in the field of bioethics, into what is meant in rights by 
dignity.  
Even in the practice of medicine, the boundaries of human life  the beginning of being a 
human, with a right to life protected by law,
330
 and the ending of that state of being,
331
 
and the formulation of criteria necessary to qualify as human  are not only uncertain but 
are considered to be a matter for individual conscience and belief. For instance, as Cook 
and Dickens point out:  
The World Medical Associations equivalent [of the Hippocratic Oath], the 1948 
Declaration of Geneva, as amended, has graduates on admission to the medical profession 
solemnly pledge to practice the profession with conscience and dignity, and to maintain respect 
for human life from its beginning, leaving each member conscientiously to determine the 
meaning of human life and the moment of its beginning.
332
 
The moment of human lifes ending is equally indeterminate, equally a cause of struggle 
and conscience, as will be seen, and is a problem not addressed within the treaties because 
that problem did not exist at the time of their drafting: brain death protocols and 
beating-heart transplants were as yet unknown, and vital signs were breaths and a 
heartbeat, and not brain waves.
333
 We are already beyond the horizons as those horizons 
were seen at the time of the treaties; possibilities considered feasible, if not now in the 
very near future, such as transgenic beings, or clones, were strictly of the realms of 
science fiction. In the search for a definition of the human that meets the present needs, 
                                                 
330 See comments at supra, n.326. 
331 To be considered in depth, below; but for a pro-euthanasia stance, see Magnusson (2001 and 2002); Hope 
(2004). See for other views Amarasekara and Bagaric (2002); de Haan (2002); Scott Peck (1997). See generally 
Moreland and Geisler (1990). For moral arguments, arising from the UK jurisdiction decision in the Airedale 
NHS Trust v Bland case of see Keown (1993, 1997); Jennet (1993) (pro-euthanasia in cases of PVS, a term which 
he coined); Gormally (1993); and citing Bland with approval, the views of Harris (e.g. 1999). 
332 Dickens and Cook (2000), at p.73. 
333 Supra, n.5 and n.31. 
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as well as those of the future, the chapter will conclude with a further biomedical 
investigation into the suggested framework of accepting human genetic material as a 
basis for the recognition of the human rights-bearer in the international law of human 
rights. 
Criticism of defining human genetic material into human rights is provided by Jürgen 
Habermas: we cannot, from the premise of pluralism, ascribe to the embryo from the 
very beginning the absolute protection of life enjoyed by persons who are subjects 
possessing basic rights. On the other hand, there is the intuition that prepersonal human 
life must not simply be declared free to be included in the familiar balancing of competing 
goods.
334
  
3.2 THE TREATIES AND THE IDENTITY OF THE RIGHTS-
BEARER 
As noted above, progressing understandings and changed social circumstances operating 
alongside the effects, beneficial and otherwise, of advancing biotechnologies, raise issues 
regarding the exact nature of the individual rights-bearer,
335
 meaning that that state of 
being must be more clearly defined than it was in the treaties.
336
 Newer international legal 
instruments are more apt to have a section defining terms than the earlier ones, and so the 
human rights treaties, written before there was a possibility (beyond the imagination) of a 
need to define human or life, have not benefited from this advance in practice. The 
previous chapter has argued for a dynamic and evolutive interpretation of the right to life 
                                                 
334 Habermas (2003) at pp.42-43.  
335 Or those who have their rights limited for some reason; see, e.g., Article 22(2) of the ICCPR, regarding the 
imposition of lawful restrictions on the freedom of association of members of the armed forces and the police. 
336 The gender-specificity, which was common to the era of drafting of the early human rights instruments, will 
be ignored though not condoned in this discussion. 
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texts, in the light of changing social conditions, taking its interpretative basis from VCLT 
and suggesting the use of textual, contextual and teleological interpretive theories in order 
to make the treaty terms as effective as they can be; that is, using the ILCs terms, to fulfil 
the object and purpose of the human rights treaties in good faith.
337
 Whilst this debate is 
not yet complete within this thesis, and will be continued in the next chapter in the context 
of a discussion of protected by law, the current stage of debate is to clarify what the 
problems are regarding the issues of definition mentioned, the human and the life, as 
illustrated by the chosen scenarios. First, there will be an examination of some significant 
examples from the relevant intergovernmental texts in order to see how the identity of the 
rights-bearer is expressed. 
3.2.1 EXAMPLES FROM INTERNATIONAL TEXTS 
i Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
UDHR refers to everyone in its right to life article,
338
 although in the discussions 
surrounding the drafting of UDHR, there was much debate regarding the identity of the 
rights-bearer.
339
 Chiles draft for UDHR speaks of the right to life of [e]very person 
from the moment of conception, including incurables, imbeciles and the insane, and 
also those unable to support themselves by their own efforts,
340
 whilst the 
contemporaneous ADRDM refers to [e]very human being in the context of the right to 
life, liberty and the security of person. The formulation finally settled upon, everyone, 
represents (as so much about UDHR) a lowest common denominator position. 
                                                 
337 See Sinclair, supra n.222. 
338 Article 3, VCLT. 
339 Supra, n.37. 
340 UN  Doc. A/C.1/38; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2.  
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ii International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICCPRs right to life article mentions every human being
341
 and [n]o one
342
 (in the 
sense of prohibiting violations of rights) and additionally, in respect of capital 
punishment, anyone sentenced to death
343
 and persons below the age of eighteen 
years
344
 and pregnant women.
345
 Elsewhere in the Covenant, reference is made as 
rights-bearer to [a]ll peoples,
346
 the/all individual/s,
347
 combinations of person/s,
348
 
sundry nouns,
349
 including [a]dults,
350
 etc.,
351
 and variations on one.
352
 There does not 
seem to be any particular pattern in the use of one interchangeable word or phrase or 
another, for instance, all persons, everyone, or anyone. Human, however, is only 
used in the context of the right to life and with reference to the inherent dignity of the 
human person in the Preamble and in Article 10, the article which expresses the right to 
liberty, and the right to be treated with humanity. The human family is also mentioned in 
the Preamble, as is the ideal of free human beings. Torture is, in its lesser form, 
                                                 
341 Article 6(1). 
342 Article 6(1). 
343 Article 6(4). 
344 Article 6(5). 
345 Article 6(5). 
346 Article 1(1,2). A people has been defined by UNESCO as: [a] group of individual human beings who enjoy 
some or all of the following common features: A common historical tradition; Racial or ethnic identity; Cultural 
homogeneity; Linguistic unity; Territorial connection; Common economic life. Final Report and Recommendations 
of an International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples, 22 February 1990, SNS-
89/CONF.602/7. 27-30 November 1989. See also 1989 ILO Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal 
Persons in Independent Countries. (No. 169), Article 3. 
347 Preamble, Article 2(1). 
348 Article 8(3)(c)(i), 14(6), Articles 10(1), 14, 26; also, qualified by terms such as juvenile, accused, Article 
10(2), Article 14(1) (this paragraph also refers to the guardianship of children, but the children are not here the 
rights-bearers); Article 14(4). 
349 Article 10(1). 
350 Article 10(2). 
351 Article 3, 23(2), Article 23(1) and human family in the Preamble, Article 23(3,4), Article 24(1,2,3), Article 
19(3), 21, 22. 
352 Article 18(3), Articles 7, 8, 9(1), 11, 12(4), 14(7), 15, 17(1), 18(2), Articles 9(1), 12(1,2), 14(2,3,5), 16, 17(2), 
18(1), 19(1,2), 22(1), Article 9(2,3,4,5). 
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inhuman treatment or punishment.
353
 Thus the notion of human is only employed in 
certain narrowly defined contexts; with regard to the protection of life and liberty, and in 
recognition of dignity.  
iii Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, refers to every child as enjoying the 
inherent right to life.
354
 The Preamble to that Convention reiterates the 1959 Declaration 
of the Rights of the Child: the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, 
needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well as 
after birth. This recognises the preborn human as a human rights-bearer.  
3.2.2 EXAMPLES FROM REGIONAL TEXTS 
i American Convention on Human Rights; American Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of Man  
The Preamble to ACHR [r]ecognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived 
from ones being a national of a certain state, but are based upon the attributes of the 
human personality. This is clarified in Article 1(2): [f]or the purposes of this 
Convention, person means every human being. Further, [e]very person has the right to 
have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the 
moment of conception. No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
355
 Hearing the the 
Baby Boy Case, it was noted by the IACommHR  that: [i]t was recognized in the 
drafting sessions in San José that [the phrase in general] left open the possibility that 
states parties to a future Convention could include in their domestic legislation the most 
                                                 
353 Article 7. 
354 Article 6.  
355 Article 4. 
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diverse cases of abortion.
356
 This is the only Convention to define a person as a human 
being (although the CRC defines a child as a human being
357
). Further, the definition is 
from the moment of conception, which is now complicated by the development of in vitro 
fertilisation techniques, where fertilisation takes place ex utero, and problems regarding, 
for instance, frozen embryos may arise.
358
 It also raises issues in the context of abortion, 
something noted by the signatories and also commented upon in Baby Boy: The United 
States and Brazil interpret the language of paragraph 1 of Article 4 as preserving to State 
Parties discretion with respect to the content of legislation in the light of their own social 
development, experience and similar factors.
359
 This is similar to comments made in 
respect of ICCPR, such as those by France, Luxembourg, and Tunisia, noted above.
360
 
ii African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 
Generally, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights employs the term [e]very 
individual
361
 as the rights-bearer, except when speaking of peoples,
362
 and the 
family
363
 and in the case of electoral and public service rights, when the term used is 
[e]very citizen.
364
 The assertion, however, with respect to the right to life, is that 
[h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to respect for his life 
and the integrity of his person .  Here, the human beings life which is to be respected 
                                                 
356 Conferencia Especializada Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.2, at 159; and 
cited in Baby Boy Case, para.14(c). 
357 Article 1 of the CRC.  
358 See the dispute arising regarding the withdrawal of consent by a womans partner to the implantation of 
frozen embryos, after the relationship broke down before the embryos could be implanted: Evans v. United 
Kingdom  
359 Supra, n.356. 
360 Supra, n.178 and accompanying text. 
361 Articles 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17. 
362 Article 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. 
363 Article 18(1,2). This Article also refers to the woman and the child (18(3)) and the aged and disabled 
(18(4)). 
364 Article 13. 
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seems to be a separate entity from the bodily person, whose integrity is to be maintained. 
This formula is repeated in the 2003 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa: [e]very woman shall be entitled to 
respect for her life and the integrity and security of her person, the only difference being 
in the change from human being to woman. This suggests that women are seen as a 
subset of the genus human beings. Extrapolating, women, men, and children  all of 
those to whom the treaties and specialist protocols refer  are subsets of the species, and 
the right to life which is to be protected is not on all fours with the physical body whose 
integrity is to be respected; respect for the womans life, the humans life, the child or 
mans life, is asserted independently of respect for a persons bodily integrity.  
iii European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
The ECHR assigns its right to life provision to [e]veryone,
365
 toute personne in the 
French language version,
366
 rather than to humans; [e]veryone,
367
 no-one
368
 (in the 
sense of  no-one being deprived of rights
369
), and person[/]s
370
 are the rights-bearers 
throughout the text, (apart from men and women having the right to marry and found a 
family
371
) and there is no mention of humans, other than in the term human rights.
372
  
                                                 
365 Article 2. 
366 All people; toute personne is literally all persons; everyone would be toute le monde. Each is equally authentic: 
see Article 33 of the VCLT. 
367 Articles 1, 2(1), 3, 4(1,2); Article 4(3)(b) mentions conscientious objectors; Articles 5(1,2,3), 6(1,2,3), 8(1), 
9(1), 10(1), 11(1), 13. 
368 Articles 4(1,2), 5(1), 7(1). 
369 Although Article 11(2) allows the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights [to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join 
trade unions] by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.  
370 Articles 2(2)(a,b), 5(1)(a,b,c,e,f); Article 5(1)(d) refers to minors; Article 7(2). 
371 Article 12. 
372 See also Article 1 of Protocol No.1: Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful         enjoyment 
of his possessions. 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iv Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
This twenty-first century Charter
373
 refers in its right to life article to [e]veryone as 
having the right to life, and no-one being condemned to the death penalty, or executed. 
It is Article 3 which is, however, of most interest to the current analysis: 
(1)     Everyone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity. 
(2)     In the fields of medicine and biology, the following must be respected in particular: 
- the free and informed consent of the person concerned, according to the procedures 
laid down by law, 
- the prohibition of eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at the selection of 
persons, 
- the prohibition on making the human body and its parts as such a source of financial 
gain, 
- the prohibition of the reproductive cloning of human beings. 
 
The selection is of persons, persons being, for instance, those able to give consent (and 
presumably, by implication, the person concerned is the consent-giver in respect of 
those who are unable to consent for themselves, and not the person unable to consent). 
The human body cannot be traded in whole or in part,
374
 although it is not stated 
whether a part is to include gametes
375
 and blood (including the now important and 
valuable umbilical-cord blood), DNA from whatever source, aborted foetuses and their 
stem cells, etc., nor does it state whether it is only the live human body that may not be 
traded, ie. whether it is ever permissible to pay for organs from a dead or brain-dead 
                                                 
373 Nice, 7 December 2000. 
374 Trading and trafficking in human body parts is an offence under a number of national penal codes, as noted 
by the UN Committee Against Torture (ComAT):  
375 Sperm and ova. Whereas gamete donations have been paid for in the past, some laws are now prohibiting 
payments: e.g. the Canadian Assisted Human Reproduction Act, s.7(1), available at 
http://www.laaws.justice.gc.ca/en/A-13.4/2389.html  (accessed 20/09/2005). See also e.g., National Gamete 
Donation Trust. http://www.ngdt.co.uk (accessed 20/09/2005). 
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donor.
376
 It is human beings who cannot be reproductively cloned,
377
 that is, a new 
embryo cannot be created from one human beings DNA in order to replicate that human 
being as closely as possible. The use of the term human being here, where person has 
been used elsewhere, is intriguing, suggesting there may be a perceived qualitative 
difference. 
3.2.3 EXAMPLES FROM BIOMEDICAL TEXTS 
Mainly created during the last two decades, there are one hundred and fifty documents of 
relevance to the interrelationship of bioethics and human rights.
378
 
i International 
Of major interest here are the discussions surrounding the United Nations Declaration on 
Human Cloning, which was adopted on 8 March 2005.
379
 It failed to attract consensus as a 
hoped-for Convention, and so became a Declaration; the lack of consensus was in itself 
seen by some states as a reason for voting against the measure or abstaining from 
voting.
380
 The Declaration as finally agreed calls on Member States to adopt all measures 
necessary to prohibit all forms of human cloning to the extent that they are incompatible 
with human dignity and the protection of human life
381
  a very ambiguous proposition  
                                                 
376 The Islamic tradition respects the right to pay for transplant organs in order to preserve life. 
377 Cloning is an inaccurate scientific term; somatic cell nuclear transfer would be better used here. See infra 
n.535. 
378 There are 170 texts listed by the University of Minnesota Human Rights Library under the heading All 
Bioethics and Human Rights Instruments. http://heiunige.ch/humanrts/instree/allbioethics.html (accessed 
11/04/2006). 
379 UN Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, Plenary, 82nd Meeting, 8 March 2005, UN Doc. A/RES/59/280; also 
see Press Release GA/10333. 
380 E.g. Mr. Lovald, Norway. UN Doc A/59/PV.82, p.8 
381 Para.(b). 
 129
and to protect adequately human life in the application of life sciences;
382
 to prohibit the 
application of genetic engineering techniques that may be contrary to human dignity;
383
 to 
prevent the exploitation of women in the application of life sciences;
384
 and to adopt and 
implement national legislation in connection with those aims.
385
 A number of States voted 
against or abstained from the Declaration,
386
 which was widely seen as an unsatisfactory 
instrument, either because it failed to discriminate between reproductive and therapeutic 
cloning, or because it insufficiently emphasized what Uganda termed the sanctity
387
  
according to Nigeria, the primacy
388
  of human life. Yet for the Republic of Korea, the 
alleviation of pain, suffering and misery of millions of people that might be a 
consequence of therapeutic cloning was of paramount importance.
389
 The Declaration was 
not in line with Islamic understanding, either, according to the representative of Mali
390
 
Spain commented that the term human life contained in the text was imprecise and 
should be replaced by the term human beings as usually employed in scientific and 
political debates on cloning and related subjects.
391
 In the context of the current 
                                                 
382 Para.(a). 
383 Para.(c). 
384 Para.(d). 
385 Para.(e). 
386 Vote of 84 in favour to 34 against, with 37 abstentions. 
387 Ms. Katungye, UN Doc A/59/PV.82, p.9. 
388 Nigerias representative, Mr. Isong, was not present for the vote. UN Doc A/59/PV.82, p.9. 
389 Mr. Ha, UN Doc A/59/PV.82, p.5. 
390 Press Release GA/10333. In accordance with the common position of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference. For a general discussion of possible Islamic positions on human cloning, see Abdulaziz Sachedina, 
University of Virginia, Cloning in the Quran and Tradition: Islamic Perspectives on Human Cloning, available at 
http://www.people.virginia.edu/~aas/article/article4.htm (accessed 19/09/2005). Sachedinas conclusion 
suggests caution, but also counsels that since we do not will unless God wills, there may indeed be a divinely 
inspired opportunity in the science and discoveries related to human cloning; another opportunity for moral 
training and maturity. Indeed, Sachedina finds authority in the Quran to suggest that embryo splitting is just 
that opportunity for our over all maturity as members of the global community under God. It is fair to suggest 
that this is probably a relatively liberal interpretation, and one not necessarily shared by other scholars. See 
Mohsin Ibrahim (2001 / 1421 H); Zawawi (2001); Abdul Majeed (2002). 
391 Mr. De Palacio España, UN Doc A/59/PV.82, pp.5-6. He also pointed out that the term human beings 
appear[ed] in the title of agenda item 150 of the current session of the General Assembly. 
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discussion, Hungarys comments are of interest; a strong message was sent by the 
Declaration, that the birth of cloned human beings is not acceptable.
392
 There is an 
emphatic cross-cultural message being expressed by the Member States of the General 
Assembly that the preborn human is, indeed, a human being. 
ii European 
The Council of Europes Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine
393
 (Oviedo Convention) begins by expressing its title in 
respect of the human being. However, as its Explanatory Report acknowledges, it does not 
define the term everyone as found in Article I (Purpose and Object): 
The Convention does not define the term everyone (in French toute personne). These two 
terms are equivalent and found in the English and French versions of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, which however does not define them. In the absence of a unanimous 
agreement on the definition of these terms among member States of the Council of Europe, it 
was decided to allow domestic law to define them for the purposes of the application of the 
present Convention.
394
 
Failing to reach agreement on the most fundamental aspect of the human condition is not 
a laudable achievement; nor is the following paragraphs provision particularly helpful, 
avoiding as it does the fundamental question of when life does begin for the purposes of 
the Convention: 
The Convention also uses the expression human being to state the necessity to protect the 
dignity and identity of all human beings. It was acknowledged that it was a generally accepted 
principle that human dignity and the identity of the human being had to be respected as soon as 
                                                 
392 Mr. Simon, UN Doc A/59/PV.82, p.5. 
393 ETS no.164. 
394 Explanatory Report, para.18. 
 131
life began.
395
 
In Plomers view, there is an apparent, almost intractable, difficulty in reconciling these 
two paragraphs: 
Paragraphs 18 and 19 thus contain an apparent contradiction between the ascription of 
human dignity as soon as life begins and the deferral to contracting parties to determine who 
should count as everyone. What life precisely is supposed to be referring to (for example, live 
unfertilised egg, fertilised egg, enucleated egg, zygote, unborn foetus, person already born) and 
when precisely life is taken to begin (for example, conception, fertilisation, birth) are not 
defined. Further, para 19 makes sense only if it is assumed that a zygote is a human being (as 
opposed perhaps to a form of human life). But if a zygote is a human being, then how could 
there be disagreement as to whether it could count as someone or everyone? One can make 
sense of there being a disagreement as to whether everyone covers every stage or form of 
human life. But the same doubt cannot reasonably arise in relation to human beings. As 
commonly understood, everyone includes every human being.
396
 
An explanation which partly covers the query as posed by Plomer could be that 
everyone may, in some opinions, be every person, a state of being which it is argued 
here is not necessarily the same as every human being. However, as the Convention 
claims in its title to be a Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of 
the Human Being  the explanation is not only partial but is also self-defeating. 
The Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human 
Beings expresses an explicit prohibition on human reproductive cloning, banning any 
intervention seeking to create a human being genetically identical to another human 
being, whether living or dead.
 397
 The Explanatory Report to the Protocol notes: 
In conformity with the approach followed in the preparation of the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine, it was decided to leave it to domestic law to define the scope of the 
                                                 
395 Explanatory Report, para.19. 
396 Plomer (2005a), p.76. 
397 ETS no.168, Article 1. 
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expression human being for the purposes of the application of the present Protocol.
398
 
In line with this, the ECtHR, in Vo v. France,
399
 expressed what may be seen as the 
Council of Europe standard viewpoint on a matter of such fundamental importance: 
At European level, the Court observes that there is no consensus on the nature and status 
of the embryo and/or foetus  although they are beginning to receive some protection in the 
light of scientific progress and the potential consequences of research into genetic engineering, 
medically assisted procreation or embryo experimentation. At best, it may be regarded as common 
ground between States that the embryo/foetus belongs to the human race.  The Oviedo Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine, indeed, is careful not to give a definition of the term everyone 
and its explanatory report indicates that, in the absence of a unanimous agreement on the 
definition, the member States decided to allow domestic law to provide clarifications for the 
purposes of the application of that Convention  The same is true of the Additional Protocol 
on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings and the draft Additional Protocol on Biomedical 
Research, which do not define the concept of human being.400 
These texts are beginning to engage with some of the issues which have now surfaced 
with regard to the identity of the rights-bearer. However, the response is not a satisfactory 
one. The Court in Vo declined to decide whether a foetus was included in the term 
everyone, finding that even if it were the case that Article 2 applied, there were 
sufficient accessible administrative remedies available in France, and so there was no 
need to address the point of the status of the foetus. This was a clumsy sidestepping of a 
difficult issue, the need to rule on something controversial and where there is a lack of a 
European consensus.
401
 These and other issues, which are a subject of concern, will now 
be considered in greater detail. 
3.3 LIFE AND HUMANITY IN OTHER DISCIPLINES 
                                                 
398 Explanatory Report, para.6. 
399 08/07/2004.  
400 Ibid., para.84. (Emphasis added).  
401 See Plomer, (2005b). For discussion on a European consensus doctrine, see Erdman (2003). 
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3.3.1 LIFE IN BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE402 
In biological terms, life is found in four categories, viruses, bacteria, archaea, and 
eukaryotes. Plants, birds, reptiles and mammals, and therefore humans, are catalogued in 
the latter. Potter offers a mainstream definition of life: In general, life has been 
traditionally characterised in terms of growth, reproduction, metabolism, motion and 
response (through homeostasis and evolution).
403
 What form the organic being takes 
depends upon the arrangements of its genes; if it is to be human, then its deoxyribonucleic 
acid [DNA] will be arranged in a human-specific manner.  
Whilst this is a basic biological understanding, it does not necessarily mean that life is 
defined by all biologists as having machine-like properties  collect the appropriate parts, 
put them together, and there is a working organism.
404
  Rosen
405
 finds the roots of this 
concept in the work of the philosopher René Descartes, he who said Cogito, ergo sum  
I think, therefore I am,
406
 and who had concluded from observing a life-like automaton, 
that life itself was automaton-like.
407
 Rosens challenge is to the statement What is life? 
being answered, Life is a machine.
408
 The Cartesian machine-metaphor, is, he believes, 
a way of anchoring biology in physics by de-mystifying it, and subsuming it entirely into 
                                                 
402 I am grateful to Dr. Edward Hollox (Geneticist, University of Nottingham) and Oliver Bridle (University of 
Leicester) for their assistance here; any errors are my own. 
403 Supra, n.15.  
404 See generally Smith (1976).  
405 Rosen (1991), at p.40.  
406 René Descartes, Discourse on Method Part IV, and in C.U.M. Smith (1976), at p.160: Descartes concluded that 
the one indubitable thing in the world was that he was something, a substance the whole essence, or nature of 
which it is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, not does it depend on any material 
thing; so that this me, the soul by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even more 
easy to know than is the latter; and even if the body were not, the soul would not cease to be what it is. 
407 Vasseleu finds in Cartesian dualism support for the concept in patent law that the body exists as an idea, and 
as such, can be an object of knowledge  patent law  authorises the use of the idea, not its embodiment. 
Cathryn Vasseleu, Patent Pending: laws of invention, patent life forms and bodies as ideas in Cheah, Fraser and 
Grbich (Eds.) (1996), p.107. 
408 Supra, n.405, at p.23. 
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physics.
409
 He is also not satisfied with an evolutionary concept, the province of history 
and not science at all.
410
 This is because, whilst it is possible to conceive of life without 
evolution, one cannot hold the tenable supposition of evolution without life, and evolution 
is therefore a corollary to life, a property of particular realisations of life, and not life 
itself.
411
  
Rosen goes on to discuss another possibility; vitality. Vitalism, the life force, is an 
additional principle, missing from the rest of nature, which made organism in principle 
inexplicable via inanimate nature alone.
412
 It is a concept invoked to assert that whatever 
made organisms alive was forever out of the reach of inanimate nature
413
 and which as a 
theory, has had its day, according to Rosen: [i]n the past, the only perceptible alternative 
to this vitalism was mechanism.
414
 Rosen asserts that evolution has come to take the 
place of vitalism and mechanism; he finds none of them adequate. He enters the realms of 
physics, mathematics, quantum mechanics and computational biology to conclude, from 
supported premises, that an organism is a material system that (1) is complex, and (2) 
admits a certain kind of relational description.
415
 The practice of medicine may employ 
vitalism as an additional, exceptional criterion when defining specifically human life (as 
indeed would some scientists).
416
 Some practitioners of medicine are content with a 
                                                 
409 Ibid., p.255. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Ibid. 
412 Ibid. See Erlingsson (2002) for a complex analysis of the Icelandic naturalist, Thorvaldur Thoroddsens 
transformation from mechanist to vitalist. Erlingsson uses Thoroddsens change of position from being a 
follower of Haeckelian Monist theory, to throw light on the social shaping of scientific knowledge (p.444).  
413 Supra, n.551. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid., p.xvii 
416 Erlingsson, supra n.412. 
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definition in line with the one Potter offers, above,
417
 whilst others go a little further.
418 
One text, whilst separating the life-force, vitality or energy which enables life from the 
abilities which characterise it, also defines what it is to be human:  
Life: The energy that enables organisms to grow, reproduce, absorb and use nutrients, 
evolve, and in some organisms achieve mobility, express consciousness, and demonstrate a 
voluntary use of the senses. Human: A member of the genus Homo and particularly of the 
species H. sapiens.419 
That definition of human, at first reading apparently tautological, has inherent within it 
greater depths than may be initially assumed. In the following discussion, an argument 
will be advanced which relates the life which is recognised by international law to the 
entrance requirement for being human; membership of the human race, that is, a being 
composed of human genetic material.  
Deconstructing the biological and medical understandings suggests that there is something 
further needed than a particular arrangement of chemicals to make any organic matter 
live, and that a being cannot be constructed by getting the formula and laboratory 
conditions right. Some vitality, energy or life-force, or some evolutionary tool, or a 
created soul, may be essential.
420
 This point will be further considered by reference to a 
psychologists interpretation of life. How does wo/man differ from machine? 
                                                 
417 Life:  Vitality, the essential condition of being alive; the state of existence characterised by such functions as 
metabolism, growth, reproduction, adaptation, and response to stimuli Steadmans Medical Dictionary (26th ed., 
1995). 
418 Life: The aggregate of vital phenomena; a certain peculiar stimulated condition of organised matter; that 
obscure principle whereby organised beings are peculiarly endowed with certain powers and function not 
associated with inorganic matter. Generally, living things share, in varying degrees, the following characteristics: 
organisation, irritability, movement, growth, reproduction and adaptation. Dorlands Illustrated Medical Dictionary 
(29th ed., 2000).  
419 Mosbys Medical, Nursing and Allied Health Dictionary (5th ed., 1998). 
420 See also an Oxford English Dictionary definition, The cause or source of living; the vivifying or animating 
principle; he who or that which makes or keeps a thing alive (in various senses); soul; essence. 
http://dictionary.oed.com, accessed 19/04/2002. 
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3.3.2 PSYCHOLOGICAL LIFE: ON BEING AND HUMAN-NESS 
An understanding in which something extra is required in terms of comprehending 
functioning human life is advanced by the psychologist, Andy Clark.
421
  For Clark, the 
extra is not the chemical plus propounded by the above definitions, but electrical plus. 
Clark investigates why artificial intelligence  robotic human life  has not been invented or 
created.  
Where are the artificial minds promised by 1950s science fiction and 1960s science 
journalism? Why are even the best of our intelligent artifacts still so unspeakably, terminally 
dumb? One possibility is that we simply misconstrued the nature of intelligence itself. We 
imagined mind as a kind of logical reasoning device coupled with a store of explicit data  a kind 
of combination logic machine and filing cabinet. In so doing, we ignored the fact that minds 
evolved to make things happen  Minds are not disembodied logical reasoning devices.422  
Clarks project is to rescue the brain/mind/intelligence from the Descartean dustbin; he 
sees Descartes as propounding a vision of mind as a realm quite distinct from body and 
world.
423
 How much the mind is inextricably woven with the essential elements of 
human life is a problematical question. The grasp of what reality is in terms of defining 
life can be assessed as ontological, (that is an a priori argument which seeks by reason 
alone to ascertain what exists), or else by an epistemological understanding. What role 
does human understanding play in the defining of itself? Clark
424
 suggests that this 
understanding is cumulative, and that advanced reason is ... the realm of the scaffolded 
brain: the brain in its bodily context, interacting with a complex world of physical and 
                                                 
421 Clark (1997). 
422 Supra n.421, p.1. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Supra n.421, Chapter 9. 
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social structures.
425
 Clarks comments about his project are relevant to this one also: 
The present discussion thus barely scratches the surface of a large and difficult project; 
understanding the way our brains both structure and inhabit a world populated by cultures, 
countries, languages, organisations, institutions, political parties, e-mail networks, and all the vast 
paraphernalia of external structures and scaffoldings which guide and inform our daily 
actions.
426
 
The consequence of all of this, I would suggest, for the protection of the right to life in 
international law is that if in some human beings the brain or intelligence or rationality is 
seen as failing or inadequate for the full assumption of personhood, then this failure is not 
intrinsic to being human, any more or less so than if it were an arm, or a liver, or a heart, 
failing. The brain or mind is a functioning part of a human body, as is any other part, and 
a processing inability on its part does not make the body which contains it any more or 
less human. In my opinion, this understanding does not deny the possibility of a soul, of 
something Other or beyond the embodied brain; but ensoulement
427
 is beyond the scope of 
international laws field of reference.  
3.3.3 THE PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE: ON BEING AND WORTHINESS 
The most obvious expression of this concept in the context of determining lifes 
boundaries is in the understandings of political and moral philosophy and their conception 
of personhood as a requisite to the recognition of being a human in society, in contrast to 
a definition of the human that may be termed legal.  
The positions which have been illustrated so far are, firstly, that life is something 
                                                 
425  He offers as an example of the external structures classical economics, owing its success to the interwoven 
dynamics of responses of institutional or organisational structures, which have evolved as a result of selective 
pressure to maximize rewards of a certain kind. The external scaffoldings are themselves the products of 
individual and collective human thought and activity. 
426 Supra n.421, p.191. 
427 See Ford, (1988). 
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chemical, with nothing before and nothing after. A development of that idea would 
require a life-force, some energizing vitality to initiate life as lived. Secondly, that the 
human embodied brain is not a mental realm distinct from the realm of the body,
428
 but that 
this understanding does not preclude the possibility of a soul. Thirdly, there may be more to 
human life than this life, so that death is not all for which we live, nor is it the ultimate evil to 
be avoided at all costs, and that there is meaning and purpose to this life because of an 
expectation afterwards. The concept that human life and being is more than an arrangement 
of chemicals is advanced by some philosophers and discarded by others. Life in terms of 
philosophy is defined by whether it has meaning, which may or may not be related to value. 
Some philosophers, such as Schopenhauer, Russell and Tolstoy  described by Paul Edwards 
as the pessimists
429
  see life as valueless and death as an emptiness. The point to be 
reached here is that any understanding of life that does not address issues relating to death, 
the cost of avoiding it or compensating for its premature visitation, cannot provide an 
effective basis for the formulation of a law that protects the right to life. 
No discussion, however abbreviated, of the philosophy of life would be complete without 
considering the work of Kant, for whom every human being is an end in himself.
430
  
James Boyd White points out that [o]ne basic question about this formula is what it 
means, not as a matter of conceptual explication but as a matter of moral experience.
431
 
He uses Sophocles play, Philoctetes, to work out the problems involved in this 
                                                 
428 Adapted from Clarkes view of Descartes, supra n.423. 
429 Paul Edwards, Meaning and Value of Life in Edwards (Ed.) (1967) Volume 4, pp.467-477, at pp.467-469. 
See, for instance, Bertrand Russells short story, The Mathematicians Nightmare, appearing in Nightmares of 
Eminent Persons (1962) Harmondsworth, Penguin, at pp.48-53; and in Monk (1997) at pp.56-58. 
430 Kants belief was that: man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a 
means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other 
rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. Kant (1785, J. W. Ellington trans., 3rd ed., 
1993), Second Section: Transition from Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysic of Morals. 
431 White (1985), at p.5. 
 139
distillation of Kants thought;
432
 in the current context, of protecting the right to life, it can 
be illustrated by thinking about the anencephalic child.
433
  
Anencephalic children, developing with an intact brainstem but without scalp, skull, and 
cortex, and with the possibility of other neural and non-neural damage, will never live, 
although they can sometimes breathe independently. They have in some circumstances 
been respirated when necessary, and otherwise medically supported, in order to provide 
organs for transplant; or else this process has been requested by the parents, and refused 
by the medical teams or the courts.
434
 Parents have hoped to find some comfort, and a 
sense of purpose in their childs unexpectedly short and tragic life, in being able to help 
another child to live. Another moral maze; because the anencephalic infants, normally 
dying very quickly after birth, have thrived unexpectedly when offered intensive care in 
order to preserve their organs for transplant.
435
 The illustration of the anencephalic 
children is directly referential to the debates surrounding stem-cell research and somatic 
cell nuclear transfer techniques; do the individual embryos used in these processes have a 
value and worth of their own and for their own ends, or is it morally and legally 
                                                 
432 Ibid., Chapter One, Persuasion and Community in Philoctetes. See also infra, n.618 and accompanying text. 
433 See Justice (1993-1994), p.1278, n.366. 
434 See for instance the case of Theresa Ann Campo Pearson, whose parents unsuccessfully challenged the 
Florida Supreme Court to review legislation that denied the possibility of transplant from their child, who 
breathed independently (and did not meet brain-death protocols) until she died at the age of 9 days in 1992. 
For discussion see Casenote, J. Justice (1993-1994). There have been suggestions that such infants should be re-
classified as brain-absent, an equivalent status to brain-dead: see M.R. Harrison, (1986) The Anencephalic as 
an Organ Donor Hastings Center Report 16:21, and in Diamond (2003), endnote 10 and accompanying text. See 
also HRC, Huamán v. Peru, 22/11/2005, in which the the author, denied an abortion whilst carrying an 
anecephalic foetus, claimed a violation of article 2 of the Covenant, since the State party failed to comply with 
its obligation to guarantee the exercise of a right. The State should have taken steps to respond to the systematic 
reluctance of the medical community to comply with the legal provision authorizing therapeutic abortion, and 
its restrictive interpretation thereof. This restrictive interpretation was clear in the author's case, in which a 
pregnancy involving an anencephalic foetus was considered not to endanger her life and health. The State 
should have taken steps to ensure that an exception could be made to the rule criminalizing abortion, so that, in 
cases where the physical and mental health of the mother was at risk, she could undergo an abortion in safety 
(para.3.1). 
435 See J.S. Justice, (1993-1994), p.1237, n.67; Friedman, (1990); Anspach, (1993). 
 140
permissible to use them for others ends? One can see that an earlier comment, that the 
questions are no different; one must simply be clearer about the logic behind the answers 
has an inherent truth. Can Kants answers accommodate todays questions? 
The debate over anencephalic infants  whether to allow the harvesting of organs from a 
living but very soon to die child whose current capacities possibly do not even include the 
ability to feel pain
436
  encapsulates the paradox. Following from the argument introduced 
above, regarding Clarks work, one can see that it ought to be possible to recognise fully 
the identity of the child as human, disregarding any question of personhood where that 
requires some degree of sentience or rationality, and to move from there. The question of 
where to? is for later in this thesis.  
At its grimmest, therefore, life is explained as only pointless suffering; at its best, it has 
value, purpose and worth, whether or not that is related to a belief in divinely-inspired 
morality and a hope of life to come. The concept of value is multi-faceted, being related to 
the value of an individual, inseparable from a theme of moral values.
437
 The offered basis for 
that value is here given as dignity, and before turning more fully to the concept of human 
genetic material as a suitable criterion for identifying the human rights-bearer, it is necessary 
to undertake a short exploration of dignity as a values framework, and the consequence of its 
recognition for the practical application of a right to life provision, in terms of equality and 
autonomy. 
3.3.4 STANDARDS OF LIFE IN GREATER DIGNITY 
                                                 
436 See In re T.A.C.P., at 589; also Letters to the BMJ: Derbyshire S.W.G., et al. Do fetuses feel pain? BMJ 1996; 
313: 795-9 (28 September); McCullagh P., Do fetuses feel pain? 1997; 314: 302-3 (25 January); Saunders P.J., 
We should give them the benefit of the doubt. BMJ 1997; 303 (25 January). See also American Academy of 
Pediatrics, Committee on Fetus and Newborn; Canadian Paediatric Society, Fetus and Newborn Committee: 
Prevention and Management of Pain and Stress in the Neonate, Pediatrics (February 2000).  
437 Rosen, supra n.405, and Clark, supra n.421. 
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The right to life has been defined in the SACC case of The State v. T. Makwanyane and 
M. Mchunu as being something more than the mere biological:  
It is not life as a mere organic matter that the Constitution cherishes, but the right to 
human life: the right to live as a human being, to be part of a broader community, to share in the 
experience of humanity.  The right to life  incorporates the right to dignity. So the rights to 
human dignity and life are entwined. The right to life is more than existence, it is a right to be 
treated as a human being with dignity: without dignity, human life is substantially diminished.
438
 
These words can be taken as expressing what the human rights bodies are seeking to 
affirm also; but what exactly is dignity? How is it understood, and what is meant by it? 
i Truths as constants 
One of the issues to be resolved, therefore, is whether there are certain truths to be known 
and acted upon, constants that can inform law and act as a primary source. Such a truth 
might be that the human being is endowed with intrinsic, or inherent dignity, whether this 
is recognised or not within their societies. The norms developed within the law of human 
rights must reflect a theoretical position, and that position must find its basis, either in 
those truths that might lay claim to being self-evident, that is Kantian a priori 
propositions established purely from reason. Otherwise, they must stem from human 
experience, that is, in Kantian terms, a posteriori
439
 However, in natural law terms, does 
that mean that those truths that are established are forever the same? 
The answer is yes; it is axiomatic within the concept of a priori truths that, known by 
reason alone, they are unchanging. It is not, however, axiomatic that human understanding 
                                                 
438 Paras.326-327, per ORegan J. 
439 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (2nd ed., 1787), Section I, at B2 in Kant (1787) and pp.42-43 in Kemp Smith 
(1963). 
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of them does not change, or evolve.
440
 This proposition may be understood more clearly 
by considering the constants of fundamental physics. Such constants  the velocity of 
light, for instance  would seem, by definition, to be unchanging. However, human 
understanding of them is not, (there is a current debate in physics regarding the possibility 
of change in the velocity of light
441
) and Barrow illustrates the process of developing and 
interpreting the place of constants in the universe of physicists.
442
 A constant is 
discovered, found to be more significant than at first thought, and then its value is 
determined by the values of other known constants. In a process of elucidation, it is 
discovered that an observed phenomenon is governed by a new combination of constants. 
Then a quantity believed to be a constant is found to be not truly constant, and by 
calculating the value of a constant from first principles, it is shown that its value is fully 
understood. In a final stage described by Barrow as transmogrification, supposed 
constants are admitted to be a small part of a deeper, more universal structure. 
There are certain precepts in human rights discourse, such as inherent dignity and worth, 
equality, and, in the case of the right to life (and, it will be argued, the other allegedly 
absolute rights
443
), inalienability, which have attained the status of constants in 
                                                 
440 For an analysis of Kants a priori methods for recognizing and understanding necessary truth see Brook 
(1992)  
441 See e.g. Webb (2003).  
442 Barrow, (2002) at p.32. 
443 The extent to which any right is absolute can be argued; the prohibition on torture is supposed to be 
absolutely so, whereas the right to life incorporates some qualifications. See generally Addo and Grief, (1998) at 
p.513, where the authors state that: In practice, the tendency has been for practitioners and academic writers to 
assume that the absence of permissible limitations, exceptions or derogations provides a sufficient basis for the 
conclusion that the prohibitions are absolute' [Footnote omitted]. For discussion of whether the right to be free 
from torture should be absolute or not, in the context of the GSS interrogation practices in Israel, see 
Symposium on the Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General 
Security Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activity, ILR, (1989). 
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physics.
444
 And indeed, if they are a priori truths, then in universal terms they are the 
same. Therefore, it is arguable that they are susceptible to a similar process to that 
outlined by Barrow, above, with respect to constants in physics, in order to understand 
their true nature and interpretative value to international human rights law. How do the 
concepts of dignity, liberty and equality, which will be seen to be of particular relevance 
to this discussion, fit (if at all) into a wider picture of international and national legal 
systems, cultures, and society? How are they recognised, granted status, ascribed value?  
ii An etymology of dignity and rights 
In seeking to arrive at an understanding of what is meant, in human rights terms, by 
dignity,
445
 an etymology can take account of President Roosevelts Four Freedoms
446
 
speech, which, together with the Atlantic Charter,
447
 concluded with Winston Churchill, 
contributed to the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter picks up the themes of 
inherent dignity and equality: We, the peoples of the United Nations determined  to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in 
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and  to promote social 
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom .
448
 
A number of points can be drawn from this, relative to the aims of the international 
                                                 
444 Otto describes the precepts that I have called constants here as universals, in a work which seeks to 
reconceptualise them, as having been fundamentally flawed from inception. Otto (1997). 
445 There is a wide literature on the concept of dignity throughout all disciplines; for a text on Dignity and Human 
Rights, in more depth than can be addressed in the context of this discussion, see Kretzmer and Klein (Eds.) 
(2002). 
446 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Speech to the 77th Congress of the USA, 6 January 1941. The Four Freedoms are 
freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of speech, freedom of religion. 
447 14 August, 1941, including the following provision: Sixth: after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they 
[UK and USA] hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety 
within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their 
lives in freedom from fear and want;  
448 Preamble. 
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community in its combined efforts. One, that fundamental human rights are at the core 
of the proposed mission; two, that humans (allegedly) possess, equally, dignity and worth, 
and entitlement to those rights; and three, that larger freedom is the basis for social 
progress and better standards of life. Additionally, these aims, of economic and social 
advancement, are to be pursued in an international framework, and by combined efforts. 
The contingency of rights, one upon another, was asserted. Also, with reference to the 
Charter, the expressions, fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the 
human person imply a quality, described elsewhere as inherent,
449
 which suggest that 
human rights law acknowledges the normative force of moral values.
450
 Recognising the 
dignity of others includes, in Kantian understanding, promoting the conditions for others 
to develop as morally autonomous human beings.
451
 There is a sense in its usage of 
respect, in that acknowledging the inherent dignity of the human person involves 
respecting their mental and physical integrity,
452
 and realising that there is something 
within the essence of humanity which endows a person with the quality of being worthy 
or honourable; worthiness, worth, nobleness, excellence.
453
 By finding for an inherent 
dignity, the discourse of human rights is, to adapt Tony Cartys expression, doing the 
                                                 
449 See Morsink (1999), Section 8.2, pp.290-296, on the inclusion in UDHR of words and phrases [inherent, 
inalienable, and inborn, and by their nature] that indicated that people have these rights by virtue of their 
humanity and not from any other external causes, like acts of governments, courts, legislatures, or international 
assemblies. (p.290). 
450 See Morsink, supra n.449, for analysis of the place of a moral understanding of the basis of rights in the 
formulation of Article 1, UDHR: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. As this is 
transparently not true in an empirical sense, it can be strongly argued that the Declaration was expressing a 
moral view: [The drafters] did not mean the phrase born free and equal in a legal way. They had in mind a 
moral equality or an equal possession of moral rights and their attendant duties. They saw this moral birth as a 
rider to the physical births that people have, although it does not make clear at what stage of development a 
human attains the moral birth which is attested.  
451 Supra, n.430. 
452 See SACC, State v Williams et al., [1995] ICHRL 35 (09/06/1995), paras.38, 39; HRC, Errol Pryce v. Jamaica 
Communication No. 793/1998, 15/03/2004, paras.3.2, 6.2.  
453 Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://dictionary.oed.com (Accessed 18/10/2002). 
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work of human rights.
454
 That which might have to be, in human terms, earned, is granted 
as of right, and from it springs the right to rights.  
iii Universality, dignity and rights 
The offered value here is dignity, inherent in every human being; the moral criterion is 
equality. None of these require any sentience, performance of societal duties, or self-
esteem, to entitle a person to the right to rights, ie. to be recognised as a rights-bearer. 
Should society wish to limit access to services, for instance, then if necessary the action 
must be taken as a lawful qualification of a particular right. From Simon Lees 
perspective, where rights conflict or otherwise fail to resolve the dispute, a deeper 
approach to ethics is needed, grounding rights talk in a broader understanding of the 
human condition.
455
 It is argued here that rights talk is grounded in a truly universal 
understanding of the human condition, that is, inherent human dignity. This does not 
mean that in many of the specific issues that are faced in respect of the right to life, 
particularly in determining what human life is at all, there is one truly obvious answer 
with which all cultures would feel comfortable. As Gatewood notes, even when people of 
similar cultural and personal backgrounds are trying to solve very similar problems, we 
should expect to find intracultural variability, manifest as inter-individual differences and/or 
cognitive pluralism.
456
 
Pheng Cheah refers to three voices operating within human rights discourse: The first 
voice is the position of governments in constitutional democracies in the economically 
hegemonic North or West. The second voice refers to the position of Asian governments. 
                                                 
454 Carty, (1996) at p.45: The discourses of colonialism do the work of colonialism. 
455 Lee, (2003) at pp.46-47. 
456 Gatewood (1993), Abstract. 
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The third voice refers to the position of human rights NGOs in the South.
457
 Cheahs 
concern is with the universal validity of human rights in general, the normative force 
claimed by the three voices of human rights.
458
 He finds in all three voices a recognition 
of human dignity, not as a source of rights nor as a normative force, but rather as some 
contentless human attribute that is the basis of freedom in the world.
459
 Dignity is the 
progenitor of the right to rights, not contestable because it has no specific historical, 
political or cultural content.
460
 
This point is debatable: consider the example of the post-War Japanese constitution. The 
American re-writing of the Japanese Constitution, under the aegis of General MacArthur, 
took place in February 1946. The history and details of this undertaking can be found in 
Inoues work,
461
 in which it is explained that the Americans, in Article 24 of the new 
Constitution, asserted that [in] other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws 
have to be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of 
the sexes.
462
 Apart from the ideal of establishing equality between the sexes as a 
consequence of acknowledging individual dignity, a concept which the Americans, and 
the West generally, understood and accepted
463
 whilst the Japanese did not (it destroyed 
                                                 
457 Cheah (1997) pp.240-241. 
458 Ibid., p.241. 
459 Ibid., p.242. 
460 Ibid., p.241. 
461 Inoue, (2002) From Individual Dignity to respect for Jinkaku  Continuity and Change in the Concept of the 
Individual in Modern Japan, in Likosky, (2002), p.295. 
462 Supra, n.461, at p.296. Inoues translation and emphasis. 
463 See CEDAW General Recommendation 21, Report of CEDAW, Thirteenth session: A/49/38 
Sessional/Annual Report of Committee, 12 April 1994. 
Equality in marriage and family relations: 
[CEDAW] (General Assembly resolution 34/180, annex) affirms the equality of human rights for women and 
men in society and in the family. The Convention has an important place among international treaties 
concerned with human rights. 
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the legal basis of the Meiji household system
464
), the Japanese did have a deeply rooted 
Buddhist idea of equality (byodo) which means that all people are equally endowed with 
the ability to cope with life.
465
 But it was not so much the concept of gender-equality, 
difficult though that was to accept, that was to cause problems of comprehension, but the 
translation of the meaning behind the term, individual dignity. Inoue goes on to discuss in 
detail what the Americans thought they meant, and what the Japanese thought they had 
agreed to, in Article 24. In Japanese hierarchical society, respect for jinkaku, the word 
chosen to explain individual dignity,
466
 was involved with respect for an individuals 
moral character and their place in society; individuals of high jinkaku were entitled to 
greater respect than those with low jinkaku.  [There was] thereby created a significant 
difference in meaning between the English and Japanese version of Article 24.
467
 The 
former reflects a natural law position, and can be considered, for example, as relating to 
the American  and other-Western  concept of individual dignity described above. 
Whereas the latter, a positivist, empirical viewpoint, can be understood in Japanese terms 
by their (effective) translation of individual dignity as jinkaku, a reflection of a persons 
moral character, and involving earned respect, either on account of a mans (and 
originally only mens) place in society, or because of high achievement and moral 
standing. 
 
 
                                                 
464 Supra, n.461, at p.297. 
465 Supra, n.461, at p.297, fn.7. 
466 Although individual dignity was translated literally as kojin-no songen, it was explained by Government 
officials as respect for jinkaku. Supra n.461 at p.297, and fn.4; and reference to K. Inoue, (1991), MacArthurs 
Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural Study of its Making. 
467  Supra, n..461, at p.296. 
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iv Dignity and bioethics 
Beyleved and Brownsword
468
 offer a thorough analysis, starting with the vagueness  
Mohammed Bedjouai describes it as fragility
469
  of the use of the term dignity 
generally in discourses of rights.
470
 They isolate two seminal notions of human dignity, 
one, the notion that human beings, having intrinsic value, must not be treated simply as a 
means, the other the idea that dignified conduct is a virtue.
471
 The finding is that a 
generally accepted principle that human dignity and the identity of the human being had 
to be respected as soon as life began has been understood to mean the protection of 
potential life, from the provisions of Article 1 of the COE Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine.
472
 Beyleveld and Brownsword suggest that:  
[A]lthough this drafting device is designed primarily to contain divisive questions 
concerning the regulation of abortion, it indicates how some might seek to deploy the concept of 
human dignity to protect human life forms that are not yet eligible for human rights 
protection.
473
 
That is, indeed, the aim of this thesis. Regarding human dignity, Beyleveld and 
Brownsword conclude that the concept  has a legitimate place in the debates about 
human genetics,
474
 although they warn against its loose cannon characteristics; it can 
oversimplify complex questions; and it can encourage a paternalism that is incompatible 
                                                 
468 Beyleveld and Brownsword (1998). See also generally Baxi, (2002) and Petchesky (2003). 
 
469 Proceedings of the Third Committee of the International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO, September 1995: Volume 1, at 
p.144, and Beyleveld and Brownsword, supra n.468, p.661, footnote 5 and accompanying text. 
470 Ibid., pp.661-662. See also Brownsword, (2003, 2004), and Aurora Plomer, Embryonic Stem Cell Research, 
Human Dignity and the Right to Life (forthcoming, 2005, copy on file with author). 
471 Ibid., p.662. 
472 Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe, Article 1, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on 
Human Rights and Biomedicine, DIR/JUR (97)1 Strasbourg, Directorate of Legal Affairs, January 1997, para.9, 
and in Beyleveld and Brownsword, supra n.468, p.663, footnote 13 and accompanying text. 
473 Beyleveld and Brownsword, supra n.468, pp.663-664. 
474 Ibid, p.662. 
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with the spirit of self-determination that informs the mainstream of human rights 
thinking.
475
 
Andorno has said that [t]he enterprise of setting common standards in the biomedical 
field, although difficult, is possible because international human rights law presupposes 
that some basic principles transcend cultural diversity.
476
 Andorno finds one such 
principle to be human dignity, which he defines elsewhere as basic dignity and 
extended dignity: The basic meaning of dignity, which is the primary and stronger 
expression of this idea, refers to the intrinsic worthiness of human beings, irrespective of 
age, sex, physical or mental ability, religion, ethnic or social origin.
477
 He uses intrinsic 
here where others refer to the inherent dignity and worth of the human person, to explain 
that such a dignity does not rely on a particular feature or capacity of persons but only on 
their human condition.
478
 
Extended dignity is a wider and more nebulous concept, referring to the dignity of the 
human species.  This is a dimension of the understanding of dignity that encompasses the 
whole of humanity, including future generations, and for which Andorno finds a basis in 
Kant: the Kantian imperative already contains this extended notion of dignity because it 
literally says that it is humanity in us (die Menschheit, the human essence) that should 
never be used only as a means.
479
 That only is important: Beyleveld and Brownsword 
point out that in Kantian terms people may be used as a means  otherwise no altruistic 
action could ever take place, but not solely as an end. This could be the answer to the 
                                                 
475 Ibid. 
476 Ibid. See also Cheng (1997). 
477 Andorno (2003) at p.2. (Emphasised in original). 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid., p.3. (Emphasis in original). 
 150
question of the anencephalic children; they were not deliberately created that way, but 
their lives can be used to give the gift of life to an unknown Other.  
Andornos question is whether human rights are applicable to humanity as a whole. 
UNESCO, in their formulation of a Declaration on the Responsibility of the Present 
Generations to Future Generations,
480
 as Andorno points out, avoid[ed] any reference to 
the rights of future generations;
481
 but this document does call for ensuring the 
maintenance and perpetuation of humankind with due respect for the dignity of the human 
person. Consequently, the nature and form of human life must not be undermined in any 
way whatsoever.
482
 
A consequence of the human rights understanding of dignity, as described here, is 
equality, in that all human beings, having value simply by the fact of their humanity, are 
equally thus endowed, and must be treated with equality.
483
 This is an empirical concept, 
as equality is only expressed in terms of treatment of one person, or group of persons, by 
another. It is a necessary consequence of human dignity, not a prerequisite. A human 
person would have dignity, if accepted as inherent, no matter whether that essential 
quality was recognised by others or not. To take the alternative position, in not 
recognising inherent human dignity but accepting that human rights discourse has 
introduced the concept as a given, proponents of that viewpoint are achieving the same 
outcome.  
                                                 
480 Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations adopted on 12 
November 1997, by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 29th session. 
481 Supra, n.478. 
482 Article 3. 
483 Not necessarily a straightforward proposition; see D'Amato (1983). On equality as an empirical right, see also 
Fukuyama (2003), pp.9-10. 
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Equality is, however, a different matter. The requirement to treat all human beings 
equally, and in fulfilment of the right to life to promote and sustain their conditions of life 
disinterestedly and with full respect for their value and worth as a human being, is a 
requirement for action by others consequent upon that which each person possesses either, 
as argued above, inherently or because human rights discourse has made it so. Equality of 
all human beings is not an inherent condition, as it is proposed dignity is, nor indeed can it 
be found supported in history, or religion; although Jonathan Sacks
484
 suggests that 
Judaism represents a highly distinctive approach to the idea of equality, namely that it is 
best served not by equality of income or wealth, nor even of opportunity.
485
 The answer 
is not even in equal standing before God or the law; it is that a society must ensure 
equal dignity  the Hebrew phrase is kavod habriyot, human honour  to each of its 
members.
486
 Whilst all created beings might be equal in the sight of their creator God, it 
has never, until the arrival of human rights discourse, been the habit of society in general 
or law in particular to treat people equally. The term now in use is discrimination; in the 
past it would have been difference. The most fundamental accepted difference was that 
between man and woman; others included white/black, freeborn/slave, master/servant.
487
 
Human rights practice needs to work, therefore, to assert equality as a consequence of 
dignity.  
 
 
                                                 
484 Sacks (2003). 
485 Ibid., p.120. 
486 Ibid. 
487 See Dred Scot, Plaintiff in Error v.  F.A. Sanford, December Term 1856 decision of the USSC. 
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3.4 HUMAN GENETIC MATERIAL: THE PROFFERED 
CONCEPT 
A claim of genetic determinism
488
 might be supported in respect of a thesis, which seeks 
to postulate that the subject of human rights, in being outside and beyond all 
categorisation by rationality, sentience, or identification with self and others, is 
determined solely by the presence of human genetic material in its composition. Douzinas 
finds the essential elements of humanity to have been stripped down to an empty nature 
deprived of substantive characteristics in the beliefs of humanism, the man of the rights 
of man being the species laid bare of all those traits and qualities that build human 
identity.
489
 Yet in appearing to impoverish the human subject by taking away what Nino 
describes as that minimum of humanity which is what allows man to claim autonomy, 
responsibility and legal subjectivity, the discourse of human rights would, in fact, by 
accepting this criterion for the recognition of the identity of the rights-bearer, be enriching 
beyond measure wo/mans humanity to wo/man. 
3.4.1 GENETIC SCIENCE 
i The building blocks 
Whilst DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] is often described as the building block of life, the 
immortal coil, the famous double helix of James Watsons and Francis Cricks 
                                                 
488 See Habermas (2003), on the philospophical implications for the individual of parents having created their 
own image of a child. For a critique of anti-deterministic concepts, including a call that governments should 
invest in education and communication strategies that are aimed at cutting through the genohype that pervades 
much of current popular culture, see Caulfield (2001) at p.403. And for a lyrical account of the potentially 
devastating social consequences of the new genetics, see Katz Rothman (1998, 2001). 
489 Douzinas (2000), at p.187. 
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discovery in 1953
490
 is in itself one of the building blocks of a language, the language of 
genetics, which is, as commented upon by Ridley, a complex jargon.
491
 Whilst a thorough 
survey of even the basics of genetics is beyond the scope of this thesis, some information 
is necessary.
492
 Analogies to books and architectural plans
493
 are made to describe the 
function and situation of the makeup of human cells, and the role each part or substance 
plays in the continuation of each and every form of life; all metaphors break down 
eventually,
494
 but the book one works quite well  indeed, Ridley claims that it is not a 
metaphor at all to describe the human genome as a book, it is literally true. A book is a 
piece of digital information, written in linear, one-dimensional and one-directional form 
and defined by a code that transliterates a small alphabet of signs into a large lexicon of 
meanings through the order of their groupings. So is a genome.
495
 
As Ridley explains it, if the human genome, (all the genes contained in a single set of 
chromosomes,
496
) is a book, there are twenty-three chapters  chromosomes; each 
chapter contains several thousand stories, called genes.
497
 Exons are the paragraphs in the 
story, interrupted by advertisements called introns; words are codons, and the letters that 
make up the words are bases.
498
 The bases of DNA and RNA each consist of only four 
                                                 
490 For the story of the discovery of DNA, see Watson (2003). See also Appleyard (1991), at p.1, who notes that 
Crick winged into the Eagle [pub] to tell everyone within hearing distance that [they] had found the secret of 
life; citing James Watson (1968) The Double Helix; A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA, 
London: Weidenfield and Nicolson. 
491 Ridley (1999), pp.5-6. 
492 The information given here is taken from Lodish, Berk, Matsudaira, Kaiser, Krieger, Scott, Zipursky and 
Darnell (2003, 5th ed.); Agar (2002); Appleyard (2000); Dawkins (1989, 2nd ed.); Ho (1999, revised ed.); McLaren 
(Co-ordinator, 2002); Rees (2003); Ridley (1996, 1999, 2003), Watson (2003); and the Oxford Dictionary of Biology 
(2004, 5th ed.) [hereafter Oxford Biology]. 
493 See e.g. Ridley (1999) and Dawkins, supra, n.492.  
494 As pointed out by Dawkins, supra, n.492, p.23. 
495 Ridley, supra n.493, p.6. 
496 Oxford Biology, p.276.  
497 Ridley, supra n.493, pp.6-7. 
498 Ibid. 
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nucleotides; adenine [A], guanine [G], cytosine [C], thiamine [T] and uracil [U]. T is 
found only in DNA, and U only in RNA.
499
 The book is written only in three-letter 
words, on long chains of sugar and phosphate called DNA molecules [rather than pages] 
to which the bases are attached as side rungs.
500
 The genome is in each and every cell 
nucleus; in fact two copies are in every cell, one from the mother and one from the father, 
except for ova and spermatozoa [egg and sperm, ie. reproductive] cells, which each have 
only one.
501
 
Lodish et al.
502
 point out that what used to be the accepted central dogma, that DNA 
directed the synthesis of RNA [ribonucleic acid], which then directed the assembly of 
proteins  the constituent factors of cells  is oversimplified; proteins themselves play a 
role in the synthesis of nucleic acids, regulating gene expression, the entire process 
whereby that information encoded in DNA is decoded into the proteins that characterize 
various cell types.
503
 Further, [r]ecombinant DNA  rDNA  is DNA that contains 
genes from different sources that have been conbined by the techniques of genetic 
engineering rather than by breeding experiments. This means that [g]enetic engineering 
is therefore also known as rDNA technology. Recombinant DNA is formed during gene 
cloning or in the creation of genetically modified organisms.
504
 
This brief scientific overview shows why it is no longer easy, if it ever was, to define a 
living being by their species.  
 
                                                 
499 Lodish et al., supra, n.492, p.103. 
500 Ridley, supra n.493, p.7. 
501 Ridley, supra n.493, pp.6-7. 
502 Supra, n.492, p.101. 
503 Ibid. 
504 Oxford Biology, p.548. 
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ii Defining human genetic material; the cellular level 
For the purpose of this survey, genetic material is defined as both human organic 
material (ie. blood, hair, etc.) as well as extracted genetic information stored electronically 
(DNA sequences, etc.).
505
 Whilst that definition, presented by the Genetic Privacy 
Working Group of the Canadian Biotechnology Strategy, is helpful, it does not go far 
enough at the cellular level. 
The definitions text of the Convention on Biodiversity defines genetic material as 
meaning any material of plant, animal or microbial origin containing functional units of 
heredity. The Cartagena Protocol to that Convention, on Biosafety, defines a living 
organism as meaning any biological entity capable of transferring or replicating genetic 
material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids; and living modified organism 
as meaning any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material 
obtained through the use of modern biotechnology. Modern biotechnology, in its turn, 
means the application of either in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant 
DNA [rDNA] and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or fusion of 
cells beyond the same taxonomic family. 
From these definitions, it is possible to extrapolate the following as deserving of being 
defined as human genetic material for the purposes of protecting the human life which 
both intrinsic to that material, and upon which the health and viability of future 
generations may depend, by regulating its use and misuse. The definition here offered of 
human genetic material is: 
Any material of human origin containing functional units of heredity, including a living 
                                                 
505 The Human Genetic Material Survey, sponsored by the Genetic Privacy Working Group of the Canadian 
Biotechnology Strategy. 
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modified human organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material  which 
includes human genetic material, obtained through the use of modern biotechnology, for 
instance by the application of in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including rDNA and direct 
injection of nucleic acid into cells or organelles, or fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, 
ie. homo sapiens. 
This position is open to debate, as seen in Oliver Bridles comments: 
 It is the case that human genes, such as the insulin gene, have been cloned into 
microorganisms in order to supply a safe, cheap and hypoallergenic source of insulin (as an 
alternative to say porcine insulin). Here is a clear modification of a piece of human genetic 
material, and yet I do not see that the presence of human genetic material in the microorganism 
implies the presence of human life in either a narrow or broad sense. By a narrow sense I mean 
the notion that the presence of the gene in the microorganism implies that it is somehow human. 
By broad sense, I mean that the presence of human genetic material in the organisms implies 
that humans must be around to supply the genetic material. But, we can see that this is not so if 
we imagine a devastating plague that succeeds in wiping out all humans, but not bacteria, by next 
Wednesday. Human genes may then persist in the organisms entirely independently of the 
persistence of actual human beings.
506 
Bridles point is a good one, and the specific definition of the human genetic material, which 
is protected by law as an aspect of the right to life, is of course open to debate and discussion 
with the scientific community. However, it represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
thesis on offer here. The point is not whether human genetic material is present as an end-
product in bacteria, as in his example (or otherwise in animals) but rather that at the moment 
when it was taken from, say, a human stem cell, and infiltrated into a bacterium, the activity 
was covered by some kind of regulation; what kind is a subject for the next chapter  what 
kind of protection by law? The aim would be to protect the right to life of the human race, of 
individual humans that might be affected by such bacteria, by recognising that human life is 
implicit in the building blocks that make it up, and the protection of one requires the 
                                                 
506 Oliver Bridle, University of Leicester, personal email, 16/11/2004. 
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protection of the other. 
iii Defining human genetic material; speciesism 
Defining human genetic material is not an easy task on a number of planes; one of the 
arguments is about speciesism, which is privileging humans above other sentient 
creatures. In the human rights context, that means why only humans? As Ryder, who 
coined speciesism, recalls, in an article entitled All beings that feel pain deserve human 
rights: Equality of the species is the logical conclusion of post-Darwin morality: 
The word speciesism came to me while I was lying in a bath in Oxford some 35 years ago. 
It was like racism or sexism - a prejudice based upon morally irrelevant physical differences. 
Since Darwin we have known we are human animals related to all the other animals through 
evolution; how, then, can we justify our almost total oppression of all the other species? All 
animal species can suffer pain and distress. Animals scream and writhe like us; their nervous 
systems are similar and contain the same biochemicals that we know are associated with the 
experience of pain in ourselves.
507
 
To genetically define a human rights-bearer is to exclude those who do not qualify as 
humans, which at the moment is largely animals. Yet animals might well suffer from, for 
instance, pain inflicted in a manner akin to torture, but they are not protected by the 
human rights prohibition on torure, inhuman and degrading treatment. So why privilege 
humans? Steinbock, writing in 1978 in answer to Singers 1975 proposal that to be 
speciesist is similar to being sexist or racist, produces a case for privileging humans: 
simply that to feed a starving dog before a starving child feels wrong.
508
 She admits the 
weakness of this argument, and examines a number of reasons why, for instance, there 
may be a moral case made for perhaps conducting necessary medical experiments on a 
                                                 
507 R. Ryder, The Guardian, Saturday August 6, 2005. This raises interesting questions regading the possibility of 
fetal pain: see Derbyshire et al., supra, n.436. If a fetus can be shown to experience pain, then it would become a 
rights-bearer by default. ECtHR, Boso v. Italy, infra n.958, and accompanying text, would therefore have to be 
reconsidered. 
508 Steinbock, (1978), p.246, citing Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (A New York Review Book, 1975).  
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chimpanzee but not on a severely retarded human.  
Singers strongest point in this regard, (in conjunction with Kuhse), is in respect of life 
which is sentient to pain and suffering being disregarded by legal rights protection 
mechanisms, whilst people fight for the preservation from suffering and death of the 
unsentient, such as the unborn or the handicapped newborn.
509
  Tooley makes a similar 
point,
510
 as does Beauchamp: 
Perhaps we can find some justification of our traditional practices other than a justification 
based on status as person or nonpersons. However, if we cannot find a compelling alternative 
justification, we either should not be using animals as we do, or we should be using humans as 
we do not.
511
 
Steinbocks argument culminates in the conclusion that: 
[W]e are morally obliged to consider the interests of all sentient creatures, but not to 
consider those interests equally with human interests. Nevertheless, even this recognition will 
mean some radical changes in our attitude toward and treatment of other species.
512
 
This debate, in all of its complexities, is outside the scope of this thesis, which is 
concerned with the international law of human rights, and therefore, despite the strong 
arguments of some authorities that there should be no difference, animals rights claims, 
particularly with regard to deliberately inflicted suffering, will not be addressed.
513
 That 
                                                 
509 Kuhse and Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants (1985) Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, version in Kuhse, (Ed.) (2002) at p. 231. See the critique of Singer in Finnis (1980), notes on s.VII4, 
p.194-195. See also Diamonds critique of Singers philosophy, (1991) at pp.319334; and Oderbergs (2001) 
impassioned criticism of Singers disregard for the right to life of what he classifies as non-persons, which 
includes all babies under the age of one month, whatever their physical condition. See also Tushnet and 
Seidman (January, 1986), and Steinbocks response to an earlier formulation of the argument, supra n.508. 
510 (1978), p.65. 
511 (1999) at p.319. [Footnote omitted]. 
512 Steinbock, supra n.508, p.256. 
513 For challenges to this position, see, e.g.,  Singer, All Animals are Equal Philosophic Exchange (1974) pp.103-
106; Jeremy Bentham, A Utilitarian View, first published c.1820, from An Introduction to the Principles of Morals 
and Legislation, section XVIII, IV; both in Kuhse, and Singer, (Eds.) (1999); and, generally, see Zimmerman, 
Callicott, Sessions, Warren, and Clark, (Eds.) (1993). 
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includes a refutation of the claim, at least for the time being, that chimpanzees,
514
 because 
of their genetic make-up, should be re-classified as in genus homo, or alternatively that 
humans be re-classified as pan sapiens. There is, however, one important respect in which 
the problem raises issues in human rights: what if we cannot tell whether a living being is 
indeed human or not? 
iv The Blurring of Species Boundaries 
One of the very real possibilities for the future considered by some critics of 
biotechnological advance, such as Rifkin
515
 and Mae-Wan Ho,
516
 to be a threat, is the 
blurring of boundaries between species: To begin with, the entire notion of a species as a 
separate recognizable entity with a unique nature becomes an anachronism once we begin 
recombining genetic traits across natural mating boundaries.
517
 The threat is new: For 
the first time in history we become the engineers of life itself. We begin to programme the 
genetic codes of living things to suit our own cultural and economic needs and desires.
518
 
The scientific outline given above indicates that it is now a theoretical, if not yet a 
practical possibility (as far as is known), to reprogramme human genetic material. 
Genetic choices can be made, and pre-implantation diagnosis and selection of embryos is 
commonly practiced.  
In a discussion of a theory of constitutional personhood for transgenic humanoid beings,  
                                                 
514 A genus of African apes (Anthropopithecus), bearing the closest resemblance to man of any of the 
anthropoids. The name originally belonged to A. Troglodytes (formerly T. niger), which was long the only species 
recognized; but at least one other species is now known. (See Nature 1889, 254.) Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
http://dictionary.oed.com , accessed 19/04/2002. 
515 Rifkin (1998). 
516 Ho (1999). 
517 Rifkin, supra n.515, p14. 
518 Ibid., p.15. 
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Rivard
519
 offers an argument based on the illegitimacy of speciesism to deny the 
plausibility of a genetic definition of humans in the prescription of rights. He argues by 
means of an analogy to the racism and denial of rights under the American Constitution in 
the past against the denial of rights now and in the future to other beings, including 
transgenic persons, on the grounds of genetic makeup: [i]n the future, constitutional 
personhood should not be arbitrarily limited to members of our own species.
520
 Further, 
[t]he intuitive conclusion that speciesism is wrong likely follows from the fact that, 
positions reversed, we would want other species to respect our rights.
521
   
Although human rights discourse, as has been addressed above, is a living and dynamic 
discourse, it is not yet ready to address straightforward animal rights claims on an equal 
footing with human rights. There is difficult terrain yet to travel; this thesis may be seen 
as a step in that direction, in asking for recognition of transgenic beings as human rights-
bearers. That might represent a logically fallacious slippery slope proposition, or else it 
may represent the only logical consequence of a world in which moral arguments 
regarding the prevention of suffering, of both sentient and non-sentient beings, are 
increasingly being recognised and given the force of law. It is not the time to make an all-
out claim for recognising the rights of all living beings, however, even for all living 
beings in which human DNA may play some part. The quest is to recognise that which is 
called here inherent human dignity,
522
 in the human race and in individual living human 
                                                 
519 Rivard (1991-1992). 
520 Supra, n.519, p.1469. 
521 Ibid., p.1469, footnote 176. 
522 A quality not recognised by Steinbock and Singer in the context of the current argument: Steinbock cites 
Singer: Faced with a situation in which they see a need for some basis for the moral gulf that is commonly 
thought to separate humans and animals, but can find no concrete difference that will do this without 
undermining the equality of humans, philosophers tend to waffle. They resort to high-sounding phrases like the 
intrinsic dignity of the human individual. They talk of the intrinsic worth of all men as if men had some worth 
that other beings do not have or they say that human beings, and only human beings, are ends in themselves, 
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organisms, and to treat with respect that human genetic material, the necessary sine qua 
non for life, and therefore that which must be protected by law in order to protect life. 
Therefore a definitive definition of what is meant by human genetic material is needed 
 
The ideal is that human material should not be used for anything without thought for how 
that activity might affect humanity, todays living humans, and the developing ones (foetuses 
are very susceptible to harmful environmental factors, such as teratogenic substances
523
), and 
the as yet-unconceived future generations. It is the right to life of all of these which is the 
subject of concern; and if, as Bridle posits, the whole human race has been wiped out by next 
Wednesday, the destroying force may well have been someones carelessness, or even 
deliberate malevolence, with biotechnology.
524
 The definition is posited here as a starting-
point, a basis for further discussion and debate, and it is of course not claimed that human 
genetic material, when not functioning as a material part of a living being, possesses dignity. 
Here the concept is, rather, that the human manipulating that material will do so in dignity, 
and with respect for the human life represented by the DNA there present. This includes due 
consideration for future humans, whose lives and ability to live might be affected by the 
manipulation taking place.
525
  
                                                                                                                                                  
while everything other than a person can only have value for a person Why should we not attribute intrinsic 
dignity or intrinsic worth to ourselves? Why should we not say that we are the only things in the universe that 
have intrinsic value? Our fellow human beings are unlikely to reject the accolades we so generously bestow 
upon them, and those to whom we deny the honor are unable to object. Steinbock, supra n.  
523 E.g. alcohol, and thalidomide; the period of greatest risk is mid-term in the first trimester. It is also now 
being demonstrated that genetic changes may take place in embryonic material simply because it has been 
cultured ex utero. It has been noted that genetic or epigenetic defects in the cluster, associated with the fetal 
overgrowth and cancer condition  Beckwith-Wiedemann syndrome, present an increased incidence in children 
born as a result of IVF internventions. Reik, the Babraham Institute Laboratory of Developmental Genetics and 
Imprinting; and BBC2 Horizon, 03/11/2005. 
524 See Rees (2003). 
525 The stance taken is not at the extreme of what Brownsword has termed the dignitarian alliance. See 
Brownsword (2003) 
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Such humans might be those referred to generally as clones, ie. beings created by somatic 
cell nuclear transfer.
526
 With regard to somatic cell nuclear transfer, reference has already 
been made to an eminent ethicist, Ronald Green,
527
 whose claim is that:  
[A] cloned embryo is not the result of fertilisation of an egg by a sperm. It is a new type of 
biological entity never before seen in nature  although board members understood that some 
people would liken this organism to an embryo, we preferred the term activated egg, and we 
concluded that its characteristics did not preclude its use in work that might save the lives of 
children and adults.
528 
The value-laden terms  activated egg, work that might save the lives  used in that 
extract are of interest here, particularly with respect to Kants teleological stance, that every 
human being is an end in him/her self.
529
 Either the activated egg, being activated from 
human genetic material, is human or it is not. If it is human, then it must be forcefully 
argued that being formed from human genetic material, whether activated or not, it 
deserves legal protection of its use, in recognition of the dignity of humanity described 
above as being accepted both as inherent in the human condition and as a basis for the 
international law of human rights; that which requires the right to life to be protected by 
law. However, the Declaration on Human Rights and the Human Genome
530
 that 
UNESCO has formulated does not specifically define the rights-bearers of the rights 
covered by the declaration. Jean-François Mattei, in discussing genes and patents, 
contends that: 
                                                 
526 See infra, n.535. 
527 Ronald M. Green, Director, Ethics Institute, Dartmouth College; Chair, Advisory Board, ACT, Worcester, 
Massachusetts. ACT is the privately owned biotechnology company which has claimed to have cloned a human 
embryo to six cells, and assembled a board of outside ethicists to weigh the moral implications of therapeutic 
cloning research before going ahead. Green, Scientific American January 2002, pp.46-48.  
528 Ibid. Greens contribution on The Ethical Considerations appears in a report that human cloning had taken 
place; Cibelli, Lanza, West, with Ezzell, The First Human Cloned Embryo, pp.42-49. 
529 Supra, n.430. In this regard also see Munzer, (1993). 
530 Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 29th session on 11 November 1997.  
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Man, as a person endowed with dignity, cannot be traded, which is why organs, tissues and 
cells are not marketable and do not come within the terms of the normal market. The gene, as 
the smallest component part of the human being, cannot to my mind be treated otherwise than 
the human being and enter directly or indirectly into a business rationale.
531
 
The case is not necessarily that the use of any human tissue, cell or part of a cell should 
not be permitted, but that such material should not be euphemistically defined as not 
human in order that justification should be found for its creation and manipulation, and 
destruction (by dubious logic). Several arguments in the use of stem cells debate suggest 
that using embryos surplus to IVF requirements, and otherwise destined only for 
destruction, is morally permissible, whereas creating them for research and therapy 
purposes is not. This seems casuistic, but the problem is not confined to linguistic 
definition.
532
 Each human being has, in the past, been formed from an amalgamation of 
the DNA (human genetic material) of two parents, male and female. Future humans may 
be created from the genetic material from two parents of the same sex,
533
 from three 
parents,
534
 or from one.
535
 That genetic material, from wherever or whoever it might 
                                                 
531 Mattei (2001) Conclusion in Ethical Eye: The Human Genome at p.133. 
532 See Dickens and Cook (1999), pp.57-58, for a discussion of the issues surrounding the disposal of 
unwanted embryos. They cite Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1992), where [t]he Tennessee 
Supreme Court has ruled that embryos are neither persons nor property, but governed separately. See also the 
UK domestic jurisdiction case, Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd (Secretary of State for Health and Another Intervening), 
CA: 25/06/ 2004. 
533 A technique known as parthenogenesis, and not yet fully achieved in mammals (although there has been a 
disputed claim with regard to mice.) See The Scientist, 01/04/2004, and critique by Jaenisch. 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20040421/01/ (Accessed 06/10/04). 
534 This would happen in a surrogacy with an embryo created from two other people being implanted in a 
surrogate mother; the mitochondrial DNA of the surrogate would not be eliminated. See generally Neill Howell, 
http://www.hbcg.utmb.edu/faculty/howell/content.html (Accessed 21/04/2002) 
535 The technique known, somewhat vaguely, as cloning, or somatic cell nuclear transfer. See Vogelstein, 
Alberts and Shine, (2003) at p.1237: In scientific parlance, cloning is a broadly used, shorthand term that refers 
to producing a copy of some biological entity  a gene, an organism, a cell  an objective that, in many cases, 
can be achieved by means other than the technique known as somatic cell nuclear transfer.  a procedure that 
can be used for many different purposes. Only one of these purposes involves an intention to create a clone of 
the organism (for example, a human). See Meyers challenge to this article on other grounds, infra n.564 and 
accompanying text. 
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come, is living material and represents the life of its progenitor. All humans shed DNA 
each day, and the future possibility is that a child could be created using that DNA, 
without the consent or involvement of the parent.
536
 Further, those parents may not both, 
or all, be human. Future possibilities include transgenic beings; those created using DNA 
from two different species, forming a hybrid, (such as a mule  a donkey and a horse) or a 
chimera, a single embryo made by fusing two fertilised embryos from different zygotes, 
of either the same or different species  a human and a chimpanzee, for instance. Human 
rights discourse has to have the courage to look beyond the horizon. 
Gregory Stock announces that few have yet grasped that we are on the cusp of profound 
biological change, poised to transcend our current form and character on a journey to 
destinations of new imagination.  Never before have we had the power to manipulate 
our biology in meaningful, predictable ways.
537
  
Habermas proposes another argument, with regard to genetic engineering and its possible 
effect on the individuals involved, and this line is supported by the Council of Europe.
538
 
This is whether later generations will come to terms with the fact that they may no longer 
see themselves as the undivided authors of their life  nor will be called upon as such.
539
 
Silvers comment on Huxleys classic, Brave New World, warns that parents, not 
governments, will be the driving force in utilising the possibilities: they will seize control 
                                                 
536 See, e.g., Harris (1999), p.298. See generally Skene (2003) at p.9. Skene, in discussing whether there should be 
a new criminal offence created regarding theft of DNA, concludes that: On balance, it may be wise to expand 
the potential civil actions for wrongful taking and testing of genetic material and also to create a new criminal 
offence. The civil actions might be in conversion; equitable claims for breach of confidence; or complaints 
under privacy legislation. I have argued that the criminal offence should consist of more than mere taking and 
testing of genetic material but I acknowledge the difficulty of drafting such an offence. 
537 Stock (2003) at p.1. 
538 See COE Assembly Debate on 26 January 1982, 21st and 22nd Sittings. Docs. 4832 and 4833, reports of the 
Legal Affairs Committee, and of the Committee on Science and Technology, Recommendation on Genetic 
Engineering 934 (1982), para.4. 
539 Habermas, (2003) pp.67. 
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of these new technologies.
 540
 The consequences for the future of the human race could be 
dire. 
 They will use some to reach otherwise unattainable reproductive goals and others to help 
their children achieve health, happiness and success. And it is in pursuit of this last goal that the 
combined actions of many individuals, operating over many generations, could give rise to a 
polarized humanity more horrific than Huxleys imagined Brave New World.
541
 
certain gene manipulation techniques that may prove detrimental further down the 
generational line.
542
 The Association of Reproductive Health Professionals makes the 
following claim, supporting embryonic selection and possible disposal of affected 
embryos rather than allowing manipulation of the germline:  
The only situation in which germline engineering would be required over pre-implantation 
selection is one in which a couple would like to endow their child with genes that neither 
member of the couple possesses. This is the enhancement scenario, which we believe would 
lead to a dystopic human future if it were allowed.  engineering the genes by means of 
germline modification would allow novel forms of human life to be created within one 
generation.
543
 
This is a conclusion that Andorno confirms, emphasising both the rights of future 
generations and the possible consequences to the human involved of their genetic 
modification at the hands of their parents or others, a point that is essential to the argument 
which Habermas advances, and which began this section: 
Regarding germ-line interventions, the UNESCO Declarations ban is also in conformity 
                                                 
540 Silver (1997) Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World New York: Avon Books at p.9, in Reinders (2000) at 
p.76.  
541 Ibid. 
542 See also Andorno (2003): At the international level, UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and 
Human Rights provides that germ-line interventions could be contrary to human dignity (Article 24). Similarly, 
the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states that an intervention seeking to modify the human 
genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if its aim is not to 
introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants (Article 13). 
543 http://www.arhp.org/patienteducation/onlinebrochures/cloning/index.cfm?ID=282 (Accessed 
14/11/2004). [Emphasis omitted]. 
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with most ethical and legal regulations and guidelines on the topic. It is important to stress that, 
unlike the alteration of the genes in the somatic cells, which affects only the individual treated, 
any alteration in the germ cells (gametes) or in the early embryo would be passed to the next 
generation. This fact raises enormous concerns about the risks of irreversible harm to future 
generations. In addition, in the case of genetic engineering for enhancement purposes, the 
objections against this procedure are based on the idea that we do not have the right to 
predetermine the characteristics of future individuals.544 
 
3.5 ISSUES ARISING REGARDING THE IDENTITY OF THE RIGHTS-BEARER 
The identity of the rights-bearer might be described as human being, or person, 
everyone, individuals, etc. Often it seems as if the terms are being used interchangeably, 
but the meaning behind them is not strictly analogous, and it is the aim of this section to 
discuss the terms human and person in relation to the issues arising from the inclusion, or 
otherwise, of them in the treaties. Following, there will be a brief discussion of the concept 
of future generations, and a concluding section in which the importance of a redefinition of 
the understanding of the term human in the context of human rights will be presented, and 
a proffered solution introduced.  
3.5.1 EVERY HUMAN IS  LIKE SOME OTHER HUMANS545  
In the quotation cited at the beginning of this chapter,
546
 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Chief Justice 
of the Vermont Supreme Court, used the opportunity of a lecture reflecting on a recent 
decision
547
 to explore the concept, in a meditation on our common humanity, of what it 
means to be a human in todays world, and what it might mean in tomorrows.
548
 He cites 
                                                 
544 Andorno, (November 2003) at p.9. 
545 Gatewood, infra, n.555, and accompanying text. 
546 Supra, text accompanying n.321. 
547 Baker v. State, Vermont Supreme Court, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.1999). 
548 Amestoy (2003). 
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Kass, who intimated that judges are, in the twenty-first century, at the intersection of 
biology and biography.
549
 This is a confusing intersection, with no clear way forward. 
Nino suggests that: 
The statement that the only condition for possessing fundamental moral rights is 
being human seems quite plausible, since it satisfies a deeply rooted egalitarian 
aspiration. This is so because the property of being human seems to be of the all-or-
nothing kind, unlike other properties  such as those of being tall, rich, or clever.550 
The property of being human may not be quite as straightforward as Nino suggests; it is to 
be argued here, however, that it is indeed the definitive criterion for possessing 
fundamental moral rights, dismissing any criteria based on quantifiable properties, 
which are usually ascribed in what has become a debate about personhood. Biology 
itself has no determinable domain,
551
 and the following discussion will refute a conclusion 
of determinable limits of life based on premises which purport to set express moments for 
lifes beginning and its ending. Even science does not have the answer, according to 
Rosen: 
[T]he ultimate question of What is life? is perhaps the hardest of all. But there is one more 
circumstance which is not without an irony of its own  there should be at least some explicit, 
tangible, categorical test for distinguishing between a material system that is an organism and one 
that is not. Indeed, many people have tried very hard to produce such criteria for separating the 
quick from the dead. Put briefly, they have all failed.
552 
He then explains that [t]here is no property of an organism that cannot at the same time be 
manifested by inanimate systems. Conversely, a dead organism is as inanimate as 
                                                 
549 Kass, (2002) Foreword, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: The Report of the Presidents Council on Bioethics at xviii, 
and in Amestoy, supra n.548, at p.1583. 
550 Nino (1991). 
551 Rosen (1991) at p.19: We thus do not know the scope or domain of biology, for it has as yet no objectively 
definable bounds. I am grateful to Professor Steve M. Potter, Georgia Institute of Technology and Emory 
University, for directing me to this work. 
552 Supra n.551, p.18. 
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anything.
553
 Yet what may be animate, that is respirated and displaying measurable vital 
signs, is a body which is being prepared to donate organs for transplant;
554
 a body that will 
not be certified as dead until after the organs have been harvested. Should animation be the 
deciding factor in human life, or should there be some degree of sentience? Are humans 
more, or something different from, the mind, even a mind which functions with reference to 
brain, body and world? Mind can be equated with personhood; the idea that to be fully 
human requires something more than biologically functioning body parts. Whether to be 
fully human can also be fully and necessarily equated with being a person, and vice versa, 
is an important question. 
i Whose human? 
The question of whose view of what it means to be a human, and which decisions about 
the issues surrounding human life should prevail, is indirectly addressed by Gatewood 
when he offers his favourite anthropological aphorism: 
Every human is in certain respects: 
a) like all other humans. 
b) like some other humans. 
c) like no other human. 
The correct answer, of course, is ... d, all of the above. It is the second line, however, that 
we focus on most of the time. How is it that every human is in certain respects like some other 
humans (and not like some others)?
 555  
But in what respect is every human like every other, and therefore categorisable as 
human? Any statement about any aspect of what constitutes human life is not without its 
detractors. Should law, however, feel able to make the determination of lifes beginning 
                                                 
553 Ibid., p.19. 
554 Machado, (1998).  
555 Gatewood (1993), Introduction. 
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and ending, where biology cannot, even to state that the humans life begins at birth
556
 can 
provoke intercultural interpretational disagreements. Different societies postulate at least 
four different moments when birth might be considered to be accomplished.
557
 Even then, 
the born child may not become, in the eyes of his or her society, fully rights-bearing. For 
example, a child born in the English jurisdiction would have to survive for forty-eight 
hours after birth in order to be able to claim damages in negligence for prenatal harm.
558
 
In some societies,
559
 infanticide of the newborn would be countenanced in the case of 
extreme disability, economic hardship or simply for being the wrong sex (usually 
female), a lethal discrimination which lasts throughout life.
560
  
For some cultures, beings belonging to other cultures are not human, as they are 
                                                 
556 A less contentious proposition than conception, which may or may not be at fertilisation. Conception is 
defined as the act of becoming pregnant; fertilization of an ovum by a spermatozoon, and fertilisation as 
creation by the physical union of male and female gametes; of sperm and ova in an animal. 
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/ (Accessed 20/12/2004). This leaves uncertain the moment when 
conception might be recognised in a case of IVF, where fertilisation has taken place ex utero. For a discussion 
of the notion of implantation, fourteen days after conception, as a widely-accepted view of when life begins 
(because the embryo does not split thereafter if twinning is to take place, and therefore the individual soul must 
be present by that point but not necessarily earlier) see Ford (1998). 
557 The start of labour, partial delivery, total delivery, total delivery plus respiration. Other belief systems include 
delivery of the placenta. See Williams (1997). 
558 Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976; although, as Mason and McCall Smith (1999), point out at 
pp.125-126, the infants common law rights are not affected by that Act: Burton v Islington Health Authority; de 
Martell v Merton and Sutton Health Authority [1992] 3 All ER 833, (1993) 10 BMLR 63.  
559 Some societies have no problem with disposal of the unwanted newborn: see, for instance,  Meads 
description of a tribe in New Guinea, the Mundugumor, who threw the dirty bodies of unwanted infants into 
the river.  Mead, (1928) Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilisation New 
York: William Morrow, at p.148, and in Watson, (2000) p.279. This is something that may also be happening in 
the postmodern West: Wolf, (1995) comments that Stories surface regularly about worthless babies left naked 
on gratings or casually dropped out of windows, while valuable, genetically correct babies are created at vast 
expense and with intricate medical assistance for infertile couples. Indeed, some contemporary ethicists 
advocate infanticide for the severely compromised newborn: Kuhse and Singer, supra n.513. See also 
Westermarck, (1924). See Pinker (1997) on neonaticide in modern American society, and Tooleys early work on 
abortion and infanticide (first in article form in 1972) and A Comment on Tooley's Abortion and Infanticide, 
by Tushnet and Seidman (January 1986).  
560 A practice that has become known as Gendercide; see Charlotte Bunch, The Intolerable Status Quo: 
Violence against Women and Girls: Women Commentary UNICEF, The Progress of Nations, 1997: Roughly 60 
million women who should be alive today are missing because of gender discrimination, predominantly in 
South and West Asia, China and North Africa. See also Jones (June 2000). 
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themselves. Amongst certain tribespeople, homicide of any person from another tribe is 
not condemned (in whatever terms the customary law of the tribe chooses to condemn and 
punish homicide) as everyone who is not of the tribe is the Other, a different kind of 
being. For the Gumuz of Ethiopia, every non-Gumuz is the enemy, known as Shuna 
mitan, man is one and the same.
561
 There are situations also in the supposedly advanced 
West, where recognition is not afforded equally to all human beings as fully human and 
fully worthwhile, such as that recorded by Pukë as persisting still in Albania:  
Under the ancient code, if a man finds his wife with another man, he has the right to shoot 
them both, but only with one bullet. If a woman in his family is killed, he must kill a woman in 
the enemy family, or their dog. Both are considered worth half a man.
562
 
The relatively easy case for inclusion as a human is the baby, conceived naturally, 
wanted, delivered completely, breathing independently, and without illness or disability, 
including pathogenic genetic mutation. This is (almost unarguably) a paradigmatic 
human, under the protection of law, and will remain so whilst living a fulfilled and 
dignified life, until death.  
Now the scenario can be expanded, until the certainty about humanity becomes fuzzy. 
The first term, baby, introduces the debate. Whether the neonate was a human baby at 
the moment before delivery, or three or six or nine months  or at any time  before, is a 
determinant of its legal status. If it was not, its ability to benefit from human rights 
legislation, as a rights-bearer, is uncertain. And if it should be one of the beings 
introduced in the scenarios about life that have been referred to above, its status may be 
still more uncertain. Perhaps it is a clone, grown for use as body parts and not to lead any 
                                                 
561 Donovan and Assefa (2003) at p.516. 
562 See Pukë (2003) Blood feuds trap Albania in the past: Thousands forced to take refuge as medieval code 
targets fathers and sons. 
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kind of life of its own; perhaps a chimera, perhaps created to add human intelligence or 
language to a beast of burden; perhaps a hybrid, made to test medicines or perform routine 
robotic tasks. And at the other end of life, there might be some dispute about the beings 
status as a person, even if it has lived an established human life, for instance, if entered 
into a state of PVS. Once that status has gone, it may be that the humanity recognised 
there is not sufficient for the being that remains to be treated with dignity. 
ii The indefinite human 
Meyer contextualises the semantic difficulties well, in his assertion that other scientists were 
wrong in their refutation of human-ness in the embryo, in respect of the debate on cloning. 
We can all agree that a preimplantation embryo is not sentient and that it is not viable to 
survive without assistance.
563
 Yet, as he points out, making distinctions about the 
humanness of genetically human organisms on the basis of their developmental stage 
falls within the realm of opinion, not scientific fact. Some scientists in the field of 
cloning put forward an argument that their research does not involve production of 
human beings and are relying on semantics to justify its exclusion from [relevant] 
regulations. Meyers point is that [s]upporting stem cell research and holding to 
philosophical distinctions between the rights of human beings from different 
developmental stages are quite a different thing from arguing that human embryos are not 
human. From Meyers viewpoint, the cause of scientific research in controversial fields 
is only weakened by relying on such arguments to support it.
564
  
What was an issue centred on abortion is rapidly becoming a much wider area of debate, 
as Meyers comments indicate. The whole field of genetics is advancing rapidly, with a 
                                                 
563 Meyer, (2002).  
564 Ibid. 
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number of interventions and manipulations which should be of interest to human rights 
discourses, but which fall outside the field because the human rights bodies do not wish to 
be involved in anything affecting the preborn, in case they are seen to be getting involved 
in the area of abortion. Many campaigners for womens reproductive rights see the 
ascription of any rights to the preborn as inevitably affecting the availability of legal 
abortion. Because this would be a step backwards in reproductive rights terms, and indeed 
possibly fatal to many women who may then well feel compelled to seek backstreet 
(illegal) abortions, the response has been that denying the humanity of the preborn 
immediately takes all such beings, and whatever might happen to them, or whatever they 
might become, out of the powerful protective field of human rights. 
Yet there are those whose instincts and beliefs are to allow legalised abortion, but who are 
prepared to argue the case for the humanity of prepersonal human life. Wolf wrote an 
emotive article on the subject, challenging second-wave feminists who have reacted to 
the dehumanization of women by dehumanizing the creatures within them,
 565
 instead of 
accepting the woman and the child within her as both human, but acknowledging that 
sometimes, nonetheless, the woman must choose her life over the fetus's.
566
 Again, the 
argument from interests is to practice semantics to achieve a particular end, and the case is 
no better in the field of abortion than it is in stem cell research. Sometimes hard things 
have to be done and they have to be named as being done; develop[ing] a rhetoric that 
defined the unwanted fetus as at best valueless: at worst an adversary, a mass of 
                                                 
565 Wolf (1995). 
566 Ibid. 
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dependent protoplasm,
567
 is not the moral answer, or even a logical one.  
The argument supporting recognition of the preborn human qua human, in some of its 
aspects, has been offered by others, such as Sanger
568
 and Shrage,
569
 although the nature 
of that humanity is still challenged, for instance by Lee.
570
 She agrees that [p]regnant 
women who have abortions (and those of us who unreservedly support their right to do 
so) do know that fetuses are human  (in a genetic and biological sense)
571
 but bases her 
argument for legalised abortion on a human/person distinction, assessing the failure to 
make this distinction as the major flaw in the arguments of anti-abortionists,
572
 whilst 
Shrage acknowledges that its important to establish laws that grant women decision-
making authority when it comes to their reproductive lives, [but] this authority need not 
be absolute, canceling out all other interests, including all of our interest in not trivializing 
the destruction of human life.
573
 Responding to an argument of Shrages,
574
 Brown 
concedes that pregnancy involves a developing human,
 575
 whilst being able to affirm 
that that developing human is inside, and is in most respects very fundamentally a part 
of, a developed and autonomous human, a legally recognized subject, a woman.
576
 
Brown and Shrage are agreeing on the same ends (although they see different political 
                                                 
567 Ibid., citing others who have wrestled with this issue: Camille Paglia, who has criticized the convoluted 
casuistry of some pro-choice language; Roger Rosenblatt, who has urged us to permit but discourage abortion; 
Laurence Tribe, who has noted that we place the fetus in shadow in order to advance the pro-choice argument. 
But we have yet to make room for this conversation at the table of mainstream feminism. For other views, see 
Sanger (2004), pp.13-15; Eberstadt, (2001). 
568 Sanger (2004). 
569 Shrage (2003). 
570  Lee, The trouble with 'smiling' fetuses, September 13, 2003  
571 Ibid. 
572 Ibid. 
573 Shrage, Pro-Choice or No Choice  and Other Alternatives, Annual Roe v. Wade Lecture, Center for the Study of 
Women, UCLA, 20/01/2004. 
574 Shrage, Electoral Politics and Abortion Dissent, (Fall 2003) and responses, infra notes 575 and 577. 
575 Brown, Argument, Dissent, (Fall 2003). See also Petcheskys Argument, Ibid. 
576 Ibid. 
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means of achieving it), and Shrages response to criticisms is a helpful summary of this 
argument, in showing why there is a polarized opinion on the acknowledgement of the 
otherwise unarguable humanity of the preborn:  
I think that we need to take our opponents at their word and argue with the reasons they 
give. Many of them simply oppose taking human life, even fetal human life. Those who favor 
unrestricted abortion need to defend the taking of fetal life, not avoid the issue by ad hominem 
attacks.
577
  
Its seems unlikely that the strongest advocates of anti-abortion policies, who do not even 
favour the late Ronald Reagans acceptance of it to save the life of the mother,
578
 would 
respond to reasoned debate; that is not a good reason, however, to reject Shrages 
proferred depolarisiation.
579
  
iii The embodied human 
Is there some essential quality to the ordinary human life, which makes people both of 
the class human  in some respects like every other human  and individually human, 
like no other?
580
 Locke offered an analysis of the essence of beings in his Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding.
581
 His conclusion was that there is nothing which is 
essential to being human in a persons bodily shape or form: 
        It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and nature has made me so: but there is nothing I 
have, is essential to me. An accident, or disease, may very much alter my colour, or shape; a fever, or 
fall, may take away my reason, or memory, or both; and an apoplexy leave neither sense nor 
understanding, no nor life. Other creatures of my shape, may be made with more, and better, or 
                                                 
577 Shrage, Arguments  Laurie Shrage Responds, Dissent, (Fall 2003). 
578 Spitzer (1987), p.62. 
579 See Spitzer, op.cit., on the strength of the extremism and political violence inspired by the debate about 
abortion in the USA. For an expression of the understandings prompting a strong anti-abortion view, (although 
it is not meant to infer that it is either extremist or violent) see Bohan (1999). Bohan cites Wolfs article, supra, 
n.565, in an impassioned plea for the aborted unborn. (p.211). Bohan also makes a case for the acknowledgment 
of preborn life as human. 
580 To paraphrase Gatewood, supra, n.555. 
581 Locke (1690, 1947 ed.) 
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fewer, and worse, faculties than I have: and others may have reason, and sense, in a shape and body 
very different from mine. So that if it be asked, whether it be essential to me or any other particular 
corporeal being to have reason, I say, no; no more than it is essential to this white thing I write on to 
have words in it.
582 
Cyborgs
583
 are a possible issue of the future, and the question will then be how much 
artificial replacement can be made to a human body for it to be no longer human, to no 
longer qualify as a human rights-bearer. Two prosthetic legs, two prosthetic arms  a heart, 
lungs, liver, kidneys; perhaps only a brain remaining, sustained entirely by machinery.
584
  
For Locke, for whom the possibilities of cyborgs had not yet arisen, the essential  nominal 
essence  element of being human was membership of the human race: 
Indeed, as to the real essences of substances, we only suppose their being, without precisely 
knowing what they are: but that which annexes them still to the species, is the nominal essence of 
which they are the supposed foundation and cause. 
585
 
 Rivard wrote in 1992 that within ten to thirty years advances in genetic technology 
should allow scientists to intermingle the genetic material of humans and animals to 
produce human-animal hybrids.
586
 His argument was in respect of a theory of 
constitutional personhood for transgenic beings; ten years later, James McCartney pointed 
out that it has proven difficult, if not impossible, to develop a philosophical theory of 
                                                 
582 Ibid., Book III, Chapter VI, 4; p.224 (1947 ed.). 
583 Part-human, part-machine (or construction); it could be claimed that a person with a pacemaker, or a 
cochlear implant, or an artificial hip, is a cyborg, and that the age of cyborgs is already here. See Warwick: he 
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584 See DeGrazia, (2005), for a thorough discussion of such possibilities. 
585 Supra n.581, Book III, Chapter VI, 6; p.226 (1947 ed.). 
586 Rivard (1992) was one of the early writers considering the possibilities of transgenic beings in the current 
biotechnological context (rather than, for instance, the mythical Gods/humans/beasts of Ancient Greece), and 
the laws ability to address the issues involved. He offers a personhood presumption theory [which] holds that 
if the average, mature member of a species has the capacity for self-awareness, then all members of that species 
are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of personhood. (p.1509). He suggests that [t]his theory may be used to 
solve the problem of constitutional personhood for nonhuman species. (Ibid.)  
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personhood. His answer to that problem within the context of laws need to meet the 
current challenges is to:  
[B]egin with the assertion  perhaps an intuition  that a person, in a non-metaphysical 
sense, is an individual of a living species, some of whose members demonstrate the capacities to 
think, choose, reason, and possess inalienable rights. Individuation within the human species is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for personhood, which alone is sufficient to claim 
fundamental human rights.
587
  
It is suggested here that whilst individuation might be necessary and sufficient for 
personhood, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for identification as a human rights-bearer. 
Although McCartneys definition is a broad and generous one, it would not include those 
whose being transgresses species, and may not include clones, and does not mention future 
generations; it would not offer the protection of the law to human genetic material, nor to 
those who may be defined out of personhood The argument must now shift bases, and 
discuss the concept of person and why that is not a comprehensive definition of the rights-
bearer, able to allow the treaty texts protecting the right to life to be most effective in their 
application. 
3.5.2 THE PERSON IN CONTEXT 
Lockes definition of person was mentioned above; it has been taken up in many fora, but 
most especially in the debates surrounding abortion, and euthanasia of those in persistent 
vegetative state [PVS]. There are three aspects to the concept of person, to be briefly 
considered here; one being a bodily entity, frequently mentioned in the treaty texts as a 
rights-bearer. Another is the idea of personhood, which has been defined
588
 as the ability to 
                                                 
587 McCartney (2001-2002) at p.604. 
588 On the subject of personhood in law see generally, and particularly with regard to property rights in people 
and their bodies,  Davies, and Ngaire Naffine (2001); and Grear (2003). Regarding the subject of the unborn as 
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relate to the world beyond oneself; to have some understanding of others and ones 
relationship with them; to have some kind of life plan.
589
 Finally there is the term legal 
personality, which can refer to corporations as well as people. 
 
i The Embodied Person 
The person of the treaty texts is ascribed rights-bearing capacity as a matter of course; 
and this person is a living being, situated somewhere between (Western) birth and 
(Western) death. Locke, cited above, continues by detailing the necessity of a being 
named man to have reason; that the paper he writes on has to have words to be called a 
treatise, and so for a human being to be named man, then reason is essential to it; 
supposing reason to be a part of the complex idea the name man stands for.
590
 Lockes 
suggestion was that as soon as [any one] supposes or speaks of essential, the consideration 
of some species, or the complex idea, signified by some general name, comes into mind.
591
 
Lockes gendered man is the person of this discussion; the person has reason. 
A person is the kind of being who can own property, marry, found a family; who can vote, 
and be elected; who can be protected against torture and freed from slavery, and assured 
of a fair trial, and whose freedom to exercise rights and liberties is not in any way 
diminished by race, gender, disability, or poverty. Such is the accepted dictum, and it is 
                                                                                                                                                  
a person and extrapolating from that to equate abortion with murder, see Ibegbu (2000) and Smits (1992). 
Regarding the personhood of the mentally disabled, see Reinders (2000). Challenging the personhood of the 
unborn and those in persistent vegetative state, see Steinbock, (1992). Generally, and especially with regard to 
the personhood of defective neonates, see Moreland and Geisler (1990); on the latter point see infra, n.513. 
589 See Higginsons critique of McCormick on an approach to life-saving interventions on defective neonates 
which focuses on their likely ability to develop meaningful relationships, and to recognise and participate in the 
qualities of justice, respect, concern, compassion and support that surround them. Higginson (1987), pp.45-48, 
esp. p.46, citing R.J. McCormick To save or let die: the dilemma of modern medicine How Brave a new World, 
SCM, 1981, p.386. 
590 Ibid.  
591 Ibid. 
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the qualities of being inherent, in some cases inalienable, in all cases universal, which 
characterise the human rights enjoyed by the person as rights-bearer. The person has a 
bodily form, either now or in the future; future generations, whose bodies will need 
breathable air and drinkable water, are beginning to be included in the class of rights-
bearers, as shown above. Where the person cannot speak for themselves, others are often 
granted standing. However, there is no-one who can speak for the already conceived but 
as yet unborn person-to-be; there must be a persons body present. The body need not be 
alive; violations have been found in respect of the missing
592
 as well as the present dead. 
But there must at least have been a body that has been born, and, it appears, must have 
lived though not necessarily breathed. This will be considered, below, in a discussion of 
human rights discourse and morality.The case was made by the HRC in Queenan v. 
Canada,
593
 where the author as a Canadian citizen, [presented] his communication on 
behalf of Canadian unborn children, because they cannot present the complaint 
themselves.
594
 His complaint was against Canadian abortion laws, and included comment 
on the Canadian Criminal Code, which explicitly states that a child becomes a human 
being after a live birth; a stillborn child was never human, a finding which had 
incidentally already been made with respect to s.7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, and s.I1, of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, in Tremblay 
v. Daigle, where the status of a foetus as a person, human being, juridical personality 
or concomitant of the mother was debated. It was held that a human being begins at birth, 
in view of Québécois legislators, who otherwise would have specifically drafted the 
                                                 
592 The leading case is the ACHR Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras. 
593 Communication No. 1379/2005, 26 July 2005. 
594 Para.2.1. 
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legislation to include the foetus.
595
 The relevant section of the Criminal Code of Canada 
reads as follows: 
Part VIII, Section 223: 
(1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has completely 
proceeded, in a living state, from the body of its mother, whether or not 
(a) it has breathed; 
(b) it has an independent circulation; or 
(c) the navel string is severed. 
 (2) A person commits homicide when he causes injury to a child before or during its birth 
as a result of which the child dies after becoming a human being.
 596
 
The author in Queenan claimed that there was nothing in the Covenant which led one to 
believe that the preborn human was anything less than human, and that non-inclusion in 
the class of human beings or persons was discriminatory.
597
 Few parents or members of 
the wider community would disagree with him; there is seldom debate on whether a 
wanted foetus is human or not.
598
 His argument failed without the HRC considering this 
fundamental point; their response was in the nature of avoiding the issue, with echoes of 
the ECtHR in Vo: 
The Committee notes that the author does not claim that he is a victim of the alleged 
violations of the Covenant by the State party. The author states that he is submitting this 
communication on behalf of all unborn children in the State party in general. The Committee 
notes that, in accordance with Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, communications must be 
submitted by or on behalf of individuals who claim that any of their rights enumerated under 
the Covenant have been violated. The Committee considers that in the absence of specific 
claimants who can be individually identified, the author's communication amounts to an actio 
                                                 
595 Pp.551-55. 
596 R.S. 1985, c. C-46. 
597 Supra, n.593, para.3.2. 
598 See Jolly (1987) on the nursing care of those who grieve the loss of someone before life has been 
established. It seems better to consider this as appropriate phraseology; life, as such, is not established, 
although it is present, but humanity is not in doubt. See also Williams (2005). 
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popularis and is therefore inadmissible under article 1 of the Optional Protocol.599 
There are good reasons for permitting legalised abortion, but failure to allow a voice to 
the unborn is not the answer which should be promoted by a human rights tribunal; it is 
not the moral answer. The Canadian Criminal Code may well be perpetuating an injustice; 
it is argued here that it is.
600
 
ii Personhood: a Lockean critique 
The definition of a person in the sense of personhood is often extrapolated from Lockes 
description: a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider 
itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places.
601
 Hughes and Keown 
comment that:  
When they specify which elements of sentience and neurological integrity create the illusion 
of personhood, Western bioethicists begin to sound remarkably Buddhistic: the awareness of 
the difference between self and other; the ability to be conscious of oneself over time; the ability 
to engage in purposive actions. 
602
  
The Buddhistic aspect is not apparent in Tooleys conclusion that it will usually become 
obvious soon after birth that a newborn is severely compromised, and that [s]ince it is 
virtually certain that an infant at such a stage of its development does not possess the 
concept of a continuing self, and thus does not possess a serious right to life, there is 
excellent reason to believe that infanticide is morally permissible in most cases where it is 
otherwise desirable.
603
 If a human rights-bearer is to be defined only as a person, with 
                                                 
599 Ibid.,para.4.2. 
600 This is similar to other formats such as that enacted in section 159 of the New Zealand Crimes Act of 1961: 
Killing of a child: (1) A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has completely 
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the necessary context of a mind that meets the personhood criteria described, what are the 
consequences for those whose minds are unformed (the unborn), unaware (the ill or 
damaged), or unsentient (the comatose)? 
Some commentators have confused the definition of the person with that of the human: 
Locke himself did not do this, considering three states of identity. The first is the Unity 
of Substance;
604
 the second, the identity of vegetables and brutes, being an identity 
attributed to things having a common Organization of Life.
605
 This includes the identity 
of a Man, which is what is being referred to in this thesis as a human. It is only Lockes 
third criterion of identity which looks to the personhood requirements, cited above.
606
 The 
first state of being is that of the same assemblage of atoms; the second identifies whether 
the being-in-evidence has genetic membership of the human species. This is the identity 
which is argued for here as a human rights-bearer, but which is often confused with the 
personhood criteria which require something more in order to recognise the identity of the 
atoms (substance) than that they should either be the same as they themselves were at 
some time in the past, or that they should possess similar characteristics to either 
themselves at some past or future date, or to others of the same classification/species 
(organisation of life).  
One such set of identity criteria which confuse humanity and personhood is Fletchers.
607
 
Higginson points out that Fletcher has a highly specific and circumscribed idea of what a 
human person is.
608
 Fletchers criteria of what he terms as indicating humanhood are: 
Minimal intelligence (a minimum IQ of 40), self-awareness, a capacity for self-control, a 
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606 Text accompanying n.601. 
607 Fletcher, (1979). 
608 See also Ford (2005); cf. Harris (2005). 
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sense of time, a sense of the future, a sense of the past, a capacity to relate to others, a capacity 
for a concern for others, the ability to communicate, control of ones existence, curiosity, a 
capacity to adapt to and intiate change in ones life, a balance of reason and emotion in ones life, 
idiosyncracy or distinctiveness, and a functioning neocortex.
609
 
Higginson notes that these are a demanding, rule-based Utilitarian set of qualifications for 
what he prefers to consider as personhood.
610
 
There is another approach to the recognition of individual identity, not centred on the 
Lockean relational and participatory requirements, offered by Loewy as a 
Bio/Psycho/Social Perspective.
611
 This is much more focused on the interpersonal and 
community relationships and interdependence which are features of everyones lives, to 
some degree or another, and regrets the emphasis upon autonomy as an oppositional 
factor to dependence itself, rather than its relative increase or decrease.
612
 The 
consequence of bringing autonomy to the fore (as Fletchers criteria would) as the default 
mode is to reinforc[e] a presumption that persons are not normally dependent but, rather, 
complete and selfcontained entities that exist independently from the rest of their 
environment unless or until they become functionally compromised.
613
 The belief that 
individuals are in control of their own lives and the integration of those lives with the 
lives of others means that autonomy comes to be treated as the default mode of human 
existence and is defined in terms of atomistic isolation: persons are self-contained, self-
sufficient, self-defining and completely selfdetermined.
614
 Loewy challenges the view 
that such autonomy is either possible or the preferable default mode; actual living 
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depends itself upon co-operative interdependence
615
 which need not be viewed as a 
defect, even when it is increased or modified as a result of illness or injury; it is already a 
fundamental fact of human existence.
616
 This is in line with Mertuss sense of 
community: she reminds us that We draw our meaning through our connection with 
others  our communities in turn exist only through their synergistic relationship with 
us.
617
 Boyd White underlines the shifting nature of our communion with our 
communities, particularly at time of crisis;
618
 certainly those times described as boundary 
moments within this thesis, which tend to stretch and divide loyalties. When we act, we 
do not act alone. Life, for a human, is human life, and to be human is, to return to an 
earlier definition,
619
 to be a member of the genus homo, species homo sapiens. To be a 
member of the human race not only confirms value in an individual life, but recognises 
the importance and place of society, which in the context of the right to life is the 
contribution each person in society requires from others in order to survive, and can give 
to others in order to aid their survival and that of the race as an ongoing entity. Mertus 
offers a re-assessment of individual rights in view of the collapse of Roe v. Wade,
620  
asserting that: 
The ultimate focus on the individual reflects an impoverished and imaginary vision of self  
the solitary self. No theory based upon such a distorted view of society can withstand the test of 
time, at least not without great sacrifice, particularly the stunting of both individual and 
community development.
621
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That is, Mertus suggests, acknowledging an individual-in-community, protecting the 
rights of the individual not only qua individual, but also because otherwise the community 
is harmed, both in principle (morally) and in practice. Perhaps  an individual rights 
analysis provides neither the proper tools for fully recognizing the centrality of 
reproductive freedom, nor an adequate means by which to ensure its survival.
622
 For 
Boyd White: 
Our practical and moral lives are radically communal  and this means that our thoughts 
about what we want and who we are must reflect the freedom and power of others, without 
whose free co-operation we can have nothing of value, be nothing of value. This in turn means 
that hardheaded practical thought and sound ethical thought alike require us to recognize the 
existence of others and our dependence upon them.
623
 
Mertuss and Boyd Whites insights contribute to an understanding of personhood such as 
that described by Loewy, and is the preferred view, to be adopted here, offering a richer 
and more generous interpretation of the human person as participant in a world of others, 
and a broader understanding of the human condition, and of those who might be counted 
as human rights-bearers. Human rights are not only for the sentient, the rational, the 
patiently enduring, the sane or the innocent.
624
 The life of the good man and the bad 
stand equal, because how a man has led his life may not affect his claim to continued 
life.
625
 As Andorno has shown, recognition of inherent human dignity does not require 
the meeting of any personhood-capacity requirements.
626
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For some, such as Harris, quality of life arguments are equated with subjective 
judgements regarding the life-as-lived: how do we explain the positive value of life, 
even for those who on an objective assessment have little or no value in their experience 
of bios? Also to be resolved is the problem that the more rich we make our account of the 
value of life, and hence the nature of the wrong done by killing someone, seems to vary 
with the quality of life of the person concerned.
627
 Indeed, for Harris, a person is a 
unified complex being, but this is not sufficient to qualify in life; that complexity is part 
of what it is to possess the radical capacities of intelligence and autonomy  in short, the 
capacity to value existence. When these are lacking the person has ceased to exist (or has 
not yet come into being).
628
 
Society depends for survival on those who can live positively and creatively, as amply 
shown in gulags and other orders of terror throughout the world. What does that imply, 
however, for the dependent spirits? Veneration of the life of thought is good; it cannot, 
however, be linked to a right to life, and may be seen as constructing a boundary between 
the sentient (rights-holders by right) and the non-sentient (rights-holders by default or 
forbearance). Agamben eloquently illustrates the richness of community:  
 human politics is distinguished from that of other living beings in that it is founded, 
through a supplement of politicity [policità] tied to language, on a community not simply of the 
pleasant and the painful but of the good and the evil and of the just and the unjust.
629 
iii The Disabled Human 
 
Abortion and embryo selection for expected disability is now the largest category of pre-
                                                 
627 Harris, Life and Death, in Craig (Ed.) (1998) pp. 625-630, at p.625. 
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birth termination. It is also the most widely accepted, being actively promoted particularly 
by means of routine testing to detect potential malformation. There are a number of 
associated consequences; including that health and life are seen as being valued over 
disease and death, but how viable is the first, and how inevitable the second? Pain and 
suffering are to some extent inevitable as part of the human condition, and death certainly 
is. Should a child born disabled instead not exist at all  another, at onset perfect, child, in 
its place in the family? That, somewhat metaphysical, question is beyond the scope of 
human rights; the related issue of promotion of eugenic practices is not, and is particularly 
close to the heart of modern human rights discourse which found its impetus partly in 
Nazi promotion of the Aryan race.  Ettore,
630
 recording an interview with a lawyer, makes 
the point: 
 The more instruments you have in your hands to prevent disability, the less you come to 
accept it. Its [disability] something that can be avoided. Its preventative medicine but you dont 
know how far it will go  You do all of this testing to prevent disabled babies being born with 
defects  Will this turn to eugenics or not in the long run?  How far can preventative health 
go? Prevention [in] the extreme can become a sort of eugenics if youre preventing things more 
and more.631 
A further consideration is, of course, what constitutes disability. Katz Rothman
632
 points 
out that in Western societies it is now acceptable to terminate pregnancy for potential 
disorders which a mother feels society is not equipped to deal with adequately, even 
though the condition is in itself not incompatible with life or a reasonable quality of life. 
She may assume  and with some reason  that the childs suffering will not only be the 
physical or mental pain and anguish associated with the disabling illness itself, but with 
the way society at large will treat the person, or care for the family and the individual 
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involved. Yet those same Western societies would seriously condemn a mother in, for 
instance, rural India, who kills her girlchild at birth or soon after, because she is a third 
daughter, and the woman herself in her great toil and struggle cannot see any kind of 
future for this little one, other than suffering.
633
 Preventing human suffering in this 
context is, therefore, equivalent to denying existence to a whole class of people  the 
disabled. Ettore appreciates the putative potential benefits of the reproductive genetic 
technologies: 
They create possibilities for medical advances and opportunities to make choices about the 
health of future generations. But, these technologies are value laden and experts are making 
moral verdicts about foetuses. When looking at genetic technologies generally, Nicholas [634] 
contends that these technologies are constructing a new moral landscape and culture. They are 
disrupting long-established social understandings of how the world is, the meaning of the 
family, the place of humans in the biosphere and the role and responsibilities of the authorised 
knowledge makers of  western culture.635 
The technologies are creating new possibilities for choice and destruction of humans,
636
 
unconsidered since Zyklon B.637 Declassifying potentially disabled foetuses as human, or 
erecting a human/person distinction, is neither logically nor morally tenable as a 
proposition at law. 
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Sheldon and Wilkinson
638
 construct a strong argument for the indefensibility of a clause 
in UK abortion legislation allowing abortion solely on the grounds of expected disability 
in the foetus, emphasising that it is maternal choice which is the only logically tenable 
deciding factor.
639
 Reinders
640
 also constructs a critique of liberal thinking in this field, 
making the point that [p]opular culture sends the message that life is more worth living 
the less trouble it takes. Only people who know this myth to be utterly distortive of human 
life will be capable of accepting lives with limited capacities as valuable and worthwhile 
in their own right.
641
 His particular concern is with the mentally disabled, and again the 
subtraction of personality from human life is displayed in his perception of others views 
regarding the status of those with limited mental capacity:  
Mentally disabled human beings do not function well as persons, that is to say, if we take 
persons to mean what it is often taken to mean in liberal society: rational, self-conscious beings 
who are capable of determining their own plan of life. To prevent the lives of those who are 
lacking this capacity  or have it only in a diminished sense  is to prevent lives that in an 
important sense cannot succeed. Or so, many people in liberal society presumably believe[642].643 
This focus upon the idea of success in life as a collateral to liberal democratic thought also 
tends to include an emphasis upon suffering and its avoidance, possibly with an 
undercurrent of avoiding cost to society (in a matrix that ascribes suffering to society by 
supporting the disabled) and can most clearly be seen in a medical ethic that insists on 
prenatal screening, not clearly indicating choice and consequence to a pregnant woman 
                                                 
638 Sheldon and Wilkinson (2001). 
639 See Scott (2005) on the role that, she argues, parental reproductive autonomy should be allowed to play in 
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis and selective abortion. 
640 Reinders (2000). 
641 Ibid,. p.xi.  
642 Reinders see this as the dominant view of liberal bioethics, classically held by such writers as Tooley, Singer 
and Kuhse. Reinders, Ibid., n.16, p.222. 
643 Reinders, Ibid.,p.44. 
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whose normal condition is treated as an illness.
644
 In the context of life, if protection by 
law were read to mean prevention by law, the consequence could be the eradication of the 
Other; if one were to try to prevent those situations in which the protection of law is 
called for, such as disability or illness, or starvation. Here again the need is for a moral 
law; one which works to eradicate the problem and not the human, however much that 
human might be objectively assumed to be better off not living. Weiner and Morse 
describe strategies to ameliorate the problems associated with foetal alcohol syndrome, 
demonstrating how an interventionist policy can work to mitigate the effects of a mothers 
heavy drinking on the developing foetus. This can be seen in distinction to those policies 
which would call for harsh strategies denying civil liberties to pregnant women who 
suffer from addictions, in order to protect the developing foetus. Such strategies may be 
self-defeating in encouraging women who otherwise might not do so to seek abortions 
rather than seek treatment; for instance, in the USA, where there is a strong right-wing 
pro-life movement, this could well be seen as a drawback. Too many of the situations in 
which life is at its boundaries are seen by activists and policiymakers as black/white, 
either/or, when in fact there is a middle way; effective palliative care instead of 
euthanasia, for instance. Health and welfare benefits and child care facilities can help 
pregnant women to keep their children, if that is their wish.
645
 Crime control and 
prevention policies can intervene to prevent rape, as a cause of unwanted pregnancies; and 
to deter murder. Punishment regimes that include rehabilitation and education can make 
                                                 
644 See generally Ettore, supra n.630. 
645 See van Zyl Smit on the German model propsed at re-unification. 
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of a murderer a different kind of person,
646
 someone they might not become if the State 
murders them first. State policies can be, and are, self-defeating in this way; they are, if 
not the root cause of many of the problems, certainly counter-productive in addressing 
them. 
iv Legal Personality 
The dichotomy apparent in recognition of a right to participate in the international legal 
system as an individual is highlighted by  McCorquodale, who points out that the nature 
of international legal personality is such that:  
[I]f it can be shown that individuals are exercising and enjoying in fact (to use the ICJs 
words) certain rights, privileges, powers or immunities in the international legal system then they 
can be assumed to be acting as international legal persons.
 647
 
International legal persons are not defined by having been granted rights; the enjoyment 
of rights itself confers international legal personality, and a power to act. As has been 
shown above, rights are inherent in the human person, recognised as inherent with human 
dignity. Therefore, all humans are international legal persons, empowered to act under the 
international human rights treaties, although within the parameters determined still by 
States.
648
 Article l(2) of the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance [DPPED] states that:  
Any act of enforced disappearance places the persons subjected thereto outside the 
protection of the law and inflicts severe suffering on them and their families. It constitutes a 
violation of the rules of international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to recognition as a 
person before the law, the right to liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
                                                 
646 [SUNDAY TIMES DAY IN THE LIFE OF MAGAZINE ARTICLE FEW WEEKS AGO USA 
PRISONER] 
647 McCorquodale (2003) The Individual and the International Legal System in Evans, (2003), pp.299-325, at 
p.304, and citing (p.301) the Reparations for Injuries Opinion, ICJ Reports 1949, p.174 at pp.178-179. 
648 See McCorquodale, supra n.647.  
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subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. It also 
violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life.  
This is one of many texts in which recognition as a person before the law is separated 
from mention of the right to life. Life, and legal personality, are distinct categories; to 
have life is not necessarily to have legal personality, nor vice versa.  
v The Post-Human Challenge 
Before conception, and often entirely without the intention to facilitate conception, 
genetic material can be manipulated for a number of reasons. Professor Keith Campbell, 
working in animal physiology, lists them as including methods (both in vivo and in vitro) 
for increasing the production of embryos of high genetic merit, for selection or production 
of embryos of defined sex and for the preservation of both embryos and sperm.
649
 
Campbell adds that other possibilities of this technique are genetic modification of (farm 
animal) species, for purposes specifically related to livestock production. The following 
passage describes some of the uses to which transgenic animals are currently put: 
Transgenic animals are used: in the basic biological study of regulatory gene elements; in 
medical research, to identify the functions of specific factors in complex homeostatic systems 
through over- or under-expression, as models of human disease; in toxicology as responsive test 
animals; in biotechnology as producers of specific proteins; and in agriculture and aquaculture to 
improve yields of meat and other animal products. This list is not inclusive; the use of transgenic 
animals is likely to expand in the future
650
 
Many of these procedures, having been developed in the animal word for reasons of 
                                                 
649 http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/biosciences/anphy/academic/campbell.html (Accessed 19/04/ 2002). See 
COE, Ethical eye: Cloning, (2002) pp.5561, at p.64, for Keith Campbells views on human cloning, which he sees 
as only useful in a specialised case of adjusting the germline for a genetic defect, whilst creating a unique 
individual human. However, his colleague in cloning Dolly the Sheep, Ian Wilmut, has applied for permission 
to clone a human embryo, not with the intention of taking it to term but in order to assist motor neurone 
disease research, (reported Wednesday, 21 April, 2004 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3645037.stm, 
accessed 12/05/2004) and despite having earlier expressed his views regarding the ethical and practical 
implications of human cloning, e.g. in an article, Don't Clone Humans! (2001, with Rudolf Jaenisch).  
650 Canadian Council on Animal Care, Guidelines on: animals (1997). Supra, n. 1041. 
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agricultural husbandry, then find their way into the human world, particularly that of 
human reproductive technologies. Whilst this might be seen as a public good/not good per 
se, Jones highlights a problem in argument, illustrated by an example from gender 
selection: 
The debate over the prohibition of sex (or gender) selection (also known as preselection 
or predetermination), has focused almost exclusively on the context of aborting a wrong-sex 
fetus after a fetal gender-identification procedure. Despite the fact that sex selection abortions 
represent only a small subset of sex selection procedures, attitudes toward the former are driving 
general policy approaches to the latter. However, the issues are analytically distinct, and only 
during the former infancy of the pre-conceptive (and non-abortive post-conceptive) technology 
for sex selection were members on both sides of the debate afforded the economy of using one 
logic to support views on two issues. Consequently, the subsequent dramatic advances in sperm 
separation and artificial insemination technology challenge this unstable consolidation of views 
and require the context-specific division of the emotional reactions, analytic reasoning, and 
societal responses.
651
 
There are a number of possible implications of others
652
 extending present, acceptable 
genetic manipulations to human life; for instance, with regard to Campbells (and others) 
work on gender selection
653
 (mentioned in the passage quoted above as a specific aim of 
the technique) and eugenic arguments, as well as problems of status and relationships. 
The Association of Reproductive Health Professionals
654
 asks the question: 
Who is the clonal child's genetic mother or father? As we understand those terms, a clonal 
child wouldn't have a genetic mother or father; it would have a single nuclear donor. If a man 
cloned himself, would the child be that man's son or his twin brother? It would be neither, it 
                                                 
651 Jones (1992), at p.1. 
652 A claim already made (but not yet with substantiation) by the religious group, the Raëlian Movement. The 
website, Clonaid, of their business arm, (name not given), stated that by 22/10/2004, 13 live babies had been 
cloned. There is no available peer review of the process.  http://www.clonaid.com/news.php . On 16/09/2005, 
the website no longer made any claims regarding the alleged thirteen births, and its most recent news article was 
dated 21/10/2003. 
653 Supra, n.XXX 
654 ARHP: http://www.arhp.org/  (Accessed 11/11/2004). 
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would be a new category of biological relationship: his clone.
655
 
Harris recommends the adoption of a measure allowing foetal ovarian tissue to be 
donated, even if harvested from an aborted foetus, and also to allow the use of cadaveric 
ovarian tissue; he envisages a situation in which a mother may wish to give birth to her 
dead daughters child, proposing a possible relationship of mother/grandmother to the 
resultant offspring.
656
 A chimera would have two or more parents; maybe four parents  
two from each species. What exists only in the mind or the laboratory today may be 
walking the streets, petitioning the courts, in fifty years time; what would the standing of 
these creatures be? 
Further, the proposition has been made that the cloned life form itself is different from 
those previously known. An attempt was made in New Jersey to pass a bill, S.1909
657
 of 
2003, which would have permitted (by omission) the implantation and gestation of a 
human cloned embryo but not its live birth. Some commentators suggest that this could 
have involved abortion at nine months: 
The pending legislation expressly authorizes the creation of new human beings by cloning 
and, perhaps unintentionally, their cultivation from the zygote stage through the newborn stage 
                                                 
655 Supra, n.543. The new categor[ies] of biological realtionship[s] are bringing new familial relationships into 
being, suggesting that human rights discourse must be prepared to enter more fully into the implications of the 
new medical technologies for all rights, including the right to marry and found a family. Consider the 
relationships involved in the contemporaneous situation of Aspen and Saffron, twins born in December 1999 to 
two male parents, Tony and Barrie Drewitt Barlow, by the implantation into a surrogate mother of embryos 
grown from an egg donor and sperm from each partner of the homosexual couple. Subsequently another child, 
Orlando, was born, Aspens identical twin from half of an embryo split and frozen at the time of implantation 
of the first children, but from a different surrogate. Tremlett, 8 February 2004, The Observer 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/article/0,2763,1143623,00.html (Accessed 09/10/2004). 
656 See Harris (June 2003). See also Keown (1993). 
657 Bill Number: S-1909, P.L. 2003, c.203 January 2, 2003 Permits human stem cell research; creates crime of 
third degree for sale or purchase of fetal tissue for research; creates first degree crime for engaging in cloning of 
human being. New Jersey Department of Criminal Justice, http://www.njdcj.org/codification/S-
1909_010804.pdf.  See the Presidents Council on Bioethics website for detail of other similar bills going 
through the legislature: Monitoring Stem Cell Research, Appendix E by Lori B. Andrews, Legislators as Lobbyists: 
Proposed State Regulation of Embryonic Stem Cell Research, Therapeutic Cloning and Reproductive Cloning. 
January 2004. http://bioethicsprint.bioethics.gov/reports/stemcell/appendix_e.html (accessed 21/12/2004). 
 194
for the purpose of harvesting what the bills themselves refer to as cadaveric fetal tissue. Please 
pause to consider whose cadaver the tissue is to be derived from. It is the cadaver of a distinct 
member of the species homo sapiens  a human being  who would be brought into being by 
cloning and, presumably, implanted and permitted to develop to the desired stage of physical 
maturation for the purpose of being killed for the harvesting of his or her tissues.
658
   
With regard to somatic cell nuclear transfer, reference has already been made to an 
eminent ethicist, Ronald Green,
659
 whose claim is that:  
[A] cloned embryo is not the result of fertilisation of an egg by a sperm. It is a new type of 
biological entity never before seen in nature  although board members understood that some 
people would liken this organism to an embryo, we preferred the term activated egg, and we 
concluded that its characteristics did not preclude its use in work that might save the lives of 
children and adults.
660 
The value-laden terms  activated egg, work that might save the lives  used in that 
extract are of interest here, particularly with respect to Kants teleological stance, that every 
human being is an end in him/her self.
661
 Either the activated egg, being activated from 
human genetic material, is human or it is not. If it is human, then it must be forcefully 
argued that being formed from human genetic material, it deserves legal regulation of its 
use, in recognition of the dignity of humanity described above as being accepted both as 
inherent in the human condition and as a basis for the international law of human rights; 
that which requires the right to life to be protected by law.  
                                                 
658 Presidents Council on Bioethics Members, Robert P. George; Alfonso Gomez-Lobo; William Hurlbut; 
Gilbert C. Meilaender, State of Cloning: A letter to the New Jersey Governor, available online  
http://www.nationalreview.com/script/printpage.asp?ref=/document/document020303c.asp, January 27, 
2003. (Accessed 21/12/ 2004).   
659 Ronald M. Green, Director, Ethics Institute, Dartmouth College; Chair, Advisory Board, ACT, Worcester, 
Massachusetts. ACT is the privately owned biotechnology company which has claimed to have cloned a human 
embryo to six cells, and assembled a board of outside ethicists to weigh the moral implications of therapeutic 
cloning research before going ahead. Green, Scientific American January 2002, pp.46-48.  
660 Ibid. Greens contribution on The Ethical Considerations appears in a report that human cloning had taken 
place; Cibelli, Lanza, West, with Ezzell, The First Human Cloned Embryo, pp.42-49. 
661 Supra, n.430. In this regard also see Munzer, (1993). 
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However, the Declaration on Human Rights and the Human Genome
662
 that UNESCO has 
formulated does not specifically define the rights-bearers of the rights covered by the 
declaration. Mattei, in discussing genes and patents, contends that: 
Man, as a person endowed with dignity, cannot be traded, which is why organs, tissues and 
cells are not marketable and do not come within the terms of the normal market. The gene, as 
the smallest component part of the human being, cannot to my mind be treated otherwise than 
the human being and enter directly or indirectly into a business rationale.
663
 
The case is not necessarily that the use of any human tissue, cell or part of a cell should 
not be permitted, but that such material should not be euphemistically defined as not 
human in order that justification should be found for its creation and manipulation, and 
destruction (by dubious logic). Several arguments in the use of stem cells debate suggest 
that using embryos surplus to IVF requirements, and otherwise destined only for 
destruction, is morally permissible, whereas creating them for research and therapy 
purposes is not. This seems casuistic, but the problem is not confined to linguistic 
definition.
664
 Each human being has, in the past, been formed from an amalgamation of 
the DNA (human genetic material) of two parents, male and female. Future humans may 
be created from the genetic material from two parents of the same sex,
665
 from three 
                                                 
662 Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its 29th session on 11 November 1997.  
663 Mattei (2001) Conclusion in Ethical Eye: The Human Genome at p.133. 
664 See Dickens and Cook (1999), pp.57-58, for a discussion of the issues surrounding the disposal of 
unwanted embryos. They cite Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588 (Tenn. Sup. Ct. 1992), where [t]he Tennessee 
Supreme Court has ruled that embryos are neither persons nor property, but governed separately. See also the 
UK domestic jurisdiction case, Evans v Amicus Healthcare Ltd (Secretary of State for Health and Another Intervening), 
CA: 25/06/ 2004, and its culmination in ECtHR, Evans v. United Kingdom. 
665 A technique known as parthenogenesis, and not yet fully achieved in mammals (although there has been a 
disputed claim with regard to mice.) See The Scientist, 01/04/2004, and critique by Jaenisch. 
http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20040421/01/ (Accessed 06/10/04). 
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parents,
666
 or from one.
667
 That genetic material, from wherever or whoever it might 
come, is living material and represents the life of its progenitor. All humans shed DNA 
each day, and the future possibility is that a child could be created using that DNA, 
without the consent or involvement of the parent.
668
 Further, those parents may not both, 
or all, be human. Future possibilities include transgenic beings; those created by 
combining DNA from two different species, forming a hybrid, (such as a mule  a donkey 
and a horse) or a trans-species chimera, such as one made by fusing two fertilised 
embryos from different species  a human and a chimpanzee, for instance.  
vi Future Generations 
Stock announces that few have yet grasped that we are on the cusp of profound 
biological change, poised to transcend our current form and character on a journey to 
destinations of new imagination.  Never before have we had the power to manipulate 
our biology in meaningful, predictable ways.
669
 Silvers comment on Aldous Huxleys 
classic, Brave New World, warns that in the future it will be parents, not governments, 
will be the driving force in utilising the possibilities: they will seize control of these new 
                                                 
666 This would happen in a surrogacy with an embryo created from two other people being implanted in a 
surrogate mother; the mitochondrial DNA of the surrogate would not be eliminated. See generally Howell, 
http://www.hbcg.utmb.edu/faculty/howell/content.html (Accessed 21/04/2002) 
667 The technique known, somewhat vaguely, as cloning, or somatic cell nuclear transfer. See Vogelstein, 
Alberts and Shine, (2003) at p.1237: In scientific parlance, cloning is a broadly used, shorthand term that refers 
to producing a copy of some biological entity  a gene, an organism, a cell  an objective that, in many cases, 
can be achieved by means other than the technique known as somatic cell nuclear transfer. [] a procedure that 
can be used for many different purposes. Only one of these purposes involves an intention to create a clone of 
the organism (for example, a human). See Meyers challenge to this article on other grounds, infra n.564 and 
accompanying text. 
668 See, e.g., Harris (1999), p.298. See generally Skene (2003) at p.9. Skene, in discussing whether there should be 
a new criminal offence created regarding theft of DNA, concludes that: On balance, it may be wise to expand 
the potential civil actions for wrongful taking and testing of genetic material and also to create a new criminal 
offence. The civil actions might be in conversion; equitable claims for breach of confidence; or complaints 
under privacy legislation. I have argued that the criminal offence should consist of more than mere taking and 
testing of genetic material but I acknowledge the difficulty of drafting such an offence. 
669 Stock (2003) at p.1. 
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technologies.
 670
 The consequences for the future of the human race could be dire. 
 They will use some to reach otherwise unattainable reproductive goals and others 
to help their children achieve health, happiness and success. And it is in pursuit of this 
last goal that the combined actions of many individuals, operating over many 
generations, could give rise to a polarized humanity more horrific than Huxleys 
imagined Brave New World.671 
Operating over many generations : does the yet-to-be-conceived person have a right 
to life? This might seem an odd concept, but it has relevance, for instance, in situations of 
enforced sterilisation for population control or eugenic purposes,
672
 and in respect of 
certain gene manipulation techniques that may prove detrimental further down the 
generational line.
673
 The ARHP makes the following claim, supporting embryonic 
selection and possible disposal of affected embryos rather than allowing manipulation of 
the germline:  
The only situation in which germline engineering would be required over pre-implantation 
selection is one in which a couple would like to endow their child with genes that neither 
member of the couple possesses. This is the enhancement scenario, which we believe would 
lead to a dystopic human future if it were allowed.  engineering the genes by means of 
germline modification would allow novel forms of human life to be created within one 
generation.
674
 
                                                 
670 Silver (1997) Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World New York: Avon Books at p.9, in Reinders (2000) at 
p.76.  
671 Ibid. 
672 See, for a general discussion of coerced or enforced sterilisation, the BMA Report, The Medical Profession and 
Human Rights: Handbook for a Changing Agenda (2001) at pp.348354. This work suggests that key ethical 
principles in this field have been identified as liberty, utility and justice (p.349). 
673 See also Andorno (2003): At the international level, UNESCO Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights provides that germ-line interventions could be contrary to human dignity (Article 
24). Similarly, the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine states that an intervention seeking 
to modify the human genome may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and 
only if its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants (Article 13). 
674 http://www.arhp.org/patienteducation/onlinebrochures/cloning/index.cfm?ID=282 (Accessed 
14/11/2004). [Emphasis omitted]. 
 198
So far, there has been developed a theme of being human as not coinciding, necessarily, 
with being a person as such, or at least as far as personhood is understood in Lockean 
terms. To be recognised as enjoying personhood is not the same as being a rights-bearer, 
that is, as holding international legal personality. International legal personality is, 
therefore, a separate concept from personhood. This can be seen easily from the fact that 
States and organisations can hold international legal personality, and, as shown above, all 
human rights-bearers can, whether or not they meet the criteria for personhood. Others 
who can hold this status are increasingly future generations. 
It is intellectual property law which is in some instances, particularly those involving the 
breakdown of barriers between species, at the forefront of developments with regard to 
the recognition of legal challenges to human identity. The Patent and Trademarks Office, 
USA [PTO] has already issued a disclaimer, that it would not consider human beings to 
be patentable subject matter, citing restrictions on property rights in human beings.
675
 
Walter
676
 challenges the appropriateness of patent law as a proper forum to decide the 
fundamental questions of the science of biotechnology, such as transgenic animals, and 
human gene sequences, as does Brownsword,
677
 who sees the patent regime as informed 
by a pragmatic utilitarian approach  not necessarily desirable, particularly as 
Brownsword suggests that the European patent regime has been working hard to 
                                                 
675 Regarding the application of intellectual property law to the issues under discussion, see e.g. Eisenberg 
(1997), pp.6-16, especially endnote 4. On patents and genetic engineering, see Tokar (Ed.) (2001); and Vasseleu, 
Patent Pending: laws of invention, patent life forms and bodies as ideas in Cheah, Fraser and Grbich (1996), 
pp.119. 
676 Walter (1998). 
677 See Brownsword, (2004a); and Biotechnology and Human Rights: Where are we Coming From, and Where 
are we Going? in Klang and Murray (Eds.) (2004), Chapter 17. I am grateful to Roger Brownsword for pre-
publication sights of these papers. See also Beyleveld, and Brownsword, (1998); and Fukuyama (2002). 
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marginalize the morality question.
678
 The morality question is, and always must be, at the 
root of any attempted answers to what are increasingly complex and difficult questions. 
3.6 CONCLUSION  
The distinctions which have been drawn are between being a human and being a person. 
A relational understanding of personhood, qua Lockes third category rather than his 
second, ascribes value rather than accepting it as inherent, and if personhood criteria are 
necessary to qualify as a member of the human race rather than mere humanity as such, 
then those who have never enjoyed those abilities, or have lost them (even if they are set 
at a lower standard than Fletchers demanding list) would not enjoy the protections of 
human rights, including the right to have their lives protected by law; their status as 
rights-bearers is called into question.  
Some words of Andorno serve to end this dimension of the argument of this thesis: 
In spite of all its weaknesses, however, the current human rights system is the only 
mechanism available to protect people. This is why the integration of some principles relating to 
biomedicine into a human rights framework seems fully justified. It should not be forgotten that 
what is at stake in some bioethical issues, such as human genetic engineering and reproductive 
cloning, is nothing less than the preservation of the identity of the human species. Thus, it is not 
an exaggeration to say that we are confronted here with the most important decision we will 
ever make.
679
 
Rehof, in acknowledging that [q]uestions of life and death  as they are posed today, 
thanks to developments in modern medical technology  are not met by easy answers,
680
 
asks that we should not diminish our efforts to find contemporary solutions in 
international human rights law. He finds a need for legal protection of early human life, 
                                                 
678 Brownsword, supra n.677, text accompanying footnotes 12 and 13. 
679 Andorno, (2003). 
680 Rehof in Eide and Alfredsson (1999) pp.89-101, at p.101. 
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human genetic material and the early stages of individual human life in the embryo or fetus. 
This plea is in the context of a chapter on Article 3 of the UDHR, the Article which first 
stated that Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of the person. The 
protection of human genetic material cannot be achieved in the context of the current 
human rights praxis; it cannot be done whilst the jurisprudence of human rights bodies and 
other fora does not recognise the humanity of the preborn. Without an adequate definition 
of what it means to be human, and consequentially to be a rights-bearer under the terms of 
international human rights treaties, responsible preparation cannot be made for the future 
that has already begun. This is particularly so with regard to the possible creation of a new 
form of beings, who ought to be considered as human and to have the rights and 
protections ascribed to them as they are to all other humans, in dignity and equality. A 
clone, if grown to a person, would look no different from any other person; would, in 
genetic terms, not be expressed differently; would some futuristic identity card  a 
microchip, a tattooed number?  be necessary for official society to be able to recognise 
this being as not a human being  not entitled to human rights protection?
681
 Green asserts 
that: 
Those who believe that human life begins at conception  and who also regard activated 
eggs as morally equivalent to human embryos  cannot ethically approve therapeutic cloning 
research. For them, such research is equivalent to killing a living child in order to harvest its 
organs for the benefit of others  therapeutic cloning remains totally unacceptable to such 
people because it involves the deliberate creation of what they deem to be a human being in 
order to destroy it.
682
 
This point is challenged. It is possible to believe that human life is found where human 
genetic material is found, yet still be able to accept the arguments that do not consider 
                                                 
681 See, for instance, the PLA website for alternative views to Greens: CORE pages on Human Cloning. 
682 Supra, n.527. 
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such life sacrosanct, but open to use and destruction in a framework of legal regulation. 
Perhaps, ultimately, such uses of human genetic material are more than unpalatable and 
are ethically and morally wrong. If they were, would law have the power to stop them 
taking place, or is regulation a more pragmatic option?
683
 However, technology will 
continue to advance, and it appears to be neither appropriate nor particularly helpful, nor 
even possible, to draft detailed law to meet each new development, and nor is an outright 
outlawing likely to be respected. What is required is a general precept, which will meet 
the objectives of international human rights law with regard to the protection of the 
individual; that is, that in times and places when life is at boundary moments or fragile or 
otherwise threatened, effective legal regulation will be in place to protect the interests of 
those involved, not necessarily the preservation to the utmost of their lives. The concept 
of protected by law is, therefore, the subject of the next chapter. 
                                                 
683 For a critique of pragmatism in such a field, see Lee, (2003), at p.13. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
  
 
Protected by Law 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings, are 
inalienable and are guaranteed by law. Their protection and promotion is the first responsibility 
of government. Respect for them is an essential safeguard against an over-mighty State. Their 
observance and full exercise are the foundation of freedom, justice and peace. 
Charter of Paris for a New Europe
 684
 
4.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The Charter of Paris for a New Europe is one of the instruments that articulate the 
responsibility of government as being its obligations in respect of human rights, and this 
chapter will focus on the proposition that the right to life shall be protected by law, as an 
aspect of that responsibility. The scope of what it means to have life protected by law has 
been addressed by the human rights bodies across a wide range of situations, and has 
included consideration of what law itself means, and of stratagems that might be 
employed by the State to frustrate the object and purpose of the treaty term, and, likewise, 
stratagems that could be legitimately invoked by the tribunals themselves in order to best 
                                                 
684 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Meeting of the Heads of State or Government of the Participating States of 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Cyprus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy-European Community, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America and Yugoslavia. Paris, 19-21 November 
1990. 
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give effect to those terms.
685
  
The approach to this chapter will be to present the quest for a moral basis for law first. Treaty 
texts will then be re-introduced and examined at an early stage in order to see how it was 
envisaged that the obligation under the right to life provision was to be recognised by States, 
and in order to discern whether the offered paraphrase the right to life will be protected by 
law is a valid one; is that what was stated in the right to life Articles? It then proves 
necessary to analyse the concept of law; what kind of law should be in place in national legal 
systems to protect life, and what are the consequences of such a law either not being present, 
or being arbitrary in its application, either to the violation or to the procedure which is 
established to bring that law to fulfilment? It is here that the Radbruch formula, mentioned 
in the introduction to this text, comes into play. The quest is for a moral law to protect life, 
and the assertion is that failure either to enact or apply such a law leads to unbearable 
injustice. 
The obvious law to protect life is one that prohibits, punishes and deters homicide, and law 
relating to homicide will therefore be discussed; the requirements that human rights bodies 
have placed upon States with reference to the investigation, trial and punishment of such 
crimes will be briefly assessed. What is of particular relevance is that there should be 
effective national law in place, and that it should be acted upon, and the human rights bodies 
will be seen to have enforced some regional and international standards upon this, including 
a dynamic concept, the reversal of the burden of proof where a disappeared person was last 
                                                 
685 For instance, in the Godínez Cruz Case, one of the first contentious cases submitted to the IAmCt, the Court 
took into account the deaths of witnesses in suspicious circumstances (paras.41-52), and the standard of proof 
required to establish the alleged facts (paras. 127-52). See also the Velásquez Rodríguez and Garbi & Corrales cases. 
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seen in the hands of agents of the State.
686
 Human rights discourse has been able to ensure 
recognition, in such cases, of the crime of homicide having taken place, and of the 
recognition of the disappeared as a murder victim, with all that that entails for that person 
and their family.
687
 The human rights bodies, however, have been unwilling to afford the 
same recognition to the preborn victims of homicide
688
 (as opposed to lawful abortion) and, 
with the developing possibilities in the field of biotechnology, this refusal has much wider 
implications, as will be seen. 
There are two fields of enquiry, here, therefore; the protection by law afforded at national 
level, (both in substance and procedure) and the protection which is required by human 
rights bodies, acting upon their interpretation of the right to life treaty articles, as their 
jurisdiction allows.
689
 This discussion will follow in the next chapter. 
4.2 MORAL LAW AND INTOLERABLE INJUSTICE 
4.2.1 THE CASE: MORAL LAW 
The argument about what constitutes moral law is, in its wider scope, beyond the space 
available in this thesis; the theme which is of essential importance here is the question of 
the laws, present in most legal systems of the world, which fall within the scope of the 
protection of life; are they moral laws? A further question would be, if they are not 
moral, are they law at all? If a law allows for an intolerable injustice, either in its 
                                                 
686 First articulated in Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, 29/07/1988. 
687 See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances, date of adoption 18 
December 1992; Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions, (1989) and supplementary Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of 
Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, (1991); Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons, entered into force March 28, 1996. 
688 See Vo v. France, and discussion infra, text accompanying n.399. 
689 See IACtHR interpretation of their jurisdiction under ADRDM: Other Treaties Subject To the Consultative 
Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights): Requested by Peru. 
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substantive provisions or in the procedures that spring from it, and that injustice affects 
someones life, or inability to live, does that invalidate the law? That will not be the focus 
of discussion here; the vast majority of national legal systems are not operating that kind 
of special case. What is in question is generally only one or two laws  an amnesty law, 
for instance, allowing that those State agents who have murdered citizens are not subject 
to trial and prosecution.
690
 It might appear, therefore, that the point is not of relevance to 
the majority of human rights jurisprudence regarding the right to life  most States do not 
have laws allowing State use of lethal force with absolute impunity, or indeed other laws 
which discriminate against a particular group, and arbitrarily kill, or allow to be killed, 
some of their citizens and others. The nature of the substantive law that is in place and of 
the procedures that spring from it may present other, less obviously amoral, problems. 
i The straightforward case 
There are some laws regarding the protection of life with which few would argue as being 
necessary and proportionate; these are the laws relating to homicide, and their absence 
would be looked upon as a moral failure, in that homicide would go unchecked. The 
ECtHR, in Keenan v. United Kingdom, offered a base-level and straightforward view of 
what was entailed in national legal systems in order for States to meet the requirements of 
obligation called for, in this instance, by Article 2 of the ECHR; that the State should not 
only refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also take appropriate 
steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.
691
 It is not difficult to 
categorise the safeguarding of life from homicidal attacks as a necessary law and suitable 
exercise of sovereign power. The Court in Keenan also argued for a positive obligation 
                                                 
690 See IACtHR, Barrios Altos Case, 14/03/2001; IAComHR, Ruíz Dávila (Estiles) v. Peru, 19/02/1998. 
691 Keenan v. United Kingdom, para.89.  
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on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose 
life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual, when appropriate,
692
 and this 
aspect of the protection of life becomes a little more difficult, raising as it does 
availability and allocation of resources, a point addressed, again by the ECtHR, in Osman 
v. UK.
693
 There are some matters, however, which are less straightforward, and it can be 
difficult to say exactly why some act or another, possibly with life-affecting 
consequences, is moral or not. 
As a final point here, consideration of what it would mean to die is important when 
defining the protection to be given to life (if it is to pass on to Paradise, then an early 
death may be more affordable than if this life is all that a person expects ever to 
experience
694
), and for those not accepting the latter argument above, Wilson argues for 
empiricism over transcendentalism as a guiding force in respect of moral values.
695
 That 
is, that there can be meaning and purpose to this life without reference to a deity (who has 
created the moral values), and without necessarily an expectation of life after death to 
make this life worthwhile. 
ii The less straightforward case 
An example of a less straightforward case is the sale of children, child prostitution, and 
                                                 
692 Ibid. 
693  
694 Religious belief in itself may be sufficient for its adherents to be unafraid of death, but for some believers, 
martyrdom is sought. The veneration of martyrs is a practice known in many societies and religions, and the 
promise of recognition now and hope of rewards in the hereafter may encourage martyrdom. As well as the 
more well-known practice of venerating the martyrs of religious traditions, those who fight for a cause, whether 
as lawful combatants, freedom fighters or terrorists, are often placed in high standing in their societies. See for 
instance, the Sri Lankan Peace Secretariat of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam website, where it is noted that Respect, 
awe, inspiration, veneration and more so the sense of gratefulness permeates the nooks and corners of Tamil 
Eelam today. Tamil people have started commemorating the fallen fighters who attained martyrdom in their war 
of independence from oppression and inequality. 
http://www.lttepeacesecretariat.com/mainpages/n25114_11.html (accessed 30/12/2004). 
695 E.g. Wilson (1998). 
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child pornography; we recoil from these practices intuitively as immoral, but why? Does 
justice require their prohibition? Stamatis, in an examination of the postmodern paradox 
of justice without law,
 696
 challenges the postmodern radically subjectivist ethical 
theory of Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington, expressed by them as A Well-
Founded Fear of Justice,
697
 which challenges the idea that there can be a clear 
demarcation between right and wrong because such a position would necessarily derive 
from a rationalist and cognitivist metaethical theory;
698
 and that it is no longer possible 
to found ethical action upon knowledge, reason or any a priori conception of the Good.
699
 
Their introduction of the personal moral feelings of each individual is a not less 
extreme solution,
700
 according to Stamatis. He accepts that spontaneous or intuitive 
moral responses may lead perhaps to right solutions,
701
 a stance with which Steinbock 
would agree;
702
 yet she would also agree that intuition on its own is unable to justify 
these solutions.
703
 Justification requires something more: justification and justice are 
intertwined,
704
 and Stamatis solution is to state that [e]thical or legal norms can be 
                                                 
696 Stamatis (1994), p.267. 
697 Stamatis critique is of Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington, A Well-Founded Fear of Justice: Law and 
Ethics in Postmodernity Law and Critique 2 (1991), 115-47. 
698 Stamatis, supra n.696, p.268. 
699 Ibid., p.266. 
700 Ibid. 
701 Ibid., p.268. 
702 Steinbock, supra n.508 and accompanying text.  
703 Stamatis, supra n.696, p.268. 
704 See Kelsens refutation, in his discussion of Law and Justice, of classical, conservative natural law theory 
(as challenged by his Pure Theory of Law) in which, he claims, what matters there is less the cognition of 
prevailing law than a justification of it, a transfiguration, achieved by showing that the positive law is simply the 
emanation of a natural or divine order or of a system of reason  the emanation of an absolutely right, just 
order. Kelsen (1934, 1992 ed., trans. B. L. and S. Paulson), § 8, pp.17-18. For a defence of  natural law theory as 
butressing the claims of of the indestructible human rights see, amongst many others, H. Lauterpacht, (1950), 
e.g. pp.111-126. Lauterpacht finds the rationalist foundations of natural law as the only reason to explain why, 
when the international recognition of human rights has become to a substantial extent part of the positive law 
and when attempts are made, through an International Bill of Human Rights and otherwise, to make that 
recognition more effective, there is no inclination to jettison the appeal to the natural rights of man and to the 
law of nature conceived as the justification and the measure of all man-made law. Lauterpacht, Ibid., p.113. 
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justified solely through the exchange, actual or potential, of persuasive arguments about 
what we ought to do.
705
 The ultimate persuasiveness must rest, it is argued here, in the 
knowledge or belief that there are some things which are good and just, and which can be 
known and acted upon. 
The international community of States having determined that the sale and prostitution of 
children, and their use in pornography, represent harms, the Optional Protocol to the 
CRC, on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography, sets out the 
procedures that will work to obviate that. Yet this instrument does not show how or why it 
has been decided that the sale of a childs organs is a harm that should be prevented, 
deterred and punished by law. As Steinbock comments, we say that some things are 
wrong because they feel wrong;
706
 for most people, the involvement of children in 
pornography feels wrong; for some, it does not.
707
 Stamatis rejection of spontaneous 
and intuitive moral responses as the only basis for just and justifiable solutions comes 
into play here, and his reasoning can be applied as a reason for treating each child 
involved with dignity and respect, a logical principle of prime importance since the 
Enlightenment
708
 which is institutionally recognised in bourgeouis societies only partly 
and sometimes perversely,
709
 would be based in Kants categorical imperative, 
reformulating it from its formalistic present to a substantive commitment to overcome 
the social conditions under which self and others demean ourselves, as exploiting or 
                                                 
705 Ibid. 
706 Steinbock, supra n.508 and accompanying text. 
707 Paedophiles frequently argue that to allow children to participate fully in sexual lives brings them fulfilment 
and joy, which should not be denied to them. On this form of paedophilia, see Wyres definition of the non-
predatory paedophile, in the Royal Commission into the NSW Police Service Final Report, The Paedophile 
Inquiry, (The Wood Report), 05/01/1997. Vol.IV, p.63, text accompanying footnote 240. 
708 Stamatis, supra n.696, pp.268-69. 
709 Ibid. 
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exploited, and as alienated and dehumanized human beings.
710
 
The theme of the Protocol is that effective national law will be in place to keep children 
safe, and it is from what is generally accepted as abuse, possibly leading to death  the 
selected text from Article 3(1)(a)(i)b above refers to selling a childs organs  that they 
are to be protected. Yet if, somewhere, there are two very rich parents, endowed with 
everything but with only one precious child, a child that is dying for the want of a 
transplanted heart, why is it wrong to buy somebody elses tenth child, a street child 
perhaps, one with little future, apparently surplus, apparently not so precious, apparently 
unloved?
711
 Would it be wrong if it were for a kidney, not something quite as life-
threatening as a heart? Would it be wrong to take the heart of a child who was extremely 
disabled and not able to participate fully in life? Would it be wrong to take the still-
beating heart of a child that was braindead? We accept that the answers to most of those 
questions is yes, it would be wrong; yet the agreed position of most States and medical 
facilities, where such things can be undertaken, is that the answer to the last question is 
no, it would not be wrong; and regarding taking the organs of a disabled child, there is 
an ongoing debate, which has been heard in the courts, regarding the use of the organs of 
an anencephalic child before death has been established.
712
 
Harvesting organs from beating-heart donors is an accepted and widespread practice.
713
 
What is more, it is argued here that it is moral, or that it can be, although formulating a 
moral protocol to choose the recipient of a scarce donated organ is problematical.
714
 
                                                 
710 Ibid. p.269. See Kant, supra, n.430 and accompanying text. 
711 On the recognition of the life plans of street children and their families, see IACtHR, Street Children 
(Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala) Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) ACHR), 26/05/2001, para.85. 
712 In re T.A.C.P., supra, n.434, and accompanying text. 
713 Machado (1998). 
714 See Rutecki (25/06/2004); Caplan (1992). 
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Dickenson contrasts the Italian and British system for making such determinations: 
Under the Italian first-come, first-served system a ninety-year-old patient with terminal 
renal cancer gets the kidney if she comes before the thirty-year-old with no other clinical 
symptoms than renal failure.
715
 The British system relies on QALY [quality adjusted life 
years
716
] assessments and would give the kidney to the younger person, with presumably 
more years of active life ahead, barring accidents. The Italians argue their method to be 
moral: Why should their shorter lives be measured against lives that would have been 
longer from no merit of their own?
717
 It is difficult in such circumstances to declare one 
answer to be moral over the other answer; for the patient who dies for the lack of the 
donated organ, the difference is not hypothetical. 
It is obviously envisaged that the national law will be of a particular kind, and will include 
substantive and procedural measures; but what kind of law can or should be in place to 
ensure Stamatis desired substantive commitment to overcome the social conditions 
under which self and others demean ourselves, as exploiting or exploited, and as alienated 
and dehumanized human beings,
718
 especially, in the context of this thesis, where life is 
threatened, must now be examined. 
                                                 
715Dickenson (2002), p.110. 
716 See The World Health Organization Quality of Life Instruments (The WHOQOL-100 and the WHOQOL-BREF). 
On QALY measurement, and its associated questions and problems, see Carr, Higginson and Robinson (Eds.) 
(2003). In the right to life context, it is interesting to note that Studies have not indicated any objective way of 
clearly identifying patients who would feel that life is not worth living. Patients may even find quality in life 
when imminently dying, when their quality of life assessed by current measures is abysmal. Farsides and 
Dunlop, Is there such a thing as a life not worth living? in Carr, Higginson and Robinson, pp.113-120, at 
p.116, footnote omitted. Further, it is difficult to avoid relating QALY indicators to an economic model: 
[Economic] methodologies can result in a different but profound interpretation of life not worth living, 
namely that particular lives may have a detrimental economic worth. (Farsides and Dunlop, p.118). 
717 Supra, n.715, citing Calabresi and Bobbitt (1978) Tragic Choices New York: W.W. Norton, at p.184; and noting 
that since Calabresi and Bobbitt published their work, on which Dickensons comparison is based, a more 
evidence-based model is operating in Italy. The usefulness of the Italian model is now not so much as an up-
to-date description of actual practice as an alternative conceptual model stressing equality above clinical criteria. 
Dickenson, p.110, endnote 8 on p.226. 
718 Stamatis, supra n.696, p.269. See text accompanying n.710, supra. 
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iii Any kind of law?  
The HRC has made clear what is not meant by law, in de Guerrero v. Colombia:
719
 
      [Therefore] it is the Committee's view that the action of the police resulting in the death of 
Mrs. Maria Fanny Suarez de Guerrero was disproportionate to the requirements of law 
enforcement in the circumstances of the case and that she was arbitrarily deprived of her life 
 Inasmuch as the police action was made justifiable as a matter of Colombian law by 
Legislative Decree No. 0070 of 20 January 1978, the right to life was not adequately protected 
by the law of Colombia as required by article 6(1).
720
 
Law which allowed State deprivation of the life of one of its citizens, in actions 
disproportionate to any threat involved, is not good law: the right to life of Mrs. Maria 
Fanny Suarez de Guerrero was not adequately protected by the law of Colombia. The 
Law of human rights, therefore, is not the law of the Nuremberg laws;
721
 not the kind of 
law which enabled the lawful barbarism of the Holocaust, in Frasers terms.
722
 He notes 
that Auschwitz, in all of its barbarity,  
[W]as lawful, it was full of law  lawful prescriptions of Aryan and Jew, lawful 
sterilisations and euthanasia to protect the blood, lawful orders, from lawyers and doctors, for 
the extermination of those enemies of the state, those parasites who would infect the 
Volksgemeinschaft.
723
  
Law was used to determine and destroy the perceived Other. The mere existence of law is 
not enough. It must be a certain kind of law, a moral law; but what is moral, in the 
questions of life? For some, lawful abortion is immoral, and indeed thoroughly evil, as is 
                                                 
719 See HRC, de Guerrero v. Colombia, 05/02/1979, at 137 (1982). 
720 Ibid., para.13.3. 
721 See the comments of Mr. Easterman, representative of the World Jewish Congress, in the discussions 
surrounding the formulation of UDHR: he suggested the use of the phrase laws in conformity with the 
principles of the United Nations, rather than simply law, drawing on the actions of the Nazis to illustrate his 
point. UN Doc. E/CN.4/AC.2/SR/3, p.9. 
722 Fraser, in Cheah, Fraser and Grbich (Eds.) (1996) 
723 Ibid., at p.74. 
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lawful euthanasia;
724
 such laws do not deserve the appellation law, whereas for others, it 
is the absence of legal recourse to abortion and euthanasia which presents the greater 
evil.
725
 Examination of the basis for this argument means that analysis must now turn to 
the whole question of law, moral values, and justice, and the role that Radbruchs 
Formula can play in determining what kind of law; must the law serve justice? 
4.2.2 JUSTICE 
The question of what constitutes justice can of course be given no more that cursory 
treatment in a work of this size; the aspect to be considered here is solely with regard to 
discovering what may be the just obligation upon States in the prevention of intolerable 
injustice with respect to the protection, or failure of protection, of human life. As has 
earlier been commented upon, the most straightforward expression of State responsibility 
with regard to the right to life has been the requirement to protect, generally seen as a 
bipolar obligation; that States will neither condone arbitrary use of lethal force on the part 
                                                 
724 On each of these as immoral law, see Keown (Abortion,1993; euthanasia, 1997a and 1997b).  
725 On abortion, see particularly Ghouris commentary on the consequences of the US Mexico City Policy 
(colloquially, the Gag Rule): it states that the US will not allow its overseas aid money to be used to fund any 
organisations that provide advice, information or counselling about abortion. There are no longer free birth 
control pills and condoms available from the clinics run by NGOs who refuse to sign the Gag Rule, such as the 
Marie Stopes clinics, and national family planning clinics. This is leading to a higher incidence of unwanted 
pregnancies, and greater incidence of transmission of disease such as HIV/AIDS. Ghouri, The Big Issue, June 30 
 July 6 2003, 546, 1012. See, for judicial considerations of national laws relating to the availability of abortions 
and abortion advice, ECtHR, Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, judgement of 12/07/1977 
(held: German national laws regarding the regulation of abortion did not constitute, per se, a violation of Article 
8 rights to the respect for private life); Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Women v. Ireland, judgement of 
29/10/1992 (held: the absolute nature of the restraint on imparting information about the availability of 
abortions abroad, and assisting women to travel outside the Irish jurisdiction in order to obtain abortions, 
constituted a breach of Article 10, freedom to impart and receive information); and ECJ, Society for the Protection of 
Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. v. Grogan, [1991] (held: where there is no commercial link between a provider of 
information and a clinic providing abortion services abroad, there is not a violation of EC law in the prohibition 
of distributing information regarding the availability of such services). On EC law in this context, and that of 
reproductive rights generally, see Hervey (1998); on Irish law, see Attorney General v. X et al., [1992]. 
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of their agents,
726
 nor allow homicide within the general population to take place with 
impunity. This was a principle recognised early in international law; Tomuschat
727
 points 
out that both Grotius
728
 and Vattel
729
 refuted the dogma that suggested the citizens lives 
were in the power of the ruler, to do with as he wished. That is, that people should not, 
either deliberately or by avoidable accident, have their lives taken from them except in a 
narrowly prescribed set of circumstances, that is, circumstances prescribed by law. The 
question is, what if the law fails to meet the standards of morality? What if the enacted 
law allows the taking of life in what is seen to be an amoral fashion  what if the law itself 
is evil? 
i The Radbruch Formula and intolerable injustice 
The argument, at its simplest seen as the defining tension between positivism and natural 
law theories  should legal certainty or moral validity prevail in the search for a just 
decision?  was creatively addressed by Radbruch, in what has come to be known as the 
Radbruch Formula (or two formulae). Gustav Radbruch was a German legal philosopher 
                                                 
726 Failure by those agents to exercise their responsibility to protect those who are threatened by others will also 
incur liability. See ICTR, Prosecutor v. Paul Bisengimana, 16/04/2006, where the Accused acknowledged that:  
68c). Despite his position as bourgmestre, and his knowledge of the facts that the refugees at Musha church had 
been attacked on 13 April 1994, he took no active steps to protect the Tutsi refugees who sought refuge at 
Ruhanga Complex between 10 and 15 April 1994. 
The Chambers reponse was: 
182. The Chamber considers that, in the circumstances of the case, Paul Bisengimanas official position as 
bourgmestre is an overwhelmingly aggravating circumstance.  that despite knowing that Tutsi civilians had taken 
refuge at Musha Church and Ruhanga Complex and that weapons had been distributed to be used to attack 
them, and despite having the means to oppose the killings, Paul Bisengimana did nothing to stop the killings. 
183.  The Chamber considers that the Accuseds presence is a very serious form of participation even if it is 
not alleged or established that he was a co-perpetrator or that he directly committed a criminal act during the 
massacre. The Chamber recalls that more than a thousand Tutsi civilians died as a result of the massacres at 
Musha Church and Ruhanga Complex. 
727 Tomuschat (2003) at p.11. 
728 Citing Hugo Grotius, (1625) (trans. F. W. Kelsey, 1964) De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, New York and 
London: Oceana and Wildy, Book I, chapter IV, VIII 
729 Citing Eméric de Vattel, (1758) (trans. C. G. Fenwick , 1916) The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law, 
Washington: Carnegie Institution, Book I, chapter IV, para.54. 
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who, in his early work, is claimed to have espoused legal positivism, and later to have 
converted to natural law theory.
 730
 Paulson notes that: 
Radbruch never shared the positivist doctrine as Hart understands that doctrine, namely, 
in terms of the separation of law and morality, and so Radbruch could not have been converted 
from legal positivism thus understood. In his earlier period, Radbruch had already defended a 
basal criterion to the effect that law is the reality whose meaning (Sinn) is to serve justice.731 
Radbruch suffered under the Nazi regime,
732
 and in 1949 set forth his views on the 
reconciliation of the requirement for legal certainty and the need to secure justice in the 
face of enacted evil law. He wrote that: 
The conflict between justice and legal certainty may well be resolved in this way: The 
positive law, secured by legislation and power, takes precedence even when its content is unjust 
and fails to benefit the people, [1.] unless the conflict between statute and justice reaches such an 
intolerable degree that the statute, as flawed law (unrichtiges Recht), must yield to justice. It is 
impossible to draw a sharper line between cases of statutory lawlessness and statutes that are 
valid despite their flaws. One line of distinction, however, can be drawn with utmost clarity: [2.] 
Where there is not even an attempt at justice, where equality, the core of justice, is deliberately 
betrayed in the issuance of positive law, then the statute is not merely flawed law, it lacks 
completely the very nature of law. For law, including positive law, cannot be otherwise defined 
than as a system and an institution whose very meaning is to serve justice.
733
 
Radbruchs work was intended at first by him to refer only to situations in which law 
becomes so evil that it is no longer law, drawing on his experience and understanding of 
the Nazi era, but from it principles can be drawn to provide scaffolding for a discussion of 
                                                 
730 This interpretation of Radbruchs position is most clearly seen in the exchange of views on positivism, 
natural law and the place of morals, known as the Hart/Fuller Debate. Ward, however, clearly makes the case 
that Hart and Fuller misrepresented Radbruch, both pre- and post-Nazi era; that his positivism was always 
infused with the moral argument and that positivist legal theory imbued his later argument. 
731 Paulson, (2006), p.19. 
732 For a history, see Ward (1992); this work sets Radbruch in the historical and political context of National 
Socialism and contrasts his views with those of Heidegger and Schmitt. See also Paulson, supra n.731. 
733 Paulson (2006b) at p.26, citing Radbruchs work in which the Formula was first included as: [f]irst published 
as Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht in Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1 (1946) 105-8. See the 
English-language translation, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (2006) 26 OJLS 1(11 ). 
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the content and nature of law in national legal systems, particularly, in the context of this 
thesis, law which impacts upon life and the ability to live. Radbruchs Formula brings 
into creative tension the roles of legal certainty and justice, and in those respects is an 
epitome of human rights jurisprudence; yet what is meant by justice? Radbruchs Third 
Minute of Legal Philosophy explains the concept in context: 
Third Minute 
Law is the will to justice. Justice means: To judge without regard to the person, to measure 
everyone by the same standard.  
If one applauds the assassination of political opponents, or orders the murder of people of 
another race, all the while meting out the most cruel and degrading punishment for the same acts 
committed against those of ones own persuasion, this is neither justice nor law. 
If laws deliberately betray the will to justice  by, for example, arbitrarily granting and 
withholding human rights  then these laws lack validity, the people owe them no obedience, 
and jurists, too, must find the courage to deny them legal character.
734
 
Paulson shows the later basis for a purposive legal interpretation from radbruchs work, in 
establishing what is understood by equality: it has a values basis, the values there 
springing from a political reality. Whereas prposiveness, however, is relative, justice is 
not: justice has an absolute value, and can be established in legal certainty without 
reference to purposiveness.
735
 Radbruch gives an example of such justice: Equality under 
the law, say, or the prohibition of extraordinary courts (Ausnahmegerichte) rests on the 
requirements not of purposiveness but solely of justice.
736
 Substantive and procedural 
requirements are necessary foundations of such an understanding of justice. 
ii Foundations of Justice 
The requirements upon States when they undertake human rights obligations (or when 
                                                 
734 Radbruch (1945) and in Paulsons translation, (2006a). 
735 Paulson (2006b), p.32. 
736 Radbruch, §9, Legal Philosophy, in Wilk, (trans.) (1950), and in Paulson (2006b), at p.32 (trans. altered). 
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customary law obligations are established) are that national laws and practice will meet 
both substantive and procedural standards. Those standards are interrelated and 
interdependent; one is of no use without the other, but such standards do not exist in a 
vacuum, and they reflect the prevailing understanding of morality, and their expression 
ensures justice. Scherer argues that justice is so fundamental to human society that there 
was no need for revolutionary orders to proclaim it, along with equality, liberty, 
fraternity,
737
 because no system of government, no matter how despotic or tyrannical, 
could have survived for very long by openly admitting injustice as a principle of treating 
its subjects or for regulating relations and interactions between the members of the 
society.
738
 Further, since so far no culture has been identified in which the concern with 
justice is totally absent, we may presume that a very primitive sense of justice is part of 
human nature as it has developed during biological and cultural co-evolution.
739
 It can 
readily be assumed that the human rights bodies will be concerned with a firm foundation 
of justice; it was injustice of a terrible nature with precipitated their own creation, and the 
avoidance of intolerable injustice is at their heart: [t]heir observance and full exercise are 
the foundation of freedom, justice and peace.
740
 
iii Perspectives of Justice 
Scherers interdisplinary work on perspectives of justice suggests that the central place in 
a quest for justice would be held by social philosophy, trying to develop theoretically 
homogenous prescriptions for a universal justice principle that corresponds to universally 
                                                 
737 As in the French Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence. K.R. Scherer, Issues in the 
study of justice in Scherer (Ed., 1992), pp.1-14, at p.2. Scherer admits that equality might express a strictly 
egalitarian aspect of justice. 
738 Ibid. 
739 Ibid., p.3. [Citations omitted]. 
740 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, supra, n.684. 
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held moral ideals.
741
 Such normative systems require a basis of ethical and moral 
principles, and logical consistency,
742
 in which legal and political systems overlap in their 
own seeking after justice by means of both practical concerns, such as certainty and 
efficiency, and by procedural rules.
743
 Scherers understanding of the practice of law is 
that lawyers are more concerned with procedural justice than distributive justice
744
 (the 
concern of economists
745
). Regarding justice, there are additional (although arguably less 
important) concerns for lawyers, he suggests,
746
 such as unequivocal and efficient 
administration of the law.
747
 This immediately raises the issue addressed by Radbruch: 
what if the law itself is immoral? Bowring observes that Systems of law, of rules, actual 
or projected  as well as notions of human rights, in particular the right of non-
discrimination, require, it may be argued, a sense of justice based on shared ethical 
foundations.
748
 He cites Gearty as finding a central theme of procedural fairness in the 
European Convention system, and uses this as an example of the kind of system of law to 
which he is referring.
749
 
                                                 
741 Scherer, supra n.737, p.11. 
742 Ibid., Fig.1.1., p.12. There is not scope here for a thoroughgoing discussion what makes morality normative; 
see Delacroix (2004) for a contrast of Harts and Kelsens concepts of normativity, during which she explores 
Korsgaards four different accounts of that problem: [a]ccording to voluntarism, normativity springs from a 
legislative will, while the moral realists hold that moral claims are normative if they are true, and true if there 
are intrinsically normative entities or facts which they correctly describe. A third alternative is provided by the 
reflective endorsement method, grounding morality in human nature and thinking of moral properties as 
projections of human dispositions. Appeal to autonomy constitutes the fourth and final alternative, according to 
which the capacity for selfconscious reflection about our own actions confers on us a kind of authority over 
ourselves, and it is this authority which gives normativity to moral claims. Delacroix, p.503, citing C. 
Korsgaard in Korsgaard, C. M. et al., The Sources of Normativity, (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 19-20. 
743 Ibid. 
744 Ibid., p.12. Institute of Governmental Studies [IGS] Public Affairs Report, Global Poverty: The Gap Between the 
Worlds Rich and Poor is Growing, and the Dying Continues. 
745 Ibid., pp.12-13. 
746 Citing J. Bell, Justice and the Law, in Scherer, (ed., 2002), pp.114-142. 
747 Ibid., p.13. 
748 Bowring (1994), p.70. 
749 Gearty, (1993), pp.89-127. 
 218
iv Moralities of Justice and Human Rights 
The exercise of human rights discourse can be seen as a form of morality, in Thomas 
Pogges
750
 terms. He talks of a perspective which ascribes to moralities, in one sense 
defined as a more or less unified set of moral beliefs, attitudes and conduct dispositions 
characteristic of particular persons or groups
751
 the ability to have real effects, which 
may themselves be made the subject of evaluation.
752
 This perspective of morality, the 
ability to effect social change and be evaluated in so doing, is one which Pogge seeks to 
extend  to both key domains of morality;
753
 ethics, the personal, and justice, 
concerned with institutions which regulate and structure human interactions.
754
 His 
judgment of a morality is not abstract and retrospective, but seeks to judge it by its own 
standards: have we organized our moral commitments in a way that reflects, and helps 
effectively achieve, what by their own lights matters?
755
 Whilst this is necessarily an 
oversimplification of an argument, about which he specifically addresses one aspect: 
cases where a code is counterproductive by giving incentives toward conduct that is 
regrettable by the codes own lights,
756
 it may be that the perspective taken by human 
rights discourse is having such a counterproductive effect, in some respects. These might 
include failure to hold States accountable because of lack of evidence which States refuse 
to give encourages a continuing lack of co-operation, and this has been recognised in the 
case law.
757
 Gordon interprets Plato as offering a similar assessment: Perfect injustice 
                                                 
750 Pogge (2002). 
751 Ibid., p.71. 
752 Ibid. 
753 Ibid., pp.71-72. 
754 Ibid., p.72. 
755 Ibid. 
756 Ibid. [Emphasis in original]. 
757 See, e.g., Sarma v. Sri Lanka, para. 8.9: The author argues  [that] it is indeed the State party, not the author, 
that is in a position to access relevant information and therefore the onus must be on the State to refute the 
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occurs  when principles of morality and legality have been successfully invoked as 
authorisation for unlimited human damage, of unbounded duration.
758
 
Provisos are attached to Pogges argument; some moralities may not be in the business of 
producing anything,
759
 rather expressing moral truth or Gods law
760
 and therefore not 
seeking to produce positive societal consequences, but possibly even remaining true to 
themselves if that should lead to their own extinction, or that of the human race. This is 
not the aim of the human rights tribunals; several rights are qualified, for instance, by 
measures necessary in a democratic society,
761
 or in the interests of public health, order, 
or morals.
762
 However, the guiding principles are moral ones, based on recognising 
dignity in the individual and in the wider aspect of the human races communal dignity, 
and on a requirement of actors themselves behaving with dignity, human rights discourse 
is a form of morality in which accomplishing societal change is a sine qua non.  
This point, regarding a cultural specificity to understandings of dignity, is supported by 
                                                                                                                                                  
presumption of responsibility. See also Sendic Antonaccio (Raul) v. Uruguay, paras.18-19, where the State duty to 
provide information is equated with the victims right to be heard. See also HRC, Hiber Conteris v. Uruguay, No. 
139/1983, paras.182-186. 
758 See Plato in Gordon, (2002) at pp.8283, where Gordon refers to Platos concept of perfect injustice: 
There are those who engage in single acts of force or fraud; Thrasymachus says, those who do such wrong in 
particular cases are called  burglars and swindlers and thieves, and when they are detected they are punished 
and incur great disgrace. But there is a form of tyranny in which the robbery occurs not little by little but 
wholesale; and when, in addition to taking the citizens money, a man has made slaves of them as well, then, 
instead of  names of reproach, he is termed happy and blessed, not only by the citizens but by all who here of 
his having achieved the consummation of injustice. Citing Plato, Book 1, Republic, 27-28, (B. Jowett trans., 
Random House 1991)  
759 Supra, n.750, p.72. 
760  Ibid. 
761 E.g., Articles 8-11, ECHR. However, in the context of the right to life, note that the burden of neccessity is 
greater: e.g., McCann et al. v. the United Kingdom, supra, n.851, at para. 149: In this respect the use of the term 
absolutely necessary in Article 2 para.2  indicates that a stricter and more compelling test of necessity must 
be employed from that normally applicable when determining whether State action is necessary in a democratic 
society under paragraph 2 of Articles 8 to 11  of the Convention. In particular, the force used must be 
strictly proportionate to the achievement of the aims set out in [Article 2]. 
762 Ibid. 
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the arguments of commentators, such as Otto and Grovogui, in challenging the 
universality, and therefore the universal justice, of international law prescriptions.
763
 Otto 
argues that the basis of dignity in human rights discourse is flawed, writing in the context 
of a project that seeks to explore the effects of the innocent ideal of universal human 
dignity as it is presently constituted by the economy of Truth of human rights discourse 
and argue that the coherence and determinacy attributed to dignity is distinctly 
modern.
764
 She highlight[s] the relationship between the individual and her/his society 
that is assumed by the human rights paradigm, and argues that it erases many womens 
experiences and is anathema to non-European communitarian traditions. Her conclusion, 
that the claim of human rights law to innocent universal foundations must be rejected, is 
not one that is disputed here, but it is argued that a broader understanding of the respect to 
be conferred on all humans, qua humans and not as meeting some complex personhood 
criteria, promotes an understanding of the recognition to be conferred on humans which 
demonstrates both a wider cultural universality and a more moral concept of what is due 
to that human, in order that vast injustice may not be perpetrated under colour of law. 
Grovoguis contention is that: 
It is my perception that European perceptions of the self and their metaphysical 
representations have been crucial to the structure of international law. They have enabled 
Western Christendom (and, later, the West) to create juridical instruments with which to 
maintain exploitative relations with other continents within presumed universal orders.
765
 
 Dignity, in all of its aspects, cannot be equated, for instance, with watching people starve 
to death; nor with being the person starving.
766
 There cannot be health without sufficient 
                                                 
763 Grovogui (1996); Otto (1997). See also generally Baxi, (2002) and Petchesky (2003). 
764 Otto (1997), p.5.  
765 Grovogui (1996) p.16.  
766 See Powell in Likosky (ed.) (2002). 
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and adequate food; there is present in the world sufficient food for every person to be able 
to eat the necessary calorific value every day, and the cause of starvation is, at its most 
simplified, not one of production, but of distribution,
767
 which can easily be understood as 
unjust. A 2003 report has noted that almost eleven million children under five years old 
are dying each year, most from preventable causes, and almost all in poor countries  
Undernutrition is the underlying cause of a substantial proportion of all child deaths, and 
better information on its determinants is needed.
768
  
Everyones death is their own; the most intensely personal undertaking that will ever be 
experienced by a human being. To that extent, every death is private, even if it has causes 
or consequences beyond the individual. Few deaths are, however, entirely private, and 
nearly all involve in some measure the more public domain,
769
 some more than others; the 
deaths not of accident but of terrorism, or being accident are adverse incidents
770
 in the 
public sector, or the consequence of avoidable but generally accepted risk. Those where 
there is an element of involvement of some others, either in causing, or failing to alleviate, 
the terminal harm, might be described as national public deaths. Then there are the 
international public deaths  those which are a consequence of, for example, poverty,
771
 
global pollution, war, cross-border terrorist activity, or epidemic disease.
772
 The extent to 
                                                 
767 See generally, Consumption for Human Development, Background Papers: Human Development Report 1998 
New York: UNDP, and Pogge (2002). 
768 Black, Morris and Bryce (2003), at p.2226, 2233.  
769 See Martin (1993) and his discussion of black deaths as political deaths in the Australian Aboriginal context. 
770 Such as medical accidents: see Dickens, (2003). 
771 One-third of all human deaths are due to poverty-related causes, such as starvation, diarrhoea, pneumonia, 
measles, and malaria, which could be prevented or cured cheaply through food, safe drinking water, 
vaccinations, rehydration packs, or medicines. Institute of Governmental Studies Public Affairs Report, Global 
Poverty: The Gap Between the Worlds Rich and Poor is Growing, and the Dying Continues (2001). See Population 
Information Program, Solutions for a  Water-Short World.  See also Pogge (2002). 
772 Such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome [SARS]: see Fidler, (April 2003, June 2003, 2004); Dute, 
(2004); Martin, (2004). See also Cliff, Haggert and Smallman-Raynor (2004), at pp.154, 182-183, and 194. SARS: 
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which the public domain of individual deaths, or mortal risk, is the subject of national 
law, or international human rights law, is problematical. 
v Themes of Justice 
Recurring themes here are distributive justice, legal certainty, procedural fairness, and 
non-discrimination, all of which can also be drawn from Radbruchs work.
773
 Bowrings 
case, in his essay on the then newly-emergent independent Latvia, was that the situation 
there call[ed] for forms of legal regulation and resolution which are adequate and are 
consciously formulated (and which do not yet exist) particularly in relation to recent 
arrivals who may also constitute a minority.
774
 He notes, in citing Gearty, that Geartys 
concept of due process means, in ascending order of generality: first, the trial situation; 
second, the protection of minorities; and third, the fairness of the political process 
itself.
775
 
The points to be drawn from this to aid the present discussion are, firstly, that it is the 
political process which creates the law, and the law must itself be a moral law in order for 
the interests of justice to be served. Second, procedure counts across the board; in the 
creation and the exercise of the law. Third, minorities must have a voice. Regarding the 
present debate, distributive justice in its wider economic terms will not be covered in this 
thesis, although its concerns  the saving of lives that will be lost because of lack of food 
and healthcare  is a logical extension of this work, even if beyond its scope in the current 
                                                                                                                                                  
a fatal lung disease that first appeared in China in late 2002, and spread rapidly through air travel to 30 
countries. (Figure 12.1., p.154.) 
773 See Paulson, (2006b): Radbruch argues, purposiveness qua component of the idea of law is clearly and 
inevitably relativistic. The political decision on ultimate values provides, inter alia, a standard for applying 
the principle of justice, and  underscoring the obvious  a standard for, say, distributive justice is 
indispensable. 
774 Bowring, supra n.748, p.71. 
775 Ibid., p.70, n.4, citing Gearty, supra n.749. 
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context. 
The themes which are of particular import are therefore the substantive law; the procedure 
which springs from it; and the protection of minorities. So that there may be no confusion, 
it is emphasized that the minorities in question are not only those usually included in such 
a descriptor, but the new minorities of new humans; those whose identity was 
discussed in the last chapter  the humans who may not be persons, and the humans who 
may, at first sight, not be humans at all.  
4.3 SCOPE OF THE PROTECTING LAW 
4.3.1 THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
The most obvious requirement of a national legal system, in protecting the right to life by 
law, is that homicide (by State and non-State actors) should be adequately prevented, 
deterred, investigated and punished, within the criminal justice system, and as appropriate 
accidents should be treated likewise.
776
  That is not as straightforward a requirement as it 
would at first appear,
777
 and raises issues of relevance to the whole concept of the scope 
of the right to life provision, involving cross-cultural and procedural matters. 
i States of Homicide: Unlawful Taking of Life 
It can be firmly stated that long before the concept of a right to life was formulated, all 
societies and all cultures have, in whatever way is known to them, prohibited some form 
                                                 
776 See e.g. ECtHR, Keenan v. United Kingdom, para.89. 
777 See the SACC case, ex parte Minister of Safety and Security et al. in Re. The State v. Walters and Walters, for a 
comparative discussion (para.39) on the defence of justifiable homicide, with related analysis of State use of 
lethal force in the context of Constitutional interpretation of limitations on guaranteed rights (para.37), the 
limiting of potentially deadly force to most serious cases (para.44), and the exercise of proportionality (para.47). 
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of the unlawful taking of life.
778
 Issues lie within the definition of life itself (and this is an 
area in which modern technical skills are broadening the field from that which was known 
to ancient societies), in questions of identity, including enfranchisement or caste,
779
 and 
ownership, and in concepts of unlawful killing. What constitutes unlawful killing is a 
subject universally variable and universally unsatisfactory.
780
 Legal systems and other less 
formalised codes have recognised the need to differentiate between unlawful killing and 
killing in what may be deemed a lawful manner. Directly lawful would be, for 
instance, judicial execution, or killing in self-defence, where these exceptions have found 
their way onto statute books, and been accepted in international law.
781
 Regarding 
unlawful killing, however, in human rights terms, where it is the State responsibility 
which is at issue (possibly also for the actions of non-State actors) the obligation is 
primarily twofold: having appropriate legislation in place, and acting upon it. 
What was deemed unlawful varied; the killing may be classed as first-, second-, or third-
degree murder, or manslaughter, in different jurisdictions and depending upon factors 
variously known as malice aforethought, premeditation, or intention; whether the loss of 
life takes place during the commission of another crime, such as rape or theft; and also 
upon factors recognised by the human rights bodies as the level of heinousness of the 
                                                 
778 See Westermarck (1924) pp.383-90, and generally Falk Moore (2005). 
779 See Dahiya (1985), pp.17-19, for discussion of the law of homicide in Hindu law in India: homicide was 
divided into various degrees sometimes on the basis of the circumstances of each case but usually on the basis 
of the caste of the murderer and the person murdered.  the use of criminal force by a person belonging to a 
lower caste to one belonging to a higher caste being regarded as a graver offence than in other cases. [Footnote 
omitted]. 
780 A detailed discussion of homicide is beyond the scope of this thesis. See UK Law Commissioners Paper, The 
Law of Murder: Overseas Comparative Studies (2006): analysis of the law of murder in the jurisdictions of Australia 
(pp.221), Canada (pp.2265), France (pp.6674), Germany (pp.7586), Scotland (pp.87105), and USA 
(pp.106117). See also Vasdev (1978), and Mahmoud (1996), Sudan; Bajwa (1996), Dahiya, (1985), Deshta and 
Deshta, (2003), Yeo (2003), India; Donovan and Assefa (2003), Ethiopia; Eames, (2003), and Martin (2003), 
Australian Aboriginal homicide; Stroud (1968), early Athenian homicide; Melville (1915), Roman law. 
781 See HRC, de Guerrero v. Colombia, 05/02/1979, at 137 (1982), para.13.3 
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crime. In some societies, it would be incumbent upon a man to kill someone who had, for 
instance, killed his brother, or violated his wife.
782
 Such would not be unlawful killing. 
And killing ones own slave, ie. the destruction of ones own property, has rarely been the 
subject of sanction.
783
 Many cultures throughout history have not made death following 
social exclusion,
784
 (whether or not the exclusion was voluntary)
785
 the subject of law. 
When the time comes for a person to die, either because they are old, or ill, they simply 
walk away, or are left, or are killed. The survival of the group depends upon this 
willingness to sacrifice ones self or ones family members (usually parents).
786
 The wide 
range of cultural difference in what is considered lawful and unlawful killing
787
 raises 
                                                 
782 See, e.g., Dorothy Whitelock (Ed.) English Historical Documents I (1955), p.380, in Hayashi, (1990) p.182: in 
the ninth century King Alfred had to stipulate that a man may fight without incurring a vendetta if he finds 
another man with his wedded wife, within closed doors or under the same blanket. Hayashi suggests that the 
seducer may have escaped with his life by paying wergelde and supplying the husband with a new wife. (p.181).  
783 See Stroud (1968), at pp.39-40, for a discussion of early Athenian criminal law. Stroud shows that a slave-
owner had a right to prosecute a homicide; the only other ground of right to prosecute was to be a member of a 
victims family (whether the victim was freeborn or slave).  
784 See Konner (1993) p.157. 
785 Although, as noted above, the deaths were not always at the wish or instigation of the victim; sometimes in 
terms of local law such killings were murder, that is parricide, a deeply condemned act leading to particularly 
vicious forms of capital punishment, such as that practised by the Ossetes where the perpetrator would be 
enclosed in his/her house, and, with the whole community looking on, be burnt alive together with all her/his 
possessions. In other societies, such killings of elderly and ill dependants, found necessary for the survival of 
society, were expected, accepted, and carried out by prescribed methods, with no condemnation by law or 
neighbour. Westermarck, (1924). 
786 For instance, Ubasuteyama, noted by Macer as a practice which could be translated as Grand-mother 
throwing mountain. This practice was relatively well known before the Meiji era, and involves the son carrying 
the mother up to the mountain to leave her there to die  The reason was usually the shortage of food. This 
unpleasant practice is reported to still occur in Korea, and is also shared with Siberian tribes such as the Yakuits 
and Mongolians. Darryl Macer, Closing Address, UNESCO ABC and the Third International Tsukuba 
Bioethics Roundtable (2000), Bioethics in Asia, C5, pp. 299-300. See also Westermarck, Ibid. 
787 See Levy on the Inuit and the Spartans, and their practices of infanticide of weak children; the Inuit were 
unable to survive as a society in their harsh living conditions if burdened with infants who were sick; the 
Spartans chose to end the lives of less strong children in order to preserve the group as physically strong, not a 
necessary condition in Sparta, but a chosen one  a form of Nazi Aryan argument. The reasons for hastening 
the death of ill children are, on first sight, the same; to prevent the weakening of the group. The moral approach 
is fundamentally different. Levy suggests that among the Inuit, we saw that they had a justification for their 
actions that we could accept; in their circumstances, we might act in just the same way. But this does not seem 
to be the case for the Spartans. They did not face starvation if they allowed such a child to survive. Levys 
opinion is that the Spartan approach is more directly moral as the Spartan honour system requires the sacrifice 
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issues regarding the fundamental basis of moral argument with regard to the preserving or 
ending of lives. A major fundamental difference between then and now appears to be the 
value given to life; in Anglo-Saxon and Germanic culture, a monetary price, varying 
according to status in society, the wergild,
788
 was assigned to men, and this provision was 
 and in some circumstances still is
789
  echoed in other cultures across the world. The 
price for a womans death was generally less than for that of a man, and can be taken as 
an early example of life being related to gender and being valued differently for men 
and for women, emphasising the notion of value and worth as defining factors in life, 
particularly when assessed against the rules of warfare, described above, and the price to 
be paid for the dishonourable killing of an equally-born man. 
Yet what is an unlawful taking of life and deserving of the most stringent penalties is not 
quite as simple as it may at first appear; what should be a relatively straightforward 
expectation, that homicide should be prevented, punished, and deterred, is in fact a maze 
of complex variables, with wide-ranging cultural understandings of the nature of the 
crime and the degree of culpability of the perpetrator and contribution of the victim to 
their fate; even debate and changing understandings of the identity of victims of murder 
qua victims. Was the person a member of a different  and outcast  caste, or a slave? 
Had the person committed a crime for which the punishment was judicial execution, had a 
                                                                                                                                                  
of such children for an ideal rather than a necessity, although it is a moral system which is very alien to the ones 
we know and are comfortable with. Levy (2002) pp.100-104. 
788 In Anglo-Saxon and Germanic law, a price set upon a persons life on the basis of rank and paid as 
compensation by the family of a slayer to the kindred or lord of a slain person to free the culprit of further 
punishment or obligation and to prevent a blood feud. Also wergeld, wergelde or weregild. American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed., 2000). 
789 See Pukë (2003) Blood feuds trap Albania in the past: Thousands forced to take refuge as medieval code 
targets fathers and sons. Note particularly: Under the ancient code, if a man finds his wife with another man, 
he has the right to shoot them both, but only with one bullet. If a woman in his family is killed, he must kill a 
woman in the enemy family, or their dog. Both are considered worth half a man.  
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price been paid, was a body found, was the perpetrator of sound mind? A victim of 
homicide is someone who has been unlawfully killed; however, that someone may not 
be the preborn, however malicious the attack upon a pregnant woman. In the case 
discussed above, Vo v. France,
790
 the ECtHRs decision that the unborn could not be 
subject to unintentional (or intentional) homicide means a failure to protect by law, to 
allow identity as a murder victim, to permit prosecution of the perpetrator. If even this 
question, of is there a murder victim, is open to such wide complexities, it is apparent 
that there is a great challenge for the international law of human rights in determining and 
establishing universal standards for the protection of life. 
Risks which some societies are prepared to accept, and others are not, influence whether a 
death which might be seen as accident, or lawful killing, in one time and place, is 
homicide in another. Justifiable homicide is when one person dies at the hands of another, 
but there is a reason present which removes blame; for instance, a legitimate act of war, or 
judicial execution where the death penalty remains upon the statute books. Some 
jurisdictions allow lawful medical intervention in death,
791
 when a person nearing the end 
of life is given medication to hasten that end, or artificial respiration or hydration and 
                                                 
790 Supra, text accompanying n.399. 
791 There is some confusion regarding the use of terms, euthanasia being generally employed for all such 
interventions. The American Geriatric Society [AGS] definitions are helpful: 
Physician-assisted suicide [PAE]: When a physician provides either equipment or medication, or informs the patient 
of the most efficacious use of already available means, for the purpose of assisting the patient to end his or her 
own life. 
Voluntary active euthanasia [VAE]: When, at the request of the patient, a physician administers a medication or 
treatment, the intent of which is to end the patient's life. 
Withholding or withdrawing treatment: When a medical intervention is either not given or the ongoing use of the 
intervention is discontinued, allowing natural progression of the underlying disease state. 
AGS Ethics Committee, Position Statement: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 
(November 1994 / May 1998 / November 2002). 
For critical comment on one jurisdiction permitting legal VAE, the Netherlands, (Wet toetsing 
levensbeëindiging op verzoek en hulp bij zelfdoding (Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide Act)) 
see Amarasekara and Bagaric, (2002). 
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nutrition are withdrawn, perhaps because of unbearable pain or suffering, or because the 
enjoyment of all faculties has come to an irreversible end. Self-defence,
792
 and state use of 
lethal force in order to achieve legitimate ends, such as the protection of others,
793
 are also 
accepted as justifiable homicide; although there are concomitant duties, such as that to 
plan and carry out operations with great care, and also to mitigate against loss of life in 
the use of force, by, wherever possible, emplying what are termed less-lethal 
technologies.
794
 In these circumstances, there may be an intention to kill or to cause 
grievous bodily harm; there are other situations, such as death during medical treatment, 
when there is not such an intention, although the possibility of death may be very high, 
even one hundred percent certain, as was the case in the separation of conjoined twins 
Jodie and Mary, when it was known that the operation needed to save Jodies life 
would kill Mary.
795
 Socities have been creative in finding ways of defining out some of 
the situations of one persons death at the hands of another, often because the societies 
themselves did not want to bear the pain of the retribution which their legal systems 
deemed necessary for murder. The crime of infanticide is one such creative device.
796
 
                                                 
792 On battered woman syndrome [BWS] as a defence to a charge of murder, see the debate between Dressler 
and Horder in Shute and Simester (eds., 2002), pp.259-82, and 283-297.  
793 See United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (UN 
Force and Firearms Principles), para.9: intentional lethal use of firearms may only be made when strictly 
unavoidable in order to protect life. Raised in ECtHR, Hugh Jordan v. UK, para.88. 
794 Patten Report Recommendations 69 and 70 Relating to Public Order Equipment, Annex to the Report of 
the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (the Patten Report of September 1999), para.23:  
Article 2 of the ECHR places an obligation on the State positively to promote the right to life. The provision 
and use of less lethal weapons and options provide a means of fulfilling that obligation, and protecting the lives 
of the public and police officers, in violent confrontations. (April 2001). See also Police Complaints Authority, 
Safer Restraint (Report of the conference held in April 2002 at Church House, Westminster). 
795 Re A (Separation of Conjoined Twins)(Minors), 22/09/2000. 
796 On a similar stuation where the defendant is pathologized, see Dressler on Battered Woman Syndrome 
[BWS], when severely traumatized women kill their abusing partners, commenting on the American case of State 
v. Norman: The conceptual  and even practical  effect of BWS evidence is to pathologize the Judy Normans 
of the world. It replaces the stereotype of the hysterical woman with the battered one. BWS marks the woman 
as a collection of behavioural abnormalities who lacks the psychological capacity to remove herself from her 
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Ward,
797
 in an article exploring the sad subject of infanticide in Britain in the century or 
so prior to the Second World War, describes the perceived need then to find a way to 
distinguish the killing of newborn babies by their distressed mothers from other murders, 
although this perceived need is in itself problematical  why not other children, why not 
killings by fathers?
798
 Previous solutions included defining violent deaths as concealed 
births or the piteously cruel imposition of a death sentence that was never intended to be 
carried out, categorised as farcical by Ward.
799
 The answer was found, not in a simple 
replacement of a legal by a medical model of crime, but in the Infanticide Acts [which] 
involved a reconstruction of medical concepts to fit the needs of the law.
800
 There was, at 
that time, no medical understanding of puerperal insanity,
801
 but the 1922 Infanticide Act 
approximated an invention of such a state by providing a partial defence to murder where 
the mother of a newly born child  had not fully recovered from the effect of giving 
birth to such a child, and by reason thereof the balance of her mind was then disturbed.
802
 
                                                                                                                                                  
abusive partner. [Footnotes omitted; citing A.M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, (1994) 82 California Law Review 
1, at 76]. Dressler, Battered Women Who Kill Their Sleeping Tormentors: Reflections on Maintaining Respect 
for Human Life while Killing Moral Monsters, in Shute and Simester (eds., 2002), pp.259-82, at p.268. See 
response by Horder, Killing the Passive Abuser: A Theoretical Defence at pp.283-97. 
797 Ward (1999). 
798 See Pinker, (1997); and Ward, supra n.797, p.176, where he notes that rather than seeking to punish 
infanticidal women in the name of equality, we should perhaps ask why the blurring of boundaries between 
offenders and victims which is a feature of the courts attitude to some women cannot be extended to some 
men. See also discussion in Ormerod, Smith and Hogan, (2005) at pp.497-9. 
799 Ibid., p.174.  
800 Ibid. See Terry Threadgold, Black man, white woman, irresistible impulse: media, law and literature making 
the black murderer in Cheah, Fraser, and Grbich (1996) at pp.163-186, especially p.166, where Threadgold 
draws on Foucault to suggest that the development of the theory of limited responsibility and the introduction 
of all the degrees of insanity into the concept of responsibility before the law  made it possible for not only 
psychiatry but all the social and human sciences to intervene in judicial procedure and to reduce  the power 
of the judiciary. Citing Foucault, (Ed.) (1975). I, Pierre Riviere, having slaughtered my mother, my sister, and my brother 
 A Case of Parricide in the 19th Century, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London. 
801 Similarly, In the USA, BSW is not now recognised as a mental disease, although it may be a precursor to 
symptoms related to post-traumatic stress disorder. Dressler, supra, n.792, at p.268, footnote 45, and citing 
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., Washington, 1994). 
802 Supra, n.797, p.170. Similar terminology was included in other jurisdictions: Infanticide Act (Northern Ireland) 
1939, Article1; Fiji Islands, Penal Code (Cap. 17), para.205 (see Ilibera Verebasaga v. The State, C.A. Fiji Islands: 
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Newly born was replaced by under the age of twelve months in the 1938 Infanticide 
Act, in recognition of the possible effects of lactation on the womans mind. This change 
further reflects the working of law as including its own construction of a socio-medical 
not-quite-reality, the (allegedly) disturbed mind of the mother of a neonate being 
sufficient to exonerate the killing of that newborn or infant, but only of that child;
803
 a 
kind of focussed mental disturbance. Steven Pinker relates this concession to a confusion 
regarding the value or worth of the infants life, compared with the lives of those whose 
potential for personhood was more nearly accomplished by virtue of being older;
804
 a state 
remarked upon by Ward, in a comment upon a work written in 1902, as the tragedy 
[portrayed] as befalling the home, rather than the identityless infant victim.
805
  
Whatever the reason, society could not be comfortable with the usual penalties being 
visited upon the mother responsible (or not responsible) for filicide.
806
 Far from law 
being an institution which thinks autonomously, a consistent application of legal 
theories to cases of infanticide became unthinkable when it clashed too starkly with 
general social ideas and values  It was this which created the anomaly which laws 
reconstruction of medical knowledge was called upon to solve.
807
 
As demonstrated in the case of infanticide, such a thorough silencing  the child, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
Criminal Appeal No. AAU0042 of 2000S (High Court of Fiji Islands Criminal Case No. HAC000800S), 22 
November 2001).  
803 Although see the Crimes Act (1961) / 43 of New Zealand, section 178 (providing that the killing of any child 
under 10 shall not be counted as murder, if the mother is found to be suffering from the effects of childbirth or 
lactation in respect of that or any other child). 
804 Pinker (1997). 
805 Supra, n.797, p.167, and citing Baker (1902) Female Criminal Lunatics: A Sketch Journal of Mental Science 47: 
13-26, and Jonathan Andrews (1998) The Boundaries of Her Majestys Pleasure: Discharging Child Murderers 
from Broadmoor and Perth Criminal Lunatic Department c.1860-1920. Unpublished paper, School of 
Humanities, Oxford Brookes University. 
806 Pinker, supra n.804, cites Resnick as arguing that neonaticide should be used to denote the killing of a child 
of less than one day old, and filicide, the killing of a child older than one day. 
807 Supra, n.797, p.175. 
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mother, the father  in an attempt to achieve a good, highlight the importance and 
relevance of Edwards and Townshends positing of a contextualist focus.
808
 An 
understanding must take account of the situations in which people find themselves, their 
location in place and culture and time. The strength of these positions becomes apparent in 
the search for identity, the identity of the individual rights-bearer. The human rights-bearer 
may be defined out of proprietorship of self and rights not by any inherent difference, but by 
location. 
iii The Radbruch Formula and substantive law 
Radbruchs work has had some impact on recently decided human rights cases, where the 
human rights bodies were examining the substantive law in place in a particular national 
legal system, that of the German Democratic Republic, in order to ascertain whether it 
was law at all; was it perpetuating intolerable injustice? These and other issues 
regarding the fundamental nature of the law on the statue books were analysed by human 
rights bodies in the Border Guard Cases: before the HRC, Baumgarten v. Germany,
809
 
and in the ECHR forum, K.-H. W. v. Germany810 and Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v. 
Germany.811 In Baumgarten, the situation giving rise to these cases was described by the 
Committee: 
Between 1949 and 1961, approximately two and a half million Germans fled from the 
German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, including West Berlin. To 
stop this flow of refugees, the GDR started construction of the Berlin Wall on 13 August 1961 
and reinforced security installations along the inner-German border, in particular by installing 
landmines, later replaced by SM-70 fragmentation mines. Hundreds of persons lost their lives 
attempting to cross the border, either because they set off mines, or because they were shot by 
                                                 
808 Edwards and Townshend (2002) at p.3. 
809 Views of 31/07/2003. 
810 22/03/2001. 
811 22/03/2001. 
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East German border guards.812 
The cases brought were instigated by those responsible both for the policy and more 
directly, as border guards, for the deaths, challenging whether they had received fair trials, 
as their actions were, they argued, compatible with law in place at the time.813 The relevant 
point here is the nature and scope of that national law, and the extent to which it met 
international and regional standards with specific reference to the right to life. The 
authors and applicants contentions were that they were acting within the prevailing 
national law, in preventing people from leaving their country unlawfully; particularly at 
issue in these cases was ex post facto criminal responsibility. The States response was 
that the legal justification in section 27, paragraph 2, of the Border Act, as applied in the 
GDRs state practice, had to be disregarded in the application of the law because it 
violated basic notions of justice and humanity in such an intolerable manner that the 
positive law must give way to justice (so-called Radbruch formula).814  
iv Retribution for Homicide 
Retribution for homicide can take a number of forms; a determinate length of 
imprisonment is common now in the Western world, although either an indeterminate 
term, or life without parole, is potentially available to the sentencing court.
815
 Other 
                                                 
812 Supra, n.809, para.3.1.  
813 See Geiger (1998); Miller (2001); Mertens (2003); Fraser (2003); GLJ Case Comment, Vol.2, No.6, 01/04/ 
2001.  
814 Supra, n.809, para.6.2. Citing Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, 
Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung (1946), p.105, at p.107. On the Radbruch formula, and the Hart-Fuller debate 
generally, see Fraser, (2003), pp.59-68. 
815 See SACC, State v. Makwanyane, para.218, on the constitutionality of life imprisonment in Germany; similarly 
Decision No. 23/1990 (X.31.) AB of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, of 24 October 1990; van Zyl Smit 
(2002) for discussion of the moral, legal and constitutional issues which life imprisonment without possibility of 
parole poses. 
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cultures have accepted a blood price; in some societies, the relatives (heir in Islam
816
) 
could, and still can, accept the payment of blood money,
817
 if they wished to exercise 
mercy and not insist on the giving of a life in return for the taking of a life, but by far the 
most common punishment for murder throughout history has been judicial execution. The 
notion of a life for a life is one that can be traced back to the oldest documents, such as 
the Code of Hammurabi;
818
 the evolution of the idea that the death penalty is both 
inhumane and ought to be unlawful is one that has been developing over the past few 
centuries, but only as a pan-European concept since the inception of the human rights 
treaties. Amnesty International report that more than half the worlds countries have now 
abolished the death penalty for all crimes.
819
 
With respect to cultural difference, it can be seen that a criminal justice system in which 
the State takes on the sole responsibility for prosecution of alleged offenders is a very 
Western concept.
820
 Tribal customary law still maintains some of these distinctions: 
Donovan and Assefa describe systems extant in Ethiopia, such as the killing of alleged 
witches, or revenge killings (a situation also persisting still in Europe, for instance 
                                                 
816 Dahiya, supra n.779, at p.19. Murder, being an offence against man, is a private offence, and consequently the 
question of retribution falls to the heirs to determine. 
817 Diyah. Kisa is the concept of a life for a life, a limb for a limb; Dahiya, supra n.779, p.26, footnote 16, and 
accompanying text, pp.19-21. 
818 1700 B.C.E. Duhaime.org, The Timetable of World Legal History. This source also quotes the worlds earliest 
recorded legal decision, from 1850 BC, as concerning the death penalty for murder. 
819 Abolitionist for all crimes: 86; Abolitionist for ordinary crimes only: 11; Abolitionist in practice: 24;  
Total abolitionist in law or practice: 121; Retentionist: 75. AI, http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-
countries-eng (accessed 25/10/2005). See AI, Constitutional prohibitions of the death penalty, AI Index: ACT 
50/009/2005, 5 April 2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT500092005, (accessed 
14/04/2006) in which it is noted that at least 42 of the abolitionist states had, by February 2005, included 
abolition in their constitutions. See also Terry Davis, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, writing in 
Isvestia, 27/10/2005, Abolish the death penalty because of Beslan; calling on the Russians to establish de jure as 
well as de facto abolition. 
820 Arhuacos Case, at para.8.8, where the HRC held that private individuals do not have right to demand the 
criminal prosecution of another; however, the State has a duty to investigate alleged violations of the right to 
life, particularly enforced disappearances. See also ECtHR Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, 17/01/2002. 
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Albania
821
), and point out the problems with a competing legal authority endorsing 
radically different norms relating to the taking of human life.
822
 As Eames discusses,
 823
 
it may not be considered unreasonable in Australian Aboriginal custom for a man to kill 
his wife whilst disciplining her (for instance for disobedience, disrespect, or neglect of 
familial duties), by beating or cutting;
824
 but the courts cannot be seen to accept or 
condone such practice, nor to make their sentences more lenient in recognition of the fact 
that Aboriginal society may itself extract some form of payback (discipline) upon the 
perpetrator. 
4.3.2 PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY LAW 
As shown in de Guerrero, what matters in the current and very specific context of 
assessing the kind of law which is in place in national jurisdictions in protecting the right 
to life,
825
 is whether the law involved is proportionate; that it is not arbitrary, either in its 
formulation or in its practice. The law must be, it is argued here, moral, in that it 
recognises inherent human dignity, protects the interests of those involved, and that it 
carries some sort of bias or presumption in favour of life.826 There must be appropriate 
substantive law in place, so that the procedures which spring from it are effective in the 
exercise of justice. 
                                                 
821 Supra, n.789.  
822 Donovan and Assefa, (2003) at p.507. 
823 Eames (1992). 
824 Although the fact that there is a regrettably high incidence of such crimes is not as acceptable to Aboriginal 
society (or certainly to Aboriginal women, most often the victims of homicide at the hands of their partners) as 
defendants in homicide trials might like to plead. Submissions on behalf of Aboriginal men have mis-stated 
Aboriginal customary laws and traditions. Eames, supra n.823, at p.165. 
825 Fair trial and retroactive criminal liability are not being argued here. 
826 Quinot (2004), at p.172, footnote 200. 
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i Procedural Justice  
The importance of procedural justice, and its roots in the substantive law, was addressed 
by the Indian Supreme Court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation,
827
 in 
assessing to what extent a death must be foreseeable and predictable for a States duty of 
care to be engaged,
828
 and to what extent is it reasonable for that duty of care to be 
enforced. In this case pavement slum-dwellers were forcibly evicted, thus losing their 
homes, close to small jobs, which otherwise they had no means of transport to reach, 
and thus losing also their means of livelihood, with consequences for their very lives. The 
judgement, ruling in favour of the applicants, has overtones of Radbruchs formula: 
The Constitution does not put an absolute embargo on the deprivation of life or personal 
liberty. It is far too well settled to admit of any argument that the procedure prescribed by law 
for the deprivation of the right conferred by Article 21[
829
] must be fair, just and reasonable. Just 
as a mala fide act has no existence in the eye of law, even so, unreasonableness vitiates law and 
procedure alike. It is therefore essential that the procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his 
fundamental right, must conform to the means of justice and fair-play. Procedure, which is unjust or unfair 
in the circumstances of a case, attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law 
which prescribes that procedure and consequently, the action taken under it.
830
  
This judgement brings into play the question of justice, contrasted with a legal certainty 
that springs from an unjust law. The Court takes the position that a mala fide act has no 
existence in the eye of law; unjust procedure vitiat[es] the law which prescribes that 
procedure and consequently, the action taken under it. Further, States must apply two 
tests to laws which they create; is the action  within the scope of the authority 
conferred by law, and is it reasonable? If not, the Court argues, it must mean that the 
                                                 
827 Olga Tellis et al. v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and State of Maharashtra, para.3.1. 
828See ECtHR, L.C.B. v. United Kingdom, 09/06/1998, paras. 36-41. 
829 Article 21 of the Indian Constitution: Protection of life and personal liberty 
No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. 
830 para.3.1, [83 E, 85 F-H, 86 A]. [Emphasis added]. 
 236
procedure established by law under which that action is taken is itself unreasonable, 
because how reasonable the law is, depends upon how fair is the procedure prescribed by 
it.
831
 Where the death penalty persists, for instance, there is an overwhelming importance 
to its being exercised only subject to the most stringent procedures; some of these are 
included in ICCPRs right to life text.
832
 Some procedures might have the effect of being 
equivalent to limitations of the right, as will now be discussed. 
ii Measures with Equivalent Effect to Limitations 
It must be noted that the enjoyment of rights may also be limited by measures pertaining 
within national legal systems, such as amnesty laws on the statute books,
833
 or the failure 
to exercise a prerogative of mercy,
834
 or the lack of effective availability of legal aid
835
 or 
counsel;
836
 or else by sentencing protocols, for instance where there is no judicial 
discretion available (as has been noted in death penalty cases where there is no 
opportunity of mitigation
837
) or by failure to ensure the adequacy of counsel.
838
 Such 
                                                 
831 Ibid. 
832 E.g., ICCPR, Article 6(4): Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of 
the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be granted in all cases. See also 
UN Manual on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions 
(1991); United Nations Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and 
Summary Executions, adopted on 24 May 1989 by the Economic and Social Council Resolution 1989/65, (UN 
Principles on Extra-Legal Executions). 
833 In S.E. v. Argentina and R. A. V. N. et al. v. Argentina, cases relating to the disappeared and heard on the same 
day by the HRC, the compatibility of the Argentinian Finality Act and Due Obedience Act (exoneration for 
those presumed to have been acting under superior orders) were challenged with respect to ICCPR obligations. 
Declared inadmissible ratione temporis (relating the date of the alleged violations to the entry into force of ICCPR 
for Argentina) and ratione materiae (no right to require criminal prosecution of another). On the Argentinian 
Amnesty Laws, see the helpful outline of events in Oren, Spring 2001, esp. pp.131-2. 
834 See e.g. HRC, Lubuto v. Zambia, where the State party claimed that the Prerogative of Mercy was available to 
a condemned man. On the exercise of the power to grant pardons, see Sarat, (2005). 
835 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland. 
836 ECtHR, Daud v. Portugal; HRC, Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, Reid v. Jamaica ; IAComHR, McKenzie et al. v. 
Jamaica. 
837 See ICCPR, Article 6(2): In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of 
the crime . 
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measures with equivalent effect to limitations are addressed carefully by the human rights 
bodies, in order to ensure that the requirement of Article 26 of the VCLT, to execute 
treaty obligations in good faith, is met, and the object and purpose of the treaty is fulfilled: 
to guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and 
effective,
839
 ensuring that governments meet the responsibility outlined by the Charter of 
Paris.
840
 
iii  Arbitrary 
An arbitrary substantive law, or an arbitrary procedure prescribed by it, could have the 
effect of depriving someone of their life, in violation of the treary provision, rendering the 
right theoretical or illusory. Article 6(1) of the ICCPR status that: Every human being 
has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life. Article 4(1), ACHR, to recap, in the relevant part states 
that: No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. Loss of life should not be as the 
result of arbitrary action, whether at the hands of another or by arbitrary judicial action. 
Arbitrary is variously defined as based on or subject to individual discretion or 
preference or sometimes impulse or caprice;
841
 uncertain; random; accidental; 
discretionary; outside of central relevance to the methodology, law or principle, therefore 
accepting of individual choice and subjectivity;
842
 determined by chance, whim, or 
impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle.
843
 
The IAComHR have considered the use of the term arbitrary, in the context of the 
                                                                                                                                                  
838 ECtHR, Daud v. Portugal. 
839 ECtHR, Airey v. Ireland, para.24. 
840 Supra, n.684 and accompanying text. 
841 http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=arbitrary (accessed 21/04/2006).  
842 http://www.bioscience-bioethics.org/a.htm (accessed 21/04/2006). 
843 Dictionary.com, http://66.161.12.81/search?q=arbitrary (accessed 21/04/2006). 
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mandatory death penalty for all crimes of capital or multiple non-capital murders in 
McKenzie et al. v. Jamaica,
844
 finding that this process eliminates a reasoned basis for 
sentencing a particular individual to death, and fails to allow for rational and 
proportionate connections between individual offenders, their offenses, and the 
punishment imposed on them. This implementation results in the arbitrary deprivation of 
life, within the ordinary meaning of that term and in the context of the object and purpose 
of Article 4(1) of the Convention. The IAComHR, in their analysis in Edwards, et al.  v. 
The Bahamas
845
 under the ADRDM, similar-fact cases in the relevant respects to 
McKenzie et al., noted that: 
The ordinary meaning of the term arbitrary connotes an action or decision that is based 
on random or convenient selection or choice rather than on reason or nature. The UN  Human 
Rights Committee suggested a similar meaning for the term arbitrary in the context of Article 
6(1) of the ICCPR, in the case of Kindler v. Canada.  the extradition of Mr. Kindler would have 
violated Canadas obligations under article 6 of the Covenant, if the decision to extradite without 
assurances had been taken arbitrarily or summarily.   The Committee has therefore suggested 
that an arbitrary decision includes one that is taken in the absence of a reasoned consideration of 
the circumstances of the case in respect of which the decision is made.
 846
 
The procedure prescribed by law must not be arbitrary, either, as noted in Olga Tellis: 
Procedural safeguards have their historical origins in the notion that conditions of 
personal freedom can be preserved only when there is some instinctual check on arbitrary 
action on the part of the public authorities.
847
  
As mentioned earlier, it can also be arbitrary to confine the protection of the right to life 
                                                 
844 Report of 13/04/2000. 
845 supra n.103. 
846 Ibid.,paras.139-141. [Citations omitted]. 
847 Para.3.4. 
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to certain situations, such as active use of force,
848
 and to exclude others, such as hunger, 
genocide, and lack of healthcare.
849
 In the general view, the States duty was to protect a 
humans right to life by protecting people from intentional deprivation of life, not 
arbitrarily depriving them of it, not using lethal force unless necessary (in whatever terms 
that may be understood
850
). Violations must be seen to be effectively investigated.
851
 In 
the hypothesis presented here, the states duty also incorporates other factors that are 
required to promote and sustain life. Whilst this concept has been understood, as seen 
above by Ramcharan, as a broader view
852
 of the previously held narrow view  and 
described as a right to living as an expansion upon the right to life  this hypothesis goes 
further in reinterpreting the right to life per se. The premise is that the right to life can 
only be logically, legally and morally understood as a right to live, and that the formerly 
held narrow view is in fact contingent upon that right to live. Arbitrary deprivation can 
include starvation, lack of shelter and healthcare, and it is in itself arbitrary to limit the 
understanding of deprivation to areas linked to homicide; environmental factors, for 
instance, can play an important part. Dinah Shelton has observed that [i]ndividuals are 
arbitrarily deprived of life by poisoned water and lack of sanitation just as surely as if they 
are summarily shot. These are avoidable deaths.
853
 
 
                                                 
848 ECHR notes the situations in which deprivation of life is not in violation of the right to life Article: Article 
2(1) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results 
from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:  
a. in defence of any person from unlawful violence;  
b. in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;  
in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
849 See supra, n.304 et seq. and accompanying text. 
850 See SACC, ex parte Minister of Safety and Security et al. in Re. The State v. Walters and Walters, 21/05/2002. 
851 See ECtHR, McCann et al. v United Kingdom, 27/09/1995, and Kelly et al. v. United Kingdom, 04/05/2001. 
852 See also Przezetacznik (1976). 
853 Shelton, (2002).  
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4.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the concept of protected by law within both a moral, and a 
substantive and procedural framework. The concept of justice has been examined, in order 
to assist in the argument regarding the accrual  or not  of rights to those humans whose 
status as humans, or as humans deserving of rights protection, might be found wanting. 
Bowring, discussed above, was writing about ethnic Russians present and oppressed in 
Latvia: the suggestion of one commentator, Palley, was that rights could accrue to the 
minorities as a result of the passage of time, by some form of prescription.
854
 After 
perhaps thirty years peaceful residence, the rights accrued might not be equivalent to 
those of citizens, but would be at least those of lawful immigrants. Bowrings critique of 
this plan is of relevance to much of the debate about embryos and the unborn: 
There is a logical problem with such a notion, however, in the context of human rights: 
how can a right accrue after 30 years and not after 10 or 5? In a world of emigration and 
immigration of great movements of refugees across international frontiers and within states, are 
rights to be denied on grounds of recent arrival? Surely these coditions [in Latvia] demand a 
consciously
855
 drawn-up framework of law, in which rights may be enjoyed which are both 
rooted in and protective of the community, and the individuals who constitute that 
community.
856
 
Recognising the possibilities and consequences of defining of the Other out of full rights-
bearing status is an essential pre-requisite to the conferring of rights. Scaperlanda sees a 
similar problem to that discussed by Bowring in the USAs treatment of non-citizens: 
                                                 
854 Bowring, supra n.748, p.90, footnote 60 and accompanying text, citing Claire Palley, Population transfers in 
D. Gomien, (ed., 1993) Broadening the Frontiers of Human Rights Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, at p.246. 
855 In this context, conscious not only of the failure of law, but of the failures of most varieties of universalising 
theory. But surely a theory of sufficient universality to achieve legitimacy is what is required. Bowring, supra 
n.748, p.90, footnote 61. 
856 Bowring, supra n.748, p.90. 
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In some respects pre-born children and would be immigrants share a similar position in the 
America of the late 1990's. In Roe v. Wade, the Court concluded that the unborn have never been 
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense. Justice Stevens, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 
draws the parallel between abortion and immigration in a rather startling footnote, suggesting that 
Haitians have risked the perils of the sea in a desperate attempt to become persons protected by 
our laws. Both immigrants and the pre-born are knocking at membership's door, with neither 
guaranteed admission into the American community. These days the pre-born also have the 
additional burden of clamoring for recognition as members of the larger human family.
857 
Arguing for some moment of sentience or viability  a passage of time requirement  in 
order for a human fetus to become a human rights-bearer can also present problems of 
apparent injustice, in a similar fashion to Palleys thirty years residence requirement 
does for minorities. Needing to pass some kind of test  good citizenship, or personhood  
can do likewise for other minorities, such as those in PVS, the ill or disabled, the 
unsentient, even the evil ones. A moral protecting law has to protect all those in the class 
human; and the definition of human has to be broad, and generous, for otherwise the 
moral basis of the law is compromised, and intolerable injustice may be perpetrated. 
The moral basis of the law must, it has been shown, be reflected in both the substantive 
law and in the procedure that springs from it. Justice might both require that a teleological 
stance is taken in the interpretation of the law, and that the object and purpose of the 
treaties is borne in mind when considering whether to allow a dynamic interpretation of 
terms, or an autonomous interpretation for the right to become real and effective, not 
artificial and illusory. Attention will now be drawn to what the human rights bodies have 
made, and could make, of the right to life provision. 
 
                                                 
857 Scaperlanda, (no date given), Life and Learning IX, at p.2. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Aspects of  Human Rights Adjudication of  the 
Right to Life 
5.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
As has earlier been acknowledged, it is not the intention of this thesis to ofer a 
comprehensive overview of the right to life as it has been adjudicated; such would be 
beyond the scope of a document of this size. Instead, the intention is to focus on situations 
in which human rights discourses could have a part to play in the avoidance of intolerable 
injustice, by the effective working out of the right to life treaty provision. The argument 
will proceed with an analysis of how rights in general, and the right to life in particular, can 
be limited in their application, either by exceptions or qualifications; are any of these of 
relevance to the right to life? Continuing with the theme of protected by law, and having 
established if there are any exceptions or qualifications which may be of relevance to the 
application of the right to life, four cases in particular will be used to highlight the issues: in 
the IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras; the HRC case of De Guerrero v. Colombia; 
from the ECtHR, Vo. v. France, and the Indian national jurisdiction case of Olga Tellis v. 
Bombay Municipal Corporation. The latters place is to show what can happen when a 
States highest court is prepared to apply human rights principals dynamically, and is an 
example of Choudhrys genealogical mode of constitutional interpretation, where legal 
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systems benefit from each others practice.
858
 Human rights thinking has informed the Indian 
Supreme Courts decisions, and such decisions can then inform human rights discourses 
themselves,
859
 in the quest for a moral law. 
5.2 LIMITATIONS 
The treaty provision, as has been shown, is that the right to life shall be protected by law. 
Circumstances, in which life might be lawfully lost, or taken, must be narrowly or 
carefully defined. Again, and as in so much of the discussion surrounding the right to life, 
to have a bias towards the protection of life is not as straightforward a proposition as it 
might be felt it should be. The practice of law must be able to determine the narrow 
boundary between what a permissible deprivation of life is, and what is not. A point to 
be clarified at an early stage of this discussion is to what extent life can and should be 
protected by law  to the uttermost, at all times (ie., what is known as an absolute right) 
or is the scope of the protection allowed to be limited or circumscribed in any way? 
Common sense would suggest that there should be some limits, some cut-off point of 
resources, risk, or balancing of rights; each and every life cannot be protected to the very 
furthest extent, cannot have money and other resources directed endlessly at its 
preservation, cannot be saved from danger always, in the face of danger to many others in 
that effort, or expense. However, before discussing what those limitations might be, it is 
necessary to examine the texts themselves and see what might be included in the form of 
limitations there. This will be briefly introduced by a short discussion of qualified rights, 
before moving into the category of so-called absolute rights, where the right to life 
belongs. 
                                                 
858 Supra, n.253-255 and accompanying text. 
859 See also Makwanyane, for the SACCs reflections upon this matter. 
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5.2.1 TEXTUAL LIMITATIONS 
Before examining what should be included in the scope of lifes protection in law, it is 
helpful to know whether the right itself is intentionally circumscribed in the texts in any 
way; is it stated in absolute terms, which may be limited by exceptions, or by 
qualifications? A brief overview of the qualified rights will be given, before a more 
thorough discussion of the absolute rights. 
i Qualified Rights 
Human rights provisions themselves may be  and often are  limited within their own 
texts. The category of rights thus limited is that of the qualified rights, where limitations 
are put upon the unfettered exercise of the rights, such as considerations which are 
deemed necessary in a democratic society for others to be able to enjoy their rights. The 
point regarding the difference between exceptions and qualifications may be more clearly 
grasped by reference to one of the so-called qualified rights, such as freedom of 
expression, as found in ICCPR: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.  
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;   
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special 
duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only 
be such as are provided by law and are necessary:  
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;  
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals.  
Generally speaking, there is a right to express ones self freely, but it may be limited by 
the rights and interests of others, and by the particular social and national circumstances 
prevailing. This is a variable standard, and one upon which judgement must be made in 
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the context of each case and each national legal system.
860
 Thus, the rights-bearer is 
limited in the unalloyed enjoyment of the right. 
Fettering of the freedom to enjoy rights is, however, also subject to limitations;
861
 any 
restriction imposed must be proportional to the legitimate aim pursued, and certain rights 
 not including the right to life  may be derogated from in times of public emergency, 
threatening the life of the nation.
862
 Chaskalson P., in the SACC case, State v. 
Makwanyane, made a comparative study of the exercise of the proportionality principle 
across several jurisdictions, those of Canada, Germany, and the ECtHR, and in US courts 
in scrtunising governmental action, concluding that although different approaches to 
proportionality were employed, it was recognised across the board as an essential 
requirement of any legitimate limitation of an entrenched right.
863
 States make an 
undertaking to respect rights, such as in ACHR:  
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full 
exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or 
any other social condition.
864
 
Such limitations which fetter rights, as have been discussed here, however, are only 
available to the State under the power of law;
865
 the nature of that law of course meeting 
                                                 
860 See discussion of limitations in IAComHPR, Constitutional Rights Project, Civil Liberties Organisation v. 
Nigeria, 01/01/1998. 
861 See IACtHR, The Word Laws in Article 30 of the American Convention on Human Rights, OC-6/86, 
Advisory Opinion (1986), paras.17-18. 
862 Article 4, ICCPR. See also Article 15, ECHR; Article 27, ACHR. (There is no derogation clause in ACHPR). 
See supra, n.184, 185 and accompanying text. See also conceptual study of the State of Exception made by 
Agamben, (2005), especially chapter 2. 
863 Para.105. See paras.105-109 for the comparison. 
864 Article 1, ACHR. See also Article 1, ECHR; Article 2, ICCPR; Article 1, ACHPR. 
865 See IACtHR, Advisory Opinion, supra, n.861. 
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the requirements of justice and adherence to human rights, as discussed, above. 
ii Absolute Rights  
Just because a right is deemed to be absolute, and does not include in its text a list of 
qualifications which may limit its unfettered enjoyment, does not mean that there may not 
be circumstances which are, so to speak, defined out of the protection. Such situations 
are exceptions to the general enjoyment of the right; they do not make the right any more 
or less absolute (whatever that may mean, a point to be addressed below) but simply list 
situations in which it does not apply. For instance, although no person may be taken into 
slavery, work which is imposed in the context of military service or imprisonment does 
not fall into the category of forced or compulsory labour, an element of the right, and so 
the right is not engaged.
866
 With respect to the right to life provision, it is absolute in 
respect of not being a formally qualified right, but there are certain limited and narrowly 
permissible exceptions, situations defined out of the protection.  
An exception is a situation or an act which may always be considered as not being 
included in the protection afforded by a particular treaty article; the early treaties included 
the death penalty, where it persisted, in the permitted exceptions, whereas a qualification 
means that in some situations a particular act or situation is included within the remit of 
the right, and in some cases, it is not. Chaskalson P., giving judgement in the SACC case 
of Makwanyane, noted that: 
When challenges to the death sentence in international or foreign courts and tribunals have 
failed, the constitution or the international instrument concerned has either directly sanctioned 
capital punishment or has specifically provided that the right to life is subject to exceptions 
                                                 
866 See ECHR, Article 4. 
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sanctioned by law.
867
 
This confirms that within national legal systems, it is recognised that exceptions to the 
protection of life may be sanctioned by law. Such exceptions are listed with some of the 
right to life Articles, especially in ECHR, which has confirmed that use of lethal force 
may be condoned in a situation recognised as one of absolute necessity
868
 (a more 
stringent test than necessary in a democratic society
869
). 
Gewirth has made a philosophical analysis of the notion of absolute in the context of 
rights, seeking to establish whether or not there are any rights which can be rated as 
absolute: as he points out, if any rights were to be regarded as such, the most plausible 
candidate would be the right to life.
870
 Arguing from Hohfeldian first principles, the 
contention is that [a] right is absolute when it cannot be overridden in any circumstances, 
so that it can never be justifiably infringed and it must be fulfilled without any 
exceptions.
871
 Consequently, there are two normative bases for an absolute right; in 
Hohfeldian claim-right terms, one aspect is that of a justified claim or entitlement to the 
performance or non-performance of certain actions, but also what Gewirth describes as 
an exceptionless justifiability of performance: this analysis is based on his previously 
formulated Principle of Generic Consistency [PGC], a principle demanding of every 
agent that he act in accord with the generic rights of his recipients as well as himself. The 
rights so marked as generic are those to the necessary conditions of action, freedom and 
                                                 
867 Para.38. 
868 McCann et al. v. UK, para.149. 
869 One of the listed limitations of the qualified rights, generally e.g. Articles 8-11 ECHR.  
870 Gewirth, (1981), p.1. 
871 Ibid., p.2. Gewirths use of exceptions here must equate, at least partially, to the idea of qualifications, as 
described above, as a right is overridden when it is justifiably infringed. [Emphases in original]. 
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well-being.
872
 
The PGC in its entirety is too complex to enter into here, but the conclusion drawn 
supports the argument which underpins this thesis. That is, that [a]gents and institutions 
are absolutely prohibited from degrading persons, treating them as if they had no rights or 
dignity. This benefit is for all persons, innocent or guilty. Further, 
 since the principle requires of every agent that he act in accord with the generic rights of 
his recipients as well as of himself, specific rights are absolute insofar as they serve to protect the 
basic presuppositions of the valid principle of morality in its equal application to all persons.
873
 
The PGC is a principle in accord with Andornos concept of extended dignity, as 
described above, which has been employed in this thesis as a basis for the claim that the 
fulfilment of rights requires of an actor that s/he act with respect for the dignity 
represented in that persons own being, and in the being signified, for instance, by human 
DNA being manipulated, as well as for the possible impact on the human race.  
Addo and Grief have applied Gewirths analysis to the right to be free from torture, which 
is the right most commonly held to be, so to speak, absolutely absolute,
874
 in that there is 
no possibility of derogation, exception, or limitation; the prohibition against torture 
cannot be in any way overridden, to use Gewirths phraseology.
875
 However, the 
protection of the right to life is different, as it does not involve solely a duty to refrain 
from acing, as not torturing someone does. Protection of the right to life requires both 
                                                 
872 Gewirth, Ibid., p.2, and citing A. Gewirth, Reason and Morality (Chicago, 1978) pp.135 et seq., 197-198, 343-44. 
873 Ibid., p.16. 
874 Gewirth suggests that, in most peoples opinion there are no absolute rights, an point of view which is 
disputed here; the right to be free from torture must be absolute, as Gewirth himself would agree. Gewirth, 
Ibid., pp.1,2. 
875 See, e.g., the ECHR case of Aktaû v. Turkey, 24/04/2003, para.310.  The Court recalls that Article 3 
enshrines one of the fundamental values of a democratic society. Even in the most difficult of circumstances, 
such as the fight against terrorism, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. No provision is made, as in other substantive clauses of the Convention and its 
Protocols, for exceptions and no derogation from it is possible under Article 15. [Citations omitted]. 
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positive action, and a balancing of rights. 
Regarding the right to life, and whether it should be considered as absolute, Plomer 
suggests that: 
 [i]n international Treaties, the right to life has never been claimed to be absolute, even 
less guaranteed. Even in the case of individuals who are already born, international treaties and 
domestic law recognise that there are circumstances in which it is lawful to take another persons 
life, for example by a lawful act of self-defence or (in the days when capital punishment was 
lawful in our society) by lawful execution.
876
 
It is of course not possible that each individuals life should be protected at all times and 
in all places to the maximum extent. The human rights bodies have made this comment in 
a number of different situations;
877
 for instance, medical resources are often at issue, such 
as in the ECHR case of Taylor et al. v. UK.
878
 Policing resources were addressed by the 
ECtHR in Osman v. UK, where the Court recognised that  
[t]he first sentence of Article 2§1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional 
and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those 
within its jurisdiction  that the States obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary 
duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the 
commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions  Article 2 of the 
Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the 
authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk 
from the criminal acts of another individual.
879
 
The interpretation of this obligation, however, bearing in mind the difficulties involved in 
                                                 
876 Plomer (2002), Review of R.G. Lee and D. Morgan, Human Fertilisation and Embryology: Regulating the 
Reproductive Revolution (London: Blackstone, 2001), at p.106. [Citations omitted]. 
877 See HRC, Plotnikov v. Russian Federation, 25/03/1999, para.4.2. The Committee agreed that incidences of 
hyperinflation, or the failure of the indexing law to counterbalance the inflation leaving the author within 
insufficient money to buy medicine, did not represent a violation of any of the author's Covenant rights for 
which the State party can be held accountable. 
878 30/08/1994; Admissibility. 
879 Para.115, citing L.C.B. v. UK, para.36. 
 250
policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational 
choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources,
880
 must be undertaken: 
 in a way which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the 
authorities. Accordingly, not every claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention 
requirement to take operational measures to prevent that risk from materialising. Another 
relevant consideration is the need to ensure that the police exercise their powers to control and 
prevent crime in a manner which fully respects the due process and other guarantees which 
legitimately place restraints on the scope of their action to investigate crime and bring offenders 
to justice, including the guarantees contained in Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention.
881
 
The notion of the right to life not being absolute, therefore, operates both in terms of a 
so-called negative obligation, in that there are exceptions defined out of the right to life 
provisions with respect to use of lethal force, and also in terms of the positive obligation; 
resources, risks, the problems of policing, might all pose threats to life, and whilst these 
threats are avoidable, they are not reasonably avoidable in a way which does not impose 
an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities.
882
 Such decisions must not, 
however, be made in an arbitrary manner.
883
 As so often, avoiding injustice will mean that 
there must be a moral basis for the decsions made. What those decisions are is not 
necessarily as important (without belittling in any way the importance to the individuals 
involved) as is having the opportunity to be heard. The opportunites granted within human 
rights discourses for those, otherwise silenced, to be heard will now be examined.
884
 
5.2.2 HUMAN RIGHTS HURDLES 
For an applicant to the human rights bodies there are hurdles to overcome within human 
                                                 
880 Ibid, para.116. 
881 Ibid. 
882 Ibid. 
883 See s.4.3.2.iii, supra.  
884 For an introduction to the concept of the silenced see supra, s.1.3.3. 
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rights discourse themselves, hurdles which may be seen to be silencing voices. Some of 
these with particular relevance to the thesis proffered here will now be addressed. 
i General Admissibility Requirements  
General admissibility requirements can be especially problematical with respect to the 
right to life, remembering that victims of the ultimate violation of the right will never 
bring their own case, nor may they be in much of a position to do so whilst they are under 
threat of death from pone cause or another  a risk or fact of disappearance, subnutrition 
that weakens the body, the terror of incipient genocide.
885
 Generally, individuals who can 
show that they are victims of alleged rights violations, or that they stand in a particular 
relationship to a victim, can bring cases, although consent to act must be shown. The HRC 
has been strict on issues of standing, noting that there is not a right to speak for others as a 
group;
886
 that individuals within a group must show how they are personally affected by 
an alleged violation;
887
 that a person purporting to act for another must show relationship 
or consent;
888
 and that an individual cannot claim to be a victim of an alleged violation of 
a right of peoples (self-determination).
889
 In Hartikainen v. Finland,
890
 regarding the 
teaching of religious education in Finnish schools, and the question whether this violated 
the rights of children whose parents are atheists, the status of parents in bringing the case 
was disputed, as they were challenged as not victims in view of the extent to which they 
were held not to be personally affected. This is an important point with respect to the right 
                                                 
885 On the situation in Ruanda prior to the 1994 genocide, see Gourevitch (1998): We wish to inform you that 
tomorrow we will be killed with our families, describing the situation that led to the ICTR joined cases, Judgement of 
21/02/2003, Prosecutor v. Elizaphan and Gérard Ntakirutimana, Cases No. ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17-T.  
886 Atkinson v. Canada, 30/05/1993. 
887 Disabled and Handicapped Persons in Italy v. Italy, (10/04/1984). 
888 U.R. v. Uruguay, infra n.899. 
889 A.D. v. Canada, 29/07/1984. 
890 Para.10.3. 
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to life, as very often someone else  perhaps only an interested party, without any 
particular familial relationship or apparently otherwise valid reason for concern, may 
attempt to speak for a rights-bearer alleging violations and unable to bring a complain 
themselves. Such was the case in the HRC Communication, U.R. v. Uruguay, in which 
there was a failure by L.A., a doctor, to substantiate authority to act on behalf of an 
individual.
891
 
The HRC also held that alleged discriminatory employment practices in an international 
organisation, the EPO, could not be considered. The case, H.d.P. v. the Netherlands, was 
declared inadmissible as an international organisation is not under the jurisdiction of a 
State party. 
ii Issues of particular relevance to the exercise of the right to life  
In the wider context, the extent of the positive obligation upon States has been considered 
by the tribunals. The HRC has expressed Views that a failure to allow travel for medical 
treatment to a victim of beating by soldiers, who then died three days later, constituted a 
right to life violation; this does not appear to be an extension of the positive obligation, as 
the causality of death as a consequence of State use of lethal force is established.
892
 
However, in Fabrikant v. Canada,
893
 although acknowledging that at any rate the State 
party remains responsible for the life and well-being of its detainees,
 894
 the HRC did not 
address the issue whether a detainee has a right to choose or refuse medical treatment 
where the author claimed a right to have the specific medical treatment he felt he required 
made available to him by a move between prisons in order to access it (at his own cost), 
                                                 
891 Views of 06/04/1983. 
892 Mulezi v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 08/07/2004, para.5.4. 
893 06/11/2002. 
894 Ibid., para.9.3. 
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issuing a finding of inadmissibility on other grounds when the State party complied with 
the authors request before Views were adopted. The lost opportunity to consider such a 
point, and clarify States obligations in this regard, is to be regretted.  
The human rights bodies may demonstrate an unwillingness to challenge powerful States 
on matters of great importance, where there is at least a possibility of abuse or failure of 
public power. Such a failure can be read into the case of Taylor et al. v. UK,
895
 heard 
before the EComHR, where the question of National Health Service resources was 
deemed by the Court to be outside the scope of Article 2 and the provisions of the 
Covenant, being matters for public and political debate, and therefore the case was 
declared inadmissible (also on other grounds).
896
 It is important to remember always that 
victims of the ultimate violation of the right will never bring their own case;
897
 the dead 
do not petition courts of law,
898
 nor do those denied the standing
899
 to participate.
900
 
                                                 
895 30/08/1994; Admissibility. 
896 In that case, an under-qualified and ill-supervised nurse, Beverley Allitt, had been convicted of the murder of 
four children, the attempted murder of three children, and causing grievous bodily harm to six children. The 
parents of some of the murdered and damaged children argued, amongst other assertions, that the ward on 
which she worked, Ward 4 at Grantham Hospital, should have been closed down due to a lack of experienced 
staff, both nurses and doctors; but closing it would have meant the loss of the hospitals status as a District 
General Hospital and the consequent loss of two consultants. 
897 See ICJ, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America) 31 March 2004, para.21. 
898 It is, in this respect, illustrative to note Sheltons comment: Most of the cases filed at the Inter-American 
Commission concern deprivations of the right to life, disappearances, and other violations where responsibility 
is denied by the state and evidence must be ascertained. Not until the Loayza Tamayo case in 1997 (19 HRLJ 203 
(1998)) did the Inter-American court have a victim alive at the time of thejudgement. Shelton, (2001), at p.169, 
fn.3. (I am grateful to Israel Butler for this material and for that pertaining to the standing of NGOs, supra 
n.899). 
899 For the status of NGOs with regard to standing before international and regional bodies, see Butler, (2004). 
900 See Okechukwu (1990) at pp.213215, for participation as an element in a triad including political liberty 
and equality, and constitut[ing] an aspect of the right to life because it enables the maximum exercise of the 
rights of liberty and equality, and promotes human dignity in which the right to life is rooted. (p.215). Although 
Knop (2002) and Okechukwu are using participation in different frames of reference here, each emphasis 
contributes to the current discussion; Okechukwus in terms of understanding the scope of the right to life, and 
Knops in placing the outworking of that right in the context of its potential for justiciability in international 
law. 
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5.3 THE RIGHT TO LIFE: SUBSTANCE, AND PROCEDURAL 
GUARANTEES 
5.3.1 THE RIGHT TO LIFE CONTESTED 
Whilst it might be misleading to suggest that there is a normal adjudication of the right 
to life in the human rights bodies (or hearing of Communications in the case of the 
Human Rights Committee), effort will now be made to find how the right is being 
interpreted, in terms of the risks and threats to life accepted within the jurisprudence, and 
who has the standing  identity  and voice (recognition) to participate in human rights 
discourse, as author or claimant, NGO or relative or friend, always remembering that 
victims of ultimate violation of the right will never bring their own case. The quest is for 
reassurance that the treaty bodies and regional jurists are realising the implications of 
some of their decisions for the unknown but probably difficult future for the human race 
that lies just beyond the horizon. 
i A caveat on case law 
A caveat must be entered here, with regard to a focus on case law. What might be seen as 
a reflection on theoretical activism, and certainly is a reflection on judicial activism, is 
made by Campbell
901
 who analyses the ought-to-be-permitted scope of discretionary 
practice in human rights: sed quis custodiet ipsos custodies?
902
 As Campbell points out, 
although a traditional source-centred legal process
903
 might be construed as rendering 
[human rights] more specific and justiciable (a process he describes as moves to 
                                                 
901 Campbell, (1999).  
902 Who is to guard the guardians themselves? Juvenal, Satire VI. For discussion related to this point, see 
Campbell, supra n.901, at p.21. 
903 Campbell cites Raz in this regard: Raz, (1979) The Authority of the Law: Essays on Law and Morality Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, at p.47 et seq. Supra, n.901, p.9. 
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concretize or positivize human rights), this same process may also be seen as a way of 
weakening the capacity of courts to develop human rights law in accordance with 
enduring or emerging moral ideals.
904
 In considering the case for having human rights 
law expressed only in the form of vague prescriptions which invite moral deliberation and 
textually unfettered discretionary decision-making
905
 he notes the powerful body of 
opinion which tends to the view that [t]he development of case law snares human rights 
in the tangled web of precedent and legal authority, thus threatening to devitalize its moral 
force.
906
 Campbell takes this discussion further, debating the extent to which there is 
accessible knowledge of objective universal values available to courts,
907
 but for the 
moment, the point is to approach an adjudicatory methodology in the context of the 
human rights bodies with caution. 
The requirement that the right to life be protected by law has now been scrutinised over 
a large number of cases by the human rights bodies. The earliest adjudicated cases on the 
right to life reflected the general principles that States should neither themselves sponsor, 
nor condone the use of lethal force against their population through the acts of their 
agents, most usually in this context police and armed forces, nor should homicide be 
allowed to be carried out with impunity by others. There are a number of groups well 
represented in right to life litigation: those under sentence of judicial execution,
908
 or 
victims of State use of lethal force
909
 or State failure of an enhanced duty of care, for 
                                                 
904 Supra, n.901, p.9. (footnote omitted). 
905 Ibid. 
906 Ibid. 
907 Ibid., p.10. 
908 E.g.  Edwards et al. v. Bahamas, supra n.103.  
909 E.g. McCann et al. v. the United Kingdom, supra, n.851; see also Interim Resolution DH (99) 434 Human Rights 
Action of the Security Forces in Turkey: Measures of a General Character, Adopted by the [Council of Europe] 
Committee of Ministers on 9 June 1999 at the 672nd meeting of the Ministers Deputies. 
 256
instance to prisoners.
910
  
Radruchs principle has been acknowledged, even if not in specific terms, in cases where 
the nature of the protecting law has been at issue. In Hector Perez Salazar v. Peru, the 
IAComHR noted that: 
Peru is not a State Party to the Forced Disappearance Convention but the mere elaboration 
of the definition of a forced disappearance by the drafters of the Convention is useful for the 
purposes of identifying the distinct elements of the same. What is crucial is that the individual be 
deprived of his freedom by agents of the state or under the color of law, followed by a refusal or 
incapacity of the State to explain what has happened to him or to give information about his 
whereabouts.
911
 
Under color of law is very apt phraseology to describe the kind of laws that were exactly 
what Radbruch had in mind: laws which allowed intolerable injustice to be perpetrated in 
their name. Further, the importance of the meeting of procedural obligations ariaing 
therefrom is seen in Commissions condemnation of the refusal of the State to disclose the 
whereabouts of its prisoners. Whilst the State obligation under Article 2 was originally 
seen as a negative one, not to arbitrarily deprive people of their life, the test has been one 
of the meeting of procedural requirements, such as the duty to make a prompt,
912
 
independent,
913
 public
914
 and effective
915
 investigation of deaths in State custody, or by 
State use of lethal force. This can therefore be argued as a positive obligation,
916
 as indeed 
can most of the so-called negative obligations.  
As has been indicated at an earlier stage of this thesis, there is a defensible case for the 
                                                 
910 E.g. HRC, Barbato v. Uruguay,para.9.2; held, Article 6 ICCPR violation for failure to protect from/prove 
suicide.  
911 Salazar v. Peru (1997) para.14. 
912 See ni Aolain (2001), footnotes 60, 61. 
913 Gulec v. Turkey 
914 Kaya v. Turkey 
915 Ergi v. Turkey 
916 See Mowbray (2004).  
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human rights bodies practice of treating the human rights treaties as living instruments, 
promoting a broader base of protection of fundamental rights as time goes by, and 
standards change.
917
 That change can be shown in action in the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR, where one commentator on the nature of the States positive obligations has 
noted (in the context of a rape case, M.C. v. Bulgaria) that: 
[I]t may not be enough for the State to establish that a criminal offence is recognised and 
effectively prosecuted, as the Court may also examine whether the content of the law and the 
elements of the offence are in conformity with the wider requirements of the Convention.
918
 
The finding has been most obviously, that the right to life should be protected by effective 
anti-homicide legislation, exercised without discrimination; this includes discrimination 
by an alleged perpetrator of a violation as well as with regard to choice of victim, and 
the non-discrimination aspect acknowledges the need to afford equal protection to the life 
of terrorists, prohibiting a shoot to kill policy.
919
 National legislation must not allow the 
arbitrary taking of life by those acting in service of the State, as well as by non-State 
actors. Article 2, ECHR, has been accepted as a positive obligation, requiring that States 
take affirmative action to protect those whom they are forewarned are at obvious, 
identified, and imminent risk of being killed.
920
 The States duty is seen as more than a 
requirement to put in place [e]ffective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of 
offences against the person, backed up by the law-enforcement machinery for the 
prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provision.
921
  
The ECtHR has exercised a broad-ranging jurisprudence in respect of the right to life. In 
                                                 
917 As shown in ECtHR, Selmouni v. France. Supra, n.281 and accompanying text. 
918 COE, ECtHR, Short survey of cases examined by the Court in 2003, reprinted in 14 HRCD [2003], p.5 
919 McCann et al. v. UK. 
920 Osman v. UK. 
921 Supra, n.920, para.115. 
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the earliest case to find for a violation of this right, McCann v. UK, certain tests were 
articulated by the Court in assessing whether State use of lethal force operations could be 
justified or not. The tests include a requirement that Article 2 provisions are to be strictly 
construed, with a use of force no more than absolutely necessary. This test, absolutely 
necessary, is stricter and more compelling than the necessary in a democratic society 
test in respect of the qualified rights, Articles 811. The State organs must subject 
deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, reading Article 1, the obligation to ensure 
rights, juncta Article 2, the positive duty on States to protect life. This means that national 
law must strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may be deprived 
of his life by agents of the State; the mere existence of a law is not enough. The 
proportionality of the States response is at issue here, and again there is a procedural 
requirement, of adequate investigation both by the police, and where the agent is a 
member of the police forces, investigation of the police. There must be an inquest, with an 
independent Coroner or judge, and jury, where applicable, and an inquiry where 
necessary. This includes equality of representation and disclosure, and appropriate 
availability of legal aid.  
ii Earliest cases: State use of lethal force 
The first right to life cases to reach judgement (or Views in the case of the HRC) on right 
to life issues concerned State use of lethal force. It had taken just over six years from the 
beginning of its mandate under the Optional Protocol
922
 for the HRC to hear a 
communication brought by an individual
923
 alleging violation of Article 6 of the ICCPR, the 
                                                 
922 (First) Optional Protocol to the ICCPR: Adopted 16/12/1966. Entry into force 23/03/1976. 
923 Article 1. 
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right to life.
924
 Bleier v. Uruguay was a case brought on 23 May 1978 before the HRC.
925
 
The fact that no earlier right to life cases were successfully heard suggests immediately a 
problem in the system; people were dying in exactly the situations envisaged by the drafters 
of the earliest right to life provision, Article 3 of UDHR, and in Article 6 ICCPR, as being 
pertinent to a claim of violation. This was state use of lethal force, without enormous 
expenditure involved in its prevention and alleviation, therefore not engaging the argument 
posited by some that the right to life is a negative obligation, requiring States to refrain 
from action, rather than a positive obligation, requiring expenditure for its fulfilment. 
Bleier and other similar cases brought against Uruguay at about the same time
926
 were 
criminal justice situations, and therefore a question of civil and political obligations rather 
than anything that might be construed as possibly costly economic or social ones, and the 
alleged perpetrators were State agents. For many distraught relatives, no certainty of death 
was available; no bodies were found. The victims became known as the disappeared,
927
 
and it is a tradition of political violence which continues around the world.
928
 Whilst it is not 
                                                 
924 There had been an earlier case, Sendic Antonaccio  v. Uruguay, in which originally a violation of the right to life 
had been alleged; but the victim had been discovered in prison, and therefore the Article 6 violation was not 
heard, although others, including torture, were upheld. 
925 In Bleier, the HRC, whilst not outright declaring a right to life violation, did state that there were serious 
reasons to believe that the ultimate violation of article 6 has been perpetrated by the Uruguayan authorities. 
(para.14.) 
926 From Massera et al. v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.1/5, 15 August 1979, through Weismann and Perdomo v. 
Uruguay, Communication No. 8/19773, April 1980; Ramirez v. Uruguay, Communication No. R.1/4, 23 July 1980; 
Grille Motta et al. v. Uruguay, Communication No. 11/1977, 29 July 1980; Weinberger v. Uruguay, Communication 
No. 28/1978, 29 October 1980; Carballal v. Uruguay, Communication No. 33/1978, 27 March 1981; de Bouton v. 
Uruguay, Communication No. 37/1978, 27 March 1981; and Burgos v. Uruguay Communication No. 52/1979, 29 
July 1981; to Sendic Antonaccio (Raul) v. Uruguay. Article 7 violation was also established in Bleier v. Uruguay. In 
some of these cases, e.g. Grille Motta, Article 6 violations were alleged also but not examined. 
927 On the disappeared e.g. in Argentina, see Feitlowitz (1998); Guest (1990); Report of the National Commission of 
the Disappeared, Argentina (1986) published as Nunca Mas [Never Again]; see especially Dworkins Introduction to 
this work. 
928 See, for instance, UNW, issue of 18/04/2003, in which separate allegations and calls for action were made in 
respect of human rights violations including disappearances, unfair detention and trial, and extrajudicial 
execution in Cuba, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Belarus, Burundi and Somalia. 
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too difficult to accept that the right to life shall be protected by law does mean that 
security forces should not murder the citizens and hide the evidence, including the bodies, 
it may be more challenging legally to accept that it must mean that the State should be 
able to prove its innocence, or otherwise accept guilt. The HRC declared in Herrera v. 
Columbia that the burden of proof does not rest solely on an alleged victim; due weight 
must be given to allegations when the State is in possession of undisclosed material 
facts.
929
 
The reversal of the burden of proof
930
 in the case of  the alleged disappeared was first 
articulated in IACtHR Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras
931
 in 1988, by the HRC in 1994 
in Mojica v. The Dominican Republic, and followed eventually  eleven years after 
Velásquez Rodríguez  by the ECtHR in Çakici v. Turkey, concluding that there was 
evidence beyond reasonable doubt of death at the hands of the security forces.
932
 In 
Timurtaú v. Turkey, the (former) European Commission of Human Rights [EComHR], in 
deciding admissibility, had considered that:  
there was indeed a strong probability that Abdulvahap Timurtaû had died whilst in 
unacknowledged detention. Nevertheless, it held that in the absence of concrete evidence that 
Abdulvahap had in fact lost his life or suffered known injury or illness, this probability was 
                                                 
929 Para. 105. 
930 See generally Kazazi (1996) and Kokott (1998). 
931 Kazazi, supra n.930, p.244, footnote17, points out the relevant text, Article 42 of the regulations of the 
IAComHR which were referred to in the Velásquez Rodríguez judgement as a legal presumption: Because the 
Government did not object here to the use of this legal presumption in the proceedings before the Commission 
and since the Government fully participated in these proceedings, Article 42 is irrelevant here. Similar 
arguments were expressed by the HRC in adopting their Views on 15/07/1994 in the case of Mojica v. Dominican 
Republic; on that occasion, unlike in Bleier v. Uruguay, the Committee were unequivocal in their expression of a 
right to life violation. 
932 On evidentiary matters before an international tribunal, see e.g. ICTR, Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, supra, 
n.12, s.4, including: The Chamber notes that it is not restricted under the Statute of the Tribunal to apply any 
particular legal system and is not bound by any national rules of evidence. In accordance with Rule 89 of its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Chamber has applied the rules of evidence which in its view best favour a 
fair determination of the matter before it and are consonant with the spirit and general principles of law. 
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insufficient to bring the facts of the case within the scope of Article 2.933 
This was in line with a particularly strongly argued case before the Court as late as 1998, 
that of Kurt v. Turkey,
934
 where four and a half years after a disappearance the 
presumption of death  and therefore assumption of State liability of violation of the right 
to life  was not made. The Court, however, in Timurtaú, was disinclined to follow the 
Commissions lead, finding that:  Timurtaú must be presumed dead following an 
unacknowledged detention by the security forces. Consequently, the responsibility of the 
respondent State for his death is engaged.
935
 
Making a determination of the sort described in Velásquez Rodríguez, Çakici, and 
Timurtaú is an exercise of legal presumption, an exercise that is not without its critics in 
the international arena.
936
 This was a beginning; a beginning to answer Frasers articulation 
of the revisionists
937
 claim in the context of the Holocaust: 
Where are the bodies? Zyklon B was a disinfectant, not a mass extermination weapon. Six 
million did not die. Where are the bodies? Where is the proof? Without proof, no trial. No trial, 
no justice. The laws of evidence will not permit the judgement of the Law.
938
 
The laws of evidence may not permit assumption of guilt of murder in the absence of the 
usual proofs; the Law of human rights might be different. It does, however, require 
willingness, and a legal justification, on the part of the human rights bodies to exercise a 
                                                 
933 Supra n.932, para.78.  
934 Supra n.932. 
935 Para.86. 
936 See Kazazi, supra n.930, p.241, where he quotes Sandifer, Evidence Before International Bodies (rev. ed., 
Charlottesville, 1975), 141-142: By its very nature the law of presumptions belongs primarily to the realm of 
municipal law, rather than to international law  Presumptions cannot  in the present stage of the 
development of international law, occupy a role comparable to that which they play in municipal law. See also 
Szàszy, International Civil Procedure (Budapest, 1967), pp. 285287, and in Kazazi, supra n.930, p.240, footnote 7. 
937 See, e.g., the website of The Institute for Historical Review, http://www.ihr.org/index.html (Accessed 
02/01/2004). 
938 Supra, n.723, at p.74. 
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dynamic interpretation of the texts. The exercise of the presumption of death in the case of 
the disappeared, and the need to exercise that presumption because of failure of co-
operation on the part of the authorities,
939
 was reiterated by the European Court in April 
2003, when it issued its judgement in the case of Aktas v. Turkey. Buckley finds in the 
Courts jurisprudence with regard to Turkeys disappeared an effective expression of 
human rights discourse, suggesting that the requirement upon the Turkish authorities to 
make a commitment to securing the right to life that requires the reform of the very 
structure and modus operandi of its institutions,
940
 is an effective interpretation of Article 
2, imposing, as it does, on States obligations to prevent, account for and investigate 
violent deaths and disappearances, despite the inability to find direct State responsibility 
and security considerations notwithstanding.
941
 Either such an interpretation is not only 
an effective interpretation of the right to life provision, it is the only possible 
interpretation to make the provision itself effective, a legitimate aim of treaty 
interpretation, as already shown; it renders the Article effective, and fit for its intended 
purpose. Otherwise this is a cas[e] where a code is counterproductive by giving 
incentives toward conduct that is regrettable by the codes own lights,
942
 as Pogge has 
argued; failure to hold States accountable because of lack of evidence which States refuse 
to give encourages a continuing lack of co-operation, and this has been recognised in the 
case law.
943
 To argue for any other interpretation would be to accept what Gordon said 
                                                 
939 The requirement to furnish all necessary assistance can be found currently in Article 38, ECHR. 
940 Buckley, (2001) at p.65; see generally for a detailed review of the Turkish right to life cases before the 
ECtHR.  
941 Ibid. 
942 Ibid. [Emphasis in original]. 
943 See, e.g., Sarma v. Sri Lanka, para. 8.9: The author argues [ that] it is indeed the State party, not the author, 
that is in a position to access relevant information and therefore the onus must be on the State to refute the 
presumption of responsibility. See also Sendic Antonaccio (Raul) v. Uruguay, supra, paras.18-19, where the State 
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Plato condemned: using principles of morality and legality  as authorisation for 
unlimited human damage .
944
 The human damage of the disappeared undoubtedly falls 
into that category, and condemning the intolerable injustice of those lost lives produces a 
situation that falls neatly into Radbruchs Formula. Legal certainty, the normal overriding 
principle, should not prevail where it would allow intolerable injustice, and this is 
sufficient cause here for the reversal of the burden of proof which renders the treaty terms 
effective. 
The identity of the disappeared as murdered persons has now become acknowledged  
even accepted as routine  and their participation has been allowed in successful 
allegations of right to life violations. However it has taken a very long time, which is 
something of a condemnation of the ability of the tribunals to respond quickly and 
effectively to troubling situations, in the light of advances made in other jurisdictions. The 
European Court was reluctant, even as recently as 1999,
945
 to presume State-sponsored or 
condoned death in the absence of a body. The consequences of that recognition across the 
jurisdictions have been far-reaching, and can be seen for instance in the decisions of the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Argentina and the civilian review body, the 
Federal Chamber of Appeal, empowered under Law 23.049 of 1984 to bring charges of 
criminal responsibility for the disappeared.
946
  
                                                                                                                                                  
duty to provide information is equated with the victims right to be heard. See also HRC, Hiber Conteris v. 
Uruguay, No. 139/1983, paras.182-186. 
944 Gordon, (2002).  
945 Kurt v. Turkey ,25/05/1998, para.108. 
946 See references to Law 23.049, regarding Appeals Filed in the ACHR case concerning Osvaldo Antonio López v. 
Argentina,18/10/1985, and the 30/06/1987 Annual  Report of the IAComHR 1987-1988, Resolution No. 
25/88, Case 9635/ Argentina of 13/09/1988. In the context of Argentina and Law 23.049, see also Nino (June 
1991), putting the duty selectively to prosecute past violations of human rights into a factual context (p.2619). 
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iii Abortion and fetal homicide: Separate and different? 
Not only may certain situations, such as the right to livelihood described by the Court in 
Olga Tellis, be at risk of being defined out of the protection of the right to life treaty 
or Constitutional provision, but certain classes of persons, or humans, may also be 
excluded. Different standards and ideals prevail across cultures and across time; for 
instance, a pre-born child in the West is not recognised as human, in order to protect the 
ideal of available legalised abortion,
947
 under the false premise that recognising the 
humanity of the pre-born would automatically rule out the possibility of countenancing 
abortion.
948
 Whereas, Japanese Buddhist parents may recognise and revere
949
 an infant 
who cannot yet be received into the family, and sadly therefore must be aborted, but 
whose birth will come later; such a stance possibly being facilitated by a belief in 
reincarnation.
950
  
                                                 
947 The Alan Guttmacher Institute reports that Approximately 26 million legal and 20 million illegal abortions 
were performed worldwide in 1995, resulting in a worldwide abortion rate of 35 per 1,000 women aged 1544. 
Among the subregions of the world, Eastern Europe had the highest abortion rate (90 per 1,000) and Western 
Europe the lowest rate (11 per 1,000). Among countries where abortion is legal without restriction as to reason, 
the highest abortion rate, 83 per 1,000, was reported for Vietnam and the lowest, seven per 1,000, for Belgium 
and the Netherlands. Abortion rates are no lower overall in areas where abortion is generally restricted by law 
(and where many abortions are performed under unsafe conditions) than in areas where abortion is legally 
permitted  Of all pregnancies (excluding miscarriages and stillbirths), 26% were terminated by abortion. 
Henshaw, Singh and Haas (1999), and available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/25s3099.html 
(Accessed 03/01/2004). 
948 See e.g. Tooley, supra n.559. 
949 Reverence in this context is by the practice of mizuko kuyõ, and is considered by Tanabe (1997) in reviewing 
Helen Hardacres Marketing the Menacing Fetus in Japan, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
The terms mizuko, literally water child, and mizuko kuyõ, the religious rites performed for them, are most often 
linked to abortion, although it is a ritual best explained in the context of fetuses, infants, and young children 
who die from any number of causes, only one of which is abortion. There is a suggestion that the act is to 
propitiate the fetuss spirit, although the fear of spirit attacks is not the only reason for performing the rite: The 
mizuko kuyõ practiced in the new religion Bentenshð is not just for mizuko, which consist of the souls of aborted, 
stillborn, and miscarried fetuses, but for the salvation of humanity and this-worldly benefits as well. (p.379). 
950 A point made by LaFleur (1992 and 1995), although he recognises a number of possible perspectives, within 
Buddhism itself and throughout Japan (1995, p.8) and particularly historically contextualised; see Tanabes 
response to LaFleur (1995), in which he acknowledges the power of LaFleurs conceptualisation of abortion as 
not sin but suffering. For an overview of Buddhist bioethics, including other potential Buddhist positions on 
abortion, and a useful bibliography, see Hughes and Keown (1995). 
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To what extent should conflicting ideologies of rights affect the substantive content of 
rights discourse? Ayton-Shenker explains that [t]he argument of cultural relativism 
frequently includes or leads to the assertion that traditional culture is sufficient to protect 
human dignity, and therefore universal human rights are unnecessary. Furthermore, the 
argument continues, universal human rights can be intrusive and disruptive to traditional 
protection of human life, liberty and security.
951
 However, [t]raditional culture is not a 
substitute for human rights; it is a cultural context in which human rights must be 
established, integrated, promoted and protected. Human rights must be approached in a 
way that is meaningful and relevant in diverse cultural contexts.
952
 The same jurisdiction 
that produced the Infanticide Acts, discussed above, incorporated into the Abortion Act of 
1967 the proviso that allowed a pregnancy to be terminated if its continuation would 
cause a greater threat to the health of the mother than termination.
953
 This is something of 
a self-defeating clause, as the continuation of pregnancy to term is inherently dangerous, 
but it was intended to give a let-out, a way of legitimising abortion by focusing on a 
medical model, rather than making more profound investigation into the necessary 
implications of a State involvement in lifes boundaries. The medical model may be 
seen as an attempt to avoid responsibility, including whatever responsibility the State, and 
individuals within the state, not only the mother, have for the perceived need to allow or 
refuse an abortion. Other solutions may be harder to achieve  welfare benefits, child 
care, a change in societys attitude to the disabled;
954
 a more effective criminal justice 
                                                 
951 Ayton-Shenker (1995). 
952 Ibid. 
953 Abortion Act 1967, Section 1, as amended by Sec. 1, Sub-sec. (1): paras (a)-(d) substituted for paras (a), (b) as 
originally enacted by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, s 37(1).  
954 See van Zyl Smit (1992). 
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procedure for the deterrence, detection, and punishment of rape, a better availability of, 
and education regarding, contraceptive use. Petchesky affirms that:  
I have always maintained that abortion access for all who need it would never be won 
unless abortion itself, as both a political issue and a medical procedure, is embedded in a much 
larger political frame that addresses health care, child care, housing, jobs, education, and the 
whole cluster of social rights and needs that make having wanted and healthy children 
possible.
955
 
Finding the abortion question to be a sensitive area, the attitude of the human rights 
tribunals has been timid. For instance, in H(R) v. Norway
956
 the ECtHR has stated that the 
Convention does not define the terms everyone and life, relying on Paton v United 
Kingdom.
957
  Further, the national law regulating abortion was at the discretion of the 
State which the Commission considers it has in this sensitive area, and so was not 
subject to the scrutiny of the Court in respect of standards which ought to be maintained. 
For instance, in Boso v. Italy,
958
 the question of whether the foetus suffered pain, and that 
therefore anaesthetic should be used, was held not to be an Article 3 ECHR
959
 matter. 
Also in Boso, as in H(R) v. Norway, the childs father was recognised only as a potential 
father, whereas the mothers status, as an actual mother, whether she had any already-
born children or not, was not questioned. It may be that there are good and sufficient 
reasons for refusing the involvement of the male parent in abortion decisions, but such 
reasons are not best served by denying identity. In Boso, the fathers interest was held to 
                                                 
955 Petchesky, Dissent, (2003), and infra n.573. See also Wolf (1995), including the comment that rape should 
merit serious jailtime. 
956 H(R) v. Norway, Application No.17004/90, 19 May 1992. 
957 Paton v. United Kingdom, Application No. 8416/78, 3 Eur.H.R. Rep. 408 7-9 (1980) (ECHR), where the word 
everyone is held to not include foetuses. 
958 Boso v. Italy, Application No.00050490/99, 5 September 2002.  
959 The right to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment. On foetal and neonatal capacity to feel 
pain, see supra, n.436. 
Formatted: All Quotes Char
Char, Don't adjust space
between Latin and Asian text
Formatted: Style8
Deleted: P. 
Deleted: s
Deleted: 
Deleted: ..
 267
be in his own right to respect for his family life and not on behalf of his unborn child. This 
reinforces the earlier case of H.(R.) v. Norway, in which a Jewish father was denied the 
right to inter the remains of his child according to the precepts of his religion. This denial 
of identity extending not only to the father but the child, is apparent also in modern 
Western constitutions; for instance, in Tremblay v. Daigle
960
 the SCC approved the 
notion, in discussing the status of the foetus as a person, human being, juridical 
personality or a concomitant of the mother, that human beings begin at birth, in the view 
of Quebecois legislators, who otherwise would have specifically drafted the Quebec 
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms to include the foetus.  
Yet in cases involving frozen pre-embryos, such as that in an English domestic 
jurisdiction case, Evans v. Amicus Healthcare Ltd. (Secretary of State for Health and 
Another Intervening):  
[Counsel for the Claimant] recognises that an embryo has no right to life in the sense that a human being 
has such a right. He submits that an embryo has a qualified right to life, that is a right to life which 
is consistent with his mother's wishes. Neither convention jurisprudence nor English law 
provides a clear cut answer to the question: at what point does human life attain the right to 
protection by law? For many purposes, the viability of a foetus is taken as the benchmark for 
determining the legal status of a child.  We do not have any scientific detail and so I proceed 
on the basis that while an embryo has the potential to become a person it is not itself that 
person: further changes must take place.  In my judgment, an embryo has no qualified right to 
life. This court rejected the argument that a foetus had a right to life protected by art 2 in Re F (in 
utero).961 
What the Court was in fact rejecting was not that a foetus has a right to life, but that it has 
a right to life that is protected by law; whereas in fact the pre-embryos concerned were 
                                                 
960 [1989] 2 SCR., 8 August 1989. 
961 Joint judgment of Thorpe and Sedley LJJ., paras. 106 and 107, citing Re F (in utero) [1988] 2 All ER 193, 
[1988] Fam 122. [Emphasis added]. This case has now been heard, and the applicants petition denied, by the 
ECtHR: Evans v. United Kingdom. 
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made the subject of Court proceedings in which the relevant interests of all those 
concerned were weighed, and the fathers right not to become a parent against his 
continuing will was confirmed. That is, their right to life was protected by law.
962
  
In the ECtHR case of Vo v. France,
963
 mentioned above, the question of the humanity of the 
preborn also arose. The case was brought by a young woman whose baby had to be aborted 
after she was negligently given treatment intended for another woman, leading to irreversible 
harm to her five-month pregnancy. Mme. Vo wanted a charge of homicide to be brought 
against the negligent doctor, but because the preborn is not regarded as a person before the 
law, this was not possible under French law. The Court considers matters regarding the 
embryo and foetus to be issues for the exercise of State discretion,
964
 and confined itself to 
commenting, as noted earlier, that the minimum European consensus is that the 
embryo/foetus can be assumed as belonging to the human race. Further,  
The potentiality of that being and its capacity to become a person  enjoying protection 
under the civil law, moreover, in many States, such as France, in the context of inheritance and 
gifts, and also in the United Kingdom   require protection in the name of human dignity, 
without making it a person with the right to life for the purposes of Article 2.
965 
Oddly, this decision seems to be suggesting that although the foetus belongs to the human 
race, it does not enjoy Article 2 protection; that status, as rights-bearer, is reserved for 
persons. 
The reason for this stance, producing this apparent dichotomy, is to be found in a logical 
fallacy regarding the existence on the statute books of a law legalising abortion. The false 
reasoning can be seen in the comments of Laura Katzive, Legal Adviser to the Center for 
                                                 
962 See Plomer, supra, n.470, for detailed analysis of these cases. 
963 Supra, n.399. 
964  
965 Supra, n.399, para.84. 
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Reproductive Rights, [CRR] which filed an amicus curiae brief in the case. Katzive 
claimed that if the Court had gone the other way, abortion laws in thirty-nine countries 
across Europe would have been rendered invalid. The facts in this case were extremely 
sad, but a womans right to make her own decisions about her life and body were at 
stake.
966
 This position represents a fundamental misconception; to legislate for homicide 
of the unborn would only affect legal abortion if it were, in fact, homicide, and not a 
lawful intervention. Abortion can be defined out of the protection,
967
 as self-defence is; 
Katzives claim is making exactly the opposite point from that which she would wish to 
advocate, by suggesting that legal abortion can be equated with homicide merely by 
recognising the humanity of the preborn. The logical fallacy is a material fallacy, 
categorical syllogism. Killing human beings is not always murder; it could be occasioned 
by use of lethal force which is no more than absolutely necessary in defence of ones self 
or another, or where the killing is deliberately engineered by the victim of police use of 
force: suicide by cop.
968
 Active killing as not-murder is a proposition to be returned to, 
that instantly undermines Katzives argument, which relies upon its own (invalid) premise 
as a basis for the proposition which is to be proved. Legal abortion would of course not be 
homicide because it would be legal taking of human life; homicide is illegal taking of 
human life. The CRR themselves recognize that there can be such a distinction, in their 
mid-term resumé of the 2005 legislative session in the USA. Five states enacted foetal 
                                                 
966 CRR Press Release Court Rejects Use of European Human Rights Law to Establish Fetal Rights, July 
08/11/2004. 
967 Matters raised within the case will be discussed further in the next chapter, in the context of protection by 
law; for the moment, the issue is that of the human-ness or otherwise of the foetus. 
968 A colloquial term used to describe a suicidal incident whereby the suicidal subject engages in a 
consciously life-threatening behavior to the degree that it compels a police officer to respond with deadly 
force. Stincelli (2004). 
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homicide laws  West Virginia, Florida, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Maryland; only in 
Maryland was it explicitly stated that the the newly enacted measure should not be 
construed to confer personhood on the fetus.  All of the laws passed this session contain 
exceptions for legal abortion.
969
 
The ECtHRs decision that it was not a necessary aspect of the Article 2 obligation that 
the unborn could be subject to unintentional (or intentional) homicide, and that therefore 
there should be effective national law in place, means a failure to protect by law, to allow 
identity as a murder victim, to permit prosecution of the perpetrator; not necessarily in 
medical negligence cases, where there is a lack of intention, but in situations of 
premeditated murder. 
Habermass view is that [f]rom a philosophical perspective, extending the argument for 
human rights to cover human life from the very beginning is not at all conclusive. On 
the other hand, the legal distinction established between the human dignity of the person, 
which is unconditionally valid, and the protection of the life of the embryo, which may on 
principle be weighed against other rights, by no means opens the way to a hopeless 
controversy over conflicting ethical goals.
970
 However, although the right to life after 
birth may be absolute in terms of prohibition on arbitrary deprivation, it is not in terms of 
limited resources, where the distinction, which may on principle be weighed against 
other rights, attributed by Habermas to the status of the embryo, is also relevant. See, for 
instance, the South African Supreme Court decision in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 
(Kwazulu-Natal)
971
 where it was found that the applicant did not have a right to the use of 
                                                 
969 CRR, 2005 Mid-Year Report, IV.A. p.8.[Emphasis added]. 
970 Supra, n.334, pp.6667. 
971 Judgment of 27/11/1997, paras.30, 3943, 5258. 
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scarce medical resources (kidney dialysis) on an ongoing, as opposed to emergency, 
basis.
972
 
Rather than limiting the concept of human by not including the human preborn, an 
expanded view of the human is more likely to achieve the object and purpose of human 
rights protection, which in the case of the right to life provision means protecting life by 
law; for instance, where democracies have decided on the availability of legal abortion, 
that means that the law in place must effectively protect the interests of those involved. 
The obligation at issue is the State obligation to promote and sustain life, and there is 
much to argue for in van Zyl Smits portrayal of the choices that threatened to undermine 
the new German Constitution, post-reunification.
973
 It would be better to look beyond the 
black/white, yes/no, pro-/anti-choice rhetoric and see instead what is available to States to 
ensure that abortions need to be sought less often. Reproductive healthcare, education, 
health and welfare benefits, childcare, sufficient support for the poor, disabled and ill; 
these are the kind of things which make a difference, and which coud be read as the 
States positive obligation with respect to protecting life, the life of the mother, child and 
family. 
iv A Right to Life as a Right to Die? A Paradox of Objectives 
Koskenniemi
974
 describes the paradox of objectives
975
 in a work seeking the raison 
dêtre of international law  what is it for?  and asks, But what if advancing human 
                                                 
972 For comment on this case see Report of the Expert's Roundtable Concerning Issues Central to the Proposed Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR, hosted by the IComJ, 2627 September 2002 Geneva, Switzerland, para.II.(c) The 
Obligation to Fulfil Under the ICESCR: Employing a Judicial Review Approach. 
973 Van zyl Smit (1994). 
974 Koskenniemi, (2003) What is International Law For? in Evans, (Ed.) (2003) at pp.89-114. 
975 Supra, n.974, at p.89. 
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rights would call for the destruction of an unjust peace?
976
 What if advancing human 
rights would call for allowing the self-destruction of life at anothers hands? This was 
held to be outside the remit of the right to life provision in the ECHR  no freedom being 
considered to be that fundamental  in Pretty v. United Kingdom.
977
 The right to life was 
not a right for a terminally ill person to commit suicide with the aid of another, on the 
understanding that the other person could then be guaranteed freedom from 
prosecution.
978
  
Singer has challenged what he sees as the traditional view that all human life is 
sacrosanct as being simply not able to cope with the array of issues that we face.
979
 
Singer, it is argued here, goes too far in throwing out the physical baby with the 
metaphysical bathwater,
980
 his beliefs including throwing out or otherwise disposing of 
babies for any reason, but particularly physical handicap, up to one month after birth.
981
 
Whilst such a position is firmly denied here as immoral, the freedom of sacrifice, of ones 
self
982
 or possibly even the suffering other, is a freedom that must be maintained. Death is 
                                                 
976 Supra, n.974, at p. 90. 
977 Pretty v United Kingdom, supra n.993 
978 See also supra, n.990; and ECHR Steering Committee For Human Rights, report of the 52nd Meeting, 6-9 
November 2001: Recommendation 1418 (1999) on the protection of the human rights and dignity of the terminally ill and the 
dying. 
979 Singer (1994), p.189. 
980 Expression adapted from Wacks (1999) at p.254: is it possible to preserve a broadly Kantian moral system 
of universal rights without adopting Kants transcendental idealism? Keep the moral baby and throw out the 
metaphysical bathwater? 
981 Singer, supra n.513. See Oderbergs accusation of Singer (Winter 2001). On the ultimate, horrifying 
possibilities of such a wide-ranging challenge to human dignity, see W. Smith (2003). 
982 See Kuhse (1999) and Quante (1999) on the difficulties related to respecting the Advance Directives (Living 
Wills) of those who may subsequently suffer from dementia, or some other condition, which changes their 
personality, capacity or freedom to choose, and whether in such cases the expression of previous autonomy 
should be respected. 
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not the ultimate wrong;
983
 torture is, and modern medicine can subject to torture those 
whose lives it is preserving, against all odds, through years of suffering.
984
 Martin Luther 
King is widely quoted as saying, on the evening before his assassination, No-one is truly 
free to live until one is free to die.
985
 
The State interest here is that life is to be preserved for teleological (in the sense of useful 
purposiveness) and not moral ends, keeping alive those who can contribute to society and 
enjoy life.
986
 At a deeper level, given that many of the people who are kept alive under 
such ordinances may not in any intrinsically obvious way be fulfilling either of those 
criteria, the benefit to society may be seen in its protection of its own health by not 
permitting the killing of the ill and incapacitated. This is a powerful argument, and not 
one to be dismissed lightly, but it is arguable that a certain respect for individual 
autonomy might counter its universal force. It is, additionally, an intriguing argument, 
coming as it does from a society, the USA, which permits the death penalty; one of the 
prevailing arguments against judicial execution is its consequence for societys moral 
health.
987
 Dworkin categorises this teleological interest as an instrumental value, and as 
such one of three ways in which human life is valuable, alongside its subjective (personal) 
                                                 
983 Sachs J., concurring in the SACC case, Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZuluNatal), 27 November 1997, 
para.57. However the right to life may come to be defined in South Africa, there is in reality no meaningful way 
in which it can constitutionally be extended to encompass the right indefinitely to evade death. As Stevens J put 
it: dying is part of life, its completion rather than its opposite. 
984 Compassion in Dying, Jane Roe, John Doe, James Poe, Harold Glucksberg, v. State Of Washington, Christine Gregoire. 
[Footnotes omitted]. In this judgement, the decision was that: We hold that a liberty interest exists in the choice 
of how and when one dies, and that the provision of the Washington statute banning assisted suicide, as applied 
to competent, terminally ill adults who wish to hasten their deaths by obtaining medication prescribed by their 
doctors, violates the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court overruled in Washington v. Glucksberg, upholding 
the constitutionality of Washington States assisted suicide ban. See also Manning, (1996); Santner (2005). 
985 E.g. SMACA, St Matthew-in-the-City Anglican Church, Auckland, Aotearoa, New Zealand, Euthanasia. 
This quote is not included in the Martin Luther King Project papers on the Stanford University website, and 
may therefore be apocryphal. 
986 Washington v. Glucksberg. 
987 Supra, n.64. 
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value and its intrinsic value;
988
 that which is inherent and described within human rights 
as the concept of dignity. Kant offers a quite different teleology and raison dêtre: 
[A]s regards the concept of necessary duty to oneself, the man who contemplates suicide 
will ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. 
If he destroys himself in order to escape from a difficult situation, then he is making use of his 
person merely as a means so as to maintain a tolerable condition till the end of his life. Man, 
however, is not a thing and hence is not something to be used merely as a means; he must in all 
his actions always be regarded as an end in himself. Therefore, I cannot dispose of man in my 
own person by mutilating, damaging or killing him.989 
The case relating dignity, suffering, and the preservation of life as not being the ultimate 
good, was made by Manuela Sanlés Sanlés, the heir of a tetraplegic person, Ramón 
Sampedro Cameán, who committed suicide (two and a half years after instituting 
proceedings pleading a right to die with dignity) with the assistance of others.
990
 She 
described his suffering to the HRC, and the States alleged responsibility for an Article 6 
violation: 
[A]rguing that life as protected by the Covenant refers not only to biological life, under any 
circumstances, but to a life of dignity,  She maintains that the right to life does not mean the 
obligation to bear torment indefinitely, and that the pain suffered by Ramón Sampedro was 
incompatible with the notion of human dignity.
991
 
In this case, both Manuela Sanlés Sanlés and Ramón Sampedro Cameán became silenced 
voices; the case was declared inadmissible, in that he was not held to be a victim of a 
violation of a Convention right, and she was not able to continue the case on his behalf.
992
 
The interest identified by Rehnquist, apart from being a State one, was an interest in life 
itself, life as not-death and not in any sense of quality or of conditions needed to maintain 
                                                 
988 Dworkin (1993) pp.72-73. 
989 Kant supra, n.430, para.429. 
990 HRC, Manuela Sanlés Sanlés (Ramón Sampedro Cameán) v. Spain, 28/04/2004, paras.2.1-4. 
991 Ibid.,paras.3.3-4. 
992 Ibid.,paras.6.2-3.   
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life  even if that life seemed unbearable to the one who lived it.  
The ECtHR had, prior to the HRC case of Ramón Sampedro Cameán, faced a similar 
situation regarding a woman suffering from motor neurone disease, in Pretty v UK.
993
 
Diane Pretty, becoming progressively disabled, was afraid of a death by suffocation, and 
wanted her husband to be allowed to help her to die at a time of her choosing before 
breathing difficulties became acute; she was physically unable to take the steps she saw as 
necessary by herself. Further, she wanted the Director of Public Prosecutions [DPP] for 
England and Wales to agree in advance that her husband would not be prosecuted for 
rendering her assistance to die. Neither the English courts
994
 nor the ECtHR were 
prepared to permit her request, and she did indeed die as a consequence of breathing 
difficulties, suffering as she had most feared that she would.
995
  
Kants teleological position differs from USA Supreme Court Chief Justice Rehnquists 
view of the States, defining the interest to be served as ones own, and not the States, but 
must still be contrasted with the claimed liberty interest in the right to death that 
Rehnquist also identified as having been conclusive in the Washington v. Glucksberg 
Court of Appeal decision
996
 which was being challenged: 
Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion, the decision how and when to die 
is one of the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, a choice 
central to personal dignity and autonomy.
997
  
This point is fundamental to the discussion in R. v. Morgentaler, when the SCC debated 
                                                 
993 Pretty v United Kingdom, 29 April 2002 
994 The Queen on the Application of Mrs. Diane Pretty (Appellant) v. The DPP (Respondent) and Secretary of State for the 
Home Department (Interested Party), 29/11/2001. 
995 Dyer, Free at last - Diane Pretty dies. Guardian, 13/05/2002 
996 Washington v. Glucksberg: Compassion in Dying, Jane Roe, John Doe, James Poe, Harold Glucksberg, v. State Of 
Washington, Christine Gregoire. 
997 R. v. Morgentaler. at 813-814 
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the constitutionality of s.251 of the Criminal Code of Canada. Madam Justice Wilson,
998
 
concurring, expressed an opinion which takes into account beliefs about human worth and 
dignity (the sine qua non of the Charter
999
), concluding (in a deeply compassionate 
judgement) that the right to liberty contained in s.7 guarantees to every individual a 
degree of personal autonomy over important decisions intimately affecting their private 
lives.
1000
 Should these decisions include that to bring ones own life, or that of another, 
sentient or non-sentient, to a premature end, where its continuation is thought of as 
unbearable? 
There is not scope here to give a full analysis of all the arguments relating to euthanasia 
and assisted dying; the point is to give due consideration to the notion of the place that 
individual liberty, in the sense of autonomy, can or should be allowed to play in the 
determination of what constitutes defensible action in the name of dignity. Would a truly 
moral law allow, or not allow, the deliberate infliction of death on a suffering person, 
even at their own (apparent) request? 
The most often quoted principles of bioethics are justice, beneficence, non-maleficence, 
and autonomy,
1001
 and the determination of lifes boundaries is most seen to challenge 
those principles in the field of euthanasia, involving dilemmas of whether to legalise, 
regulate or prosecute, or to continue to allow what Magnusson
1002
 has documented as an 
underground, a world where illegally precipitated deaths are assisted, often by health care 
                                                 
998 Ibid., at p.171. 
999 Citing the Chief Justice in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. (Citation omitted.) 
1000 Supra, n.998. See also Godbout v. Longueuil (City), where LaForest J. stated: the right to liberty enshrined in s. 
7 of the Charter protects within its ambit the right to an irreducible sphere of personal autonomy wherein 
individuals may make inherently private choices free from state interference. [1997] 3 S.C.R 844. 
1001 First stated in Beauchamp and Childress (1979). 
1002 Magnusson (2002). 
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workers, on a regular and frequent basis. The critical thing for national law is to be able to 
draft legislation in terms that protect the right to life, as required by the treaties.
1003
 
Whether that means the legal availability of euthanasia is a case strongly argued for by 
Magnusson.
1004
 And it is, of course, the argument of this thesis that the right to life shall 
be protected by law means that there should be effective legal regulation in place at 
moments when life is at its boundaries, and that regulation permitting euthanasia is more 
likely to protect the interests of those involved than either pretending or wishing it did not 
need to happen. Such a matter is, again, for democratic governance, but the stance of the 
ECtHR, in holding that the right to life does not incorporate a right to die, misses the 
point.
1005
  
Lord Goff of Chieveley in an English jurisdiction case, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, 
regarding withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from a person in PVS, commented that 
the fundamental principle is the principle of the sanctity of human life  a principle long 
recognised not only in our own society but also in most, if not all, civilised societies 
throughout the modern world. However, this principle, fundamental as it is, is not 
absolute.  there is no absolute rule that the patient's life must be prolonged by such 
treatment or care, if available, regardless of the circumstances.
1006
 The decision has been 
                                                 
1003 See ní Aoláin, (1995) commenting on HRC, de Guerrero v. Colombia, (1982), where there were deaths as a 
result of shooting by police: The [HRC] unequivocally concluded that there had been a violation of the right to 
life protected under Article 6(1) [ICCPR]. As a matter of law the consensus of the Committee was that 
inasmuch as the police action was made justifiable as a matter of Colombian law by Legislative Decree No. 0070 
of 20 January 1978, the right to life was not adequately protected by the law of Colombia as required by article 
6(1). The argument here is that, in contrast to the de Guerrero decision, effective legal regulation of euthanasia 
would provide greater protection of the right to life than outright prohibition, the current position in most 
states. 
1004 See for other views Amarasekara and Bagaric (2002); de Haan (2002); Peck (1997). 
1005 Pretty v. UK, supra n.993.  
1006 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland, at p.864. 
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criticised, for instance by Finnis1007 and  Keown,1008 but Paust suggests that overreaching 
domestic laws do not address the contextual complexities1009 in which people in many 
different situations might seek to end their own lives, or the lives of those dear to them, 
when fragile lives seem broken.1010 In respect of the oft-quoted slippery slope 
argument, he cites Bender, who claims that:  
[T]he social and ethical price of gearing our laws and rules to the bad actors is significant 
suffering and indignity to innocent, humane people because of unnecessary restraints on their 
freedom to act out of care in a manner responsive to particular circumstances of need.
1011
 
The questions involved in assisted suicide and euthanasia are complex, and beyond the 
scope of this thesis to enter into in detail, but the principle which is affirmed is that, as 
Paust puts it, legal decision should not be blind to context.
1012
 There are indeed 
circumstances, contexts of fragile, broken lives, when the laws protection of the interests 
of those involved is denied by the laws criminalisation of heroic compassion; when 
unbearable injustice is perpetrated in the name of a higher law. But can unbearable 
injustice be perpetrated against humans as yet unconceived, the generations of the future? 
 
5.4 ADDRESSING THE SCENARIOS 
5.4.1 AVOIDING INTOLERABLE INJUSTICE AS A RIGHT TO LIFE FRAMEWORK 
                                                 
1007 Finnis, (1995). 
1008 Keown (1997). 
1009 Paust (1995), p.464. 
1010 Ibid., p.466. 
1011 Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 59, Tennessee 
Law Review 519, at p.532, and cited in Paust, supra n.1009, at p.467. 
1012 Paust, supra n.1009, p.467. 
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i Effective Interpretations to Meet Past, Present, and Future Realities 
It has been argued that an exercise of Radbruchs Formula in the current context requires 
a recognition of the effectiveness of human rights treaties being fulfilled by interpretations 
that allow the treaty terms to achieve their object and purpose in good faith, and thus is 
intolerable injustice avoided. The question of what constitutes justice with regard to the 
right to life has been argued as including a number of facets, amounting to taking action 
which recognises a bias or presumption in favour of life, particularly in the fields where 
decisons are made that are going to affect the ability of others to live. In this section, the 
scenarios presented at an early stage of this thesis will be re-introduced in the context of 
some fields of enquiry in which human rights discourses have, or have not, been active to 
make a difference to who is to live and who is to die. As indicated in the introduction, 
discourse implies relations of power, and it is the relations of power implicit in the 
decisions about who lives and who dies that will end this discussion. 
ii Future Generations 
The concept of future generations as a recognised entity of potential rights-bearers is a 
relatively new one in human rights discourse. The 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights [VDPA] expressed the 
beneficiaries of developmental policies as present and future generations.
1013
 Further, 
[t]he World Conference on Human Rights recognises that illicit dumping of toxic and 
dangerous substances and waste potentially constitutes a serious threat to the human rights 
to life and health of everyone.
1014
 Who that everyone might be was recognised in the 
1994 Agenda for Development: [d]evelopment has to be oriented towards each person in 
                                                 
1013 Para.11. 
1014 Ibid. 
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the world. Beyond this must arise a recognition that this human community includes the 
generations yet to come .
1015
 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development Nuclear Energy Agency have issued a collective report, The Environmental 
and Ethical Basis of Geological Disposal of Long-Lived Radioactive Waste,
1016
 which 
states that: 
Radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way that predicted impacts on the health of 
future generations will not be greater than relevant levels of impact that are acceptable today.
1017
 
Radioactive waste shall be managed in such a way that will not impose undue burdens on 
future generations.
1018
  
And UNESCO in the Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations 
towards Future Generations declared:
1019
  
The present generations should strive to ensure the maintenance and perpetuation 
of humankind with due respect for the dignity of the human person. Consequently, the 
nature and form of human life must not be undermined in any way whatsoever.1020 
It is sobering to realise just how the nature and form of human life can so easily be 
undermined. It has been shown that being malnourished at certain times of development 
can affect the life expectancy of an individuals grandchildren;
1021
 and exposure to 
environmental toxins causing cancer leads to genetic changes in all generations of 
                                                 
1015 Para.233. 
1016 International Atomic Energy Authority, Safety Fundamentals: The Principles of Radioactive Waste 
Management. 
1017 Principle 4. 
1018 Principle 6. 
1019Preamble: Recalling that the responsibilities of the present generations towards future generations have 
already been referred to in various instruments such as the Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage, , the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, , the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, , the [VDPA ] and the 
United Nations General Assembly resolutions relating to the protection of the global climate for present and 
future generations adopted since 1990, . 
1020 Article 3 - Maintenance and perpetuation of humankind. 
1021 BBC2 Horizon, 03/11/2005: The Ghost in your Genes. See also the work of Wolf Reik and the Laboratory of 
Developmental Genetics and Imprinting, The Babraham Institute, Cambridge: 
http://www.babraham.ac.uk/research/developmental%20genetics/imprinting.htm (accessed 04/11/2005) 
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descendants, who then all can show a genetic predispostition to that cancer.
1022
 The future 
world and future beings within it are more fragile than we may realise, bringing to mind 
Rawls Theory of Justice,
1023
 in which he complements his total scheme by looking to the 
need for justice between generations.
1024
 For future generations, this requires the 
exercise of the just savings principle,
1025
 similar to the difference principle
1026
 which 
he advocates for the current generation, who of course (under the Rawlsian veil of 
ignorance) do not know which generation they are: the first, or the last, or in between.
1027
 
The principle shows  
that persons in different generations have obligations to one another just as contemporaries 
do. The present generation cannot do as it pleases but is bound by the principles that would be 
chosen in the original position to define justice between persons at different moments of 
time.
1028 
Whilst expressed primarily in economic terms, justice, as Rawls points out, is not only 
financial: capital is not only factories and machines, and so on, but also the knowledge 
and culture, as well as the techniques and skills, that make possible just institutions and 
the fair value of liberty.
1029
 The ramifications of enduring justice through the generations 
could be construed as concerning matters such as nuclear waste, which has been brought 
to the attention of the HRC. In E.H.P. v. Canada, the Committee listened to a 
Communication regarding the right to life of future generations in connection with nuclear 
                                                 
1022 A relatively recently discovered field of study, known as epigenetics: the study of heritable changes in 
genome function that occur without a change in DNA sequence.  Epigenetics impacts on our understanding 
of human disease, cancer, ageing and stem cells, as well as on agriculture. The Epigenome Network of 
Excellence [NoE], http://www.epigenome-noe.net/index.php (accessed 04/11/2005). 
1023 Rawls (1971, 1999 rev.ed.) 
1024 Ibid., §44, pp.251-258. 
1025 Ibid. 
1026 Ibid., §13, pp.65-73 
1027 Ibid., p.254. 
1028 Ibid., p.258. 
1029 Ibid., p.256. 
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waste dumpsites, declaring it inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
However, the question of standing of future generations, raised as potential victims by the 
author: E. H. P.  on her own behalf and, as chairperson of the Port Hope 
Environmental Group, on the behalf of the present and future generations of Port Hope, 
Ontario, Canada, including 129 Port Hope residents who have specifically authorized the 
author to act on their behalf was not exactly dismissed by the HRC, but nor was it 
addressed either:  
The Committee considers that the author of the communication has the standing to submit 
the communication both on her own behalf and also on behalf of those residents of Port Hope 
who have specifically authorized her to do so. Consequently, the question as to whether a 
communication can be submitted on behalf of future generations does not have to be resolved 
in the circumstances of the present case. The Committee will treat the author's reference to 
future generations as an expression of concern purporting to put into due perspective the 
importance of the matter raised in the communication.
1030
 
The ICJ have also recognised the possible claims of generations unborn in its Advisory 
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, cited also in the 
Gabcíkovo Dams Case,
1031
 asserting a developing customary law of environmental 
protection with future generations as potential beneficiaries, and protection of the 
environment recognised as an essential interest of a State.
1032
 
iii Implications of the recognition of future generations 
Future generations as a subject of the recognition of law raises an interesting lacuna. 
                                                 
1030 Para.8(a). 
1031 Supra n.275 and accompanying text. 
1032 Gabcíkovo Dams Case, para.53: The [ILC], in its Commentary, indicated that one should not, in that context, 
reduce an "essential interest" to a matter only of the "existence" of the State, and that the whole question was, 
ultimately, to be judged in the light of the particular case (see Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 
1980, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 49, para. 32); at the same time, it included among the situations that could occasion a 
state of necessity, "a grave danger to . . . the ecological preservation of all or some of [the] territory [of a State]" 
(Ibid., p. 35, para. 3); and specified, with reference to State practice, that "It is primarily in the last two decades 
that safeguarding the ecological balance has come to be considered an 'essential interest' of all States.(Ibid., p. 
39, para. 14.). 
 283
The status as rights-bearers of those who have already been born is not disputed (although 
whether that includes a requirement to have breathed is not clear
1033
). The status of future 
generations, presumably meaning those not yet conceived, is now being recognised. The 
preborn, that is the already conceived, whether in or ex utero, are not currently rights-
bearers. The genetic material that forms them is recognised as requiring the protection of 
law.
1034
 Environmental harms can affect developing embryos and their gametes, both in 
their own case and in the case of the future descendants from those gametes, and 
developing gametes in the case of the female are present in ovarian tissue being formed 
whilst the female child is in the womb. Yet the preborn human is not recognised as a 
rights-bearer, meaning that whilst that human was still a future generation rights were 
ascribed; they are considered not present whilst it is in utero; and they return at live birth. 
This legal fiction about the human identity of the preborn has been created in order to 
preserve the right of access to legal abortion, a right which does not have to be lost by 
removing the euphemisms and treating the human identity of the developing being as a 
continuum, and it is an expression of Western liberal thought. Cross-cultural insights 
could well inform human rights thinking in this regard. 
iv Cross-cultural insights 
Something which could be read as an expansionist view is offered by  Traer,
1035
 in a 
discussion in which he finds the roots of an Indian human rights tradition within the 
sacred texts, and based on a notion of dharma: an ethic of community, responsibility and 
                                                 
1033 See Queenan v. Canada, where the HRC dismissed the Communication on admissibility grounds without 
considering the appropriateness of the legislation to which attention was being drawn. Supra, n.593 and 
accompanying text. 
1034  
1035 Traer (1991). 
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loyalty,
1036
 cites Panikkar who argues that:  
the Hindu notion of dharma requires, [firstly,] that human rights are not only the rights of 
individuals or even humans, [and second,] that human rights involve duties and relate us to the 
whole cosmos[. Finally,] that human rights are not absolute but are relative to each culture.1037  
Menski offers a critical approach to rights arguments that fail to recognise the ideals of 
rights springing from other cultures,
1038
 and that point of Pannikars regarding human 
rights as possibly being ascribed beyond the notion of human is important in the context 
of the current discussion; both because it implies a possibility of rights for those who are 
not only outside the parameters of an understanding of what it is to be persons, but those 
whose humanity may also be in question: clones or chimera, for example, although these 
are almost certainly not what Panikkar had specifically in mind, even if he might be 
prepared to extend his argument to these new creations in the cosmos. 
Baxi asserts the right of human rights discourse to challenge the politics of identity, where 
those politics allow the imposition of suffering on the grounds of perceived or ascribed 
difference: 
As an untouchable, no matter how you perceive your identity (as a mother, wife, or 
daughter), you are still liable to be raped; still will be denied access to water in the high caste 
village well; still will be subjected to all kinds of forced and obnoxious labor; still have your huts 
set ablaze; still have your adult franchise regularly confiscated at elections by caste Hindu 
                                                 
1036 Juergensmeyer, Dharma and the Rights of the Untouchables, unpublished essay, 8 March 1986, p.28. Cited 
in Traer, supra n.1035. 
1037 Traer, supra n.1035, n.3. Citing Panikkar, Is Human Rights a Western Concept? A Hindu/Jain/Buddhist 
Reflection, Breakthrough 10, nos. 2-3 (Winter/Spring 1989), pp.33-34. 
1038 See Menski (2003), regarding Hindu law: Issues that keep coming to the fore are honor killings, female 
circumcision for many African Women, and consent in marriage. Whilst all of these problems pose real 
challenges and endanger some women, the issues are used as tools to denigrate everything non-Western as 
primitive, misogynist, and inherently discriminatory. The issue of consent in marriage  serves to legitimize 
immigration-related agenda and controls in Britain and the [EU  and] to teach immigrants  that they 
should adopt the values of their host country by marrying among themselves, rather than importing spouses. 
Human rights arguments are here used selectively to deny certain human rights. Menski, (2003), p.582, footnote 
101. 
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militia.1039 Human rights logic and rhetoric, fashioned by historic struggles, simply and starkly 
assert that such imposition of primordial identities is morally wrong and legally prohibited.  it 
is the mission of human rights logics and paralogics to dislodge primordial identities that 
legitimate the orders of imposed suffering, socially invisible at times even to the repressed.1040 
Perhaps the embryo/foetus is the new untouchable, denied identity and protection of the 
law for cultural reasons. However one sees the preborn, as fully human, as potentially a 
person, as a bundle of cells, possibly even as a transgenic
1041
 bundle of cells, it is possible 
to ascribe the protection of rights, and indeed to recognise the need for some protection 
before the embryonic stage, to the genetic material that has developmentally preceded it. 
v Recognition of present realities 
Because preborn life is not established life, and it is the established lives that, it has been 
argued, can and do take precedence over the not-yet-established ones, it is possible 
thereby to defend legitimate legal abortion
1042
 without denying the humanity of the 
preborn; the argument is that they are not potential persons, they are not-yet-established 
lives, and the bias towards life can, legitimately and morally, preferentially protect those 
lives that are already in situ, so to speak. Inflicting a Foucauldian biological caesura
1043
 
at this point  the was-person becomes the non-person (the capital convict, the PVS 
sufferer) and therefore no longer homo sapiens but now homo sacer,
1044
 eligible to be 
killed without the protection of law  is, in human rights discourse, an arbitrary act; and to 
                                                 
1039 Citing Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political 97, 100 (1993). 
1040 Baxi (2002) Voices of Suffering, Fragmented Universality, and the Future of Human Rights in Weston and 
Marks, (1999) pp.101-157, at p.120. 
1041 Canadian Council on Animal Care, Guidelines on: Transgenic Animals (1997): By definition, the term 
transgenic animal refers to an animal in which there has been a deliberate modification of the genome  the 
material responsible for inherited characteristics  in contrast to spontaneous mutation. 
1042 On global abortion practice, see UNPD, Abortion Policies: A Global Review, Vols.I,II,III, (2001/2002); see also 
Eser and Koch (2005); Cook, Dickens, and Bliss, (1999). 
1043 Foucault (1997) at p. 227; see also discussion in Agamben, (1999) at p.84. 
1044 A concept thoroughly explored by Agamben, particularly in the context of the Holocaust. Agamben, the 
Homo Sacer trilogy, (1998, 1999, 2004a). 
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kill is not the same as to allow to die. Protesting against killing with impunity does not 
mean necessarily continuing to preserve any life by what has been termed heroic efforts, 
particularly in express opposition to the wishes of the person concerned.  
5.4.1 THE POWER TO ORDAIN LIFE AND DEATH 
It could be asserted that avoiding intolerable injustice in the context of the right to life 
means addressing arbitrary exercise of the power to ordain who will live and who will die, 
Mbembe having seen the power and the capacity to dictate this as being where the 
ultimate expression of sovereignty resides: 
Hence, to kill or to allow to live constitute the limits of sovereignty, its fundamental 
attributes. To exercise sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the 
deployment and manifestation of power. One could summarize in the above terms what Michel 
Foucault meant by biopower: that domain of life over which power has taken control. But under 
what practical conditions is the right to kill, to allow to live, or to expose to death exercised? 
Who is the subject of this right? What does the implementation of such a right tell us about the 
person who is thus put to death and about the relation of enmity that sets that person against his 
or her murderer?  What place is given to life, death, and the human body (in particular the 
wounded or slain body)? How are they inscribed in the order of power?
1045
 
So writes Mbembe, in an exploration of necropolitics, the subjugation of life to the 
power of death.
1046
 His essay explores the empirical and philosophical underpinnings of 
the political actions, particularly war, which exercise sovereign power over life by the 
distribution of death; colonialism, and the choice of life and death held in the whip of the 
slave-owner; the body of the suicide bomber in Palestine; the state of exception that was 
                                                 
1045 Mbembe (2003), p.11-12. 
1046 See Santners essay on the power implications of the fight for/against the state of exception that was Terri 
Schiavos life and dying. (2005). 
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the Nazi concentration camps.
1047
  
There are a number of circumstances in which societies have permitted the taking of the 
lives of those within their number, for reasons which may or may not be considered moral 
from the perspective of recognition of human dignity and human rights. Some of those in 
the not moral category have involved the defining out of one group or another, 
excluding them from the protection of law that is granted to the common people. Kelly, 
in a discussion of State racism, which involves the idea of the nation as race, of a people 
as which is racially homogenous, for which internal and external racial others are 
dangers
1048
 takes a Foucauldian biopolitical slant on the decisions of the State in this 
regard: 
In the context of Foucaults final lecture of 1976 then, we can define state racism as 
whatever justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle 
that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or 
population. The word biological in this definition is (I think) used rather loosely, such that 
there is no implication that the discourse of the strength of the population needs to be couched 
in explicitly biological terms to be biologically racist  there simply needs to be an understanding 
of the population as something that is threatened by internal and external agents, and which can 
grow stronger by the elimination of those threats.
1049
 
This thesis set out to explore the legal and philosophical response of the discourses of 
human rights to threats to life and purveyors of death, to the sovereign decisions of who is 
to live and who is to die. What place is given to life, death, and the human body (in 
particular the wounded or slain body)?
1050
 Is such a body, for instance, recognised as a 
                                                 
1047 On the state of exception and relating it, in modern biopolitics, to the concentration camps, see Agamben 
91999). 
1048 Kelly (2004), p.59. 
1049 Ibid., p.61, citing Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, trans. David Macey (London: Penguin, 2003), at 
p.258. 
1050 Supra, n.1045. 
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murder victim, not merely lost? Human rights discourse has worked to ensure that the 
disappeared are acknowledged as victims of State use of lethal force,
1051
 even where 
there is no body present; and, where possible, has required the finding and reburial of 
corpses,
1052
 according to rites that will bring comfort to the families,
1053
 of those slain in 
such circumstances. The same discourse has, however, denied the compulsory provision 
in national law of a crime of homicide against the unborn,
1054
 judging (incorrectly, as it 
was argued in this thesis) that such a provision would interfere with the possibility of 
permitting legal abortion. 
Brysk challenges the accountability for private wrongs
1055
 of global civil society; in this 
field as in others, the present and future causes of avoidable early deaths, or failure of 
human rights to recognise the suffering human, can be addressed within the current 
framework. Recognising that [t]ransnational networks have introduced new standards of 
accountability for private actors,
1056
 and in the context of bodily integrity, Brysk suggests 
that the standard human rights repertoires have been the key vehicles for progress on 
medical rights.
1057
 New medical phenomena [are being] reframe[ed] as human rights 
issues.
1058
 Brysk sees this as a countering force to Foucaults biopolitical agenda;
1059
 
sovereign power, whether of the State or of scientific and medical knowledge as 
                                                 
1051 The primary case is IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. 
1052 This finding has been made in a number of IACtHR cases, including Bámaca Velásquez 
1053 The IACtHR has been particularly strong on finding a violation of the right to be free from torture in 
respect of the relatives of the disappeared; see, for instance, Bámaca Velásquez Case, para.61; and also HRC, e.g. 
Quinteros v. Uruguay; ECtHR, e.g. Timurtas v. Turkey. 
1054 Vo v. France. 
1055 Brysk (2005), passim, e.g. p.125. 
1056 Ibid., p.92. 
1057 Ibid. 
1058 Ibid. Note that Brysks study is taking human rights asa broader frame of action than this thesis, which is 
focussing on the legal regime, whereas Brysk refers to a normative discourse and and resulting struggles to 
change political behaviour and instituions  not legal rights or justiciable norms . Brysk, endnote 2, p.129. 
1059 Brysk cites Foucault, 1970, 1979, 1994. 
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power
1060
 can be challenged by the discourses of rights. It is for this that this thesis has 
argued. Human rights discourses themselves have the power to ordain who will live and 
who will die. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented the role that human rights has been playing with regard to the 
protection of life ordained by the treaties in their several right to life shall be protected by 
law articles, and the role that human rights could play as agents of the future. Wilkie has 
warned that:  
[h]uman reproduction  and the course of human lives  will be profoundly affected by 
the new human genetics. To eat of this tree of knowledge may not, quite, fulfil the serpents 
promise that your eyes will be opened and ye shall be as gods, but with this knowledge will 
inescapably come power also. How is this power to be exercised and who is to wield it?
1061
 
And who is to yield to it? What should be the role of human rights in the unknown future? 
Unless the discourses of rights are prepared to look beyond the horizons and make plans 
now for circumstances as yet unforeseen  but not necessarily unforeseeable  there could 
be a danger of human rights forever being a reactionary force and not a proactive one, 
declining to participate as an agent in the creation of new futures and struggling to pick up 
the pieces after the event. The consequence could be one of intolerable injustices 
perpetrated against many human beings, their right to life violated without recourse to the 
help that human rights could give. Veitch makes the point succinctly:
1062
 he questions  
                                                 
1060 Ibid. 
1061 Wilkie, (1993), Preface, p.x. 
1062 Although it must be noted that Veitch is writing in terms of national/common law, and the reference to 
judges must be taken in the current context as applying also to Commissioners and Committee Members, who 
take on roles with equivalent effect to justices in human rights jurisprudence (although in the context of the 
Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American and (former) African Commissions, not legally binding, 
although this position may be developing in customary international law). 
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how, given the liberal premise of tolerance towards incommensurable values, the common law 
can operate so smoothly to produce the community standards by reference to which it justifies 
its decisions. And the issues that need addressing are not simply how the judges produce such 
standards (the problem to which traditional legal scholarship devotes so much time) but what is 
the meaning and significance of their doing so? In particular, what effects do the institutional 
setting and dynamic of law within the community have in turn back on the varied values and 
social forms of that community?
1063
 
The argument here is that there could be greater (as in, both more profound and more 
effective) meaning and significance flowing from the interpretations of human rights 
discourses; that, in Pogges terms, they represent a form of morality, and that from 
morality springs both a power and a duty to act in the way that Dworkin would describe 
as making the developing story as good as it could be. Failure to do so allows intolerable 
injustices to be perpetrated, sometimes in the name of rights. 
In a sense, as time goes by, Radbruchs formula, in its original concept, is of less 
relevance to human rights discourse. The majority of cases are not addressing situations in 
which an obviously evil law is at play; the moral complexities are more nuanced.
1064
 Law 
that allows genocide is not prevalent in most States parties to human rights treaties. There 
is the occasional case where something such as an amnesty law, preventing the bringing 
to criminal trial of someone who has killed in the name of the State, may be at issue; or 
situations such as the 'Border Guards can challenge past laws. As shown in the examples 
taken from the CRC Optional Protocol, above, however, although sometimes we 
                                                 
1063 Veitch (1999) p.5. [Emphases in original]. 
1064 Although see Bajwa (1996), at pp.285-291, where she enumerates, in the context of the Indian political 
system, Black laws at the Central and State levels vis-à-vis violation of the right to life, including in that category 
National Security Amendment Ordinances, No.5 and No.6 of 1984;  The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 
1958; The Armed Forces (Punjab and Chandigarh) Special Powers Act of 1983; The Terrorist Affected Areas 
(Special Courts) Act of 1984; The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act of 1985; and the Uttar 
Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act of 1986. These laws generally give to the armed 
forces and the police wide-ranging powers, to detain, search, and hold without warrant, to bring to trial in 
Special Courts, to shoot to kill, and to otherwise afford civil liberties and fundamental rights a secondary 
position in what is seen as the pursuit of good order. 
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recognise something as evil, we cannot necessarily say why; and sometimes, many times, 
there are situations which for some people are utterly evil, and for others, are not. The 
questions for human rights today concern challenging moral questions that are incredibly 
difficult philosophically to answer; the polarised ongoing debates about abortion, 
euthanasia, the death penalty; the present and future debates about the recognition of the 
human rights-bearer. The heart of Radbruchs Formula must be invoked: is national law 
permitting intolerable injustice? Are the practices of human rights discourse themselves 
doing likewise? Some questions are for national democracies to answer; some are for 
judges. The deepest injustice, it is argued here, is allowing a voice to die unheard, and 
without the possibility of being heard. 
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CONCLUSION: LOOKING BEYOND THE 
HORIZONS 
What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult 
comprehension? This affords no presumption of their falsehood. On the contrary, it seems 
impossible, that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very 
obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think ourselves 
sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make 
any addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unspeakable importance. 
  David Hume  
An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
1065
 
6.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The human right to have ones right to life protected by law has two clear implications; 
that the right is ascribed to all humans, and the protection of law shall be there when that 
right is threatened. Yet what it means to be human is no longer clear  if it ever was; 
biotechnologies are doing now what prejudice and tribalism did in previous years, that is 
in defining the Other out of being human. It appears that human rights discourses are 
neither prepared nor ready for the challenges of the future, nor are they meeting 
adequately the needs of today. Although there is much to be proud of and much to take 
heart from in the current system, there is an omission in the recognition of the Other as 
part of the discourse and not as its object, external and without a voice, except when 
                                                 
1065 Hume, (1751) (Hendel, Ed., & Introduction) (1995) An inquiry concerning human understanding; with a supplement 
An abstract of a treatise of human nature, Section I Of the Different Species of Philosophy. New York : Liberal 
Arts Press. 
 293
permitted.  
Perhaps the human rights treaty system, the way it was originally formulated and the way 
it has evolved, is not the best way to address the problems. David Kennedy offers one 
view of the process: These people [human rights advocates] began the process of treaty-
drafting and bureaucracy-building which has been carried out by subsequent enthusiasts, 
bureaucrats and politicians.
1066
 Yet it is too simplistic to dismiss it out of hand, to point 
to the extent of the worlds suffering and recognise both the vested interests that are 
protected, and those that are not. Kennedy encapsulates concerns also expressed by 
others, such as Baxi:
1067
 
Activists in the international human rights community try to develop a right not to be 
tortured or a right to health in order to reach out with empathy, assistance and protection to 
people who are tortured and sick. They think of their work as a response of civilized society, the 
response of reason to that which it cannot comprehend. Although it seems obvious to think of 
human rights work as responsive to a preexisting irrationality, it is far from clear that the world 
presents itself to human rights advocates neatly divided into realms of reason and chaos. Indeed, 
human rights discourse plays an important role in sustaining the very image of irrationality to 
which it purports to be merely responding.
1068
 
One of those irrationalities could be that people are dying of preventable causes and that 
the protection of their lives by law to which their States and external states are committed 
by treaty and by norms of customary international law is not being adequately and 
sufficiently challenged, either by legitimate legally justifiable international action, or in 
the courts and tribunals which ought to be concerned. The authors of the system are 
largely outside that suffering and have not written in the voices that would have been 
heard if the authorship of the discourse had lain elsewhere. Whilst some of the unheard 
                                                 
1066 Kennedy, (1985),  p.1414.  
1067 See generally Baxi, (2002). 
1068 Supra, n.1066, p.1414. 
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(before human rights tribunals) suffering is in the Western world, such as the deaths from 
gun crime in the USA,
1069
 and from adverse medical incidents in countries that ought to 
be able to deal better with their sick and suffering ones,
1070
 most is in the less-developed 
countries, and the power to make a difference is not centred there. As human rights 
activists, we can touch the barbaric and return unscathed.
1071
 As human rights activists, 
can we touch the barbaric and break down the barriers that separate the authors of the 
solution from those who suffer the barbarisms?  
It needs only a brief cognisance of the case law to realise how deeply barbaric the 
suffering can be: Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu
1072
 springs immediately to mind, with 
its description of the history of the Rwandan genocide, and the stories of witnesses who 
survived; yet the horrors of Rwandan genocide are neither the beginning nor the ending of 
lethal suffering wrought before a watching world. As widely reported on the occasion of 
the tenth anniversary of that genocide, the suffering is not at an end for the genocide 
widows, women whose husbands were killed and who were themselves repeatedly raped, 
and now, infected with HIV/AIDS, find themselves denied retroviral drugs.
1073
 Is there 
any claim that people such as these women can make to argue that their lives and those of 
their families should have been protected from genocide ten years ago, and should be 
protected now by equitable distribution of drugs, otherwise available only to those with 
                                                 
1069 US Bureau of Justice Statistics, Homicide by weapon type, 1976-2002: For handguns, the number of victims 
begins at 8,651 in 1976 and rises to 10,552 in 1980. Then it decreases  It increased to 8,286 in 2002.  For 
other guns, the number of victims begins at 3,328 in 1976 and increases to 3,834 in 1980.  It was 2,538 in 
2002. [Graph descriptor.] This represents 10,825 gun deaths in 2002, not including accidents and suicide. 
1070 See Dickens, (April 2003). See also Learning from Bristol: the report of the public inquiry into children's heart surgery at 
the Bristol Royal Infirmary 1984 1995. 
1071 Supra, n.1066 p.1414. 
1072 Supra, n.12. See particularly the heartrending witness statements relating to Charges 12A and 12B of the 
Indictment.  
1073 As reported e.g. by IRIN, Kigali, 08/10/2003 
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37064, (Accessed 06/04/04). 
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money to pay?  
So much for the situations in which life deserves respect and protection; but what about 
the subject of that protection? It has been argued strongly in the preceding pages that the 
protection of the international law of human rights, and specifically the protection of the 
right to life, should be extended to all human genetic material. This has not been asserted 
to mean that life is sacrosanct, but rather that it is sacred, and that in circumstances in 
which life is at its boundaries, or threatened, legal regulation should be available to 
protect the interests of those involved. This goes beyond any requirement of rationality, 
sentience or even good citizenship; it does not require that any of the demands of 
personhood made in political and moral philosophy should be met.  
6.2 THE ARGUMENT OF THE THESIS 
The first substantive chapter, Human Rights in Treaties and Other Instruments aimed to 
support the main argument of the thesis, that an expanded understanding of the right to 
life treaty term is both necessary, and valid under customary international law rules of 
treaty interpretation, and the VCLT regime. It is necessary because the rights-bearer has 
not been sufficiently precisely identified and advances both in biotechnology, which open 
up new questions about what it means to be human and to have life, and changing societal 
understandings of the scope and possibilities of rights protection, mean that the right may 
not be being interpreted in a manner which can give full force to both the possibilities 
inherent in the treaty term, and to the perceived needs which could be met by an 
expansivist interpretation. Before addressing the issues in the next chapter, and the current 
and possible responses of human rights discourse to a requirement that the right to life 
shall be protected by law the groundwork must be laid by supporting the posited dynamic 
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interpretation, with reference to the general customary international law rules on treaty 
interpretation under the regime of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and to 
any special regimes that might pertain to human rights treaties, as a form of lex specialis. 
The chapter set out therefore to detail the right to life provision as found in human rights 
treaties and other instruments, both global and regional, before offering, in its second 
section, an analysis of the rules of treaty interpretation under the VCLT, and how these 
are applied to human rights treaties. The rules analysis aspect of the section includes 
discussion of why treaty texts require interpreting, and who does it, as well as how it is 
done. The final parts of that section addresses human rights bodies as interpreters of their 
own texts, and introduces the notion of human rights principles as interpretive principles. 
The section is then linked to the next one, in which some interpretive theories are 
discussed, before an interpretive taxonomy is introduced. This employs textual, contextual 
and teleological measures in order to render the treaty terms effective, a notion which 
has been understood by the ILC as meaning fulfilling the object and purpose of the treaty 
in good faith.  
The chapter then concludes by confronting the issue of evolving treaty interpretation; is it 
valid? Examined are the changing context of the treaties; how understandings that 
pertained up to sixty years ago may not be valid now. It was simpler to tell, for instance, 
who was alive and who was dead befor the concept of a beating-heart donor became 
possible, something that would not have been envisaged by those who drafted the treaties. 
This leads to a discussion of the validity of recourse to the travaux préparatoires, and the 
circumstances in which what was said or understood at the time of drafting the treaty is, 
or should be, of relevance now. The concept of changing understandings introduces the 
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now well-established idea of human rights instruments as living instruments, a theme 
that was introduced by the ECtHR and taken up by all of the treaty bodies, recognising 
changing societal understandings and concerns by applying higher standards of State 
conduct in meeting their obligations. It is also a theme understood in the national 
jurisprudence where human rights principles are applied under the provisions of 
Constitutions and Bills of Rights. These national tribunals have been particularly strong in 
a dynamic interpretation of the right to life provision as a right to live, and that 
expansivist interpretation ends the chapter. 
Therefore, by the end of the chapter, the place of human rights treaties in the lexicon of 
public international law, and the validity of a particularly dynamic theme of interpretation, 
has been shown. The interpretive scheme has built on a foundation of human rights treaty 
articles that express a notion of a right to life, but it is not yet clearly understood whose 
is the right to life referred to; who is the human in the international law of human rights? 
This provides the theme for the next chapter. 
The first section of this next chapter, on the treaties and the identity of the rights-bearer, 
examines the treaty texts  the global and regional ones introduced in the previous 
chapter, plus some biomedical instruments  in order to find out how the rights-bearer is 
identified. This then provides a background for a cross-disciplinary examination of the 
notions of life and humanity in other disciplines; how has life, and the human that lives it, 
been identified or understood in biology and medicine, philosophy and psychology? This 
leads into a discussion of the place of constants in our knowledge and understanding of 
the human life, and the notion of dignity as an inherent concept, fundamental to the 
concept of all humans as equally of value. The problem then shifts to a micro-level 
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definition; exactly what is the human life that is protected?  
The proffered concept is to repect the human life represented by  human genetic material, 
and an argument is advanced to support this claim, suggesting a definition and showing 
the inadequacies and consequences of failing to define the human in any other way. This 
is done by introducing, in the next section, a debate on the human/person distinction, and 
offering a critique of what is generally accepted as a understanding of personhood, based 
on the works of Locke. The common understanding and development of this theory of 
personhood fails to take into account his other other subsets of identity, one of which can 
be read as the human species  or, as offered here, human genetic material. Human rights, 
it is argued, are for humans, and not those who meet personhood criteria, however 
defined; human rights are not only for the sentient, the sane, the innocent. We must be 
prepared to look beyond the horizons in the debate about human life, and understand 
some of the fundamental issues that are failing to be addressed. 
Yet if this is accepted as the human life of the human rights treaties, how is it to be 
protected? What kind of law will make the treaty provision, the right to life shall be 
protected by law effective? The next chapter takes up the moral argument, which has so 
far pervaded the thesis as a call for a bias or presumption in favour of life. Here, a basis 
is found for the paraphrase the right to life shall be protected by law as an effective 
expression of the treaty provisions, and examines some limitations on the exercise of that 
right; whether it is absolute, or in some ways qualified. The emphasis is on the substantive 
law and the procedure that springs from it, for example in a discussion of the term 
arbitrary, as used in the exercise of the right. 
The discussion in the next section then turns to what has been shown to be at the heart of 
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the issue  what kind of law is it that protects life? It has to be a moral law, it is argued; 
but what constitutes a moral law? The works of Radbruch are drawn on to illustrate an 
approach that can best support an aim which goes back to the treaties and their 
interpretation; that the treaty provisions should be rendered effective by a form of law 
which recognises their object and purpose in good faith; it is argues that law which 
allowes for intolerable injustice, as argued by Radbruch, is not good law. The law that 
protects by law must be able to make determinations about those circumstances in which 
the right to life is subject to the protection of law, and the case law of the human rights 
bodies is then examined in order to discover just how this is being done, and whether the 
working out of the jurisprudence meets the moral aim of avoiding unbearable injustice. 
Human rights are for humans, both present and future generations, and not only for those 
who qualify as persons, and avoiding intolerable injustice is the key. 
Some scenarios were chosen, and introduced at an early stage of the thesis, to represent 
four aspects of life: the human before birth; the creation of new humans; the creation of 
new beings who may or may not be human; and the misuse/misrepresentation of human 
DNA. Throughout the thesis, aspects of these scenarios have illustrated possible problems 
arising both now and in the future, in that the right to life provision may not be able to 
offer full protection to those who are uncertain humans. Having shown that neither 
embodiment nor personhood qualifications are necessary to qualify as a rights-bearer, the 
aim has been to establish respect for human dignity as a basis for a broad interpretation of 
the right to life. Respect for human dignity has been referred to throughout the thesis as a 
basis for the inevitable decisions that must be made, risks that must be taken, 
circumstances which cannot or should not be avoided, in making choices about life, and 
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its protection at law; choices that are not arbitrary, that recognise inherent human dignity, 
that render the treaty provisions as effective as they may be by fulfilling the object and 
purpose of the treaties in good faith. 
6.3 CONVERSATION 
The answer to the silenced ones challenge to international law is a conversation; a one-
way monologue will not achieve the necessary ends, and no matter how good or right the 
cause, it has no future if not communicated. A political or social or moral claim has to be 
translated into laws terms for law to play its part. Anton Schutz has said that: 
the practice of such fields as political and moral philosophy is  subject to the 
predicament that any incidence, any difference  any difference that makes a difference  is 
obtained through communication, or not at all. Further, that within the borders of 
contemporary society  all order possibly hoped for is of the precarious, future-exposed, 
contingent, and ultimately uncontrollable kind: order produced by noise. Why are 
communications that important, and not, for example, convictions? Because, if they are to have 
social consequences, convictions must be communicated  by whatever means.
1074
 
That includes the conviction that the new humans and other subjects raised in the 
scenarios above have a voice which ought to be heard before the human rights tribunals; 
that in their special power they have a part to play in the prevention of abuse of others 
power. And the voice which should be heard is not necessarily that of a victim, because 
victims of the ultimate violation of this right are silenced, and for that reason or others  
disability; imprisonment; the voice interpreted by Louis MacNiece as saying: 
         I am not yet born; O fill me 
  With strength against those who would freeze my 
       humanity, would dragoon me into a lethal automaton, 
         would make me a cog in a machine, a thing with 
            one face, a thing, and against all those 
               who would dissipate my entirety, would 
                                                 
1074Anton Schutz, The Twilight of the Global Polis in Teubner, (ed.) (1997) p.286.  
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                 blow me like thistledown hither and 
                    thither or hither and thither 
                       like water held in the hands would spill me.
1075
  
These human beings may never have the power to speak, and need someone else to be 
allowed to speak for them. Limited rules on standing have no place in this jurisprudence. 
According to Jonathan Sacks, Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the 
Commonwealth, Bad things happen when the pace of change exceeds our ability to 
change, and events move faster than our understanding.
1076
 He traces a path through the 
consequent anxiety to fear and then to anger and violence, and finds the greatest single 
antidote to that fear is conversation, speaking our fears, listening to the fears of others, 
and in that sharing of vulnerabilities discovering a genesis of hope.
1077
 For some, there 
will never be a world free from fear, and how much each individual struggles with the 
ultimate fear of death is a personal matter, contingent often upon a belief in fundamental 
values. The proper field of human rights is in affirming the dignity, equality and worth of 
each person, and ensuring the measures required by treaty and customary international 
law are effectively in place and practised by states, and interpreted dynamically in 
offering that protection to life, which ought reasonably to be expected and relied upon.  
 
6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The practice of human rights has its own constraints, its own fears and threats to its 
credibility and power. It cannot justify a free-for-all, a massive explosion of unfettered 
rights claims. But it can listen to the voices of those who represent the silenced, or are 
                                                 
1075 Prayer Before Birth, in Martin, Chamberlin, and Wieler, (Eds.) Mans Search for Values, (1996), at p.313. 
1076 Sacks (2003), at p. 2. 
1077 Ibid. 
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themselves in danger of being silenced, and take appropriate action, as and where 
possible. There are a number of factors to recognise with regard to the right to life 
provision in the international human rights treaties, which have been brought to attention 
in the preceding pages. These include the recognition that human rights law is not static, 
and that some of the judgements are making unfortunate rulings regarding what it means 
to be human; that there is no arguable distinction in use of term arbitrary to mean 
deprivation of life by homicide or by other possible and more probable means, and that 
protection of life by law has to mean protection of conditions of life. 
The lived future is dependent upon agency now, and although some scenes of that agency 
are in technology, or politics, or the natural world, others are in the hands of international 
lawyers. One scene in particular which calls for immediate recognition is that of defining 
human in a manner that will offer the protection of life by law to all human genetic 
material. To protect life does not mean to treat is as sacrosanct, but to fail to protect it is to 
fail to recognise that it is sacred, and deserving of the recognition of dignity.  
The forum of human rights is to allow the conditions of the ordinary life to be met; the 
extraordinary belongs elsewhere, with the individual, and in society; with families and 
friends and divinity. The ordinary is the task of law  to allow a life to be lived without 
fear of being taken from ones ordinary days by abuse, or failure, of power. Those whose 
ordinary lives are not lived in fulfilment to their natural end are the silenced, and their 
suffering must be granted the recognition of law, and the right to involvement in that law 
not as victims, but as equals in authorship, in suffering, and in rights. The need is to look 
beyond the horizons; the power of law is there, and all it requires is the will. 
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Once upon a time, tomorrow never came. Safely projected into the 
reaches of distant times and faraway galaxies, the future was science 
fiction and belonged to another world. Now, it is here, breaking 
through the endless deferral of human horizons, short-circuiting 
history, down-loading its images into today.1078 
                                                 
1078 S. Plant (1996) On the matrix  cyberfeminist simulations, in R. Shields (ed.) Cultures of Internet: Virtual 
Spaces, Real Histories, Living Bodies London & Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, at p. 181, and in McGuigan, supra, n.636, 
at p.85. 
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